“银保互动”能否促进农户技术采用?——基于田野实验的实证分析
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摘要
本文以黑龙江与江苏省的572个农户为样本,采用田野实验方法获取农户在不同情境下技术选择的动态数据,实证分析了"银保互动"对农户技术采用的影响。研究发现:"银保互动"产品有助于分散自然风险、缓解农户面临的信贷配给,能够有效促进农户对新技术的选择;农户的风险偏好、是否经常收看农业电视节目等因素也是影响农户技术采用的重要因素。因此,应加强农业保险与农村信贷市场的结合,提升农户新技术的采纳水平,最终提高农业生产率。
This article analyzes the impact of interlinked index insurance and credit contract on households’ technology adoption by conducting a field experiment with 572 rural households in Heilongjiang and Jiangsu to collect the dynamic data of farmers’ technology selection in different situations. The results show that the interlinked index insurance and credit contract help households disperse natural risks and mitigate credit constraints, thus promoting the technology adoption of rural households. Furthermore, other variables such as risk attitude and the frequency of watching agricultural TV programs are also important factors that can affect technology adoption behavior of rural households. Thus, the combination of agricultural insurance and rural credit market should be strengthened to improve farmers’ new technology adoption and ultimately improve the productivity of the agricultural sector.
This article analyzes the impact of interlinked index insurance and credit contract on households’ technology adoption by conducting a field experiment with 572 rural households in Heilongjiang and Jiangsu to collect the dynamic data of farmers’ technology selection in different situations. The results show that the interlinked index insurance and credit contract help households disperse natural risks and mitigate credit constraints, thus promoting the technology adoption of rural households. Furthermore, other variables such as risk attitude and the frequency of watching agricultural TV programs are also important factors that can affect technology adoption behavior of rural households. Thus, the combination of agricultural insurance and rural credit market should be strengthened to improve farmers’ new technology adoption and ultimately improve the productivity of the agricultural sector.
引文
1.储小俊、曹杰,2012:《天气指数保险研究述评》,《经济问题探索》第12期。
2.侯麟科、仇焕广、白军飞、徐志刚,2014:《农户风险偏好对农业生产要素投入的影响——以农户玉米品种选择为例》,《农业技术经济》第5期。
3.刘祚祥、郭伦国、杨勇,2010:《信息共享、风险分担与农村“银保互动”机制》,《广东金融学院学报》第3期。
4.罗俊、汪丁丁、叶航、陈叶烽,2015:《走向真实世界的实验经济学——田野实验研究综述》,《经济学(季刊)》第4期。
5.马九杰、王国达、张剑,2012:《中小金融机构与县域中小企业信贷——从需求端对“小银行优势”的实证分析》,《农业技术经济》第4期。
6.谢玉梅、高娇,2014:《“银保互动”对我国农户收入波动影响效应研究》,《中山大学学报(社会科学版)》第1期。
7.宋金田、祁春节,2013:《农户农业技术需求影响因素分析——基于契约视角》,《中国农村观察》第6期。
8.庹国柱,2012:《我国农业保险的发展成就、障碍与前景》,《保险研究》第12期。
9.吴本健、单希、马九杰,2013:《信贷保险、金融机构信贷供给与农户借贷决策——来自F县草莓种植“信贷+保险”的证据》,《保险研究》第8期。
10.张建军、张兵,2012:《农业信贷与保险互联影响农户风险配给实证研究——基于江苏、湖北两省的调研数据》,《南京农业大学学报(社会科学版)》第4期。
11.Ahsan,S.M.,A.G.Ali,and N.J.Kurian.,1982,“Toward a Theory of Agricultural Insurance”,American Journal of Agricultural Economics,64(3):520-529.
12.Barnett,B.J.and O.Mahul.,2007,“Weather Index Insurance for Agriculture and Rural Areas in Lower-income Countries”,American Journal of Agricultural Economics,89:1241-1247.
13.Binswanger,H.P.,1980,“Attitudes toward Risk:Experimental Measurement in Rural India”,American Journal of Agricultural Economics,62(3):395-407.
14.Brick,K.,and M.Visser.,2015,“Risk Preferences,Technology Adoption and Insurance Uptake:A Framed Experiment”,Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,118:383-396.
