客户集中度、体恤效应与商业信用供给
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摘要
以供应商利用银行信贷融资进行商业信用供给这一信贷再配置行为为视角,选取2007~2014年中国A股制造业上市企业为样本,首先,证明了客户集中度的提升会强化供应商进行供应链关系管理的意愿,并由此降低买卖双方的信息不对称,进而激励买方在更大程度上"体恤"供应商——降低商业信用渠道下的供应商信贷侵占;其次,证明了体恤效应会随着供应商的产权特征、产能风险、创新能力的不同而呈现出异质性特征,即体恤效应具有产权偏好、风险规避偏好和预防性偏好。研究的理论贡献在于以体恤效应为媒介,构建了供应链关系影响商业信用供给的新逻辑,并对这一影响的异质性提供了多个维度的逻辑解释。
From the perspective of credit redistribution used by suppliers to provide trade credit extension based on the credit financing of banks,and by selecting listed A-share companies of manufacturing industry in China from 2007 to 2014 as examples,this research demonstrates that the improvement of customer concentration may strengthen the willingness of suppliers to manage the supply chain relationship,hence reducing the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers,which stimulates buyers to show their compassionate to the suppliers at a larger degree—reducing suppliers' bank credit occupation in the trade credit channel,and that the compassionate effect may indicate heterogeneous features with the change of the suppliers' property attributes,capacity risk and innovation capability,that is,the compassionate effect has a property preference,a risk avoidance preference. Besides,the paper proves that compassionate effect has heterogeneous characteristics which vary with investors' equity features,manufacturing capacity risks and innovation ability. That is,compassionate effect has equity preference,risk avoidance preference and preventive preference. The theoretical contribution is that by taking the compassionate effect as media,the paper constructs a new logic that supply chain relationship has an influence on trade credit extension,and a multi-dimensional logic explanation on the heterogeneity of the influence is provided.
From the perspective of credit redistribution used by suppliers to provide trade credit extension based on the credit financing of banks,and by selecting listed A-share companies of manufacturing industry in China from 2007 to 2014 as examples,this research demonstrates that the improvement of customer concentration may strengthen the willingness of suppliers to manage the supply chain relationship,hence reducing the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers,which stimulates buyers to show their compassionate to the suppliers at a larger degree—reducing suppliers' bank credit occupation in the trade credit channel,and that the compassionate effect may indicate heterogeneous features with the change of the suppliers' property attributes,capacity risk and innovation capability,that is,the compassionate effect has a property preference,a risk avoidance preference. Besides,the paper proves that compassionate effect has heterogeneous characteristics which vary with investors' equity features,manufacturing capacity risks and innovation ability. That is,compassionate effect has equity preference,risk avoidance preference and preventive preference. The theoretical contribution is that by taking the compassionate effect as media,the paper constructs a new logic that supply chain relationship has an influence on trade credit extension,and a multi-dimensional logic explanation on the heterogeneity of the influence is provided.
引文
[1]Schwartz R A.An Economic Model of Trade Credit[J].Journal of Financial&Quantitative Analysis,1974,9(4):643-657.
[2]Petersen M A,Rajan R G.Trade Credit:Theories and Evidence[J].Review of Financial Studies,1997,10(3):661-691.
[3]Fisman R,Raturi M.Does Competition Encourage Credit Provision?Evidence from African Trade Credit Relationships[J].Review of Economics&Statistics,2004,86(1):345-352.
[4]Van Horen N.Customer Market Power and the Provision of Trade Credit:Evidence from Eastern Europe and Central Asia[R].The World Bank,Policy Research Working Paper Series 4284,2007.
[5]Fabbri D,Menichini A M C.Trade Credit,Collateral Liquidation and Borrowing Constraints[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,96(3):413-432.
[6]Ellingsen T,Jacobson T,Schedvin E V.Trade Creidt:Contract-Level Evidence Contradicts Current Theories[R].Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No.315,2016.
[7]Fabbri D,Klapper L F.Bargaining Power and Trade Credit[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,(41):66-80.
[8]Cull R,Xu L C,Zhu T.Formal Finance and Trade Credit During China's Transition[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2009,18(2):173-192.
