考虑市场竞争的电信数据业务质量与定价决策
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摘要
针对现有文献较少关注电信市场竞争、数据业务质量与价格三者之间内在关系这一不足,设计了一个由单个运营商和两个服务提供商所构成的竞争市场,重点考察了竞争条件下的电信数据业务质量与价格决策。模型均衡表明:①运营商对服务提供商的筛选,有助于提升电信数据业务市场质量竞争的充分性。具有质量成本优势的服务提供商,可以通过业务质量的提升将竞争者挤出电信数据业务市场。②当质量成本优势显著时,赢得合作的服务提供商可以选择最适合自身的质量进行电信数据业务创新,并获得最佳的利润;而当质量成本优势较弱时,服务提供商为赢得合作,必须以牺牲利益为代价选择高于最适合自身的质量进行电信数据业务创新。此时,运营商的利润也将相应的提高。③运营商提高价值分成比例会降低服务提供商的积极性,并影响电信数据业务的质量和价格,最终反而可能导致运营商的利润受损。
Focusing on the fact that less attention is paid to the relationship among telecom market competition, data service quality, and pricing decision, this paper designs a competitive market which contains a single operator and two service providers, and examines data service quality and price decision of telecom in market competition. The model equilibriums show that the partner selection of the operator promotes quality competition in data service market. Ultimately, the service provider, which has advantage on the cost of quality, can drive the competitors out of market. When a service provider has a significant advantage on the cost of quality, it may choose a level of quality to maximize its profit since it surely gains cooperation with the operator. However, it may choose another level of quality higher than that in the former case to ensure cooperation with the operator with a sacrifice of its own profit when the advantage is insignificant, which will benefit the operator. An increase in the sharing ratio of the operator will reduce the enthusiasm of the service provider and affect the quality and price of data service, which may eventually lead to the loss of profit of the operator.
Focusing on the fact that less attention is paid to the relationship among telecom market competition, data service quality, and pricing decision, this paper designs a competitive market which contains a single operator and two service providers, and examines data service quality and price decision of telecom in market competition. The model equilibriums show that the partner selection of the operator promotes quality competition in data service market. Ultimately, the service provider, which has advantage on the cost of quality, can drive the competitors out of market. When a service provider has a significant advantage on the cost of quality, it may choose a level of quality to maximize its profit since it surely gains cooperation with the operator. However, it may choose another level of quality higher than that in the former case to ensure cooperation with the operator with a sacrifice of its own profit when the advantage is insignificant, which will benefit the operator. An increase in the sharing ratio of the operator will reduce the enthusiasm of the service provider and affect the quality and price of data service, which may eventually lead to the loss of profit of the operator.
引文
[1] 陈卫华.中国电信市场的有效竞争研究[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2005.
[2] 张英.中国电信系统推进战略转型做综合信息服务提供商[N].第18版.人民邮电报,2005-10-18.
[3] 王朝晖等.创新:电信业战略转型的过去和未来[J].电信科学,2010(1):25-31.
[4] 张新香,胡立君.数据业务时代我国移动通信产业链整合模式及绩效研究:基于双边市场理论的分析视角[J].中国工业经济,2010(6):147-157.
[5] 孙晓东,田澎,赵藜.消费者异质下基于质量-价格竞争的定价策略选择[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(3):349-357.
[6] 泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997.
[7] Shaked A,Sutton J.Relaxing price competition through product differentiation[J].Review of Economic Studies,1982,49(1):3-13.
[8] 卢强.定价[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2006.
[9] Shapiro C,Varian H.Information rules:A strategic guide to the network economy[M].Boston:Harvard Business School Press,1999.
[10] Varian H R.Pricing information goods[C]//The Proceedings of Scholarship in the New Information Environment Symposium.Harvard Law School:[s.n.],1995.
[11] Ulph D N,Vulkan N.Electronic commerce discrimination and competitive first-degree price[R].Working Paper,University College London,2000.
