树大招风还是树大根深? CEO-董事会社会资本差距与离职形式
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摘要
本文从高管的社会嵌入性出发,关注CEO与董事会在企业边界之外形成的社会资本相对差距如何影响离职形式。在区分CEO不同离职形式的基础上,分析CEO-董事会社会资本差距对两种不同离职形式的影响。针对2011—2015年A股上市公司的实证研究显示:CEO-董事会社会资本差距越大,发生工作调动离职的概率越高,社会资本差距表现出信号效应;发生任期届满离职的概率越低,社会资本差距表现出光环效应。进一步的研究结果显示,企业声誉对CEO-董事会社会资本差距的信号效应有放大作用,对光环效应有替代作用,在增加了稳健性检验之后研究结论仍然成立。本文的研究结论为CEO-董事会社会资本差距在经理人治理中发挥作用提供了参考。
This research explored the impact of relative social capitals between CEO and the board on CEO changes from executives' social embeddedness. By distinguishing different departure forms,this paper investigated signal effect and halo effect from relative social capitals between CEO and the board on job mobility and expiration change. The research was built on the sample of A-share listed companies between 2011—2015,and the empirical result shows when the relative social capital gap between CEO and board is greater,the probability of job mobility will be increased,showing signal effect; and when the probability of the expiration is decreased,there is halo effect.Further research shows firm reputation amplifies the signal effect,while substitutes halo effect,and the conclusion was also supported when adding the robustness test. Thus,this research may provide a reference for the role of CEOboard relative social capital in management governance.
This research explored the impact of relative social capitals between CEO and the board on CEO changes from executives' social embeddedness. By distinguishing different departure forms,this paper investigated signal effect and halo effect from relative social capitals between CEO and the board on job mobility and expiration change. The research was built on the sample of A-share listed companies between 2011—2015,and the empirical result shows when the relative social capital gap between CEO and board is greater,the probability of job mobility will be increased,showing signal effect; and when the probability of the expiration is decreased,there is halo effect.Further research shows firm reputation amplifies the signal effect,while substitutes halo effect,and the conclusion was also supported when adding the robustness test. Thus,this research may provide a reference for the role of CEOboard relative social capital in management governance.
引文
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[3]COWEN A P,MARCEL J J.Damaged goods:board decisions to dismiss reputationally compromised directors[J].The Academy of Management Journal,2011,54(3):509-527.
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[7]ZHANG Y.The presence of a separate COO/president and its impact on strategic change and CEO dismissal[J].Strategic Management Journal,2006,27(3):283-300.
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[14]周林洁,邱汛.政治关联、所有权性质与高管变更[J].金融研究,2013(10):194-206.
[15]吴超鹏,叶小杰,吴世农.媒体监督、政治关联与高管变更---中国的经验证据[J].经济管理,2012(2):57-65.
[16]王俊秋,江敬文.政治关联、制度环境与高管变更[J].管理评论,2012(12):156-165.
[17]张祥建,徐晋,徐龙炳.高管精英治理模式能够提升企业绩效吗?---基于社会连带关系调节效应的研究[J].经济研究,2015(3):100-114.
[18]ZAJONC R B.Attitudinal effects of mere exposure[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1968,9(2):1-27.
[19]LOVE E G,KRAATZ M.Character,conformity,or the bottom line?How and why downsizing affected corporate reputation[J].Academy of Management Journal,2009,52(2):314-335.
[20]徐磊,王伟龙.省级“政坛CEO”与地方经济增长:商而优则仕?[J].管理世界,2016(1):29-43.
[21]ANDERSON C,SHIRAKO,A.Are individuals’reputations related to their history of behavior?[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,2008,94(2):320-333.
[22]FOCKE F,MAUG E,NIESSEN-RUENZI A.The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2017,123(2):313-336.
[23]GRAFFIN S D,BOIVIE S,CARPENTER M A.Examining CEO succession and the role of heuristics in early-stage CEO evaluation[J].Strategic Management Journal,2013,34(4):383-403.
[24]CANNELLA A A,FINKELETEIN S,HAMBRICK D C.Strategic leadership:theory and research on executives,top management teams,and boards[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2008.
[25]HALEBLIAN J J,PFARRER M D,KILEY J T.High-reputation firms and their differential acquisition behaviors[J].Strategic Management Journal,2017,38(11):2237-2254.
[26]MISHINA Y,DYKES B J,BLOCK E S.Why good firms do bad things:the effects of high aspirations,high expectations and prominence on the incidence of corporate illegality[J].Academy of Management Journal,2010,53(4):701-722.
[27]HANNAN M T,FREEMAN J.Structural inertia and organizational change[J].American Sociological Review,1984,49(2):149-164.
