政府委托下应急物资生产能力代储系统激励契约设计
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摘要
政府委托生产企业进行能力代储,是扩大应急物资供应保障的一种重要途径,提高代储企业的努力水平对有效发挥这一系统的作用具有重要影响。但由于存在信息不对称因素,政府无法完整地观测到企业的行为,也无法全面掌握企业市场运作的所有有价值信息,为此,论文探讨了政府与代储企业的委托代理关系,研究了不对称信息条件下政府与代储企业之间的利益博弈,提出了针对委托代储企业的激励机制,建立了相应的激励契约模型,通过设置激励系数有效控制应急物资生产能力储备水平,同时设计了收益奖惩系数,根据实际效果对委托代储企业实施奖罚。通过双重激励措施,鼓励企业改善信息共享程度,激励企业增加努力水平。最后,运用MATLAB试验平台对模型求解并结合算例进行了数值计算和分析。结果表明,激励契约模型存在最优激励系数和最优奖惩系数,通过协调可以达到双方联合最优收益值,从而实现最大化社会效益。
The agent emergency supplies productivity capacities reservation system can decrease occupied funds reserve and reduce resource waste caused by material deterioration, which can enhance the supply of materials in the condition of emergency. Improving the effort of an enterprise is an important factor to make the agent reserve system become fully effective. However, on the one hand, in the process of agent emergency supplies productivity capacities reservation, the government and the enterprise pursue different objectives. There exist benefit gambling relations. On the other hand, because of the asymmetric information, the government cannot completely observe the company's behavior, and cannot get a full grasp of market information. The enterprise may suffer from the highest emotional burnout, or may be tempted to dismiss destructive speculation in order to maximize revenues in the process of agent reservation. Either reason can lead to the decrease of the effort level, which will bring hidden troubles for emergency supplies in the condition of emergency. Hence, how to constraint the enterprise's behavior and increase its effort effectively is critical to making the agent reserve system function adequately, while designing adequate incentive contract is a viable way for solving this problem.According to the above analysis, this article is organized as follows. Section one mainly discusses the principal-agent relationship between the government and the enterprise, and studies the interests gambling between the two sides under asymmetric information. Section two proposes the incentive mechanism aiming at the enterprise and establishes the incentive contract model based on three hypotheses. By setting incentive coefficient to control capacity reservation level of emergency supplies effectively, the paper also sets rewards and punishment coefficients, implements rewards and punishment to encourage the enterprise to improve information sharing degree, and increases efforts through double incentives. Then we use Lagrange method to solve and analyze the incentive contract model.The model derivation proved that there exists an optimal solution to maximize the benefit of government. Section three proceeds numerical simulation by using MATLAB experiment platform. The numerical simulation results mainly focus on the following four key points. First, the government revenue function with respect to the incentive coefficient, and the rewards and punishment coefficient are strictly a convex function. Hence, there exists the optimal solution to maximize the government's social benefits. Second, the random factor has a significant influence on the incentive coefficient and the rewards and punishment coefficients. Both of the two coefficients decrease as the random factors increase, which can directly affect the enterprise's efforts and benefits of the government and the enterprise. Third, there is an inverse relationship between the effort cost coefficient m and the two decision variables. On the other hand, the two decision variables are proportional to the social benefits conversion coefficient. Fourth, the two decision variables are both proved to be concave on the enterprise's reserve capacity within limits. In other words, the incentive contract model is effective only when the reserve capacity lies in a certain range. Finally, the article solves the optimal value of decision variables by numerical simulation and achieves the joint optimal solution by coordination. In summary, the incentive contract model achieves the optimal incentive coefficient, and the optimal rewards and punishment coefficients. The model also can achieve coordination and maximize the government's social benefits.
The agent emergency supplies productivity capacities reservation system can decrease occupied funds reserve and reduce resource waste caused by material deterioration, which can enhance the supply of materials in the condition of emergency. Improving the effort of an enterprise is an important factor to make the agent reserve system become fully effective. However, on the one hand, in the process of agent emergency supplies productivity capacities reservation, the government and the enterprise pursue different objectives. There exist benefit gambling relations. On the other hand, because of the asymmetric information, the government cannot completely observe the company's behavior, and cannot get a full grasp of market information. The enterprise may suffer from the highest emotional burnout, or may be tempted to dismiss destructive speculation in order to maximize revenues in the process of agent reservation. Either reason can lead to the decrease of the effort level, which will bring hidden troubles for emergency supplies in the condition of emergency. Hence, how to constraint the enterprise's behavior and increase its effort effectively is critical to making the agent reserve system function adequately, while designing adequate incentive contract is a viable way for solving this problem.According to the above analysis, this article is organized as follows. Section one mainly discusses the principal-agent relationship between the government and the enterprise, and studies the interests gambling between the two sides under asymmetric information. Section two proposes the incentive mechanism aiming at the enterprise and establishes the incentive contract model based on three hypotheses. By setting incentive coefficient to control capacity reservation level of emergency supplies effectively, the paper also sets rewards and punishment coefficients, implements rewards and punishment to encourage the enterprise to improve information sharing degree, and increases efforts through double incentives. Then we use Lagrange method to solve and analyze the incentive contract model.The model derivation proved that there exists an optimal solution to maximize the benefit of government. Section three proceeds numerical simulation by using MATLAB experiment platform. The numerical simulation results mainly focus on the following four key points. First, the government revenue function with respect to the incentive coefficient, and the rewards and punishment coefficient are strictly a convex function. Hence, there exists the optimal solution to maximize the government's social benefits. Second, the random factor has a significant influence on the incentive coefficient and the rewards and punishment coefficients. Both of the two coefficients decrease as the random factors increase, which can directly affect the enterprise's efforts and benefits of the government and the enterprise. Third, there is an inverse relationship between the effort cost coefficient m and the two decision variables. On the other hand, the two decision variables are proportional to the social benefits conversion coefficient. Fourth, the two decision variables are both proved to be concave on the enterprise's reserve capacity within limits. In other words, the incentive contract model is effective only when the reserve capacity lies in a certain range. Finally, the article solves the optimal value of decision variables by numerical simulation and achieves the joint optimal solution by coordination. In summary, the incentive contract model achieves the optimal incentive coefficient, and the optimal rewards and punishment coefficients. The model also can achieve coordination and maximize the government's social benefits.