[12] Dewan R,Jing B,Seidmann A.Product customization and price competition on the Internet[J].Management Science,2003,49(8):1055-1070.
[13] Bakos Y,Brynjolfsson E.Bundling and competition on the internet[J].Management Science,2000,19(1):63-82.
[14] Kephart J O,Fay S A.Competitive bundling of categorized information goods[C]//Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce.Minnesota:[s.n.],2000.
[15] Fishburn P C,Odlyzko A M.Competitive pricing of information goods:Subscription pricing versus pay-per-use[J].Economic Theory,1999,13(2):447-470.
[16] Choudhary V.Use of pricing schemes for differentiating information goods[J].Information Systems Research,2010,21(1):78-92.
[17] Choudhary V,Ghose A,Mukopadhyay T,et al.Personalized pricing and quality differentiation[J].Management Science,2005,51 (7):1120-1130.
[18] Bhargava H,Choudhary V.Research note:When is versioning optimal for information goods[J].Management Science,2008,54(4):1029-1035.
[19] Wei X,Nault B R.Vertically differentiated information goods:Monopoly power through versioning[R].Working Paper,2011.
[20] 刘志勇,李敏强,寇纪淞.信息产品销售渠道模式选择研究[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(1):109-118.
[21] 周木生,张玉林.基于非线性边际支付意愿的信息产品定价策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(3):710-716.
[22] 王晓明,李仕明,倪得兵.网络外部性下的电信业务服务质量和定价的博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(4):910-917.
[23] 张宇,唐小我,钟林.在线信息产品捆绑定价研究[J].系统工程学报,2008,23(3):331-337.
[24] 林家宝,鲁耀斌,张龙.移动服务供应链的收益分配机制研究[J].管理学报,2009,6(7):906-909.
[25] 晓镜.“开放的花园”成就常新服务:解析i-mode模式中的创新思维[N].第3版.人民邮电报,2004-08-13.
[26] Desai P S.Quality segmentation in spatial markets:When does cannibalization affect product line design[J].Marketing Science,2001,20(3):265-283.
[27] Kim K,Chhajed D.Product design with multiple quality-type attributes[J].Management Science,2002,48(11):1502-1511.
[28] Matsubayashi N.Price and quality competition:The effect of differentiation and vertical integration[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,180(2):907-921.
[29] Stiving M.Price-endings when prices signal quality[J].Management Science,2000,46(12):1617-1629.
[30] Li H,Dinlersoz E.Quality-based price discrimination:Evidence from internet retailers’ shipping options[J].Journal of Retailing,2012,88(2):276-290.
[31] Nash J F.The bargaining problem[J].Econometrica,1950,18(2):155-162.
[32] 蒋丽丽,梅姝娥,仲伟俊.抽成比例对移动网络运营商定价策略的影响[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(3):297-306.
1)本文对服务提供商1的质量成本系数进行了标准化处理,即其为1。因此,当服务提供商2的质量成本系数b∈(0,1)时,表明服务提供商2相对于服务提供商1具有成本优势;当b=1时,表明双方成本相同;当b∈(1,+∞)时,表明服务提供商2具有成本劣势
2)由于服务提供商的业务设计成本发生在第1阶段,对于第3阶段而言,这一部分的成本已经沉没,故电信业务的收入就是双方议价时的增量价值
[2] 张英.中国电信系统推进战略转型做综合信息服务提供商[N].第18版.人民邮电报,2005-10-18.
[3] 王朝晖等.创新:电信业战略转型的过去和未来[J].电信科学,2010(1):25-31.
[4] 张新香,胡立君.数据业务时代我国移动通信产业链整合模式及绩效研究:基于双边市场理论的分析视角[J].中国工业经济,2010(6):147-157.
[5] 孙晓东,田澎,赵藜.消费者异质下基于质量-价格竞争的定价策略选择[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(3):349-357.
[6] 泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997.