[28]HUBBARD T D,CHRISTENSEN D M,GRAFFIN S D.Higher highs and lower lows:the role of corporate social responsibility in CEO dismissal[J].Strategic Management Journal,2017,38(11):2255-2265.
[29]张远飞,贺小刚,连燕玲.“富则思安”吗?---基于中国民营上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界,2013(7):130-144,188.
[30]BEN-OZ C,GREVE H R.Short-and long-term performance feedback and absorptive capacity[J].Journal of Management,2015,41(7):1827-1853.
[31]贺小刚,邓浩,吕斐斐,等.期望落差与企业创新的动态关系---冗余资源与竞争威胁的调节效应分析[J].管理科学学报,2017(5):13-34.
[32]方军雄.高管超额薪酬与公司治理决策[J].管理世界,2012(11):144-155.
[33]张龙,刘洪.高管团队中垂直对人口特征差异对高管离职的影响[J].管理世界,2009(4):108-118.
[34]CORE J E,GUAY W,LARCKER D F.The power of the pen and executive compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(1):1-25.
[35]罗宏,黄敏,周大伟,等.政府补助、超额薪酬与薪酬辩护[J].会计研究,2014(1):42-48,95.
[36]LECUONA J R,REITZIG M.Knowledge worth having in‘excess’:the value of tacit and firm-specific human resource slack[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(7):954-973.
[37]GUO L,MASULIS R W.Board structure and monitoring:new evidence from CEO turnovers[J].Review of Financial Studies,2012,28(10):2770-2811.
[38]FALEYE O,HOITASH R,HOITASH U.The costs of intense board monitoring[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,101(1):160-181.
[39]KUUSELA P,KEIL T,MAULA M.Driven by aspirations,but in what direction?Performance shortfalls,slack resources,and resource-consuming vs.resource-freeing organizational change[J].Strategic Management Journal,2017,38(5):1101-1120.
[40]申慧慧,于鹏,吴联生.国有股权、环境不确定性与投资效率[J].经济研究,2012(7):113-126.
[41]王曾,符国群,黄丹阳,等.国有企业CEO“政治晋升”与“在职消费”关系研究[J].管理世界,2014(5):157-171.
[42]HAMBRICK D C,HUMPHREY S E,GUPTA A.Structural interdependence within top management teams:a key moderator of upper echelons predictions[J].Strategic Management Journal,2015,36(3):449-461.
[43]张兴亮,夏成才.非CEO高管患寡还是患不均[J].中国工业经济,2016(9):144-160.
[44]JENTER D,KANAAN F.CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation[J].The Journal of Finance,2015,70(5):2155-2184.
[45]杨勇,方世建,缪柏其.绩效考核机制与CEO更换---基于上市公司终极产权的视角[J].经济管理,2009(2):49-56.
[2]WIERSEMA M F,ZHANG Y.CEO dismissal:the role of investment analysts[J].Strategic Management Journal,2011,32(11):1161-1182.
[3]COWEN A P,MARCEL J J.Damaged goods:board decisions to dismiss reputationally compromised directors[J].The Academy of Management Journal,2011,54(3):509-527.
[4]FAMA E F,JENSEN M C.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):301-325.
[5]BRICK LEY J A.Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance:a discussion[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2003,36(1-3):227-233.
[6]DENIS D J,DENIS D K,SARIN A.Ownership structure and top executive turnover[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1997,45(2):193-221.
[7]ZHANG Y.The presence of a separate COO/president and its impact on strategic change and CEO dismissal[J].Strategic Management Journal,2006,27(3):283-300.
[8]BOEKER W.Power and managerial dismissal:scapegoating at the top[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1992,37(3):400-421.
[9]LEONE A J,LIU M.Accounting irregularities and executive turnover in founder-managed firms[J].The Accounting Review,2010,85(1):287-314.
[10]FLICKINGER M,WRAGE M,TUSCHKE A,et al.How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal:a social status perspective[J].Strategic Management Journal,2016,37(6):1107-1117.
[11]JOHNSON S G,SCHNATTERLY K,HILL A D.Board composition beyond independence:social capital,human capital,and demographics[J].Journal of Management,2013,39(1):232-262.
[12]BOIVIE S,GRAFFIN S D,POLLOCKT T G.Time for me to fly:predicting director exit at large firms[J].Academy of Management Journal,2012,55(6):1334-1359.
[13]LOVE E G,LIM J,BEDNAR M.The face of the firm:the influence of CEOs on corporate reputation[J].Academy of Management Journal,2017,60(4):1462-1481.
[14]周林洁,邱汛.政治关联、所有权性质与高管变更[J].金融研究,2013(10):194-206.
[15]吴超鹏,叶小杰,吴世农.媒体监督、政治关联与高管变更---中国的经验证据[J].经济管理,2012(2):57-65.