15.Boucher,S.R.,M.R.Carter,and C.Guirkinger,2008,“Risk Rationing and Wealth Effects in Credit Markets:Theory and Implications for Agricultural Development”,American Journal of Agricultural Economics,90(3):409-423.
16.Carter,M.R.,C.Lan and S.,Alexandros.,2014,“Where and How Index Insurance Can Boost the Adoption of Improved Agricultural Technologies”,Journal of Development Economics,118:59-71.
17.Carter,M.R.,J.Lybbert and Travis.,2012,“Consumption versus Asset Smoothing:Testing the Implications of Poverty Trap Theory in Burkina Faso”,Journal of Development Economics.99(2):255-264.
18.Carter,M.R.,L.Cheng,and A.,Sarris,2011,“The Impact of Interlinked Index Insurance and Credit Contracts on Financial Market Deepening and Small Farm Productivity”,Annual Meeting of the American Applied Economics Association,Pittsburgh,PA,7:24-26.
19..Dercon,S.,and L.Christiaensen.,2011,“Consumption Risk,Technology Adoption and Poverty Traps:Evidence from Ethiopia”,Journal of Development Economics,96(2):159-173.
20.Farrin,K.and M.J.Miranda.,2015,“A Heterogeneous Agent Model of Credit-linked Index Insurance and Farm Technology Adoption”,Journal of Development Economics,116:199-211.
21.Farrin,K.and M.J.Miranda.,2013,“Premium Benefits?A Heterogeneous Agent Model of Credit-linked Index Insurance and Farm Technology Adoption”,Annual Meeting No.149666,Agricultural and Applied Economics Association,Washington,D.C.,4-6 August.
22.Ghosh,P.,D.Mookherjee,and D.Ray.,2000,“Credit Rationing in Developing Countries:An Overview of the Theory”,D Mookherjee&D Ray A Reader in Development Economics,383-401.
23.Giné,X.and Y.Dean.,2009,“Insurance,Credit,and Technology Adoption:Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi”,Journal of Development Economics,89:1-11.
24.Giné,X.,R.Townsend and J.Vickery.,2008,“Patterns of Rainfall Insurance Participation in Rural India”,The World Bank Economic Review,22(3):539-566.
25.Harrison,G.and J.List.,2004,“Field Experiments”,Journal of Economic Literature,42(4):1009-1005.
26.Hill,R.V.and A.Viceisza.,2012,“A Field Experiment on the Impact of Weather Shocks and Insurance on Risky Investment”,Experimental Economics,15(2):341-371.
27.Holt,C.A.and S.K.Laury,2002,“Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects”,The American Economic Review,92(5):1644-1655.
28.Just R.E.and R.D.Pope.,1978,“Stochastic Specification of Production Functions and Economic Implications”,Journal of Econometrics,7(1):67-86.
29.Karlan D.,R.Osei,I.Oseiakoto.,et al.2014,“Agricultural Decisions after Relaxing Credit and Risk Constraints”,Social Science Electronic Publishing,129(2):597-652.
30.Lybbert,T.J.and J.Mc Peak.,2012,“Risk and Intertemporal Substitution:Livestock Portfolios and Off-take among Kenyan Pastoralists”,Journal of Development Economics,97(2):415-426.
31.Nicola,F.D.,2015,“The Impact of Weather Insurance on Consumption,Investment and Welfare”,Quantitative Economics,6(3):637-661.
32.Skees,J.R.,2008,“Challenges for Use of Index-based Weather Insurance in Lower Income Countries”,Agricultural Finance Review,68:197-217.
33.Tadesse,M.A.,2014,“Fertilizer Adoption,Credit Access,and Safety Nets in Rural Ethiopia”,Agricultural Finance Review,74(3):290-310.
34.Tadesse,A.G.,S.Rashid,C.Borzaga and K.Getnet.,2016,“Finance and Agricultural Technology Adoption in Ethiopia:Does the Institutional Design of Lending Organizations Matter?”,World Development,84:235-253.
35.Ward,Patrick S.and S.Vartika.,2015,“Using Field Experiments to Elicit Risk and Ambiguity Preferences:Behavioral Factors and the Adoption of New Agricultural Technologies in Rural India”,The Journal of Development Studies,51(6):707-724.
