消费者反馈机制下食品质量安全监管三方演化博弈及仿真分析
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摘要
食品安全问题关系到公众健康、社会稳定和经济发展,一直都是社会各界关注的热点问题之一。近年来,食品安全问题层出不穷,社会各界都在为如何强化食品安全努力。文章从食品质量安全监管角度出发,在考虑信息不对称及有限理性条件下,构建基于消费者反馈机制的食品生产企业、第三方检测机构和政府监管部门之间的三方演化博弈模型,分析了不同行为主体间策略选择的相互影响机制和不同参数变化下各主体策略选择的演化趋势,并运用Matlab 2016b对博弈模型进行了仿真分析,仿真结果表明各行为主体对消费者反馈机制的敏感性(即对消费者反馈的价值感知)以及检测与监管的成本高低是影响其决策行为的重要因素。最后,提出了消费者反馈机制下食品质量安全监管的对策与建议,为提高食品质量安全水平,维护市场秩序指明了方向。
Food safety issues related to public health, social stability and economic development, has always been one of the hot issues of concern to all sectors of society. In recent years, food safety problems emerge in an endless stream, all sectors are trying their best to enhance food safety. Thus, from the food quality and safety supervision point of view, and based on the theory of information asymmetry, bounded rationality and consumer feedback mechanism, this paper constructs tripartite evolution game model among food production enterprises, third party testing institutions and government regulators, and analyzes the interaction mechanism between the strategies of different subjects and the evolution trend of each subject strategy selection under different parameter changes. The game model is simulated by Matlab 2016 b, the results show that the sensitivity of each subject to consumer feedback (le, The perception of the value of consumer feedback), as well as the cost of detection and supervision is important factors affecting their decision-making behaviors.Finally, the countermeasures and suggestions on food quality and safety supervision under the feedback mechanism of consumers are put forward. In order to improve the safety level of food quality and to maintain the market order, the direction is pointed out.
Food safety issues related to public health, social stability and economic development, has always been one of the hot issues of concern to all sectors of society. In recent years, food safety problems emerge in an endless stream, all sectors are trying their best to enhance food safety. Thus, from the food quality and safety supervision point of view, and based on the theory of information asymmetry, bounded rationality and consumer feedback mechanism, this paper constructs tripartite evolution game model among food production enterprises, third party testing institutions and government regulators, and analyzes the interaction mechanism between the strategies of different subjects and the evolution trend of each subject strategy selection under different parameter changes. The game model is simulated by Matlab 2016 b, the results show that the sensitivity of each subject to consumer feedback (le, The perception of the value of consumer feedback), as well as the cost of detection and supervision is important factors affecting their decision-making behaviors.Finally, the countermeasures and suggestions on food quality and safety supervision under the feedback mechanism of consumers are put forward. In order to improve the safety level of food quality and to maintain the market order, the direction is pointed out.
引文
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[2]DORA M,van GOUBERGEN D,KUMAR M,et al.Application of lean practices in small and medium-sized food enterprises[J].British Food Journal,2014,116(1):125-141.
[3]BASELICE A,COLANTUONI F,LASS D A,et al.Trends in EU consumers'attitude towards fresh-cut fruit and vegetables[J].Food Quality and Preference,2017,59:87-96.
[4]AUNG M M,CHANG Y S.Traceability in a food supply chain:Safety and quality perspectives[J].Food Control,2014,39:172-184.
[5]BRASHEARS M M,CHAVES B D.The diversity of beef safety:A global reason to strengthen our current systems[J].Meat Science,2017,132:59-71.
[6]热比亚·吐尔逊,宋华,于亢亢.供应链安全管理、食品认证和绩效的关系[J].管理科学,2016(4):59-69.
[7]徐玲玲,赵京,李清光,等.食品可追溯体系建设的标准问题研究[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2017,23(4):56-63.
[8]STADLMULLER L,MATT M,STGER H P,et al.An operational hygiene inspection scoring system for Austrian high-risk companies producing food of animal origin[J].Food Control,2017,77:121-130.
[9]谢康,肖静华,赖金天,等.食品安全“监管困局”、信号扭曲与制度安排[J].管理科学学报,2017(2):1-17.
[10]全世文,曾寅初.我国食品安全监管者的信息瞒报与合谋现象分析---基于委托代理模型的解释与实践验证[J].管理评论,2016(2):210-218.
[11]宋亚辉.食品安全标准的私法效力及其矫正[J].清华法学,2017(2):155-175.
[12]周开国,杨海生,伍颖华.食品安全监督机制研究---媒体、资本市场与政府协同治理[J].经济研究,2016(9):58-72.
[13]王海燕,陈欣,于荣.质量链协同视角下的食品安全控制与治理研究[J].管理评论,2016(11):228-234.
[14]TIOZZO B,MARI S,RUZZA M,et al.Consumers'perceptions of food risks:A snapshot of the Italian Triveneto area[J].Appetite,2017,111:105-115.
[15]李玉峰,刘敏,平瑛.食品安全事件后消费者购买意向波动研究:基于恐惧管理双重防御的视角[J].管理评论,2015(6):186-196.
[16]靳明,赵敏,杨波,等.食品安全事件影响下的消费替代意愿分析---以肯德基食品安全事件为例[J].中国农村经济,2015(12):75-92.
[17]王建华,葛佳烨,刘茁.民众感知、政府行为及监管评价研究---基于食品安全满意度的视角[J].软科学,2016(1):36-40,65.