上市公司的关系网络和事务所审计行为——基于公司年报文本分析的经验证据
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摘要
中国上市公司普遍存在的关系型交易模式对资本市场的运行机制和信息中介的行为模式产生了重要影响。文章采用2001—2012年沪深A股全部上市公司作为研究样本,通过文本分析技术从上市公司年报中获取交易网络结构的信息,对关系网络如何影响公司的审计费用和盈余质量进行实证检验。研究结果表明,上市公司的关系网络规模越大,则审计费用越高。尤其对于公司所在省份内部的关系网络和所在行业外部的关系网络,其审计溢价效应更为明显,且发现同一地区和同一行业的关系网络对盈余质量具有正向影响。进一步的横截面分析表明,公司所处的外部信息环境的改善能够增强关系网络对审计费用和盈余质量的正向影响。文章为上市公司的关系网络如何影响事务所的审计活动提供了经验证据,补充了关系型交易模式下审计行为研究的相关文献。
China is a highly relationship-based economy. The widely-used relationshipbased transactions form the structure of the capital market and the behaviors of information intermediaries. Theoretically,the company's networks have an impact on auditing behaviors in three ways. First,the company's networks increase the difficulty of evaluating the company's specific investments. Second,the members within the same network repeat certain transactions indefinitely. Third,the company's networks also make a broader scope of its stakeholders,which may increases the externality of its transactions. However,the company's networks also provide more information sources for the auditors,which increase the informativeness of the financial report. Thus,this paper predicts that the company's networks would increase the audit fee and earnings quality. Empirically,this paper investigates how the company' networks affect auditing behaviors by using textual analysis on annual reports of all the Shanghai and Shenzhen A share listed companies from 2001 to 2012. We measure the networks of each company by using the number of network nodes from each company's financial report with textual analysis. The empirical results show that the company's networks increase the audit fee. The fee premiums are even larger for the company's local networks and cross-industry networks. However,we don't find any results of the network coefficient on earnings quality. In addition,further analysis shows that earnings quality is higher when the company has larger local networks and larger intraindustry networks. This finding suggests that it is difficult for auditors to understand the crossprovince and cross-industry networks of the company. Further cross-sectional analysis shows that the effects of the company's networks on fee premium and earnings quality are larger with more transparent information environment including more open local market,larger size of auditing firms,and more analyst following. Overall,this paper provides some empirical evidence to the relational contract theory from an auditing perspective,by using the data of the company's networks to investigate how relational contracts affect auditing behaviors. This paper also has potential implications for the network study,as it offers some new mythologies to measure the company's networks by using textual analysis.
China is a highly relationship-based economy. The widely-used relationshipbased transactions form the structure of the capital market and the behaviors of information intermediaries. Theoretically,the company's networks have an impact on auditing behaviors in three ways. First,the company's networks increase the difficulty of evaluating the company's specific investments. Second,the members within the same network repeat certain transactions indefinitely. Third,the company's networks also make a broader scope of its stakeholders,which may increases the externality of its transactions. However,the company's networks also provide more information sources for the auditors,which increase the informativeness of the financial report. Thus,this paper predicts that the company's networks would increase the audit fee and earnings quality. Empirically,this paper investigates how the company' networks affect auditing behaviors by using textual analysis on annual reports of all the Shanghai and Shenzhen A share listed companies from 2001 to 2012. We measure the networks of each company by using the number of network nodes from each company's financial report with textual analysis. The empirical results show that the company's networks increase the audit fee. The fee premiums are even larger for the company's local networks and cross-industry networks. However,we don't find any results of the network coefficient on earnings quality. In addition,further analysis shows that earnings quality is higher when the company has larger local networks and larger intraindustry networks. This finding suggests that it is difficult for auditors to understand the crossprovince and cross-industry networks of the company. Further cross-sectional analysis shows that the effects of the company's networks on fee premium and earnings quality are larger with more transparent information environment including more open local market,larger size of auditing firms,and more analyst following. Overall,this paper provides some empirical evidence to the relational contract theory from an auditing perspective,by using the data of the company's networks to investigate how relational contracts affect auditing behaviors. This paper also has potential implications for the network study,as it offers some new mythologies to measure the company's networks by using textual analysis.
引文
[1]陈信元,夏立军.审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2006,(1).
[2]陈运森,谢德仁.网络位置、独立董事治理与投资效率[J].管理世界,2011,(7).
