商业信用融资与银行信贷融资的多重结构突变——基于面板门限的非线性关系分析
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摘要
以2004-2015年中国A股制造业上市企业为样本建立面板门限模型。首先,基于信号理论探讨了商业信用融资与银行信贷融资之间为什么存在从替代到互补的转换特征,并对转换条件(门槛变量)进行逻辑构建与分析;其次,以信号效应边际递减与信号扭曲为逻辑,分析商业信用融资与银行信贷融资之间为什么会进一步呈现出从"强互补"到"弱互补"的二次突变特征;最后,结合所有制差异与产能差异,证明信号效应在我国信贷市场环境中不仅存在,而且还具有显著的异质性,即非SOE企业信贷融资与SOE企业相比更容易受信号效应激励,产能过剩企业的信贷融资与非过剩企业相比更容易受信号效应激励,说明信息不对称水平越高,商业信用作为一种信号机制越能缓解企业的信贷约束。创新之处在于以信号效应为核心对两种信用之间的多重结构突变进行逻辑阐述,并从体制和产能差异两个方面探索了信号效应在新兴市场下的异质性特征。
Using the panel data of A-share manufacturing listed companies covering period from 2004 to 2015 and threshold panel data model, this paper reveals:(1) the relationship between trade credit and bank loan takes on a nonlinear shift( from substitution to complementation, and finally to attenuation). The structural break of complementation originates from Signaling Effects, which argues the increase of trade credit use contributes to bank credit financing by means of signal incentive. The attenuation break proves the signaling effect has nature of diminishing marginal utility, which enriches the implications of the signaling effects by suggesting that the overexpansion of trade credits increase the risk aversion of banks and lead to the declining of bank loan supplies which in return give rise to the diminishing of complementary effects. The traditional signaling theory only emphasizes on the positive effect of commercial credit financing as a quality signal without describing the strength of the signaling effect in terms of its evolving features. By demonstrating the evolving process of the signal strength through dual-threshold analysis, the research not only enriches the connotation of the theory of signaling effect but extends the complementary theory from the traditional linear complementarity to nonlinear complementarity, hence providing micro logics to the convergence of the substitution theory and the complementary theory and expanding the boundary of the research on the signaling theory.(2) Firms with different institutional background have different signaling effects. Non-SOEs and firms with excess capacity are more dependent on the signaling effects to extend their bank credit financing because SOEs and firms without excess capacity are more likely to receive soft budgets, government's recessive guarantee as well as subsidy which behave as non-market mechanism and reduce the signaling effects, therefore, they take on lower strength of complementary effects.
Using the panel data of A-share manufacturing listed companies covering period from 2004 to 2015 and threshold panel data model, this paper reveals:(1) the relationship between trade credit and bank loan takes on a nonlinear shift( from substitution to complementation, and finally to attenuation). The structural break of complementation originates from Signaling Effects, which argues the increase of trade credit use contributes to bank credit financing by means of signal incentive. The attenuation break proves the signaling effect has nature of diminishing marginal utility, which enriches the implications of the signaling effects by suggesting that the overexpansion of trade credits increase the risk aversion of banks and lead to the declining of bank loan supplies which in return give rise to the diminishing of complementary effects. The traditional signaling theory only emphasizes on the positive effect of commercial credit financing as a quality signal without describing the strength of the signaling effect in terms of its evolving features. By demonstrating the evolving process of the signal strength through dual-threshold analysis, the research not only enriches the connotation of the theory of signaling effect but extends the complementary theory from the traditional linear complementarity to nonlinear complementarity, hence providing micro logics to the convergence of the substitution theory and the complementary theory and expanding the boundary of the research on the signaling theory.(2) Firms with different institutional background have different signaling effects. Non-SOEs and firms with excess capacity are more dependent on the signaling effects to extend their bank credit financing because SOEs and firms without excess capacity are more likely to receive soft budgets, government's recessive guarantee as well as subsidy which behave as non-market mechanism and reduce the signaling effects, therefore, they take on lower strength of complementary effects.
引文
[1]Biais,B.,Gollier,C..Trade Credit and Credit Rationing.Review of Financial Studies,1997,10(4):903-937.
[2]Cook,L.D..Trade Credit and Bank Finance:Financing Small Firms in Russia.Journal of Business Venturing,1999,14(5):493-518.
[3]Meltzer,A.H..Mercantile Credit,Monetary Policy,and Size of Firms.Review of Economics&Statistics,1960,42(4):429-437.
[4]Repullo,R.,Suarez,J..Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring:A Model of the Credit Channel.European Economic Review,2000,44(10):1931-1950.
[5]Fisman,R.,Love,I..Trade Credit,Financial Intermediary Development,and Industry Growth.Journal of Finance,2003,58(1):353-374.
[6]Choi,W.G.,Kim,Y..Trade Credit and the Effect of Macro-financial Shocks:Evidence from U.S.Panel Data.Journal of Financial&Quantitative Analysis,2005,40(4):897-925.
[7]Molina,C.A.,Preve,L.A..An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Financial Distress on Trade Credit.Financial Management,2012,41(1):187-205.
