企业战略影响管理层业绩预告行为吗?
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摘要
本文以2006-2015年我国A股上市公司数据为研究样本,考察企业战略对管理层业绩预告行为的影响。根据Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003)的分类标准,本文将公司分为三种类型:防御型、分析型和进攻型企业,在此基础上检验不同战略类型的企业管理层业绩预告行为,研究结果发现,相比于防御型企业,进攻型企业更可能自愿披露业绩预告,但是管理层业绩预告的精确性更低,即更倾向于发布定性估计和区间估计;并且业绩预告的预测误差更大、准确度更低,本文的研究结论在控制内生性问题后仍然稳健。本文的研究结论表明,企业战略对管理层业绩预告行为具有显著影响,本文为监管层和资本市场参与者加深了解管理层业绩预告行为提供了重要的经验证据,并且为进一步改善我国上市公司业绩预告制度提供一定的参考和借鉴。
This paper investigates whether and how the business strategy and its categories impose influence on management earnings forecasts based on the sample of China A-share listed firms during 2006-2015. Based on Miles and Snow's(1978, 2003) strategy typologies, we divide the listed firms into three categories: prospectors, analyzers and defenders. We empirically examine the relationship between firms' management earnings forecasts and business model. Our empirical results show that the prospector firms are more likely to disclose voluntarily management earnings forecasts but with less precise(e.g. more qualitative description and range estimation) and less accurate forecasts than defender firms. These empirical results are robust after controlling possible endogenous problems. The research conclusion shows that business strategy can impose significant impact on the management earnings forecasts. This study extends current literature relating to both business strategy and management earnings forecasts and has important implications for investors and regulators to deeply understand the firms' management earnings forecasts. Moreover, this study has policy implication for improving earnings forecasts system.
This paper investigates whether and how the business strategy and its categories impose influence on management earnings forecasts based on the sample of China A-share listed firms during 2006-2015. Based on Miles and Snow's(1978, 2003) strategy typologies, we divide the listed firms into three categories: prospectors, analyzers and defenders. We empirically examine the relationship between firms' management earnings forecasts and business model. Our empirical results show that the prospector firms are more likely to disclose voluntarily management earnings forecasts but with less precise(e.g. more qualitative description and range estimation) and less accurate forecasts than defender firms. These empirical results are robust after controlling possible endogenous problems. The research conclusion shows that business strategy can impose significant impact on the management earnings forecasts. This study extends current literature relating to both business strategy and management earnings forecasts and has important implications for investors and regulators to deeply understand the firms' management earnings forecasts. Moreover, this study has policy implication for improving earnings forecasts system.
引文
[1] Healy P., Palepu K. Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2001,31(1-3):405-440
[2] 罗玫,宋云玲.中国股市的业绩预告可信吗?[J]. 金融研究, 2012,(9):168-180
[3] 王玉涛,王彦超. 业绩预告信息对分析师预测行为有影响吗[J]. 金融研究, 2012,(6):193-206
[4] 李馨子,肖土盛. 管理层业绩预告有助于分析师盈余预测修正吗[J]. 南开管理评论, 2015,18(2):30-38
[5] Rogers J. L., Stocken P. C. Credibility of Management Forecasts[J]. The Accounting Review, 2005,80(4):1233-1260
[6] 李常青,滕明慧. 并购公司管理层业绩预告的披露策略研究[J]. 投资研究, 2013,32(5):94-107
[7] 王俊秋,花贵如,姚美云. 投资者情绪与管理层业绩预告策略[J]. 财经研究, 2013,39(10):76-90
[8] 刘行. 企业战略类型会影响盈余特征吗?——会计稳健性视角的考察[J]. 南开管理评论, 2016,19(4):111-121
[9] 王化成,张修平,高升好. 企业战略影响过度投资吗?[J]. 南开管理评论, 2016,19(4):87-97
[10] 孙健,王百强,曹丰,等. 企业战略影响盈余管理吗?[J]. 管理世界, 2016,(3):160-169
[11] Doyle J., Magilke M. The Timing of Earnings Announcements: An Examination of The Strategic Disclosure Hypothesis[J]. Accounting Review, 2009,84(1):157-182
[12] 张馨艺,张海燕,夏冬林. 高管持股、择时披露与市场反应[J]. 会计研究, 2012,(6):54-60
[13] 饶育蕾,王建新,苏燕青. 上市公司盈余信息披露是否存在时机择?——基于投资者有限注意的实证分析[J]. 管理评论, 2012,24(12):146-155
[14] Dimirov V., Jain P. C. It’s Show Time: Do Managers Report Better News Before Annual Shareholder Meeting?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2011,49(5):1193-1221
