电子商务视阈下的农户诚信经营意识:强化还是弱化?——来自江苏沭阳的证据
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摘要
在中国,已有大量农户借助电商平台参与网络营销。平台企业构建了一套制度体系确保网络交易的顺利开展。与此同时,网络假货问题成为社会热点。一个有趣的问题是,电子商务的发展究竟是强化还是弱化了农户的诚信经营意识?理论上讲,平台型电子商务既存在强化经营者诚信经营意识的正向机制,也存在弱化经营者诚信经营意识的负向机制,前者源自消费者维权机制以及卖家行为管制的制度设计,后者源自平台型电子商务一定程度上为售假提供了便利渠道。文章基于江苏省沭阳县954个农户的调查数据,采用倾向得分匹配法进行实证检验,结果显示,电子商务采纳对农户诚信经营意识有着显著的积极影响,不同角度所进行的稳健性检验也都得到一致的结论。研究还发现,电子商务采纳对受教育程度较低、品牌化意识较弱以及网店经营期限较长的农户的诚信经营意识具有更强的促进效应。
In China, a number of rural households have participated in e-marketing on e-commerce platforms. The platform enterprises have built a set of institutional systems to ensure the trading activities online successfully. In the meanwhile, the problem of online fake goods has become a hot issue in society. An interesting question is whether the development of e-commerce has strengthened or weakened the farmers' consciousness of integrity operation. Theoretically, platform-based e-commerce affects the consciousness of integrity operation in both a positive way and a negative way. The former is derived from the consumer right protection mechanism and seller behavior control system, while the latter is because the platform-based e-commerce to some extent provides a convenient channel for the sale of fake goods. The researchers conducted an empirical study by using propensity score matched with the data collected from 954 rural households in Shuyang County, Jiangsu Province. The result shows that e-commerce adoption exerts a significant positive influence on farmers' consciousness of integrity operation and the robustness checks lead to the same conclusion. It also reveals that for those farmers who have lower-level education, weaker branding awareness as well as longer e-shop running experience, e-commerce adoption has a stronger effect on their integrity operation sense.
In China, a number of rural households have participated in e-marketing on e-commerce platforms. The platform enterprises have built a set of institutional systems to ensure the trading activities online successfully. In the meanwhile, the problem of online fake goods has become a hot issue in society. An interesting question is whether the development of e-commerce has strengthened or weakened the farmers' consciousness of integrity operation. Theoretically, platform-based e-commerce affects the consciousness of integrity operation in both a positive way and a negative way. The former is derived from the consumer right protection mechanism and seller behavior control system, while the latter is because the platform-based e-commerce to some extent provides a convenient channel for the sale of fake goods. The researchers conducted an empirical study by using propensity score matched with the data collected from 954 rural households in Shuyang County, Jiangsu Province. The result shows that e-commerce adoption exerts a significant positive influence on farmers' consciousness of integrity operation and the robustness checks lead to the same conclusion. It also reveals that for those farmers who have lower-level education, weaker branding awareness as well as longer e-shop running experience, e-commerce adoption has a stronger effect on their integrity operation sense.
引文
[1]曾亿武,邱东茂,沈逸婷,等.淘宝村形成过程研究:以东风村和军埔村为例[J].经济地理,2015(12):90-97.
[2]许光.互联网假货交易的现状、根源及其应对策略[J].学术交流,2011(1):110-114.
[3]阳超,吕庆华.网络假货的历史演化及其治理对策[J].学术交流,2013(3):115-117.
[4]汪旭晖,张其林.平台型网络市场中的“柠檬问题”形成机理与治理机制---基于阿里巴巴的案例研究[J].中国软科学,2017(10):31-52.
[5]陈兆誉.互联网经济中炒信行为的规制路径[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2018(6):203-215.
[6]ROBERTSJ W.Can warranties substitutefor reputations?[J].American Economic Journal:Microeconomics,2011,3(3):69-85.
[7]ANDREAS M.Assisting consumers in detecting fake reviews:the role of identity information disclosure and consensus[J].Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services,2016,32(5):96-108.
[8]吴德胜,任星耀.网上拍卖交易机制有效性研究---来自淘宝网面板数据的证据[J].南开管理评论,2013(1):122-137.
[9]杨青,钱新华,庞川.消费者网络信任与网上支付风险感知实证研究[J].统计研究,2011(10):89-97.
[10]LEWIS G.Asymmetric information,adverse selection and online disclosure:the case of e Bay motors[J].American Economic Review,2010,101(4):1535-1546.
[11]CHANG J J S.EBay:towards a perfectly competitive market[J].International Journal of Economics&Business Research,2010,9(3):65-70.
[12]潘勇,乔晓东.逆向选择与中国电子商务市场声誉机制的本土性研究---以淘宝网为例[J].商业经济与管理,2012(2):13-18.
