乡村振兴战略下如何突破融资瓶颈——基于物权融资公司视角
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摘要
实施乡村振兴战略离不开农业产业振兴,土地经营权抵押贷款是实现农业产业振兴的有效途径之一,它能够解决农业产业发展融资瓶颈,为农业产业振兴注入金融活水。本文使用某城市商业银行在内蒙古兴安盟扎赉特旗开展的土地收益保证贷款数据,运用Heckman模型,实证检验了物权融资公司对农户贷款可得性的影响。研究结果表明:物权融资公司在建议贷款金额范围内为农户提供土地收益保证担保,增强了银行为农户发放贷款的意愿,提高了农户贷款的可得性,但为控制风险,银行多为小农户发放小额贷款。农户自有地亩数是物权融资公司为银行提供土地收益保证担保的基础前提。村委会的"熟人社会"效应提高了物权公司为银行提供土地收益保证担保的概率。
The implementation of the rural revitalization strategy is inseparable from the revitalization of the agricultural industry. Land management rights mortgage loan is one of the effective ways to realize the revitalization of agricultural industry. It can solve the financing bottleneck of agricultural industry development and inject financial water into the revitalization of agricultural industry. This paper uses the land revenue guarantee loan data of a city commercial bank in Zaanute Banner of Xing'an League, Inner Mongolia, and uses Heckman model to empirically examine the impact of the possession financing company on the availability of rural households' loan. The results of the study indicate that the possession financing company provided landholders with guarantees for land revenue within the range of proposed loan amounts, enhanced the bank's willingness to grant loans to rural households, and improved the availability of rural households' Loan. However, in order to control risks, banks often issued small amounts for small rural households. loan. The peasant household own land is the basic premise that the possession financing company provides the bank with the land revenue guarantee. The "acquaintance society" effect of the village committee has raised the probability that the possession financing company has agreed to the bank's loans to the rural households and the guarantee of the land revenue guarantee.
The implementation of the rural revitalization strategy is inseparable from the revitalization of the agricultural industry. Land management rights mortgage loan is one of the effective ways to realize the revitalization of agricultural industry. It can solve the financing bottleneck of agricultural industry development and inject financial water into the revitalization of agricultural industry. This paper uses the land revenue guarantee loan data of a city commercial bank in Zaanute Banner of Xing'an League, Inner Mongolia, and uses Heckman model to empirically examine the impact of the possession financing company on the availability of rural households' loan. The results of the study indicate that the possession financing company provided landholders with guarantees for land revenue within the range of proposed loan amounts, enhanced the bank's willingness to grant loans to rural households, and improved the availability of rural households' Loan. However, in order to control risks, banks often issued small amounts for small rural households. loan. The peasant household own land is the basic premise that the possession financing company provides the bank with the land revenue guarantee. The "acquaintance society" effect of the village committee has raised the probability that the possession financing company has agreed to the bank's loans to the rural households and the guarantee of the land revenue guarantee.
引文
[1]范天森.农业产业化经营的融资瓶颈与金融支持[J].农业经济,2008(8):93-94.
[2]郭忠兴,汪险生,曲福田.产权管制下的农地抵押贷款机制设计研究——基于制度环境与治理结构的二层次分析[J].管理世界,2014(9):48-57.
[3]Field,E.and Torero,M.Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access among the Urban Poor? Evidence from Peru[D],Research Program in Development Studies Working Paper,Priceton University,2002.
[4]Feder,G.onchan,T.and Raparla,T.Collateral,Guaranties and Rural Credit in Developing Countries:Evidence from Asia[J].Agricultural Economics,1988,2(3):231-245.
[5]Hayes, J. Roth, M. and Zepeda, L. Tenure Security, Investment and Productivity in Gambian Agriculture:A Generailzed Probit Analysis[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1997,79(2):369-382.
[6]Besley,T.Property Rights and Investment Incentives:Theory and Evidence from Ghana[J].The Journal of Political Economy,1995,103(5):903-937.
[7]Hare,D.The Origins and Influence of Land Property Rights in Vietnam[J].Development Policy Review,2008,26(3):339-361.
[8]Boucher,S.R.;Braham,B.L.and Carter,M.R.The Impact of“Market-friendly”Reforms on Credit and Land Markets in Honduras and Nicaragua[J].World Development,2005,33(1):107-128.
[9]黄惠春.农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款可得性分析——基于江苏试点地区的经验证据[J].中国农村经济,2014(3):48-57.
[10]兰庆高,惠献波,于丽红等.农村土地经营权抵押贷款意愿及其影响因素研究——基于农村信贷员的调查分析[J].农业经济问题,2013(7):78-84.
[11]Carter,M.R.and Olinto,P.Getting Institutions Right for Whom?Credit Constraints and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of Investment[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2003,85(1):173-186.
[12]李韬,罗剑朝.农户土地承包经营权抵押贷款的行为响应——基于Poisson Hurdle模型的微观经验考察[J].管理世界,2015(7):54-69.
[13]郑美江,范静.农户土地承包经营权抵押贷款意愿分析——基于吉林省7县农村地区的实地调查[J].中国农村经济,2012(12):41-48.
[14]惠献波.农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款潜在需求及其影响因素研究[J].农业经济问题,2013(2):9-15.