[8]Ogawa,K.,Sterken,E.,Tokutsu,I..The Trade Credit Channel Revisited:Evidence from Micro Data of Japanese Small Firms.Small Business Economics,2013,40(1):101-118.
[9]陆正飞,杨德明.商业信用:替代性融资,还是买方市场?管理世界,2011,(4):6-14.
[10]饶品贵,姜国华.货币政策对银行信贷与商业信用互动关系影响研究.经济研究,2013,(1):68-82.
[9]Van Horen,N..Customer Market Power and the Provision of Trade Credit:Evidence from Eastern Europe and Central Asia.Ssrn Electronic Journal,2007.
[12]Tsuruta,D..Bank Loan Availability and Trade Credit for Small Businesses during the Financial Crisis.Quarterly Review of Economics&Finance,2015,(55):40-52.
[13]Agostino,M.,Trivieri,F..Does Trade Credit Play a Signalling Role?Some Evidence from SMEs Microdata.Small Business Economics,2014,42(1):131-151.
[14]Kling,G.,Paul,S.,Gonis,E..Cash Holding,Trade Creidt and Access to Short-term Bank Finance.International Review of Financial Analysis,2014,(32):123-131.
[15]江伟,曾业勤.金融发展、产权性质与商业信用的信号传递作用.金融研究,2013,(6):89-103.
[16]Burkart,M.,Ellingsen,T..In-kind Finance:A Theory of Trade Credit.American Economic Review,2004,(6):569-590.
[17]Huang,H.,Shi,X.,Zhang,S..Counter-cyclical Substitution between Trade Credit and Bank Credit.Journal of Banking&Finance,2011,35(8):1859-1878.
[18]于博.商业信用、信号效应与银行融资——基于A股制造业上市企业的实证分析.证券市场导报,2017,(1):34-42.
[19]江伟,底璐璐,彭晨.客户集中度影响银行长期信贷吗——来自中国上市公司的经验证据.南开管理评论,2017,(2):71-80.
[20]中国人民银行天津分行课题组.贯彻落实三降一去一补重点调研课题:商业信用膨胀、期限置换与信贷扩张——基于面板门限模型的非线性关系分析研究报告,2016.
[21]Jain,N..Monitoring Costs and Trade Credit.Quarterly Review of Economics&Finance,2001,41(1):89-110.
[22]Cole,R..Bank Credit,Trade Credit or No Credit:Evidence from the Surveys of Small Business Finances.SSRN Working Paper,2010.
[23]Emery,G.W..A Pure Financial Explanation for Trade Credit.The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1984,19(3):271-285.
[24]Hermes,N.,Kihanga,E.,Lensink,R.,Lutz,C..The Impact of Trade Credit on Customer Switching:Evidence from the Tanzanian Rice Market.Journal of Development Study,2012,48(3):363-376.
[25]米运生,姜百臣,牟小容.经营模式、组织形式、资本结构的交互影响与农业企业成长:基于温氏集团的实证研究.中国工业经济,2008,(8):132-142.
[26]金碚.债务支付拖欠对当前经济及企业行为的影响.经济研究,2006,(5):13-19,30.
[27]张新民,王珏,祝继高.市场地位、商业信用与企业经营性融资.会计研究,2012,(8):60-67.
[28]Cull,R.,Xu,L.C.,Zhu,T..Formal Finance and Trade Credit during China`s Transition.Journal of Financial Intermediation,2009,18(2):173-192.
[29]Fabbir,D.,Klapper L.F..Bargaining Power and Trade Credit.Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,41(7):66-80.
[30]张天华,张少华.偏向性政策、资源配置与国有企业效率.经济研究,2016,(2):126-139.
[31]韩鹏飞,胡奕明.政府隐性担保一定能降低债券的融资成本吗——关于国有企业和地方融资平台债券的实证研究.金融研究,2015,(3):116-130.
[32]Hansen,B.E..Threshold Effects in Non-dynamic Panels:Estimation,Testing,and Inference.Journal of Econometrics,1999,93(2):345-368.
[33]蔡吉甫.金融漏损、银行歧视与商业信用.财经论丛,2013,(5):84-91.
[34]Kohler,M.,Britton,E.,Yates,T..Trade Credit and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism.The Bank of England Working Paper,2000,(115):689-732.
[35]吴娜.经济周期、融资约束与营运资本的动态协同选择.会计研究,2013,(8):54-61.
(1)本文参照2013年10月15日国务院《关于化解产能严重过剩矛盾的指导意见》,将钢铁、水泥、煤化工、平板玻璃、电解铝、船舶、纺织、造纸、光伏、风电设为产能过剩行业,行业过滤以证监会二级行业目录为准。
[2]Cook,L.D..Trade Credit and Bank Finance:Financing Small Firms in Russia.Journal of Business Venturing,1999,14(5):493-518.
[3]Meltzer,A.H..Mercantile Credit,Monetary Policy,and Size of Firms.Review of Economics&Statistics,1960,42(4):429-437.
[4]Repullo,R.,Suarez,J..Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring:A Model of the Credit Channel.European Economic Review,2000,44(10):1931-1950.
