目标设置至关重要吗?来自专利喜与忧的证据
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摘要
中国专利申请和授权量均取得了可喜成绩,也存在已有专利多集中于国内专利等令人担忧的问题。本文验证了作为政府绩效管理关键环节的目标设置的作用,具体采用2001-2010年中国30个省份的面板数据,运用双重差分法(DID)对五年规划中发明专利授权量目标设置对发明专利授权量、海外发明专利申请比重的影响进行研究。结果显示,五年规划中发明专利授权量目标设置显著提高了发明专利授权量,但也显著降低了海外专利申请量的比重。现有专利目标设置使政府往往高度关注专利数量增长,专利保护知识产权、鼓励发明创造的"初心"往往被忽略。
Considerable achievenments have been achieved by China in terms of the volume of patent applications and patent grants.However,there are also issues,including the domestic concentration of patent applications. As the key link of government performance management,the role of goal-setting in them needs to be verified. Base on the panel data of 30 provinces in China from 2001-2010,this paper use Difference-in-difference( DID) model to study the impact of setting a goal of the invention patent grant amount in the five-year-plan on the number of invention patent grant and the proportion of overseas invention patent applications. The results show that setting a goal of the invention patent grant amount in the five-year-plan has a significant positive impact on the number of invention patent grant,and poses a significant negative impact on the proportion of overseas invention patent. The current number-oriented patent goal-setting makes the government pay high attention to promoting the growth of the number of patents,but the original meaning of patents intellectual property protection always be ignored.
Considerable achievenments have been achieved by China in terms of the volume of patent applications and patent grants.However,there are also issues,including the domestic concentration of patent applications. As the key link of government performance management,the role of goal-setting in them needs to be verified. Base on the panel data of 30 provinces in China from 2001-2010,this paper use Difference-in-difference( DID) model to study the impact of setting a goal of the invention patent grant amount in the five-year-plan on the number of invention patent grant and the proportion of overseas invention patent applications. The results show that setting a goal of the invention patent grant amount in the five-year-plan has a significant positive impact on the number of invention patent grant,and poses a significant negative impact on the proportion of overseas invention patent. The current number-oriented patent goal-setting makes the government pay high attention to promoting the growth of the number of patents,but the original meaning of patents intellectual property protection always be ignored.
引文
[1]刘凤朝,潘雄锋.我国八大经济区专利结构分布及其变动模式研究[J].中国软科学,2005,(6):96-100.
[2]马亮.目标治国、绩效差距与政府行为:研究述评与理论展望[J].公共管理与政策评论,2017,6(2):77-91.
[3]魏四新,郭立宏.我国地方政府绩效目标设置的研究——基于目标设置理论视角[J].中国软科学,2011,(2):8-15.
[4]阎波,吴建南.问责、组织政治知觉与印象管理:目标责任考核情境下的实证研究[J].管理评论,2013,25(11):74-84.
[5]吴建南,杨宇谦,阎波.政府绩效评价:指标设计与模式构建[J].西安交通大学学报(社会科学版),2007,(5):79-85.
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[7]吴丹,胡鞍钢,鄢一龙.国家发展五年规划的战略分析与实践认识——以“十二五”规划为例[J].清华大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016,(1):27-39,189.
[8]龙小宁,王俊.中国专利激增的动因及其质量效应[J].世界经济,2015,(6):115-142.
[9]李伟,夏向阳.专利促进政策对区域专利增长的影响分析——以宁波为例[J].科学学研究,2011,(8):1176-1183.
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[11]刘云,谭龙,张振伟.RFP框架下区域专利增长的差异性特征分析[J].科学学研究,2016,34(5):668-677.
[12]Li X.Behind the recent surge of Chinese patenting:An institutional view[J].Research Policy,2012,41(1):236-249.
[13]Hu A G Z,Zhang P,Zhao L.China as number one?Evidence from China's most recent patenting surge[J].Journal of Development Economics,2017,124:107-119.