[15]于丽红,陈晋丽,兰庆高.农户农村土地经营权融资需求分析——基于辽宁省385个农户的调查[J].农业经济问题,2014(3):25-31.
[16]肖轶,魏朝富,尹珂.农户农村“三权”抵押贷款需求意愿及影响因素分析——基于重庆市22个县(区)1141户农户的调查数据[J].中国农村经济,2012(9):88-96.
[17]杨婷怡,罗剑朝.农户参与农村产权抵押融资意愿及其影响因素实证分析——以陕西高陵县和宁夏同心县919个样本农户为例[J].中国农村经济,2014(4):42-57.
[18]王兴稳,纪月清.农地产权、农地价值与农地抵押融资——基于农村信贷员的调查研究[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2007(4):71-75.
[19]林乐芬,王军.农村金融机构开展农村土地金融的意愿及影响因素分析[J].农业经济问题,2011(12):60-65.
[20]黄惠春,祁艳,程兰.农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款与农户信贷可得性——基于组群配对的实证分析[J].经济评论,2015(3):72-83.
[21]詹琳.现代农业产业发展现状及展望[A].中国经济分析与展望,2017-2018.
[22]李明贤,王旋.农户信贷抵押担保方式创新研究综述[J].湖湘论坛,2015(1):50-55.
[23]汪险生,郭忠兴.土地承包经营权抵押贷款:两权分离及运行机理——基于对江苏新沂市与宁夏同心县的考察[J].经济学家,2014(4):49-60.
[2]郭忠兴,汪险生,曲福田.产权管制下的农地抵押贷款机制设计研究——基于制度环境与治理结构的二层次分析[J].管理世界,2014(9):48-57.
[3]Field,E.and Torero,M.Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access among the Urban Poor? Evidence from Peru[D],Research Program in Development Studies Working Paper,Priceton University,2002.
[4]Feder,G.onchan,T.and Raparla,T.Collateral,Guaranties and Rural Credit in Developing Countries:Evidence from Asia[J].Agricultural Economics,1988,2(3):231-245.
[5]Hayes, J. Roth, M. and Zepeda, L. Tenure Security, Investment and Productivity in Gambian Agriculture:A Generailzed Probit Analysis[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1997,79(2):369-382.
[6]Besley,T.Property Rights and Investment Incentives:Theory and Evidence from Ghana[J].The Journal of Political Economy,1995,103(5):903-937.
[7]Hare,D.The Origins and Influence of Land Property Rights in Vietnam[J].Development Policy Review,2008,26(3):339-361.
[8]Boucher,S.R.;Braham,B.L.and Carter,M.R.The Impact of“Market-friendly”Reforms on Credit and Land Markets in Honduras and Nicaragua[J].World Development,2005,33(1):107-128.
[9]黄惠春.农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款可得性分析——基于江苏试点地区的经验证据[J].中国农村经济,2014(3):48-57.
[10]兰庆高,惠献波,于丽红等.农村土地经营权抵押贷款意愿及其影响因素研究——基于农村信贷员的调查分析[J].农业经济问题,2013(7):78-84.
[11]Carter,M.R.and Olinto,P.Getting Institutions Right for Whom?Credit Constraints and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of Investment[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2003,85(1):173-186.
[12]李韬,罗剑朝.农户土地承包经营权抵押贷款的行为响应——基于Poisson Hurdle模型的微观经验考察[J].管理世界,2015(7):54-69.
[13]郑美江,范静.农户土地承包经营权抵押贷款意愿分析——基于吉林省7县农村地区的实地调查[J].中国农村经济,2012(12):41-48.
[14]惠献波.农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款潜在需求及其影响因素研究[J].农业经济问题,2013(2):9-15.
[15]于丽红,陈晋丽,兰庆高.农户农村土地经营权融资需求分析——基于辽宁省385个农户的调查[J].农业经济问题,2014(3):25-31.
[16]肖轶,魏朝富,尹珂.农户农村“三权”抵押贷款需求意愿及影响因素分析——基于重庆市22个县(区)1141户农户的调查数据[J].中国农村经济,2012(9):88-96.
[17]杨婷怡,罗剑朝.农户参与农村产权抵押融资意愿及其影响因素实证分析——以陕西高陵县和宁夏同心县919个样本农户为例[J].中国农村经济,2014(4):42-57.
[18]王兴稳,纪月清.农地产权、农地价值与农地抵押融资——基于农村信贷员的调查研究[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2007(4):71-75.
[19]林乐芬,王军.农村金融机构开展农村土地金融的意愿及影响因素分析[J].农业经济问题,2011(12):60-65.
[20]黄惠春,祁艳,程兰.农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款与农户信贷可得性——基于组群配对的实证分析[J].经济评论,2015(3):72-83.
[21]詹琳.现代农业产业发展现状及展望[A].中国经济分析与展望,2017-2018.
[22]李明贤,王旋.农户信贷抵押担保方式创新研究综述[J].湖湘论坛,2015(1):50-55.
[23]汪险生,郭忠兴.土地承包经营权抵押贷款:两权分离及运行机理——基于对江苏新沂市与宁夏同心县的考察[J].经济学家,2014(4):49-60.