[3]陈运森,谢德仁.董事网络、独立董事治理与高管激励[J].金融研究,2012,(2).
[4]戴亦一,肖金利,潘越.“乡音”能否降低公司代理成本?——基于方言视角的研究[J].经济研究,2016,(12).
[5]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2009年报告[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2010.
[6]李青原,张肖星,王红建.独立董事连锁与公司盈余质量的传染效应[J].财务研究,2015,(4).
[7]李增泉.关系型交易的会计治理——关于中国会计研究国际化的范式探析[J].财经研究,2017,(2).
[8]刘启亮,唐建新.学习效应、私人关系、审计任期与审计质量[J].审计研究,2009,(4).
[9]刘文军.审计师的地理位置是否影响审计质量?[J].审计研究,2014a,(1).
[10]刘文军.审计师的地理位置与审计定价策略[J].财经研究,2014b,(9).
[11]潘越,肖金利,戴亦一.文化多样性与企业创新:基于方言视角的研究[J].金融研究,2017,(10).
[12]王红建,李青原,邢斐.金融危机、政府补贴与盈余操纵——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2014,(7).
[13]王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.
[14]巫景飞,何大军,林暐,等.高层管理者政治网络与企业多元化战略:社会资本视角——基于我国上市公司面板数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2008,(8).
[15]吴溪,王春飞,陆正飞.独立董事与审计师出自同门是“祸”还是“福”?——独立性与竞争—合作关系之公司治理效应研究[J].管理世界,2015,(9).
[16]徐现祥,刘毓芸,肖泽凯.方言与经济增长[J].经济学报,2015,(2).
[17]杨俊,张玉利,杨晓非,等.关系强度、关系资源与新企业绩效——基于行为视角的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2009,(4).
[18]姚铮,胡梦婕,叶敏.社会网络增进小微企业贷款可得性作用机理研究[J].管理世界,2013,(4).
[19]张敏,童丽静,许浩然.社会网络与企业风险承担——基于我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2015,(11).
[20]张五常.中国的经济制度[M].北京:中信出版社,2009.
[21]章卫东.定向增发新股与盈余管理——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].管理世界,2010,(1).
[22]张维迎,柯荣住.信任及其解释:来自中国的跨省调查分析[J].经济研究,2002,(10).
[23]Allen F,Qian J,Qian M J. Law,finance,and economic growth in China[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57–116.
[24]Behn B K,Choi J H,Kang T. Audit quality and properties of analyst earnings forecasts[J]. The Accounting Review,2008,83(2):327–349.
[25]Chen J D,Cumming D,Hou W X,et al. Does the external monitoring effect of financial analysts deter corporate fraud in China?[J]. Journal of Business Ethics,2016,134(4):727–742.
[26]Chen T,Harford J,Lin C. Do analysts matter for governance? Evidence from natural experiments[J]. Journal of financial Economics,2015,115(2):383–410.
[27]Choi J H,Kim J B,Qiu A A,et al. Geographic proximity between auditor and client:How does it impact audit quality?[J]. AUDITING:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2012,31(2):43–72.
[28]Coleman J S. Social capital in the creation of human capital[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1988,94:S95–S120.
[29]Cull R,Xu L C. Institutions,ownership,and finance:The determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):117–146.
[30]DeAngelo L E. Auditor size and audit quality[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1981,3(3):183–199.
[31]DeFond M,Zhang J Y. A review of archival auditing research[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2014,58(2–3):275–326.
[32]García D,Norli?. Geographic dispersion and stock returns[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2012,106(3):547–565.
[33]Granovetter M S. The strength of weak ties[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1973,78(6):1360–1380.
[34]Guan Y Y,Su L N,Wu D H,et al. Do school ties between auditors and client executives influence audit outcomes?[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2016,61(2–3):506–525.
[35]He X J,Pittman J A,Rui O M,et al. Do social ties between external auditors and audit committee members affect audit quality?[J]. The Accounting Review,2017,92(5):61–87.
[36]Ke B,Lennox C S,Xin Q Q. The effect of China’s weak institutional environment on the quality of big 4audits[J]. The Accounting Review,2015,90(4):1591–1619.
[37]Kothari S P,Leone A J,Wasley C E. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39(1):163–197.
[38]Li Z Q,Wong T J,Yu G. Information dissemination through embedded financial analysts[R]. Working Paper,2018.
