前期交易成本会诱发PPP项目危机吗?——制度治理的负向中介作用
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摘要
当前中国社会经济条件下PPP项目存在前期持续时间普遍较长、运作不规范、危机频发的现实问题。研究项目危机并采取措施化解、减少冲突是PPP项目治理的关键。探究国内PPP项目危机发生条件和政策治理作用,能够为进一步规范国内PPP项目前期运作、解决项目危机、提高项目绩效提供有效的治理路径。建立前期交易成本、制度治理与PPP项目危机的关系理论模型,通过实证研究发现,前期交易成本对PPP项目危机有正向影响作用,制度治理在前期交易成本与项目危机关系中起到负向中介作用。研究结果表明,前期交易成本应作为PPP项目前期重要的风险关注点,制度治理应作为规制PPP项目前期运作的治理着力点,同时还应充分重视危机治理作用,以推动PPP项目绩效的进一步提升。
引文
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[39] Makris M. The Theory of Incentives:The PrincipalAgent Model[J]. The Economic Journal,2013,113(488).
[40]李宝良,郭其友.冲突与合作经济治理的契约解决之道——2016年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主主要经济理论贡献述评[J].外国经济与管理,2016(11).
[41] Faisol N,Dainty A,Price A. The Concept of‘Relational Contracting’A Tool for Understanding Inter-organizational Relationships in Construction[C]. London:Proceedings of the 21st Annual Association of Researchers in Construction Management Conference,2005:17-26.
[42] Meng X. The Effect of Relationship Management on Project Performance in Construction[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2012(2).
[43]严玲,邓娇娇,吴绍艳.临时性组织中关系治理机制核心要素的本土化研究[J].管理学报,2014(6).
[44] Hart O. Incomplete Contracts and Control[C]. Stockholm:Nobel Prize in Economics Documents,2016:2-3.
[2] Malhotra D,Lumineau F. Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict:The Effects of Contract Structure[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2011(5).
[3]张春流,章恒全.产权性质、代理冲突与股权治理效应[J].南京社会科学,2013(4).
[4] Hart O,Zingales L. Liquidity and Inefeicient Investment[J]. Journal of the European Economic Association,2015(5).
[5] Hart O. Thinking about the Firm:A Review of Daniel Spul?ber’s The Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of Economic Lit?erature,2011(1).
[6]雷新途.债务契约冲突:投资过度或不足——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].经济经纬,2011(5).
[7]李云鹤,李湛,唐松莲.企业生命周期、公司治理与公司资本配置效率[J].南开管理评论,2011(3).
[8] Hart O,Holmstrom B. A Theory of Firm Scope[J]. Quar?terly Journal of Economics,2010(2).
[9] Halonen A M,Hart O. Short-Term,Long-Term,and Con?tinuing Contracts[M]. New York:Social Science Electron?ic Publishing,2015.
[10] Markus H?llgren,Wilson T L. The Nature and Manage?ment of Crises in Construction Projects:Projects-as-prac?tice Observations[J]. International Journal of Project Man?agement,2008(8).
[11] Ahola T,Ruuska I,Artto K,et al. What is Project Gov?ernance and what are Its Origins?[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2014(8).
[12] Ling F,Ke Y,Kumaraswamy M,et al. Key Relational Contracting Practices Affecting Performance of Public Con?struction Projects in China[J]. Journal of Construction En?gineering&Management,2014(1).
[13] Williamson O E. Transaction Cost Economics:An overview[M]. New York:Chapters,2015.
[14] Board S. Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty[J].American Economic Review,2011(11).
[15]丁利.制度治理、博弈均衡与社会正义[J].中国社会科学,2016(4).
[16] Holmstrom B. Commentary:The Panic of 2007 Proceed?ings-Economic Policy Symposium-Jackson Hole[J]. Fed?eral Reserve Bank of Kansas City,2014(2):263-273.
[17] Holmstrom B. The Economic Theory of Agency——The Principal’s Problem[J]. Decision Making Under Uncer?tainty,2014(2).
[18] Holmstrom B,Kaplan S N. The State of U.S. Corporate Governance:What’s Right and What’s Wrong?[J]. Jour?nal of Applied Corporate Finance,2003(3).
