森林碳汇储备中政府监管与林农行为博弈分析
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摘要
基于碳汇发展过程中政府与林农之间的博弈关系,结合嵌入式社会结构理论、农户经济理论和正式制度与非正式制度理论,构建政府监管和林农行为选择博弈模型,分析双方的博弈收益。结果表明:政府采取监管、加大扶持力度、建立健全碳汇发展体制机制、完善碳汇市场体系等措施,林农会选择执行监管政策;反之,若政府不实施相关政策,加之林农对森林碳汇认识不够,参与森林碳汇储备意愿不强等,林农会选择不执行监管政策。因此,急需建立健全碳汇交易市场体制机制、完善碳汇林补贴政策、加大政策宣传力度、创新政府监管模式,以期有效推动森林碳汇储备,从而加快森林碳汇项目发展。
(1)Background——The development of forest carbon sequestration is in line with the general trend of green development and an important means to solve the problem of carbon emission reduction. However,compared with some countries,China's forest carbon sequestration is developing slowly and its development mechanism is not sound. As the main supplier of forest carbon sequestration,forest farmers' decision-making on forest carbon sequestration reserve depends on many factors.(2)Results——Farmers are the suppliers of forest carbon sequestration. The government,as the supplier of forest carbon sequestration reserve policy,is also the supervisor of farmers' behavior. It is assumed that both the government and farmers are limited rational economic persons in the process of forest carbon sequestration reserve. The implementation policy of forest farmers is directly proportional to the cost of government supervision and government subsidy for forest carbon sequestration reserve. On the basis of improving the carbon sequestration market system and expanding the trading channels of carbon sequestration,the government has strengthened its supervision on forest carbon sequestration reserve of forest farmers. Forest farmers have to carry out the policy under this pressure,in order to avoid unnecessary punishment. In addition,the government's subsidy support for forest farmers is also an important factor in encouraging forest farmers to actively implement policy. Therefore,two mandatory institutional measures have prompted forest farmers to choose to participate in forest carbon sequestration reserve. Whether the government chooses to supervise depends on the size of its own benefits; on the other hand,from the perspective of forest farmers,the government's choice of supervisory measures is affected by the behavior of forest farmers and the cost-benefit of forest farmer' participation in forest carbon sequestration reserve. Based on the theory of peasant household economy,forest farmers are limited rational economic men who pursue profit maximization,labor avoidance and risk avoidance. The probability of government supervision is inversely proportional to the cost of forest farmers choosing to participate in carbon sequestration reserve.The less the forest farmers pay,the less the forest farmers are willing to invest too much cost to the supervision and maintenance of carbon sequestration forests for the purpose of maximizing profits,thus stimulating government departments to strengthen supervision to ensure the effective policy implementation; on the other hand,the probability that the government chooses to supervise is directly proportional to the fine that farmers receive,indicating that the more government fine imposes on forest farmers,the greater the government's supervision.(3) Conclusions and Discussions——In the reserve of forest carbon sequestration,forest farmers as the main body of carbon sequestration supply,and the government as the supervisor,have certain contradictions in their behavioral choices in the process of promoting the development of forest carbon sequestration project for their own interests,and thus become the key players in the game. While global warming is becoming more and more prominent,the international and domestic carbon emission reduction task remains arduous. Forest carbon sequestration is an important means of carbon emission reduction. Whether carbon sequestration reserve can work smoothly depends on the effect of government policy implementation and the choice of forest farmers' behavior. In view of the game analysis of forest farmers and the government,the following suggestions are put forward: first,we should establish and improve the system and mechanism of carbon sequestration trading market,perfect the subsidy policy of carbon sequestration forests,and improve the participation enthusiasm of forest farmers; second,we should intensify the promotion of forest carbon sequestration and change the traditional concepts of forest farmers; third,we should innovate the mode of government supervision and play to the full advantages of the forestry cooperation organization.
