成就、联合成就与知识的价值（英文）
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摘要
在本文第一部分,我回顾了知识论的德性理论方法的主要成就,尤其是针对解释知识的价值而言。其主要观点是,知识是认知者的成就,而不是纯粹幸运的成功。在第二部分中,我考察了这种反对意见,它认为,这种方法无法处理证言知识,并且一般情况下无法解释社会认知依赖,或者对于他人的认知依赖这种重要现象。在第三部分中,我提出了一种新方法用以回答这些反对意见。这种新方法区分了基于感知和其他生成来源的知识生成以及基于证言的知识传递。知识生成仍然被理解为可归于认知者的德性认知主体性的真信念。这种新理论采用联合主体性概念来理解知识传递。在涉及知识传递的情况中,真信念可归于言说者与聆听者双方合作一致的德性联合主体性。第四部分回到知识价值问题。其所持有的理念是,传递知识构成了一种联合成就,也因此普遍地具有了联合成就的价值。
In Part One of the paper I review what I take to be the chief merits of a virtue-theoretic approach in epistemology, especially with regard to explaining the value of knowledge. The main idea here is that knowledge is an achievement of the knower, as opposed to a mere lucky success. In Part Two, I review the objection that such an approach does poorly with testimonial knowledge, and in general fails to accommodate the important phenomenon of social epistemic dependence, or epistemic dependence on other persons. In Part Three, I develop a new approach that is designed to answer these objections. The new approach makes a distinction between the generation of knowledge via perception and other generative sources, and the transmission of knowledge via testimony. The generation of knowledge continues to be understood as true belief attributable to the virtuous cognitive agency of the knower. The new account understands the transmission of knowledge in terms of joint agency. In cases involving the transmission of knowledge, true belief is attributable to the virtuous joint agency of speaker and hearer cooperating together. Part Four returns to the value problem. The governing idea is that the transmitted knowledge constitutes a joint achievement, and thereby inherits the value of joint achievements generally.
In Part One of the paper I review what I take to be the chief merits of a virtue-theoretic approach in epistemology, especially with regard to explaining the value of knowledge. The main idea here is that knowledge is an achievement of the knower, as opposed to a mere lucky success. In Part Two, I review the objection that such an approach does poorly with testimonial knowledge, and in general fails to accommodate the important phenomenon of social epistemic dependence, or epistemic dependence on other persons. In Part Three, I develop a new approach that is designed to answer these objections. The new approach makes a distinction between the generation of knowledge via perception and other generative sources, and the transmission of knowledge via testimony. The generation of knowledge continues to be understood as true belief attributable to the virtuous cognitive agency of the knower. The new account understands the transmission of knowledge in terms of joint agency. In cases involving the transmission of knowledge, true belief is attributable to the virtuous joint agency of speaker and hearer cooperating together. Part Four returns to the value problem. The governing idea is that the transmitted knowledge constitutes a joint achievement, and thereby inherits the value of joint achievements generally.
引文
[1]Greco,J.'Knowledge as Credit for True Belief'[A],De Paul,M.,Zagzebski,L.(Eds)Intellectual Virtue:Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology[C],Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003,111-134.
[2]Riggs,W.'Luck,Knowledge,and Control'[A],Haddock,A.,Millar,A.,Pritchard,D.H.(Eds)Epistemic Value[C],Oxford University Press,2009,204-224
[3]Greco,J.Achieving Knowledge:A Virtue-theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2010.
[4]Sosa,E.'The Raft and the Pyramid:Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge'[J].Midwest Studies in Philosophy,1980,5:3-25.
[5]Sosa,E.Knowledge in Perspective[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1991.
[6]Sosa,E.A Virtue Epistemology:Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge[M].Vol.I.Oxford:Oxford University Press,2007.
[7]Greco,J.'A(Different)Virtue Epistemology'[J].Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,2012,85(1):1-26.
[8]Riggs,W.'Two Problems of Easy Credit'[J].Synthese,2009,169(1):201-216.
[9]Pritchard,D.'Knowledge and Understanding'[A],Haddock,A.,Millar,A.,Pritchard,D.(Eds)The Nature and Value of Knowledge:Three Investigations[C],Oxford:Oxford University Press,2010,3-88.
