联合投资下创业投资机构间机会主义行为的演化博弈分析
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摘要
在联合创业投资中往往存在着跟随型创业投资机构的机会主义行为。机会主义行为严重影响双方的投资成效,进而引发信任危机。为防范跟随型创业投资机构的机会主义行为,构建了双方的演化博弈模型,求解该模型的复制动态方程以及演化稳定策略。探究牵头型创业投资机构和跟随型创业投资机构间的利益分配、跟随型的机会主义行为的衍生收益、跟随型被发现时损失的收益、牵头型对跟随型机会主义行为的监管成本以及发现机会主义行为所收罚款对跟随型机会主义行为的影响。在此基础上,运用Netlogo仿真工具对双方的演化博弈行为进行仿真分析。
Under syndication there comes the opportunistic behavior of following venture capital institution, which seriously affects the investment results of both parties, leading to a crisis of trust. In order to prevent the opportunistic behavior of the following venture capital institutions, an evolutionary game model was constructed to capture the replication dynamics and evolutionary stability strategies. It explores the interest distribution between the leading ones and the following ones, opportunistic derivative income and the loss in case opportunistic behavior comes to light. It also analyzes the cost of the leading venture capital institutions for supervising the following ones and the post-fine impact on the following opportunistic behavior. On this basis, Netlogo simulation tool is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary game behavior of both sides, and the simulation models of opportunistic behavior under different conditions are analyzed.
Under syndication there comes the opportunistic behavior of following venture capital institution, which seriously affects the investment results of both parties, leading to a crisis of trust. In order to prevent the opportunistic behavior of the following venture capital institutions, an evolutionary game model was constructed to capture the replication dynamics and evolutionary stability strategies. It explores the interest distribution between the leading ones and the following ones, opportunistic derivative income and the loss in case opportunistic behavior comes to light. It also analyzes the cost of the leading venture capital institutions for supervising the following ones and the post-fine impact on the following opportunistic behavior. On this basis, Netlogo simulation tool is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary game behavior of both sides, and the simulation models of opportunistic behavior under different conditions are analyzed.
引文
[1] 王东静,张景青. 创投企业投资成功因素分析:来自国际经验启示[J]. 中国软科学,2007(6):151-155.
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[11] 曹国华,章丹锋,林川. 联合投资下创业机构间道德风险的博弈分析[J]. 工业工程,2012,15(4):102-107.
[12] CASAMATTA C. Financing and advising:optimal financial contracts with venture capitalists[J]. The Journal of Finance,2003,58(5):2059-2086.
[13] 张新立,杨德礼. 风险资本联合投资的激励契约设计[J]. 中国管理科学,2007,15(1):106-111.
[14] FRIEDMAN D. Evolutionary games in economics[J]. Econometrica,1991,59(3):637-66.
[15] 张华. 协同创新、知识溢出的演化博弈机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学,2016,24(2):92-99.
[2] European Venture Capital Association. EVCA yearbook[R]. Zaventem:EVCA,2002.
[3] BRANDER J A,AMIT R,ANTWEILER W. Venture-capital syndication:improved venture selection vs. the value-added hypothesis[J]. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,2002,11(3):423-452.
[4] GOMPERS P A,HART O,KAPLAN S,et al. Ownership and control in entrepreneurial firms:an examination of convertible[R]. Cambridge:Harvard U. Graduate School of Business,1997(9):1-33.
[5] 陈学胜,李雯雯. 融资约束、风险与金融资产定价——来自中国A股市场的证据[J]. 大连理工大学学报(社会科学版),2017,38(2):45-51.
[6]李志东. 创业投资契约机制与机会主义行为[J]. 价值工程,2014(24):10-14.
[7] 陈艳莹,候志敏,杨文璐. 关系投资、市场化程度与研发服务企业利润——基于中国第二次经济普查数据的实证研究[J]. 大连理工大学学报(社会科学版),2017,38(2):40-44.
[8] 朱莹,侯合银. 创业投资辛迪加网络中控制权的演化博弈分析[J]. 世界科技研究与发展,2014(6):681-685.
[9] 曹龙,胡利利,王雷. 联合创业投资战略联盟契约设计研究[J]. 科技进步与对策,2010,27(14):15-19.
[10] 陈关金. 风险投资中联合投资的第三重委托代理关系研究——基于道德风险视角[J]. 中国商贸,2014(6):162-163.
[11] 曹国华,章丹锋,林川. 联合投资下创业机构间道德风险的博弈分析[J]. 工业工程,2012,15(4):102-107.
[12] CASAMATTA C. Financing and advising:optimal financial contracts with venture capitalists[J]. The Journal of Finance,2003,58(5):2059-2086.
[13] 张新立,杨德礼. 风险资本联合投资的激励契约设计[J]. 中国管理科学,2007,15(1):106-111.
[14] FRIEDMAN D. Evolutionary games in economics[J]. Econometrica,1991,59(3):637-66.
[15] 张华. 协同创新、知识溢出的演化博弈机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学,2016,24(2):92-99.