(1)数据来源:《2016年社会服务发展统计公报》,http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/sj/tjgb/201708/20170815005382.shtml。
(1)根据调研地点以往洪水灾害情况,距离江堤2公里以内的农田遭受洪水的概率最大,因此选取村庄以此为标准。
(1)安徽国元保险公司的“银保互动”产品主要针对规模草莓种植户,参保人数较少,样本量无法满足实验的要求;此外,经济作物与粮食作物的投入与产出模式存在一定差异,因此本研究通过田野实验的方法获取数据。
(1)需求效应是指被试者会主观猜测实验人员的研究目的并希望配合实验人员,给出实验期望的结果。这些猜测可能会影响被试者在实验中的决策,影响实验结果的准确性。
(1)农户参加有2种选择的彩票游戏:选项1是直接获得一笔资金,金额从3到25元依次增加;选项2则是不确定项,需进行抽球赌博(共有七个黑球和三个白球;抽中黑球代表获得0元;抽中白球则代表能获得50元)。若农户选择选项2,则增加选项1的金额,选项2不变,直到农户选择选项1,游戏结束。将农户选择选项2的次数作为农户风险偏好测度,次数越多说明该农户风险偏好程度越高。
2.侯麟科、仇焕广、白军飞、徐志刚,2014:《农户风险偏好对农业生产要素投入的影响——以农户玉米品种选择为例》,《农业技术经济》第5期。
3.刘祚祥、郭伦国、杨勇,2010:《信息共享、风险分担与农村“银保互动”机制》,《广东金融学院学报》第3期。
4.罗俊、汪丁丁、叶航、陈叶烽,2015:《走向真实世界的实验经济学——田野实验研究综述》,《经济学(季刊)》第4期。
5.马九杰、王国达、张剑,2012:《中小金融机构与县域中小企业信贷——从需求端对“小银行优势”的实证分析》,《农业技术经济》第4期。
6.谢玉梅、高娇,2014:《“银保互动”对我国农户收入波动影响效应研究》,《中山大学学报(社会科学版)》第1期。
7.宋金田、祁春节,2013:《农户农业技术需求影响因素分析——基于契约视角》,《中国农村观察》第6期。
8.庹国柱,2012:《我国农业保险的发展成就、障碍与前景》,《保险研究》第12期。
9.吴本健、单希、马九杰,2013:《信贷保险、金融机构信贷供给与农户借贷决策——来自F县草莓种植“信贷+保险”的证据》,《保险研究》第8期。
10.张建军、张兵,2012:《农业信贷与保险互联影响农户风险配给实证研究——基于江苏、湖北两省的调研数据》,《南京农业大学学报(社会科学版)》第4期。
11.Ahsan,S.M.,A.G.Ali,and N.J.Kurian.,1982,“Toward a Theory of Agricultural Insurance”,American Journal of Agricultural Economics,64(3):520-529.
12.Barnett,B.J.and O.Mahul.,2007,“Weather Index Insurance for Agriculture and Rural Areas in Lower-income Countries”,American Journal of Agricultural Economics,89:1241-1247.
13.Binswanger,H.P.,1980,“Attitudes toward Risk:Experimental Measurement in Rural India”,American Journal of Agricultural Economics,62(3):395-407.
14.Brick,K.,and M.Visser.,2015,“Risk Preferences,Technology Adoption and Insurance Uptake:A Framed Experiment”,Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,118:383-396.
15.Boucher,S.R.,M.R.Carter,and C.Guirkinger,2008,“Risk Rationing and Wealth Effects in Credit Markets:Theory and Implications for Agricultural Development”,American Journal of Agricultural Economics,90(3):409-423.
16.Carter,M.R.,C.Lan and S.,Alexandros.,2014,“Where and How Index Insurance Can Boost the Adoption of Improved Agricultural Technologies”,Journal of Development Economics,118:59-71.
17.Carter,M.R.,J.Lybbert and Travis.,2012,“Consumption versus Asset Smoothing:Testing the Implications of Poverty Trap Theory in Burkina Faso”,Journal of Development Economics.99(2):255-264.
18.Carter,M.R.,L.Cheng,and A.,Sarris,2011,“The Impact of Interlinked Index Insurance and Credit Contracts on Financial Market Deepening and Small Farm Productivity”,Annual Meeting of the American Applied Economics Association,Pittsburgh,PA,7:24-26.
19..Dercon,S.,and L.Christiaensen.,2011,“Consumption Risk,Technology Adoption and Poverty Traps:Evidence from Ethiopia”,Journal of Development Economics,96(2):159-173.
