独立随机需求下共享剩余库存的双渠道订货与定价模型
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  • 英文篇名:Joint Replenishment and Pricing Model of Dual Channels with Sharing Leftovers under Independent and Stochastic Demand
  • 作者:张爱凤 ; 经有国
  • 英文作者:ZHANG Ai-feng;JING You-guo;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiao tong University;Faculty of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science and Technology;
  • 关键词:双渠道 ; 独立随机需求 ; 共享剩余库存 ; 订货 ; 定价
  • 英文关键词:double channels;;independent and stochastic demand;;sharing leftovers;;ordering;;pricing
  • 中文刊名:GYGC
  • 英文刊名:Industrial Engineering and Management
  • 机构:西南交通大学经济管理学院;昆明理工大学管理与经济学院;
  • 出版日期:2018-09-27 11:56
  • 出版单位:工业工程与管理
  • 年:2019
  • 期:v.24;No.134
  • 基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71461014,71762021)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:GYGC201901007
  • 页数:9
  • CN:01
  • ISSN:31-1738/T
  • 分类号:49-57
摘要
考虑由一个零售商经营的具有依赖于价格的独立随机需求的双渠道,在销售季节末当一渠道缺货时可分享另一渠道的剩余库存,研究了两个渠道各自的订货与定价决策问题,分别建立了不共享剩余库存和共享剩余库存时的双渠道纳什博弈模型。运用博弈论、最优化理论求解各种模型下存在纳什均衡解的条件、最优订货数量和最优定价。同时研究结论表明,针对价格或订货数量不易改变的产品,零售商实施共享剩余库存后应减少两渠道的订货数量或增加定价。通过数值分析验证上述模型、结论的有效性,并得到了零售商实施共享库存策略相对是占优策略的结论。
        Considering a retailer's dual channels which face the independent and stochastic demands which depend on price,when a channel is stock out at the end of the selling season,it can share the other channel's leftovers.The two channels' ordering and pricing decision problems were studied,double channel Nash game models with sharing and non-sharing leftovers were established respectively.Game theory and optimization theory were used to solve the conditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions of the optimal order quantity and the optimal pricing.When the retailer implements the sharing of the remaining inventory,for products whose price or order quantity is not easy to change,the order quantity of the two channels should be reduced or the pricing should be increased.The validity of the above models and conclusions is verified by numerical analysis,and it is concluded that the retailer's implementation of the shared inventory strategy is a dominant strategy.
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