[10]Lackey,J.'Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know'[J].Synthese,2007,158:345-61.
[11]Lackey,J.'Knowledge and Credit'[J].Philosophical Studies,2009,142:27-42.
[12]Craig,E.Knowledge and the State of Nature[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1990.
[13]Williamson,T.Knowledge and its Limits[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2000.
[14]Fantl,J.,Mc Grath,M.'Evidence,Pragmatics,and Justification'[J].Philosophical Review,2002,111:6-94
[15]Fantl,J.,Mc Grath,M.Knowledge in an Uncertain World[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2009.
[16]Hawthorne,J.Knowledge and Lotteries[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2004.
[17]Stanley,J.Knowledge and Practical Interests[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2005.
[18]Goldberg,S.Relying on Others[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2010.
[19]Goldberg,S.'The Division of Epistemic Labour'[J].Episteme,2011,8:112-25.
[20]Kallestrup,J.,Pritchard,D.'Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism'[J].Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,2012,93(1):84-103.
[21]Roth,A.“Shared Agency,”Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/shared-agency/2010-12-13.
[22]Searle,J.'Collective Intentions and Actions'[A],Cohen,P.,Morgan,J.,Pollack,M.(Eds)Intentions Communication[C],Cambridge:MIT Press,1990,401-415.
[23]Bratman,M.'Shared Cooperative Activity'[J].The Philosophical Review,1992,101:327-341.
[24]Gilbert,M.'Walking Together:A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon'[J].Midwest Studies in Philosophy,1990,15:1-14.
[25]Reibsamen,J.Social Epistemic Dependence:Trust,Testimony,and Social Intellectual Virtue[D].Saint Louis University,2015.
(1)The idea that knowledge is a kind of success from virtuous agency goes back at least to Aristotle.A revival of the idea in contemporary epistemology is due to see Sosa(1980;1991;2007).I give the idea a systematic defense in Greco(2010).It is important to note here that the kind of agency that is relevant here is cognitive agency,deriving from cognitive excellence.Accordingly,the present approach follows Aristotle in drawing a distinction between cognitive or intellectual virtue(excellence)and moral or practical virtue(excellence).
(2)A thing has“intrinsic”value insofar as it is valuable“in itself,”i.e.independently of its relation to other things.A thing has“final”value insofar as it is valuable“for itself,”i.e.independently of its value as a means to something else.
(1)I have sometimes used the phrases“creditable to S’s ability”and“creditable to S.”But“creditable”is ambiguous between“praiseworthy”and“attributable.”To avoid that confusion,I now use the latter term.Also,I use the phrase“attributable to S’s ability”as equivalent to“attributable to S’s excellent agency.”The same distinction is employed by Riggs(2009b)and Pritchard(2010).
(1)Barn Fa?ade Cases must be handled differently than what I am here calling“standard”Gettier cases.See Greco 2012:section 6.
(2)For objections along this line,see Pritchard 2010;Goldberg 2010;Goldberg 2011;Kallestrup and Pritchard 2012.More generally,the present view is meant to address the charge that robust virtue epistemology entails epistemic individualism.
(1)I am indebted to many people for relevant conversation,including Vincent Colapietro,Lizzie Fricker,Sandy Goldberg,Georgi Gardiner,Peter Graham,David Henderson,Jesper Kallestrup,Christopher Kelp,Jennifer Lackey,Duncan Pritchard,Jonathan Reibsamen,Ernest Sosa,Deborah Tollefsen,John Turri,participants at the 2016 Philosophical Dimensions of Trust conference at Innsbruck University,participants at the 2011 Rutgers Epistemology Conference,and students in graduate seminars at Saint Louis University.
[2]Riggs,W.'Luck,Knowledge,and Control'[A],Haddock,A.,Millar,A.,Pritchard,D.H.(Eds)Epistemic Value[C],Oxford University Press,2009,204-224
[3]Greco,J.Achieving Knowledge:A Virtue-theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2010.
[4]Sosa,E.'The Raft and the Pyramid:Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge'[J].Midwest Studies in Philosophy,1980,5:3-25.
[5]Sosa,E.Knowledge in Perspective[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1991.