(1)Background——The development of forest carbon sequestration is in line with the general trend of green development and an important means to solve the problem of carbon emission reduction. However,compared with some countries,China's forest carbon sequestration is developing slowly and its development mechanism is not sound. As the main supplier of forest carbon sequestration,forest farmers' decision-making on forest carbon sequestration reserve depends on many factors.(2)Results——Farmers are the suppliers of forest carbon sequestration. The government,as the supplier of forest carbon sequestration reserve policy,is also the supervisor of farmers' behavior. It is assumed that both the government and farmers are limited rational economic persons in the process of forest carbon sequestration reserve. The implementation policy of forest farmers is directly proportional to the cost of government supervision and government subsidy for forest carbon sequestration reserve. On the basis of improving the carbon sequestration market system and expanding the trading channels of carbon sequestration,the government has strengthened its supervision on forest carbon sequestration reserve of forest farmers. Forest farmers have to carry out the policy under this pressure,in order to avoid unnecessary punishment. In addition,the government's subsidy support for forest farmers is also an important factor in encouraging forest farmers to actively implement policy. Therefore,two mandatory institutional measures have prompted forest farmers to choose to participate in forest carbon sequestration reserve. Whether the government chooses to supervise depends on the size of its own benefits; on the other hand,from the perspective of forest farmers,the government's choice of supervisory measures is affected by the behavior of forest farmers and the cost-benefit of forest farmer' participation in forest carbon sequestration reserve. Based on the theory of peasant household economy,forest farmers are limited rational economic men who pursue profit maximization,labor avoidance and risk avoidance. The probability of government supervision is inversely proportional to the cost of forest farmers choosing to participate in carbon sequestration reserve.The less the forest farmers pay,the less the forest farmers are willing to invest too much cost to the supervision and maintenance of carbon sequestration forests for the purpose of maximizing profits,thus stimulating government departments to strengthen supervision to ensure the effective policy implementation; on the other hand,the probability that the government chooses to supervise is directly proportional to the fine that farmers receive,indicating that the more government fine imposes on forest farmers,the greater the government's supervision.(3) Conclusions and Discussions——In the reserve of forest carbon sequestration,forest farmers as the main body of carbon sequestration supply,and the government as the supervisor,have certain contradictions in their behavioral choices in the process of promoting the development of forest carbon sequestration project for their own interests,and thus become the key players in the game. While global warming is becoming more and more prominent,the international and domestic carbon emission reduction task remains arduous. Forest carbon sequestration is an important means of carbon emission reduction. Whether carbon sequestration reserve can work smoothly depends on the effect of government policy implementation and the choice of forest farmers' behavior. In view of the game analysis of forest farmers and the government,the following suggestions are put forward: first,we should establish and improve the system and mechanism of carbon sequestration trading market,perfect the subsidy policy of carbon sequestration forests,and improve the participation enthusiasm of forest farmers; second,we should intensify the promotion of forest carbon sequestration and change the traditional concepts of forest farmers; third,we should innovate the mode of government supervision and play to the full advantages of the forestry cooperation organization.
引文
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[9]白江迪,沈月琴,龙飞,等.森林碳汇抵消政策实施影响因素的实证研究[J].林业科学,2017,53(7):118-133.
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[12]张丹.林农参与森林碳汇抵押贷款意愿影响因素分析:基于结构方程模型[D].咸阳:西北农林科技大学,2014:11-12.
[13]罗必良.新制度经济学[M].太原:山西经济出版社,2005:91-92.
[14]陈卫洪.森林碳汇储备中的农户行为研究:以西南地区为例[D].雅安:四川农业大学,2016:31-32.
[15]何丽红,王秀.低碳供应链中政府与核心企业进化博弈模型[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(S1):27-30.
[16]杨丽霞.农村面源污染治理中政府监管与农户环保行为的博弈分析[J].生态经济,2014,30(5):127-130.
[17]张浩,蔡志坚,谢煜.博弈结构视角下林农合作模式研究:以红豆杉专业合作组织为例[J].林业经济问题,2013,33(4):289-293.
[2]杨帆,庄天慧,曾维忠,等.农村精英森林碳汇项目组织意愿及其影响因素分析[J].科技管理研究,2016,36(4):201-206.
[3]白江迪,沈月琴,朱臻,等.农户风险和时间偏好对森林碳汇经营意愿的影响分析[J].林业经济问题,2016,36(1):72-78.
[4]宁可,沈月琴,朱臻.农户对森林碳汇认知及碳汇林经营意愿分析:基于浙江、江西、福建3省农户调查[J].北京林业大学学报(社会科学版),2014,13(2):63-69.
[5]陈瑶,张晓梅.林农参与林业碳汇意愿影响因素分析:基于黑龙江省集体林调研数据[J].林业经济,2018,40(8):98-103.
[6]田国双,邹玉友.供需视域下森林碳汇研究综述与展望[J].林业经济,2018,40(8):80-86.
[7]龚荣发,曾维忠.政府推动背景下森林碳汇项目农户参与的制约因素研究[J].资源科学,2018,40(5):1073-1083.
[8]熊平.森林碳汇经济的现状与发展[J].中国林业经济,2018(2):73-74.
[9]白江迪,沈月琴,龙飞,等.森林碳汇抵消政策实施影响因素的实证研究[J].林业科学,2017,53(7):118-133.
[10]杨帆,曾维忠.我国森林碳汇市场综述与展望[J].资源开发与市场,2014,30(5):603-606.
[11]刘先辉.论气候变化背景下森林碳汇法律制度的构建[J].郑州大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016,49(1):26-31.
[12]张丹.林农参与森林碳汇抵押贷款意愿影响因素分析:基于结构方程模型[D].咸阳:西北农林科技大学,2014:11-12.
[13]罗必良.新制度经济学[M].太原:山西经济出版社,2005:91-92.
[14]陈卫洪.森林碳汇储备中的农户行为研究:以西南地区为例[D].雅安:四川农业大学,2016:31-32.
[15]何丽红,王秀.低碳供应链中政府与核心企业进化博弈模型[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(S1):27-30.
[16]杨丽霞.农村面源污染治理中政府监管与农户环保行为的博弈分析[J].生态经济,2014,30(5):127-130.
[17]张浩,蔡志坚,谢煜.博弈结构视角下林农合作模式研究:以红豆杉专业合作组织为例[J].林业经济问题,2013,33(4):289-293.