[39]Loughran T,McDonald B. Textual analysis in accounting and finance:A survey[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2016,54(4):1187–1230.
[40]Macneil I R. The many futures of contracts[R]. 47 Southern California Law Review 691,1974.
[41]Macneil I R. Contracts:Adjustments of long-term economic relations under classical,neoclassical and relational contract law[J]. Northwestern University Law Review,1978,72(6):854–906.
[42]Macaulay S. Non-contractual relations in business:A preliminary study[M]. The Law and Society Canon.Routledge,2018:155-167.
[43]Peng M W,Luo Y D. Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy:The nature of a micromacro link[J]. The Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(3):486–501.
[44]UzziB.Socialstructureandcompetitionininterfirmnetworks:Theparadoxofembeddedness[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42(1):35–67.
[45]Williamson O E. Transaction-cost economics:the governance of contractual relations[J]. The Journal of Law and Economics,1979,22(2):233–261.
[46]Watts R L,Zimmerman J L. Agency problems,auditing,and the theory of the firm:Some evidence[J]. The Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(3):613–633.
[47]Xu C. The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms and development[J]. Journal of economic literature,2011,49(4):1076–1151.
[48]Yu F F. Analyst coverage and earnings management[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(2):245–271.
(1)本文对上市公司年报中的文本信息进行提取并构建公司的关系网络,这部分公开披露的交易关系通常符合资本市场的法律法规以及证监会的监管条例,因此本文的关系网络反映的是公司在法律和监管范围内的正当交易行为。这种关系网络构造方式也可能损失部分不正当的交易关系对公司审计行为的影响。
(2)由于该排名从2003年开始,2003年以前采用事务所的CPA收入排名状况确定国内十大会计师事务所。
(1)由于审计费用和盈余信息质量数据具有一定程度上的缺失,具体回归模型中根据不同的因变量,回归的样本量有所不同。
(1)本文在替换因变量定义方式以及剔除同一事物所的关系网络节点基础上,进行了地区分组和行业分组的检验,检验结果与本文的主要结果保持一致,同一地区和同一行业的关系网络规模与盈余质量正相关,限于篇幅未在正文列示。
[2]陈运森,谢德仁.网络位置、独立董事治理与投资效率[J].管理世界,2011,(7).
[3]陈运森,谢德仁.董事网络、独立董事治理与高管激励[J].金融研究,2012,(2).
[4]戴亦一,肖金利,潘越.“乡音”能否降低公司代理成本?——基于方言视角的研究[J].经济研究,2016,(12).
[5]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2009年报告[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2010.
[6]李青原,张肖星,王红建.独立董事连锁与公司盈余质量的传染效应[J].财务研究,2015,(4).
[7]李增泉.关系型交易的会计治理——关于中国会计研究国际化的范式探析[J].财经研究,2017,(2).
[8]刘启亮,唐建新.学习效应、私人关系、审计任期与审计质量[J].审计研究,2009,(4).
[9]刘文军.审计师的地理位置是否影响审计质量?[J].审计研究,2014a,(1).
[10]刘文军.审计师的地理位置与审计定价策略[J].财经研究,2014b,(9).
[11]潘越,肖金利,戴亦一.文化多样性与企业创新:基于方言视角的研究[J].金融研究,2017,(10).
[12]王红建,李青原,邢斐.金融危机、政府补贴与盈余操纵——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2014,(7).
[13]王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.
[14]巫景飞,何大军,林暐,等.高层管理者政治网络与企业多元化战略:社会资本视角——基于我国上市公司面板数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2008,(8).
[15]吴溪,王春飞,陆正飞.独立董事与审计师出自同门是“祸”还是“福”?——独立性与竞争—合作关系之公司治理效应研究[J].管理世界,2015,(9).
[16]徐现祥,刘毓芸,肖泽凯.方言与经济增长[J].经济学报,2015,(2).
[17]杨俊,张玉利,杨晓非,等.关系强度、关系资源与新企业绩效——基于行为视角的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2009,(4).
[18]姚铮,胡梦婕,叶敏.社会网络增进小微企业贷款可得性作用机理研究[J].管理世界,2013,(4).
[19]张敏,童丽静,许浩然.社会网络与企业风险承担——基于我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2015,(11).
[20]张五常.中国的经济制度[M].北京:中信出版社,2009.
[21]章卫东.定向增发新股与盈余管理——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].管理世界,2010,(1).