引文
[1]Basu AK,Lal R,Srinivasan V,et al.Salesforce compensation plans:An agency theoretic perspective[J].Marketing science,1985,4(4):267-291.
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[5]徐庆,朱道立,李善良.不对称信息下供应链最优激励契约的设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,04:27-33.
[6]徐玖平,陈书剑.不对称信息下风险投资的委托代理模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004,24(1):19-24.
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[9]Weitzman ML.Efficient incentive contracts[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1980:719-730.
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[11]Zaheer A,Venkatraman N.Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy:an empirical test of trust in economic exchange[J].Strategic management journal,1995,16(5):373-392.
[12]王辉,侯文华.考虑业务流程模块化度影响的业务流程外包激励契约设计[J].管理工程学报,2014,01:144-150+47.
[13]李云飞,周宗放.基于委托-代理关系的风险投资家激励契约模型[J].管理学报,2011,06:872-878.
[14]田军,葛永玲,侯丛丛.政府主导的基于实物期权契约的应急物资采购模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,10:2582-2590.
[15]田军,张海青,汪应洛.基于能力期权契约的双源应急物资采购模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,09:2212-2219.
[16]张海青,田军.采购方主导的基于能力期权契约的应急物资采购模型[J].系统科学与数学,2011,31(10):1317-1327.
[17]Cucchiella F,Gastaldi M.Risk management in supply chain:A real option approach[J].Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management,2006,17(6):700-720.
[18]Kleindorfer PR,Wu DJ.Integrating long-and short-term contracting via business-to-business exchanges for capital-intensive industries[J].Management Science,2003,49(11):1597-1615.
[19]Qi XT,Bard JF,Yu G.Supply chain coordination with demand disruptions[J].Omega,2004.32(4):301-312.
[20]Wu Y.The government expenditure on health and health systems-the perspective behind the SARS[J].Chin Hosp Manag,2003,23(7):1-2.
[2]Lal R,Staelin R.Salesforce compensation plans in environments with asymmetric information[J].Marketing science,1986,5(3):179-198.
[3]Lal R,Srinivasan V.Compensation plans for single-and multi-product salesforces:An application of the Holmstrom-Milgrom model[J].Management Science,1993,39(7):777-793.
[4]Chu LY,Sappington DEM.Procurement contracts:Theory vs.practice[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2009,27(1):51-59.
[5]徐庆,朱道立,李善良.不对称信息下供应链最优激励契约的设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,04:27-33.
[6]徐玖平,陈书剑.不对称信息下风险投资的委托代理模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004,24(1):19-24.
[7]李善良,朱道立.不对称信息下供应链线性激励契约委托代理分析[J].计算机集成制造系统,2005,12:1758-1762.
[8]Chao GH,Iravani SMR,Savaskan RC.Quality improvement incentives and product recall cost sharing contracts[J].Management Science,2009,55(7):1122-1138.
[9]Weitzman ML.Efficient incentive contracts[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1980:719-730.
[10]Kunter M.Coordination via cost and revenue sharing in manufacturer-retailer channels[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2012,216(2):477-486.
[11]Zaheer A,Venkatraman N.Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy:an empirical test of trust in economic exchange[J].Strategic management journal,1995,16(5):373-392.
[12]王辉,侯文华.考虑业务流程模块化度影响的业务流程外包激励契约设计[J].管理工程学报,2014,01:144-150+47.
[13]李云飞,周宗放.基于委托-代理关系的风险投资家激励契约模型[J].管理学报,2011,06:872-878.
[14]田军,葛永玲,侯丛丛.政府主导的基于实物期权契约的应急物资采购模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,10:2582-2590.
[15]田军,张海青,汪应洛.基于能力期权契约的双源应急物资采购模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,09:2212-2219.
[16]张海青,田军.采购方主导的基于能力期权契约的应急物资采购模型[J].系统科学与数学,2011,31(10):1317-1327.
[17]Cucchiella F,Gastaldi M.Risk management in supply chain:A real option approach[J].Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management,2006,17(6):700-720.
[18]Kleindorfer PR,Wu DJ.Integrating long-and short-term contracting via business-to-business exchanges for capital-intensive industries[J].Management Science,2003,49(11):1597-1615.
[19]Qi XT,Bard JF,Yu G.Supply chain coordination with demand disruptions[J].Omega,2004.32(4):301-312.
[20]Wu Y.The government expenditure on health and health systems-the perspective behind the SARS[J].Chin Hosp Manag,2003,23(7):1-2.