[7] Shaked A,Sutton J.Relaxing price competition through product differentiation[J].Review of Economic Studies,1982,49(1):3-13.
[8] 卢强.定价[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2006.
[9] Shapiro C,Varian H.Information rules:A strategic guide to the network economy[M].Boston:Harvard Business School Press,1999.
[10] Varian H R.Pricing information goods[C]//The Proceedings of Scholarship in the New Information Environment Symposium.Harvard Law School:[s.n.],1995.
[11] Ulph D N,Vulkan N.Electronic commerce discrimination and competitive first-degree price[R].Working Paper,University College London,2000.
[12] Dewan R,Jing B,Seidmann A.Product customization and price competition on the Internet[J].Management Science,2003,49(8):1055-1070.
[13] Bakos Y,Brynjolfsson E.Bundling and competition on the internet[J].Management Science,2000,19(1):63-82.
[14] Kephart J O,Fay S A.Competitive bundling of categorized information goods[C]//Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce.Minnesota:[s.n.],2000.
[15] Fishburn P C,Odlyzko A M.Competitive pricing of information goods:Subscription pricing versus pay-per-use[J].Economic Theory,1999,13(2):447-470.
[16] Choudhary V.Use of pricing schemes for differentiating information goods[J].Information Systems Research,2010,21(1):78-92.
[17] Choudhary V,Ghose A,Mukopadhyay T,et al.Personalized pricing and quality differentiation[J].Management Science,2005,51 (7):1120-1130.
[18] Bhargava H,Choudhary V.Research note:When is versioning optimal for information goods[J].Management Science,2008,54(4):1029-1035.
[19] Wei X,Nault B R.Vertically differentiated information goods:Monopoly power through versioning[R].Working Paper,2011.
[20] 刘志勇,李敏强,寇纪淞.信息产品销售渠道模式选择研究[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(1):109-118.
[21] 周木生,张玉林.基于非线性边际支付意愿的信息产品定价策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(3):710-716.
[22] 王晓明,李仕明,倪得兵.网络外部性下的电信业务服务质量和定价的博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(4):910-917.
[23] 张宇,唐小我,钟林.在线信息产品捆绑定价研究[J].系统工程学报,2008,23(3):331-337.
[24] 林家宝,鲁耀斌,张龙.移动服务供应链的收益分配机制研究[J].管理学报,2009,6(7):906-909.
[25] 晓镜.“开放的花园”成就常新服务:解析i-mode模式中的创新思维[N].第3版.人民邮电报,2004-08-13.
[26] Desai P S.Quality segmentation in spatial markets:When does cannibalization affect product line design[J].Marketing Science,2001,20(3):265-283.
[27] Kim K,Chhajed D.Product design with multiple quality-type attributes[J].Management Science,2002,48(11):1502-1511.
[28] Matsubayashi N.Price and quality competition:The effect of differentiation and vertical integration[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,180(2):907-921.
[29] Stiving M.Price-endings when prices signal quality[J].Management Science,2000,46(12):1617-1629.
[30] Li H,Dinlersoz E.Quality-based price discrimination:Evidence from internet retailers’ shipping options[J].Journal of Retailing,2012,88(2):276-290.
[31] Nash J F.The bargaining problem[J].Econometrica,1950,18(2):155-162.
[32] 蒋丽丽,梅姝娥,仲伟俊.抽成比例对移动网络运营商定价策略的影响[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(3):297-306.
1)本文对服务提供商1的质量成本系数进行了标准化处理,即其为1。因此,当服务提供商2的质量成本系数b∈(0,1)时,表明服务提供商2相对于服务提供商1具有成本优势;当b=1时,表明双方成本相同;当b∈(1,+∞)时,表明服务提供商2具有成本劣势
2)由于服务提供商的业务设计成本发生在第1阶段,对于第3阶段而言,这一部分的成本已经沉没,故电信业务的收入就是双方议价时的增量价值