[16]王俊秋,江敬文.政治关联、制度环境与高管变更[J].管理评论,2012(12):156-165.
[17]张祥建,徐晋,徐龙炳.高管精英治理模式能够提升企业绩效吗?---基于社会连带关系调节效应的研究[J].经济研究,2015(3):100-114.
[18]ZAJONC R B.Attitudinal effects of mere exposure[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1968,9(2):1-27.
[19]LOVE E G,KRAATZ M.Character,conformity,or the bottom line?How and why downsizing affected corporate reputation[J].Academy of Management Journal,2009,52(2):314-335.
[20]徐磊,王伟龙.省级“政坛CEO”与地方经济增长:商而优则仕?[J].管理世界,2016(1):29-43.
[21]ANDERSON C,SHIRAKO,A.Are individuals’reputations related to their history of behavior?[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,2008,94(2):320-333.
[22]FOCKE F,MAUG E,NIESSEN-RUENZI A.The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2017,123(2):313-336.
[23]GRAFFIN S D,BOIVIE S,CARPENTER M A.Examining CEO succession and the role of heuristics in early-stage CEO evaluation[J].Strategic Management Journal,2013,34(4):383-403.
[24]CANNELLA A A,FINKELETEIN S,HAMBRICK D C.Strategic leadership:theory and research on executives,top management teams,and boards[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2008.
[25]HALEBLIAN J J,PFARRER M D,KILEY J T.High-reputation firms and their differential acquisition behaviors[J].Strategic Management Journal,2017,38(11):2237-2254.
[26]MISHINA Y,DYKES B J,BLOCK E S.Why good firms do bad things:the effects of high aspirations,high expectations and prominence on the incidence of corporate illegality[J].Academy of Management Journal,2010,53(4):701-722.
[27]HANNAN M T,FREEMAN J.Structural inertia and organizational change[J].American Sociological Review,1984,49(2):149-164.
[28]HUBBARD T D,CHRISTENSEN D M,GRAFFIN S D.Higher highs and lower lows:the role of corporate social responsibility in CEO dismissal[J].Strategic Management Journal,2017,38(11):2255-2265.
[29]张远飞,贺小刚,连燕玲.“富则思安”吗?---基于中国民营上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界,2013(7):130-144,188.
[30]BEN-OZ C,GREVE H R.Short-and long-term performance feedback and absorptive capacity[J].Journal of Management,2015,41(7):1827-1853.
[31]贺小刚,邓浩,吕斐斐,等.期望落差与企业创新的动态关系---冗余资源与竞争威胁的调节效应分析[J].管理科学学报,2017(5):13-34.
[32]方军雄.高管超额薪酬与公司治理决策[J].管理世界,2012(11):144-155.
[33]张龙,刘洪.高管团队中垂直对人口特征差异对高管离职的影响[J].管理世界,2009(4):108-118.
[34]CORE J E,GUAY W,LARCKER D F.The power of the pen and executive compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(1):1-25.
[35]罗宏,黄敏,周大伟,等.政府补助、超额薪酬与薪酬辩护[J].会计研究,2014(1):42-48,95.
[36]LECUONA J R,REITZIG M.Knowledge worth having in‘excess’:the value of tacit and firm-specific human resource slack[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(7):954-973.
[37]GUO L,MASULIS R W.Board structure and monitoring:new evidence from CEO turnovers[J].Review of Financial Studies,2012,28(10):2770-2811.
[38]FALEYE O,HOITASH R,HOITASH U.The costs of intense board monitoring[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,101(1):160-181.
[39]KUUSELA P,KEIL T,MAULA M.Driven by aspirations,but in what direction?Performance shortfalls,slack resources,and resource-consuming vs.resource-freeing organizational change[J].Strategic Management Journal,2017,38(5):1101-1120.
[40]申慧慧,于鹏,吴联生.国有股权、环境不确定性与投资效率[J].经济研究,2012(7):113-126.
[41]王曾,符国群,黄丹阳,等.国有企业CEO“政治晋升”与“在职消费”关系研究[J].管理世界,2014(5):157-171.
[42]HAMBRICK D C,HUMPHREY S E,GUPTA A.Structural interdependence within top management teams:a key moderator of upper echelons predictions[J].Strategic Management Journal,2015,36(3):449-461.
[43]张兴亮,夏成才.非CEO高管患寡还是患不均[J].中国工业经济,2016(9):144-160.
[44]JENTER D,KANAAN F.CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation[J].The Journal of Finance,2015,70(5):2155-2184.
[45]杨勇,方世建,缪柏其.绩效考核机制与CEO更换---基于上市公司终极产权的视角[J].经济管理,2009(2):49-56.