20.Farrin,K.and M.J.Miranda.,2015,“A Heterogeneous Agent Model of Credit-linked Index Insurance and Farm Technology Adoption”,Journal of Development Economics,116:199-211.
21.Farrin,K.and M.J.Miranda.,2013,“Premium Benefits?A Heterogeneous Agent Model of Credit-linked Index Insurance and Farm Technology Adoption”,Annual Meeting No.149666,Agricultural and Applied Economics Association,Washington,D.C.,4-6 August.
22.Ghosh,P.,D.Mookherjee,and D.Ray.,2000,“Credit Rationing in Developing Countries:An Overview of the Theory”,D Mookherjee&D Ray A Reader in Development Economics,383-401.
23.Giné,X.and Y.Dean.,2009,“Insurance,Credit,and Technology Adoption:Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi”,Journal of Development Economics,89:1-11.
24.Giné,X.,R.Townsend and J.Vickery.,2008,“Patterns of Rainfall Insurance Participation in Rural India”,The World Bank Economic Review,22(3):539-566.
25.Harrison,G.and J.List.,2004,“Field Experiments”,Journal of Economic Literature,42(4):1009-1005.
26.Hill,R.V.and A.Viceisza.,2012,“A Field Experiment on the Impact of Weather Shocks and Insurance on Risky Investment”,Experimental Economics,15(2):341-371.
27.Holt,C.A.and S.K.Laury,2002,“Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects”,The American Economic Review,92(5):1644-1655.
28.Just R.E.and R.D.Pope.,1978,“Stochastic Specification of Production Functions and Economic Implications”,Journal of Econometrics,7(1):67-86.
29.Karlan D.,R.Osei,I.Oseiakoto.,et al.2014,“Agricultural Decisions after Relaxing Credit and Risk Constraints”,Social Science Electronic Publishing,129(2):597-652.
30.Lybbert,T.J.and J.Mc Peak.,2012,“Risk and Intertemporal Substitution:Livestock Portfolios and Off-take among Kenyan Pastoralists”,Journal of Development Economics,97(2):415-426.
31.Nicola,F.D.,2015,“The Impact of Weather Insurance on Consumption,Investment and Welfare”,Quantitative Economics,6(3):637-661.
32.Skees,J.R.,2008,“Challenges for Use of Index-based Weather Insurance in Lower Income Countries”,Agricultural Finance Review,68:197-217.
33.Tadesse,M.A.,2014,“Fertilizer Adoption,Credit Access,and Safety Nets in Rural Ethiopia”,Agricultural Finance Review,74(3):290-310.
34.Tadesse,A.G.,S.Rashid,C.Borzaga and K.Getnet.,2016,“Finance and Agricultural Technology Adoption in Ethiopia:Does the Institutional Design of Lending Organizations Matter?”,World Development,84:235-253.
35.Ward,Patrick S.and S.Vartika.,2015,“Using Field Experiments to Elicit Risk and Ambiguity Preferences:Behavioral Factors and the Adoption of New Agricultural Technologies in Rural India”,The Journal of Development Studies,51(6):707-724.
(1)数据来源:《2016年社会服务发展统计公报》,http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/sj/tjgb/201708/20170815005382.shtml。
(1)根据调研地点以往洪水灾害情况,距离江堤2公里以内的农田遭受洪水的概率最大,因此选取村庄以此为标准。
(1)安徽国元保险公司的“银保互动”产品主要针对规模草莓种植户,参保人数较少,样本量无法满足实验的要求;此外,经济作物与粮食作物的投入与产出模式存在一定差异,因此本研究通过田野实验的方法获取数据。
(1)需求效应是指被试者会主观猜测实验人员的研究目的并希望配合实验人员,给出实验期望的结果。这些猜测可能会影响被试者在实验中的决策,影响实验结果的准确性。
(1)农户参加有2种选择的彩票游戏:选项1是直接获得一笔资金,金额从3到25元依次增加;选项2则是不确定项,需进行抽球赌博(共有七个黑球和三个白球;抽中黑球代表获得0元;抽中白球则代表能获得50元)。若农户选择选项2,则增加选项1的金额,选项2不变,直到农户选择选项1,游戏结束。将农户选择选项2的次数作为农户风险偏好测度,次数越多说明该农户风险偏好程度越高。