[9]刘小鲁.我国商业信用的资源再配置效应与强制性特征——基于工业企业数据的实证检验[J].中国人民大学学报,2012,(1):68-77.
[10]王雄元,彭旋,王鹏.货币政策、稳定客户关系与强势买方商业信用[J].财务研究,2015,(6):15-23.
[11]江伟,底璐璐,彭晨.客户集中度影响银行长期贷款吗——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2017,20(2):71-80.
[12]Giannetti M,Burkart M,Ellingsen T.What You Sell is What You Lend?Explaining Trade Credit Contracts[J].Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(4):1261-1298.
[13]Uchida H,Udell G F,Watanabe W.Are Trade Creditors Relationship Lenders?[J].Japan&the World Economy,2013,25-26(3):24-38.
[14]张新民,王珏,祝继高.市场地位、商业信用与企业经营性融资[J].会计研究,2012,(8):58-65.
[15]米运生,姜百臣,牟小容.经营模式、组织形式、资本结构的交互影响与农业企业成长:基于温氏集团的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2008,(8):132-142.
[16]Jain N.Monitoring Costs and Trade Credit[J].Quarterly Review of Economics&Finance,2001,41(1):89-110.
[17]张敏,马黎珺,张胜.供应商―客户关系与审计师选择[J].会计研究,2012,(12):81-86.
[18]卢闯,张伟华,崔程皓.市场环境、产权性质与企业纵向一体化程度[J].会计研究,2013,(7):50-55.
[19]Kalwani M,Narayandas N.Long-Term Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships:Do They Pay Off for Supplier Firms?[J].Journal of Marketing,1995,59(1):1-16.
[20]Dan D,Judd J S,Serflin M,Shaikh S.Customer Concentration Risk and the Cost of Equity Capital[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2016,61(1):23-48.
[21]孙婷婷,陈丁.商业信用与创新的关系研究——以欧洲中小企业为例[J].软科学,2014,28(3):69-72.
[22]蒲文燕,张洪辉.基于融资风险的现金持有与企业技术创新投入的关系研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(5):38-45.
[23]鲍群,赵秀云.产权性质、供应商关系与公司风险[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2016,(3):117-123.
[24]Yang X.The Role of Trade Credit in the Recent Subprime Financial Crisis[J].Journal of Economics&Business,2011,63(5):517-529.
[25]于博.货币政策、所有制差异与商业信用再配置——兼论新常态背景下供给侧治理的微观路径[J].广东财经大学学报,2016,(3):45-55.
[26]Biais B,Gollier C.Trade Credit and Credit Rationing[J].Review of Financial Studies,1997,10(4):903-937.
[27]Couppey-Soubeyran J,Héricourt J.The Impact of Financial Development on the Relationship between Trade Credit,Bank Credit and Firm Characteristics[J].Universite Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne(PostPrint and Working Papers),2013,9(2):197-239.
(1)参照2013年10月国务院《关于化解产能严重过剩矛盾的指导意见》,将钢铁、水泥、煤炭、平板玻璃、电解铝、船舶、纺织、造纸、新能源、汽车设为产能过剩行业,行业样本过滤以证监会二级行业目录为准。
(1)参照Yang[24]522的方式,本文以短期贷款作为信贷规模的代理变量。主要原因是:与长期贷款相比,短期贷款对货币政策等外生冲击的影响更加敏感,响应能力更强。当然,稳健性检验中,本文以“长期贷款+短期贷款”为口径对模型(1)进行了再测试,回归结果依然支持本文全部研究结论。
(2)SOE,OVERINV,INNODUMMY等分类标准详见变量定义表(表1)。
[2]Petersen M A,Rajan R G.Trade Credit:Theories and Evidence[J].Review of Financial Studies,1997,10(3):661-691.
[3]Fisman R,Raturi M.Does Competition Encourage Credit Provision?Evidence from African Trade Credit Relationships[J].Review of Economics&Statistics,2004,86(1):345-352.
[4]Van Horen N.Customer Market Power and the Provision of Trade Credit:Evidence from Eastern Europe and Central Asia[R].The World Bank,Policy Research Working Paper Series 4284,2007.