[13]MAVLANOVA T,BENBUNAN-FICH R.Counterfeit products on the internet:the role of seller-level and product-level information[J].International Journal of Electronic Commerce,2010,15(2):79-104.
[14]ABADIE A,IMBENS G W.Bias corrected matching estimators for average treatment effects[J].Journal of Business and Economic Statistics,2011,29(11):1-11.
[15]HAINMUELLER J.Entropy balancing for causal effects:a multivariate reweighting method to produce balanced samples in observational studies[J].Political Analysis,2012,20(1):25-46.
[16]胡安宁.倾向值匹配与因果推论:方法论述评[J].社会学研究,2012(1):221-242.
(1)有些卖家行为管理制度同时具备激励和惩罚两种功能,例如淘宝网的卖家商盟制度。淘宝网鼓励卖家组织起来建立商盟,商盟可以起到协调的作用,防止成员之间展开恶性的价格竞争;此外,小卖家组织成城市商盟可以增加其谈判力量,降低商品配送费用和采购成本。更重要的是,商盟还可以起到承诺作用。商盟可以其形成的集体声誉作为抵押向买家承诺商盟成员不会有欺骗行为。商盟成员的欺骗行为将损害整个商盟的集体声誉,买家因而可以对整个商盟实施惩罚。
(2)从分析方法角度来看,样本集中于同一个地区、经营同一个产业的电商农户和非电商农户,使得试验组和对照组农户更有可比性,从而使实证分析获得的因果关系更加可信。
(3)电商农户问卷由家庭网店经营的主要决策者负责填写,非电商农户问卷由家庭花木生产经营的主要决策者负责填写。一般来说,非电商农户数量大于电商农户数量更有利于样本匹配成功。
(4)问卷采用情景法、结合量表的形式测度农户的诚信经营意识,即通过设置六个有关诚信经营的行为情景,让农户表达赞同程度。六个诚信题项的情景内容分别是:(1)某人做生意不经允许直接采用他人的包装或商标,对此行为您的看法是什么?(2)某人做生意偶尔销售劣质产品,对此行为您的看法是什么?(3)某人做生意未按时偿还欠款,对此行为您的看法是什么?(4)某人做生意经常向员工强调诚信经营的重要性,对此行为您的看法是什么?(5)某人做生意经常关注诚信经营的新闻报道,对此行为您的看法是什么?(6)某人做生意向消费者承诺假一罚十,对此行为您的看法是什么?六个题项的选项都是一样的,包括非常赞同、赞同、中立、反对和非常反对。前三个题项从5到1赋值,后三个题项从1到5赋值。经计算发现,各题项的CR值显著性水平都小于0.05,说明各题项均能有效鉴别不同农户的反应程度,显示了良好的效度;此外,六个题项的Cronbach α系数为0.812,明显高于0.60,显示了良好的信度。
(5)使用方差最大法进行旋转得到因子得分,进而按照所有因子的方差贡献率进行加权加总。适用性检验结果显示,KMO值为0.74,Bartlett球体检验给出的相伴概率为0.000,均说明样本数据适合做因子分析。
(6)最近邻匹配(1～5匹配)和最近邻匹配(1～10匹配)即是分别为每个电商农户寻找倾向得分与之最接近的5个和10个非电商农户,并将这5个和10个非电商农户的有关变量进行简单算术平均得到1个样本个体,并将该样本个体作为电商农户的匹配对象;核匹配(窗宽=0.06)和核匹配(窗宽=0.10)即是分别将倾向得分在窗宽0.06和0.10内的所有非电商农户样本个体的有关变量进行加权平均得到1个样本个体后将之与电商农户样本个体进行匹配。
(7)在本文中,品牌化意识采用是否注册商标进行衡量。这是因为,农户从商标设计到审批结束通常需要花费一到两年的时间以及一笔费用,并且需要面临结果的不确定性,一旦注册成功,往往会用心经营和使用商标,因此有理由相信,积极注册商标的农户具有更强的品牌化意识。
[2]许光.互联网假货交易的现状、根源及其应对策略[J].学术交流,2011(1):110-114.
[3]阳超,吕庆华.网络假货的历史演化及其治理对策[J].学术交流,2013(3):115-117.
[4]汪旭晖,张其林.平台型网络市场中的“柠檬问题”形成机理与治理机制---基于阿里巴巴的案例研究[J].中国软科学,2017(10):31-52.
[5]陈兆誉.互联网经济中炒信行为的规制路径[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2018(6):203-215.
[6]ROBERTSJ W.Can warranties substitutefor reputations?[J].American Economic Journal:Microeconomics,2011,3(3):69-85.
[7]ANDREAS M.Assisting consumers in detecting fake reviews:the role of identity information disclosure and consensus[J].Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services,2016,32(5):96-108.