[6]Sosa,E.A Virtue Epistemology:Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge[M].Vol.I.Oxford:Oxford University Press,2007.
[7]Greco,J.'A(Different)Virtue Epistemology'[J].Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,2012,85(1):1-26.
[8]Riggs,W.'Two Problems of Easy Credit'[J].Synthese,2009,169(1):201-216.
[9]Pritchard,D.'Knowledge and Understanding'[A],Haddock,A.,Millar,A.,Pritchard,D.(Eds)The Nature and Value of Knowledge:Three Investigations[C],Oxford:Oxford University Press,2010,3-88.
[10]Lackey,J.'Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know'[J].Synthese,2007,158:345-61.
[11]Lackey,J.'Knowledge and Credit'[J].Philosophical Studies,2009,142:27-42.
[12]Craig,E.Knowledge and the State of Nature[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1990.
[13]Williamson,T.Knowledge and its Limits[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2000.
[14]Fantl,J.,Mc Grath,M.'Evidence,Pragmatics,and Justification'[J].Philosophical Review,2002,111:6-94
[15]Fantl,J.,Mc Grath,M.Knowledge in an Uncertain World[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2009.
[16]Hawthorne,J.Knowledge and Lotteries[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2004.
[17]Stanley,J.Knowledge and Practical Interests[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2005.
[18]Goldberg,S.Relying on Others[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2010.
[19]Goldberg,S.'The Division of Epistemic Labour'[J].Episteme,2011,8:112-25.
[20]Kallestrup,J.,Pritchard,D.'Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism'[J].Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,2012,93(1):84-103.
[21]Roth,A.“Shared Agency,”Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/shared-agency/2010-12-13.
[22]Searle,J.'Collective Intentions and Actions'[A],Cohen,P.,Morgan,J.,Pollack,M.(Eds)Intentions Communication[C],Cambridge:MIT Press,1990,401-415.
[23]Bratman,M.'Shared Cooperative Activity'[J].The Philosophical Review,1992,101:327-341.
[24]Gilbert,M.'Walking Together:A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon'[J].Midwest Studies in Philosophy,1990,15:1-14.
[25]Reibsamen,J.Social Epistemic Dependence:Trust,Testimony,and Social Intellectual Virtue[D].Saint Louis University,2015.
(1)The idea that knowledge is a kind of success from virtuous agency goes back at least to Aristotle.A revival of the idea in contemporary epistemology is due to see Sosa(1980;1991;2007).I give the idea a systematic defense in Greco(2010).It is important to note here that the kind of agency that is relevant here is cognitive agency,deriving from cognitive excellence.Accordingly,the present approach follows Aristotle in drawing a distinction between cognitive or intellectual virtue(excellence)and moral or practical virtue(excellence).
(2)A thing has“intrinsic”value insofar as it is valuable“in itself,”i.e.independently of its relation to other things.A thing has“final”value insofar as it is valuable“for itself,”i.e.independently of its value as a means to something else.
(1)I have sometimes used the phrases“creditable to S’s ability”and“creditable to S.”But“creditable”is ambiguous between“praiseworthy”and“attributable.”To avoid that confusion,I now use the latter term.Also,I use the phrase“attributable to S’s ability”as equivalent to“attributable to S’s excellent agency.”The same distinction is employed by Riggs(2009b)and Pritchard(2010).
(1)Barn Fa?ade Cases must be handled differently than what I am here calling“standard”Gettier cases.See Greco 2012:section 6.
(2)For objections along this line,see Pritchard 2010;Goldberg 2010;Goldberg 2011;Kallestrup and Pritchard 2012.More generally,the present view is meant to address the charge that robust virtue epistemology entails epistemic individualism.
(1)I am indebted to many people for relevant conversation,including Vincent Colapietro,Lizzie Fricker,Sandy Goldberg,Georgi Gardiner,Peter Graham,David Henderson,Jesper Kallestrup,Christopher Kelp,Jennifer Lackey,Duncan Pritchard,Jonathan Reibsamen,Ernest Sosa,Deborah Tollefsen,John Turri,participants at the 2016 Philosophical Dimensions of Trust conference at Innsbruck University,participants at the 2011 Rutgers Epistemology Conference,and students in graduate seminars at Saint Louis University.