“去行政化”背景下我国科研院所治理模式设计研究
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摘要
长期以来的"行政化"管理导致我国科研院所普遍存在学术事务行政化、科研过度利益化、科研产出效率低等问题,严重制约影响了其发展,使得科研院所的"去行政化"改革势在必行。"去行政化"改革打破了原有的院所治理结构模式,并对院所治理结构模式提出了新的要求,本文在现有文献基础上根据利益相关者理论设计新型的我国科研院所治理模式并引入了一个含有监督和惩罚行为的委托代理模型,验证了新型模式下相关利益者效用和科研产生水平有效明显的提升,为我国未来科研院所新治理模式的设计提供思路和参考。
Long-term "administrative" administration of scientific research institutions causes serious problems. The development of scientific research institutes is restricted because of the loss of academic research's freedom, public welfare and low efficiency. De-administration reform of research institutions is imperative. It breaks the original structure of governance structure, and puts forward new demands on the model of governance structure. This paper designs a new type of governance system based on stakeholder theory model and introduces a principal-agent model which includes supervision and punishment behavior. It proves that the utility of relevant stakeholders and the level of scientific research's output can be improved obviously in the new model. It also provides reference for the design of the new governance mode of the future scientific research institutes in China.
Long-term "administrative" administration of scientific research institutions causes serious problems. The development of scientific research institutes is restricted because of the loss of academic research's freedom, public welfare and low efficiency. De-administration reform of research institutions is imperative. It breaks the original structure of governance structure, and puts forward new demands on the model of governance structure. This paper designs a new type of governance system based on stakeholder theory model and introduces a principal-agent model which includes supervision and punishment behavior. It proves that the utility of relevant stakeholders and the level of scientific research's output can be improved obviously in the new model. It also provides reference for the design of the new governance mode of the future scientific research institutes in China.
引文
[1]冯再,万冰.转制型科研院所“去行政化”管理机制探析[J].四川有色金属,2013(6):70-74.
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[3]苏文洋.百姓的天空京东大苏的北京论语2.0[M].北京:新华出版社,2010:71.
[4]王全宝,李敏.科研机构的去行政化难题[J].中国新闻周刊,2011(16):36-38.
[5]郭军灵,盛亚.美日德非营利科研机构管理的比较研究及其启示[J].科研管理,2004,25(5):116-121.
[6]李慧聪,霍国庆.现代科研院所治理:内涵、演进路径及量化体系[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2015,36(8):10-17.
[7]BOATRIGHT J R.Contractors as Stakeholders:Reconciling Stakeholder Theory with the nexus-of-contracts Firm[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2002,26(9):1837-1852.
[8]WILLIAMSON O E.Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implications[J].Accounting Review,1978,86(343):596.
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[10]陈闻,彭雯,彭勇.产学研合作研究生培养模式发展探析--基于利益相关者理论的视角[J].广西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2013,49(2):144-148.
[11]吴增基.论我国高校的官本位倾向及其克服的条件[J].学术界,2006,(6):261-267.
[12]李政刚.“去行政化”背景下公益类科研院所改革与治理的新探索[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2015,36(8):18-27.
[13]刘太刚.非营利组织及其法律规制[M].北京:中国法制出版社,2009:178.
[14]王琪.高校去行政化:原因、本质和路径选择[J].大学(学术版),2010(9):32-35.
[15]范鹏飞,赵怀罡.委托-代理理论中的监督问题及其应用[J].南京邮电学院学报(自然科学版),2000,20(4):70-72.
[16]朱林美,周晶,吴孝灵.基于委托代理的工程监理激励--监督模型[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(3):176-180.
[2]王洪才.“去行政化”与“纪宝成难题”求解[J].高等理科教育,2011(2):1-6.
[3]苏文洋.百姓的天空京东大苏的北京论语2.0[M].北京:新华出版社,2010:71.
[4]王全宝,李敏.科研机构的去行政化难题[J].中国新闻周刊,2011(16):36-38.
[5]郭军灵,盛亚.美日德非营利科研机构管理的比较研究及其启示[J].科研管理,2004,25(5):116-121.
[6]李慧聪,霍国庆.现代科研院所治理:内涵、演进路径及量化体系[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2015,36(8):10-17.
[7]BOATRIGHT J R.Contractors as Stakeholders:Reconciling Stakeholder Theory with the nexus-of-contracts Firm[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2002,26(9):1837-1852.
[8]WILLIAMSON O E.Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implications[J].Accounting Review,1978,86(343):596.
[9]Mitchell R K,Agle B R,Wood D J.Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience:Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts[J].Academy of Management Review,1997,22(4):853-886.
[10]陈闻,彭雯,彭勇.产学研合作研究生培养模式发展探析--基于利益相关者理论的视角[J].广西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2013,49(2):144-148.
[11]吴增基.论我国高校的官本位倾向及其克服的条件[J].学术界,2006,(6):261-267.
[12]李政刚.“去行政化”背景下公益类科研院所改革与治理的新探索[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2015,36(8):18-27.
[13]刘太刚.非营利组织及其法律规制[M].北京:中国法制出版社,2009:178.
[14]王琪.高校去行政化:原因、本质和路径选择[J].大学(学术版),2010(9):32-35.
[15]范鹏飞,赵怀罡.委托-代理理论中的监督问题及其应用[J].南京邮电学院学报(自然科学版),2000,20(4):70-72.
[16]朱林美,周晶,吴孝灵.基于委托代理的工程监理激励--监督模型[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(3):176-180.