[8]吴德胜,任星耀.网上拍卖交易机制有效性研究---来自淘宝网面板数据的证据[J].南开管理评论,2013(1):122-137.
[9]杨青,钱新华,庞川.消费者网络信任与网上支付风险感知实证研究[J].统计研究,2011(10):89-97.
[10]LEWIS G.Asymmetric information,adverse selection and online disclosure:the case of e Bay motors[J].American Economic Review,2010,101(4):1535-1546.
[11]CHANG J J S.EBay:towards a perfectly competitive market[J].International Journal of Economics&Business Research,2010,9(3):65-70.
[12]潘勇,乔晓东.逆向选择与中国电子商务市场声誉机制的本土性研究---以淘宝网为例[J].商业经济与管理,2012(2):13-18.
[13]MAVLANOVA T,BENBUNAN-FICH R.Counterfeit products on the internet:the role of seller-level and product-level information[J].International Journal of Electronic Commerce,2010,15(2):79-104.
[14]ABADIE A,IMBENS G W.Bias corrected matching estimators for average treatment effects[J].Journal of Business and Economic Statistics,2011,29(11):1-11.
[15]HAINMUELLER J.Entropy balancing for causal effects:a multivariate reweighting method to produce balanced samples in observational studies[J].Political Analysis,2012,20(1):25-46.
[16]胡安宁.倾向值匹配与因果推论:方法论述评[J].社会学研究,2012(1):221-242.
(1)有些卖家行为管理制度同时具备激励和惩罚两种功能,例如淘宝网的卖家商盟制度。淘宝网鼓励卖家组织起来建立商盟,商盟可以起到协调的作用,防止成员之间展开恶性的价格竞争;此外,小卖家组织成城市商盟可以增加其谈判力量,降低商品配送费用和采购成本。更重要的是,商盟还可以起到承诺作用。商盟可以其形成的集体声誉作为抵押向买家承诺商盟成员不会有欺骗行为。商盟成员的欺骗行为将损害整个商盟的集体声誉,买家因而可以对整个商盟实施惩罚。
(2)从分析方法角度来看,样本集中于同一个地区、经营同一个产业的电商农户和非电商农户,使得试验组和对照组农户更有可比性,从而使实证分析获得的因果关系更加可信。
(3)电商农户问卷由家庭网店经营的主要决策者负责填写,非电商农户问卷由家庭花木生产经营的主要决策者负责填写。一般来说,非电商农户数量大于电商农户数量更有利于样本匹配成功。
(4)问卷采用情景法、结合量表的形式测度农户的诚信经营意识,即通过设置六个有关诚信经营的行为情景,让农户表达赞同程度。六个诚信题项的情景内容分别是:(1)某人做生意不经允许直接采用他人的包装或商标,对此行为您的看法是什么?(2)某人做生意偶尔销售劣质产品,对此行为您的看法是什么?(3)某人做生意未按时偿还欠款,对此行为您的看法是什么?(4)某人做生意经常向员工强调诚信经营的重要性,对此行为您的看法是什么?(5)某人做生意经常关注诚信经营的新闻报道,对此行为您的看法是什么?(6)某人做生意向消费者承诺假一罚十,对此行为您的看法是什么?六个题项的选项都是一样的,包括非常赞同、赞同、中立、反对和非常反对。前三个题项从5到1赋值,后三个题项从1到5赋值。经计算发现,各题项的CR值显著性水平都小于0.05,说明各题项均能有效鉴别不同农户的反应程度,显示了良好的效度;此外,六个题项的Cronbach α系数为0.812,明显高于0.60,显示了良好的信度。
(5)使用方差最大法进行旋转得到因子得分,进而按照所有因子的方差贡献率进行加权加总。适用性检验结果显示,KMO值为0.74,Bartlett球体检验给出的相伴概率为0.000,均说明样本数据适合做因子分析。
(6)最近邻匹配(1～5匹配)和最近邻匹配(1～10匹配)即是分别为每个电商农户寻找倾向得分与之最接近的5个和10个非电商农户,并将这5个和10个非电商农户的有关变量进行简单算术平均得到1个样本个体,并将该样本个体作为电商农户的匹配对象;核匹配(窗宽=0.06)和核匹配(窗宽=0.10)即是分别将倾向得分在窗宽0.06和0.10内的所有非电商农户样本个体的有关变量进行加权平均得到1个样本个体后将之与电商农户样本个体进行匹配。
(7)在本文中,品牌化意识采用是否注册商标进行衡量。这是因为,农户从商标设计到审批结束通常需要花费一到两年的时间以及一笔费用,并且需要面临结果的不确定性,一旦注册成功,往往会用心经营和使用商标,因此有理由相信,积极注册商标的农户具有更强的品牌化意识。