[19] Holmstrom B. Managerial Incentive Problem:A Dynamic Perspective[J]. Review of Economic Studies,1999(1).
[20] Bai X,Sheng S,Li J J. Contract Governance and Buyersupplier Conflict:The moderating Role of Institutions[J].Journal of Operations Management,2016(41):12-24.
[21] Ning Y,Ling F Y Y,Teo A C Y. Driving Forces behind and Barriers to Relational Transaction Practices in Public Construction Projects[J]. Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering Education&Practice,2014(1).
[22] Holmstrom B,Tirole J. Inside and Outside Liquidity[M].London:Mit Press Books,2011:13-14.
[23] Holmstrom B. Understanding the Role of Debt in the Finan?cial System[M]. New York:Social Science Electronic Pub?lishing,2015:22-24.
[24] Rai A,Keil M,Hornyak R,Wüllenweber K. Hybrid Rela?tional-Contractual Governance for Business Process Out?sourcing[J]. Journal of Management Information Systems,2012(2).
[25] Wang L,Yeung J H Y,Zhang M. The Impact of Trust and Contract on Innovation Performance:The Moderating Role of Environmental Uncertainty[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2011(1).
[26] Thomas L H,Thomas A F,Jens D,Hirschheim R. A Pro?cess Model of Complementarity and Substitution of Contrac?tual and Relational Governance in IS Outsourcing[J]. Jour?nal of Management Information Systems,2013(3).
[27]梁永宽.合同与关系:中国背景下的项目治理机制——基于委托代理与交易成本理论的分析[J].科技管理研究,2012(22).
[28]李应.关系契约治理动态性研究[J].经济问题探索,2012(8).
[29] Cao Z,Lumineau F. Revisiting the Interplay between Con?tractual and Relational Governance:A qualitative and me?ta-analytic Investigation[J]. Journal of Operations Manage?ment,2015(1).
[30] Zhou K Z,Xu D. How Foreign Firms Curtail local Supplier Opportunism in China:Detailed Contracts,Centralized Control,and Relational Governance[J]. Journal of Interna?tional Business Studies,2012(7).
[31]严玲,史志成,严敏,邓娇娇.公共项目契约治理与关系治理:替代还是互补?[J].土木工程学报,2016(11).
[32] Williamson O E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism[M]. New York:Free Press,1998.
[33]李鑫,李香梅.代理冲突、公司治理因素的激励约束效应与资本配置效率[J].管理世界,2014(11).
[34] Furubotn E G,Richter R.新制度经济学:一个交易费用分析范式[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2007.
[35]郭其友,李宝良.公共资源和企业边界的经济治理之道——2009年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主的主要经济理论贡献述评[J].外国经济与管理,2009(11).
[36] Adelstein R. Firms as Social Actors[J]. Journal of Institu?tional Economics,2010(3).
[37] Williamson O E. The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure:From Choice to Contract[J]. Journal of Econom?ic Perspectives,2002(3).
[38]程红,汪贤裕,郭红梅,黄梅萍.道德风险和逆向选择共存下的双向激励契约[J].管理科学学报,2016(12).
[39] Makris M. The Theory of Incentives:The PrincipalAgent Model[J]. The Economic Journal,2013,113(488).
[40]李宝良,郭其友.冲突与合作经济治理的契约解决之道——2016年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主主要经济理论贡献述评[J].外国经济与管理,2016(11).
[41] Faisol N,Dainty A,Price A. The Concept of‘Relational Contracting’A Tool for Understanding Inter-organizational Relationships in Construction[C]. London:Proceedings of the 21st Annual Association of Researchers in Construction Management Conference,2005:17-26.
[42] Meng X. The Effect of Relationship Management on Project Performance in Construction[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2012(2).
[43]严玲,邓娇娇,吴绍艳.临时性组织中关系治理机制核心要素的本土化研究[J].管理学报,2014(6).
[44] Hart O. Incomplete Contracts and Control[C]. Stockholm:Nobel Prize in Economics Documents,2016:2-3.