[15] Aboody D., Kasznik R. CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Voluntary Corporate Disclosures[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000,29(1):73-100
[16] Skinner D. Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1994,32(1):38-60
[17] 高敬忠,周晓苏. 管理层持股能减轻自愿性披露中的代理冲突吗?——以我国A股上市公司业绩预告数据为例[J]. 财经研究, 2013,39(11):123-133
[18] 王浩,向显湖. 高管权力、内部薪酬差距与公司业绩预告行为——基于中国证券市场的经验证据[J]. 投资研究, 2015,34(10):124-141
[19] 袁振超,岳衡,谈文峰. 代理成本、所有权性质与业绩预告精确度[J]. 南开管理评论, 2014,17(3):49-61
[20] Brown N., Christensen T., Elliott B., et al. Investor Sentiment and Pro Forma Earnings Disclosures[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2012,50(1):1-40
[21] Bergman N., Roychowdhury S. Investor Sentiment and Corporate Disclosure[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2008,46(5):1057-1083
[22] 权小锋,吴世农. 投资者关注、盈余公告效应与管理层公告择机[J]. 金融研究, 2010,(11):90-107
[23] 蒋义宏,王丽琨. 非经常性损益缘何经常发生——来自亏损上市公司年报的证据[J]. 证券市场导报, 2003,(6):9-13
[24] 王艳艳. 管理层盈余预测与权益资本成本[J]. 厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2013,(5):114-123
[25] Miles R. E., Snow C. C. Organizational Strategy, Structure and Process[M]. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978
[26] Miles R. E., Snow C. C. Organizational Strategy, Structure and Process[M]. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003
[27] Ittner C. D., Larcker D. F., Rajan M. V. The Choice of Performance Measures in Annual Bonus Contracts[J]. Accounting Review, 1997,72(2):231-255
[28] Simons R. Accounting Control Systems and Business Strategy: An Empirical Analysis[J]. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1987,12(4):357-374
[29] Collins F., Holzmann O., Mendoza R. Strategy, Budgeting and Crisis in Latin America[J]. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1997,22(7):660-689
[30] Bentley K. A., Omer T. C., Sharp N. Y. Business Strategy, Financial Reporting Irregularities and Audit Effort[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2013,30(2):780-817
[31] Higgins D., Omer T. C., Phillips J. D. The Influence of a Firm’s Business Strategy on Its Tax Aggressiveness[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2014,32(2):674-702
[32] Habib A., Hasan M. M. Business Strategy, Overvalued Equities, and Stock Price Crash Risk[J]. Research in International Business & Finance, 2017,39(1):389-405
[33] 周兵. 企业战略、管理者预期与成本粘性——基于中国上市公司经验证据[J]. 会计研究, 2016,(7):58-65
[34] 叶康涛,张姗姗,张艺馨. 企业战略差异与会计信息的价值相关性[J]. 会计研究, 2014,(5):44-51
[35] 叶康涛,董雪雁,崔倚菁. 企业战略定位与会计盈余管理行为选择[J]. 会计研究, 2015,(10):23-29
[36] Abody D., Lev B. Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2000,55(6):2747-2766
[37] Kothari S. P., Shu S., Wysocki P. Do Managers Withhold Bad News?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2009,47(1):241-276
[38] Hambrick D. C., Mason P. A. Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1984,9(2):193-206
[39] Leone A., Rock S. Empirical Tests of Budget Ratcheting and Its Effect on Managers’ Discretionary Accrual Choices[J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2002,33(1):43-67
[40] Graham J. R., Harvey C. R., Rajgopal S. The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2005,40(1-3):3-73
[41] Baginski S. P., Hassell J. M., Kimbrough M. D. Why Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2004,42(1):1-29
[42] Hutton A. P., Miller G. S., Skinner D. J. The Role of Supplementary Statements with Management Earnings Forecasts[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2003,41(5):867-890
(1)将区间估计和定性估计合在一起的目的是为了与点估计进行有效区分。点估计是精确性最高的业绩预告类型,相对于点估计,区间估计和定性估计的精确性较低。
[2] 罗玫,宋云玲.中国股市的业绩预告可信吗?[J]. 金融研究, 2012,(9):168-180
[3] 王玉涛,王彦超. 业绩预告信息对分析师预测行为有影响吗[J]. 金融研究, 2012,(6):193-206
[4] 李馨子,肖土盛. 管理层业绩预告有助于分析师盈余预测修正吗[J]. 南开管理评论, 2015,18(2):30-38
[5] Rogers J. L., Stocken P. C. Credibility of Management Forecasts[J]. The Accounting Review, 2005,80(4):1233-1260
[6] 李常青,滕明慧. 并购公司管理层业绩预告的披露策略研究[J]. 投资研究, 2013,32(5):94-107
[7] 王俊秋,花贵如,姚美云. 投资者情绪与管理层业绩预告策略[J]. 财经研究, 2013,39(10):76-90
[8] 刘行. 企业战略类型会影响盈余特征吗?——会计稳健性视角的考察[J]. 南开管理评论, 2016,19(4):111-121
[9] 王化成,张修平,高升好. 企业战略影响过度投资吗?[J]. 南开管理评论, 2016,19(4):87-97
