基于双毁伤因素的域间路由系统级联失效模型
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摘要
级联失效建模研究对检测和防御级联失效攻击具有重要意义。针对现有研究存在毁伤因素单一、失效条件不符合实际等问题,提出了基于双毁伤因素的域间路由系统级联失效模型。该模型综合考虑了UPDATE报文和流量重分配对级联失效过程的影响,并基于两者的相互作用关系,系统刻画了级联失效过程。实验结果表明,该模型能够较准确地模拟域间路由系统级联失效过程,验证了模型的有效性。相对于已有模型,使模型与真实数据的预测偏差降低了35%。
Researches on inter-domain routing system cascading failures model are important for detecting and defending cascading failures attacks. Considering the unrealistic simulation problem in existing studies caused by simplified damage factor and untruth of failure conditions, this paper proposes a double damage factors based inter-domain routing system cascading failures model after analyzing the main cause and propagation mechanism generated by inter-domain routing system cascading failures. The proposed model considers effects of both UPDATE message and traffic redistribution acting on cascading failures, systematically characterizing cascading failures process based on the mutual effect of two factors mentioned above. It designs a real data experiment to demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed model. Experimental result turns out that the prediction deviation of the model reduces by 35% when compared with traditional model.
Researches on inter-domain routing system cascading failures model are important for detecting and defending cascading failures attacks. Considering the unrealistic simulation problem in existing studies caused by simplified damage factor and untruth of failure conditions, this paper proposes a double damage factors based inter-domain routing system cascading failures model after analyzing the main cause and propagation mechanism generated by inter-domain routing system cascading failures. The proposed model considers effects of both UPDATE message and traffic redistribution acting on cascading failures, systematically characterizing cascading failures process based on the mutual effect of two factors mentioned above. It designs a real data experiment to demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed model. Experimental result turns out that the prediction deviation of the model reduces by 35% when compared with traditional model.
引文
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[3]Deng W,Zhu P,Lu X,et al.On evaluating BGP routing stress attack[J].JCM,2010,5(1):13-22.
[4]Li H,Zhu J,Qiu H,et al.The new threat to internet:DNP attack with the attacking flows strategizing technology[J].International Journal of Communication Systems,2015,28(6):1126-1139.
[5]黎松,诸葛建伟,李星.BGP安全研究[J].软件学报,2013,24(1).
[6]Kang M S,Gligor V D,Sekar V.SPIFFY:inducing costdetectability tradeoffs for persistent link-flooding attacks[C]//NDSS,2016.
[7]邱菡,李玉峰,兰巨龙,等.域间路由系统的级联失效攻击及检测研究[J].中国科学:信息科学,2017,47(12):1715-1729.
[8]Cowie J,Ogielski A,Premore B J,et al.Global routing instabilities triggered by Code Red II and Nimda worm attacks[R].[S.l.]:Renesys Corporation,2001.
[9]Chang D F,Govndan R,Heidemann J.An empirical study of router response to large BGP routing table load[C]//Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet Measurement,2002:203-208.
[10]Wang Q,Xiao F,Zhou M,et al.Mitigating link-flooding attacks with active link obfuscation[J].arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.09521,2017.
[11]Zhang Y,Mao Z M,Wang J.Low-rate TCP-targeted Do Sattack disrupts internet routing[C]//NDSS,2007.
[12]Guo Y,Wang Z,Luo S,et al.A cascading failure model for inter-domain routing system[J].International Journal of Communication Systems,2012,25(8):1068-1076.
[13]Liu Y,Peng W,Su J,et al.Assessing the impact of cascading failures on the inter-domain routing system of the internet[J].New Generation Computing,2014,32(3/4):237-255.
[14]陆余良,杨斌.域间路由系统级联失效分析与建模[J].系统工程与电子技术,2016,38(1):172-178.
[15]Schuchard M,Thompson C,Hopper N,et al.Taking routers off their meds:unstable routers and the buggy BGPimplementations that cause them[R].[S.l.]:University of Minnesota,2011.
[16]Feamster N,Winick J,Exford J.A model of BGP routing for network engineering[J].ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review,2004,32(1):331-342.
[17]Motter A E,Lai Y C.Cascade-based attacks on complex networks[J].Physical Review E,2002,66(6):065102.
[18]Gill P,Schapire M,Goldberg S.A survey of interdomain routing policies[J].ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review,2013,44(1):28-34.
[19]Rekhter Y,Li T,Hares S.A border gateway protocol 4(BGP-4)[R].2005.
[20]RIPE’s routing information service[EB/OL].[2017-05-05].http://data.ris.ripe.net/.
[21]CAIDA[EB/OL].[2017-05-05].http://www.caida.org/.
[22]Zou C C,Gong W,Towsley D.Code red worm propagation modeling and analysis[C]//Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,2002:138-147.