[22]张维迎,柯荣住.信任及其解释:来自中国的跨省调查分析[J].经济研究,2002,(10).
[23]Allen F,Qian J,Qian M J. Law,finance,and economic growth in China[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57–116.
[24]Behn B K,Choi J H,Kang T. Audit quality and properties of analyst earnings forecasts[J]. The Accounting Review,2008,83(2):327–349.
[25]Chen J D,Cumming D,Hou W X,et al. Does the external monitoring effect of financial analysts deter corporate fraud in China?[J]. Journal of Business Ethics,2016,134(4):727–742.
[26]Chen T,Harford J,Lin C. Do analysts matter for governance? Evidence from natural experiments[J]. Journal of financial Economics,2015,115(2):383–410.
[27]Choi J H,Kim J B,Qiu A A,et al. Geographic proximity between auditor and client:How does it impact audit quality?[J]. AUDITING:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2012,31(2):43–72.
[28]Coleman J S. Social capital in the creation of human capital[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1988,94:S95–S120.
[29]Cull R,Xu L C. Institutions,ownership,and finance:The determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):117–146.
[30]DeAngelo L E. Auditor size and audit quality[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1981,3(3):183–199.
[31]DeFond M,Zhang J Y. A review of archival auditing research[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2014,58(2–3):275–326.
[32]García D,Norli?. Geographic dispersion and stock returns[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2012,106(3):547–565.
[33]Granovetter M S. The strength of weak ties[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1973,78(6):1360–1380.
[34]Guan Y Y,Su L N,Wu D H,et al. Do school ties between auditors and client executives influence audit outcomes?[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2016,61(2–3):506–525.
[35]He X J,Pittman J A,Rui O M,et al. Do social ties between external auditors and audit committee members affect audit quality?[J]. The Accounting Review,2017,92(5):61–87.
[36]Ke B,Lennox C S,Xin Q Q. The effect of China’s weak institutional environment on the quality of big 4audits[J]. The Accounting Review,2015,90(4):1591–1619.
[37]Kothari S P,Leone A J,Wasley C E. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39(1):163–197.
[38]Li Z Q,Wong T J,Yu G. Information dissemination through embedded financial analysts[R]. Working Paper,2018.
[39]Loughran T,McDonald B. Textual analysis in accounting and finance:A survey[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2016,54(4):1187–1230.
[40]Macneil I R. The many futures of contracts[R]. 47 Southern California Law Review 691,1974.
[41]Macneil I R. Contracts:Adjustments of long-term economic relations under classical,neoclassical and relational contract law[J]. Northwestern University Law Review,1978,72(6):854–906.
[42]Macaulay S. Non-contractual relations in business:A preliminary study[M]. The Law and Society Canon.Routledge,2018:155-167.
[43]Peng M W,Luo Y D. Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy:The nature of a micromacro link[J]. The Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(3):486–501.
[44]UzziB.Socialstructureandcompetitionininterfirmnetworks:Theparadoxofembeddedness[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42(1):35–67.
[45]Williamson O E. Transaction-cost economics:the governance of contractual relations[J]. The Journal of Law and Economics,1979,22(2):233–261.
[46]Watts R L,Zimmerman J L. Agency problems,auditing,and the theory of the firm:Some evidence[J]. The Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(3):613–633.
[47]Xu C. The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms and development[J]. Journal of economic literature,2011,49(4):1076–1151.
[48]Yu F F. Analyst coverage and earnings management[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(2):245–271.
(1)本文对上市公司年报中的文本信息进行提取并构建公司的关系网络,这部分公开披露的交易关系通常符合资本市场的法律法规以及证监会的监管条例,因此本文的关系网络反映的是公司在法律和监管范围内的正当交易行为。这种关系网络构造方式也可能损失部分不正当的交易关系对公司审计行为的影响。
(2)由于该排名从2003年开始,2003年以前采用事务所的CPA收入排名状况确定国内十大会计师事务所。
(1)由于审计费用和盈余信息质量数据具有一定程度上的缺失,具体回归模型中根据不同的因变量,回归的样本量有所不同。
(1)本文在替换因变量定义方式以及剔除同一事物所的关系网络节点基础上,进行了地区分组和行业分组的检验,检验结果与本文的主要结果保持一致,同一地区和同一行业的关系网络规模与盈余质量正相关,限于篇幅未在正文列示。