[10] 孙健,王百强,曹丰,等. 企业战略影响盈余管理吗?[J]. 管理世界, 2016,(3):160-169
[11] Doyle J., Magilke M. The Timing of Earnings Announcements: An Examination of The Strategic Disclosure Hypothesis[J]. Accounting Review, 2009,84(1):157-182
[12] 张馨艺,张海燕,夏冬林. 高管持股、择时披露与市场反应[J]. 会计研究, 2012,(6):54-60
[13] 饶育蕾,王建新,苏燕青. 上市公司盈余信息披露是否存在时机择?——基于投资者有限注意的实证分析[J]. 管理评论, 2012,24(12):146-155
[14] Dimirov V., Jain P. C. It’s Show Time: Do Managers Report Better News Before Annual Shareholder Meeting?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2011,49(5):1193-1221
[15] Aboody D., Kasznik R. CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Voluntary Corporate Disclosures[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000,29(1):73-100
[16] Skinner D. Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1994,32(1):38-60
[17] 高敬忠,周晓苏. 管理层持股能减轻自愿性披露中的代理冲突吗?——以我国A股上市公司业绩预告数据为例[J]. 财经研究, 2013,39(11):123-133
[18] 王浩,向显湖. 高管权力、内部薪酬差距与公司业绩预告行为——基于中国证券市场的经验证据[J]. 投资研究, 2015,34(10):124-141
[19] 袁振超,岳衡,谈文峰. 代理成本、所有权性质与业绩预告精确度[J]. 南开管理评论, 2014,17(3):49-61
[20] Brown N., Christensen T., Elliott B., et al. Investor Sentiment and Pro Forma Earnings Disclosures[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2012,50(1):1-40
[21] Bergman N., Roychowdhury S. Investor Sentiment and Corporate Disclosure[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2008,46(5):1057-1083
[22] 权小锋,吴世农. 投资者关注、盈余公告效应与管理层公告择机[J]. 金融研究, 2010,(11):90-107
[23] 蒋义宏,王丽琨. 非经常性损益缘何经常发生——来自亏损上市公司年报的证据[J]. 证券市场导报, 2003,(6):9-13
[24] 王艳艳. 管理层盈余预测与权益资本成本[J]. 厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2013,(5):114-123
[25] Miles R. E., Snow C. C. Organizational Strategy, Structure and Process[M]. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978
[26] Miles R. E., Snow C. C. Organizational Strategy, Structure and Process[M]. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003
[27] Ittner C. D., Larcker D. F., Rajan M. V. The Choice of Performance Measures in Annual Bonus Contracts[J]. Accounting Review, 1997,72(2):231-255
[28] Simons R. Accounting Control Systems and Business Strategy: An Empirical Analysis[J]. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1987,12(4):357-374
[29] Collins F., Holzmann O., Mendoza R. Strategy, Budgeting and Crisis in Latin America[J]. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1997,22(7):660-689
[30] Bentley K. A., Omer T. C., Sharp N. Y. Business Strategy, Financial Reporting Irregularities and Audit Effort[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2013,30(2):780-817
[31] Higgins D., Omer T. C., Phillips J. D. The Influence of a Firm’s Business Strategy on Its Tax Aggressiveness[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2014,32(2):674-702
[32] Habib A., Hasan M. M. Business Strategy, Overvalued Equities, and Stock Price Crash Risk[J]. Research in International Business & Finance, 2017,39(1):389-405
[33] 周兵. 企业战略、管理者预期与成本粘性——基于中国上市公司经验证据[J]. 会计研究, 2016,(7):58-65
[34] 叶康涛,张姗姗,张艺馨. 企业战略差异与会计信息的价值相关性[J]. 会计研究, 2014,(5):44-51
[35] 叶康涛,董雪雁,崔倚菁. 企业战略定位与会计盈余管理行为选择[J]. 会计研究, 2015,(10):23-29
[36] Abody D., Lev B. Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2000,55(6):2747-2766
[37] Kothari S. P., Shu S., Wysocki P. Do Managers Withhold Bad News?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2009,47(1):241-276
[38] Hambrick D. C., Mason P. A. Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1984,9(2):193-206
[39] Leone A., Rock S. Empirical Tests of Budget Ratcheting and Its Effect on Managers’ Discretionary Accrual Choices[J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2002,33(1):43-67
[40] Graham J. R., Harvey C. R., Rajgopal S. The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2005,40(1-3):3-73
[41] Baginski S. P., Hassell J. M., Kimbrough M. D. Why Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2004,42(1):1-29
[42] Hutton A. P., Miller G. S., Skinner D. J. The Role of Supplementary Statements with Management Earnings Forecasts[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2003,41(5):867-890
(1)将区间估计和定性估计合在一起的目的是为了与点估计进行有效区分。点估计是精确性最高的业绩预告类型,相对于点估计,区间估计和定性估计的精确性较低。