[5]Fisman,R.,Love,I..Trade Credit,Financial Intermediary Development,and Industry Growth.Journal of Finance,2003,58(1):353-374.
[6]Choi,W.G.,Kim,Y..Trade Credit and the Effect of Macro-financial Shocks:Evidence from U.S.Panel Data.Journal of Financial&Quantitative Analysis,2005,40(4):897-925.
[7]Molina,C.A.,Preve,L.A..An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Financial Distress on Trade Credit.Financial Management,2012,41(1):187-205.
[8]Ogawa,K.,Sterken,E.,Tokutsu,I..The Trade Credit Channel Revisited:Evidence from Micro Data of Japanese Small Firms.Small Business Economics,2013,40(1):101-118.
[9]陆正飞,杨德明.商业信用:替代性融资,还是买方市场?管理世界,2011,(4):6-14.
[10]饶品贵,姜国华.货币政策对银行信贷与商业信用互动关系影响研究.经济研究,2013,(1):68-82.
[9]Van Horen,N..Customer Market Power and the Provision of Trade Credit:Evidence from Eastern Europe and Central Asia.Ssrn Electronic Journal,2007.
[12]Tsuruta,D..Bank Loan Availability and Trade Credit for Small Businesses during the Financial Crisis.Quarterly Review of Economics&Finance,2015,(55):40-52.
[13]Agostino,M.,Trivieri,F..Does Trade Credit Play a Signalling Role?Some Evidence from SMEs Microdata.Small Business Economics,2014,42(1):131-151.
[14]Kling,G.,Paul,S.,Gonis,E..Cash Holding,Trade Creidt and Access to Short-term Bank Finance.International Review of Financial Analysis,2014,(32):123-131.
[15]江伟,曾业勤.金融发展、产权性质与商业信用的信号传递作用.金融研究,2013,(6):89-103.
[16]Burkart,M.,Ellingsen,T..In-kind Finance:A Theory of Trade Credit.American Economic Review,2004,(6):569-590.
[17]Huang,H.,Shi,X.,Zhang,S..Counter-cyclical Substitution between Trade Credit and Bank Credit.Journal of Banking&Finance,2011,35(8):1859-1878.
[18]于博.商业信用、信号效应与银行融资——基于A股制造业上市企业的实证分析.证券市场导报,2017,(1):34-42.
[19]江伟,底璐璐,彭晨.客户集中度影响银行长期信贷吗——来自中国上市公司的经验证据.南开管理评论,2017,(2):71-80.
[20]中国人民银行天津分行课题组.贯彻落实三降一去一补重点调研课题:商业信用膨胀、期限置换与信贷扩张——基于面板门限模型的非线性关系分析研究报告,2016.
[21]Jain,N..Monitoring Costs and Trade Credit.Quarterly Review of Economics&Finance,2001,41(1):89-110.
[22]Cole,R..Bank Credit,Trade Credit or No Credit:Evidence from the Surveys of Small Business Finances.SSRN Working Paper,2010.
[23]Emery,G.W..A Pure Financial Explanation for Trade Credit.The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1984,19(3):271-285.
[24]Hermes,N.,Kihanga,E.,Lensink,R.,Lutz,C..The Impact of Trade Credit on Customer Switching:Evidence from the Tanzanian Rice Market.Journal of Development Study,2012,48(3):363-376.
[25]米运生,姜百臣,牟小容.经营模式、组织形式、资本结构的交互影响与农业企业成长:基于温氏集团的实证研究.中国工业经济,2008,(8):132-142.
[26]金碚.债务支付拖欠对当前经济及企业行为的影响.经济研究,2006,(5):13-19,30.
[27]张新民,王珏,祝继高.市场地位、商业信用与企业经营性融资.会计研究,2012,(8):60-67.
[28]Cull,R.,Xu,L.C.,Zhu,T..Formal Finance and Trade Credit during China`s Transition.Journal of Financial Intermediation,2009,18(2):173-192.
[29]Fabbir,D.,Klapper L.F..Bargaining Power and Trade Credit.Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,41(7):66-80.
[30]张天华,张少华.偏向性政策、资源配置与国有企业效率.经济研究,2016,(2):126-139.
[31]韩鹏飞,胡奕明.政府隐性担保一定能降低债券的融资成本吗——关于国有企业和地方融资平台债券的实证研究.金融研究,2015,(3):116-130.
[32]Hansen,B.E..Threshold Effects in Non-dynamic Panels:Estimation,Testing,and Inference.Journal of Econometrics,1999,93(2):345-368.
[33]蔡吉甫.金融漏损、银行歧视与商业信用.财经论丛,2013,(5):84-91.
[34]Kohler,M.,Britton,E.,Yates,T..Trade Credit and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism.The Bank of England Working Paper,2000,(115):689-732.
[35]吴娜.经济周期、融资约束与营运资本的动态协同选择.会计研究,2013,(8):54-61.
(1)本文参照2013年10月15日国务院《关于化解产能严重过剩矛盾的指导意见》,将钢铁、水泥、煤化工、平板玻璃、电解铝、船舶、纺织、造纸、光伏、风电设为产能过剩行业,行业过滤以证监会二级行业目录为准。