[5]Fabbri D,Menichini A M C.Trade Credit,Collateral Liquidation and Borrowing Constraints[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,96(3):413-432.
[6]Ellingsen T,Jacobson T,Schedvin E V.Trade Creidt:Contract-Level Evidence Contradicts Current Theories[R].Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No.315,2016.
[7]Fabbri D,Klapper L F.Bargaining Power and Trade Credit[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,(41):66-80.
[8]Cull R,Xu L C,Zhu T.Formal Finance and Trade Credit During China's Transition[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2009,18(2):173-192.
[9]刘小鲁.我国商业信用的资源再配置效应与强制性特征——基于工业企业数据的实证检验[J].中国人民大学学报,2012,(1):68-77.
[10]王雄元,彭旋,王鹏.货币政策、稳定客户关系与强势买方商业信用[J].财务研究,2015,(6):15-23.
[11]江伟,底璐璐,彭晨.客户集中度影响银行长期贷款吗——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2017,20(2):71-80.
[12]Giannetti M,Burkart M,Ellingsen T.What You Sell is What You Lend?Explaining Trade Credit Contracts[J].Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(4):1261-1298.
[13]Uchida H,Udell G F,Watanabe W.Are Trade Creditors Relationship Lenders?[J].Japan&the World Economy,2013,25-26(3):24-38.
[14]张新民,王珏,祝继高.市场地位、商业信用与企业经营性融资[J].会计研究,2012,(8):58-65.
[15]米运生,姜百臣,牟小容.经营模式、组织形式、资本结构的交互影响与农业企业成长:基于温氏集团的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2008,(8):132-142.
[16]Jain N.Monitoring Costs and Trade Credit[J].Quarterly Review of Economics&Finance,2001,41(1):89-110.
[17]张敏,马黎珺,张胜.供应商―客户关系与审计师选择[J].会计研究,2012,(12):81-86.
[18]卢闯,张伟华,崔程皓.市场环境、产权性质与企业纵向一体化程度[J].会计研究,2013,(7):50-55.
[19]Kalwani M,Narayandas N.Long-Term Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships:Do They Pay Off for Supplier Firms?[J].Journal of Marketing,1995,59(1):1-16.
[20]Dan D,Judd J S,Serflin M,Shaikh S.Customer Concentration Risk and the Cost of Equity Capital[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2016,61(1):23-48.
[21]孙婷婷,陈丁.商业信用与创新的关系研究——以欧洲中小企业为例[J].软科学,2014,28(3):69-72.
[22]蒲文燕,张洪辉.基于融资风险的现金持有与企业技术创新投入的关系研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(5):38-45.
[23]鲍群,赵秀云.产权性质、供应商关系与公司风险[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2016,(3):117-123.
[24]Yang X.The Role of Trade Credit in the Recent Subprime Financial Crisis[J].Journal of Economics&Business,2011,63(5):517-529.
[25]于博.货币政策、所有制差异与商业信用再配置——兼论新常态背景下供给侧治理的微观路径[J].广东财经大学学报,2016,(3):45-55.
[26]Biais B,Gollier C.Trade Credit and Credit Rationing[J].Review of Financial Studies,1997,10(4):903-937.
[27]Couppey-Soubeyran J,Héricourt J.The Impact of Financial Development on the Relationship between Trade Credit,Bank Credit and Firm Characteristics[J].Universite Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne(PostPrint and Working Papers),2013,9(2):197-239.
(1)参照2013年10月国务院《关于化解产能严重过剩矛盾的指导意见》,将钢铁、水泥、煤炭、平板玻璃、电解铝、船舶、纺织、造纸、新能源、汽车设为产能过剩行业,行业样本过滤以证监会二级行业目录为准。
(1)参照Yang[24]522的方式,本文以短期贷款作为信贷规模的代理变量。主要原因是:与长期贷款相比,短期贷款对货币政策等外生冲击的影响更加敏感,响应能力更强。当然,稳健性检验中,本文以“长期贷款+短期贷款”为口径对模型(1)进行了再测试,回归结果依然支持本文全部研究结论。
(2)SOE,OVERINV,INNODUMMY等分类标准详见变量定义表(表1)。