收益共享视角下的项目群工期激励的计算实验模型
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摘要
已有项目群工期优化的激励机制主要从业主角度探讨总量激励策略,较少考虑承包商的收益共享偏好。为此,从项目群相关者收益共享视角,引入激励总量和激励强度,构建收益共享视角下的项目群工期激励的计算实验模型。研究结果表明:单独依靠激励总量存在激励效率边际递减效应;收益分享比例设计能够在激励总量基础上进一步提升承包商努力水平及业主收益;激励总量和收益分享比例的平衡是实现工期及业主收益最优的关键;收益共享激励策略的引入形成并强化了项目群工期优化的激励-努力程度的反馈回路。
The incentive mechanism for the optimization of the program schedule mainly discusses the total incentive strategy from the perspective of the owner,and the contractor's income sharing preference is less considered.To this end,from the perspective of program shareholder revenue sharing,the total amount of incentives and incentive intensity are introduced to construct the computational experimental model of program schedule incentives from the perspective of revenue sharing.The research results show that:there is a marginal diminishing effect of incentive efficiency on the basis of the total amount of incentives alone;the revenue sharing ratio design can further improve the contractor's effort level and the owner's income on the basis of the total amount of incentives;the balance between the total incentives and the proportion of revenue sharing is the key to achieving the optimal construction period and the owner's income.
The incentive mechanism for the optimization of the program schedule mainly discusses the total incentive strategy from the perspective of the owner,and the contractor's income sharing preference is less considered.To this end,from the perspective of program shareholder revenue sharing,the total amount of incentives and incentive intensity are introduced to construct the computational experimental model of program schedule incentives from the perspective of revenue sharing.The research results show that:there is a marginal diminishing effect of incentive efficiency on the basis of the total amount of incentives alone;the revenue sharing ratio design can further improve the contractor's effort level and the owner's income on the basis of the total amount of incentives;the balance between the total incentives and the proportion of revenue sharing is the key to achieving the optimal construction period and the owner's income.
引文
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[24]VAN DER RHEE B,SCHMIDT G,VAN DER VEEN J A A,et al.Revenue-sharing contracts across an extended supply chain[J].Business Horizons,2014,57(4):473-482.
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[26]PALSULE-DESAI O D.Supply chain coordination using revenuedependent revenue sharing contracts[J].Omega,2013,41(4):780-796.
[27]吴孝灵,周晶,俞潇阳.基于总包商施工效率的BOT项目工期激励合同研究[J].科技进步与对策,2011(13):75-80.
[28]ZHENG D X M,NG S T,KUMARASWAMY M M.Applying a genetic algorithm-based multi-objective approach for timecost optimization[J].Journal of Construction Engineering&Management,2004,130(2):168-176.
[29]JIANG Z L,WANG D Y,LIU X J.Study on the risk analysis and benefit sharing in BT construction project[J].Journal of Hunan University(Natural Sciences),2012,39(7):89-92.
[2]FENG J C,HU Z R,REN Y F,et al.Construction period reward model of contract works for large and medium-sized projects from a viewpoint of program[J].Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice,2012,32(6):1369-1376.
[3]BOULLAIN R C,WALKER D W.Construction incentive clauses for timely project completion:the marta experience[C]//AMERICANPUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION.Proceedings of the 1998 Rapid Transit Conference.San Diego:Springer-Verlag,1998:57-64.
[4]YANG Z,ZHOU G H,LOU J H.Application research on construction project schedule incentive mechanisms based on prospect theory[C]//PMRC.The Ninth China Project Management Conference(NCPMC 2010 E-BOOK)Shanghai:Scientific Research Publishing,2010:236-240.
[5]SU J,JIANG C,LIU C,et al.Research on project duration coordination and optimization of construction supply chain based on bonus-penalty mechanism[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2010,18(1):95-101.
[6]CHEN J H,MA S H.A Revenue incentive model of project duration coordination between project corporation and contractor[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2007,15(3):114-122.
[7]施建刚,吴光东,唐代中.工期-质量协调均衡的项目导向型供应链跨组织激励[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(2):58-64.
[8]陈勇强,傅永程,华冬冬.基于多任务委托代理的业主与承包商激励模型[J].管理科学学报,2016(4):45-55.
[9]BRIAND C,NGUEVEU S U,AUCHA P.Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem[J].Journal of Scheduling,2012(1):1-17.
[10]AGNETIS A,BRIAND C,BILLAUT J C,et al.Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times[J].Journal of Scheduling,2015,18(1):15-27.
[11]KERKHOVE L P,VANHOUCKE M.Incentive contract design for projects:the owner's perspective[J].Omega-international Journal of Management Science,2016,62:93-114.
[12]LAN D,YIN J.A study on the cost and time incentive coefficients in agent contracts[J].China Civil Engineering Journal,2008,41(6):93-97.
[13]吕萍,慕芬芳,宋吟秋.考虑工期的业主和承包商的收益协调研究[J].预测,2012(1):54-59.
[14]易涛,陆龚曙.基于工程成本与工期对承包商的激励[J].系统工程,2010(1):123-126.
[15]李智勇.工程项目群进度优化激励机制研究[D].北京:华北水利水电学院,2011.
[16]盛昭瀚,张军,杜建国,等.社会科学计算实验理论与应用[M].上海:上海三联出版社,2009.
[17]ZHEN L I,CHENG S P,QIAN L I,et al.Analysis of project quality optimization based on revenue sharing contract[J].Operations Research&Management Science,2013,22(1):164-170.
[18]XIA H,ZHANG L B.Construction engineering quality optimization under bi-directionalincentive based on computational experiments[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2015,29(5):103-108.
[19]丁翔,盛昭瀚,李真.基于计算实验的重大工程决策分析[J].系统管理学报,2015(4):545-551.
[20]李真,孟庆峰,盛昭瀚.考虑公平关切的工期优化收益共享谈判[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013(1):82-91.
[21]孟庆峰,李真,丁翔,等.社会偏好对工程工期优化谈判的影响[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017(11):2844-2853.
[22]ARANI H V,RABBANI M,RAFIEI H.A revenue-sharing option contract toward coordination of supply chains[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,178:42-56.
[23]HU B Y,FENG Y.Optimization and coordination of supply chain with revenue sharing contracts and service requirement under supply and demand uncertainty[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017,183(A):185-193.
[24]VAN DER RHEE B,SCHMIDT G,VAN DER VEEN J A A,et al.Revenue-sharing contracts across an extended supply chain[J].Business Horizons,2014,57(4):473-482.
[25]FENG X,MOON I,RYU K.Revenue-sharing contracts in an N-stage supply chain with reliability considerations[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2014,147(A):20-29.
[26]PALSULE-DESAI O D.Supply chain coordination using revenuedependent revenue sharing contracts[J].Omega,2013,41(4):780-796.
[27]吴孝灵,周晶,俞潇阳.基于总包商施工效率的BOT项目工期激励合同研究[J].科技进步与对策,2011(13):75-80.
[28]ZHENG D X M,NG S T,KUMARASWAMY M M.Applying a genetic algorithm-based multi-objective approach for timecost optimization[J].Journal of Construction Engineering&Management,2004,130(2):168-176.
[29]JIANG Z L,WANG D Y,LIU X J.Study on the risk analysis and benefit sharing in BT construction project[J].Journal of Hunan University(Natural Sciences),2012,39(7):89-92.