[14]文家春,朱雪忠.政府资助专利费用对我国技术创新的影响机理研究[J].科学学研究,2009,27(5):686-691.
[15]Harris J,Bromiley P.Incentives to cheat:The influence of executive compensation and firm performance on financial misrepresentation[J].Organization Science,2007,18(3):350-367.
[16]Latham G P,Borgogni L,Petitta L.Goal setting and performance management in the public sector[J].International Public Management Journal,2008,11(4):385-403.
[17]Sitkin S B,See K E,Miller C C,et al.The paradox of stretch goals:Organizations in pursuit of the seemingly impossible[J].Academy of Management Review,2011,36(3):544-566.
[18]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[19]马建飞,王建康.五年规划量化指标中期评估方法[J].技术经济与管理研究,2016,(9):114-118.
[20]西安市2016年度省考指标任务分解表[EB/OL].http://www.xa.gov.cn/ptl/def/def/index_1121_6774_ci_trid_2164722.html.
[21]Chun Y H,Rainey H G.Goal ambiguity in US federal agencies[J].Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,2005,15(1):1-30.
[22]刘焕,吴建南,徐萌萌.不同理论视角下的目标偏差及影响因素研究述评[J].公共行政评论,2016,9(1):151-171,186.
[23]Bevan G,Hood C.What’s measured is what matters:Targets and gaming in the English public health care system[J].Public administration,2006,84(3):517-538.
[24]Kelman S,Friedman J N.Performance improvement and performance dysfunction:An empirical examination of distortionary impacts of the emergency room wait-time target in the English National Health Service[J].Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,2009,19(4):917-946.
[25]朱国云.科层制与中国社会组织管理模式[J].管理世界,1999,(5):207-208.
[2]马亮.目标治国、绩效差距与政府行为:研究述评与理论展望[J].公共管理与政策评论,2017,6(2):77-91.
[3]魏四新,郭立宏.我国地方政府绩效目标设置的研究——基于目标设置理论视角[J].中国软科学,2011,(2):8-15.
[4]阎波,吴建南.问责、组织政治知觉与印象管理:目标责任考核情境下的实证研究[J].管理评论,2013,25(11):74-84.
[5]吴建南,杨宇谦,阎波.政府绩效评价:指标设计与模式构建[J].西安交通大学学报(社会科学版),2007,(5):79-85.
[6]Rothstein B.The Chinese paradox of high growth and low quality of government:The cadre organization meets Max Weber[J].Governance,2015,28(4):533-548.
[7]吴丹,胡鞍钢,鄢一龙.国家发展五年规划的战略分析与实践认识——以“十二五”规划为例[J].清华大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016,(1):27-39,189.
[8]龙小宁,王俊.中国专利激增的动因及其质量效应[J].世界经济,2015,(6):115-142.
[9]李伟,夏向阳.专利促进政策对区域专利增长的影响分析——以宁波为例[J].科学学研究,2011,(8):1176-1183.
[10]詹爱岚,翟青.中国专利激增动因及创新力研究[J].科学学研究,2013,(10):1504-1511.
[11]刘云,谭龙,张振伟.RFP框架下区域专利增长的差异性特征分析[J].科学学研究,2016,34(5):668-677.
[12]Li X.Behind the recent surge of Chinese patenting:An institutional view[J].Research Policy,2012,41(1):236-249.
[13]Hu A G Z,Zhang P,Zhao L.China as number one?Evidence from China's most recent patenting surge[J].Journal of Development Economics,2017,124:107-119.
[14]文家春,朱雪忠.政府资助专利费用对我国技术创新的影响机理研究[J].科学学研究,2009,27(5):686-691.
[15]Harris J,Bromiley P.Incentives to cheat:The influence of executive compensation and firm performance on financial misrepresentation[J].Organization Science,2007,18(3):350-367.
[16]Latham G P,Borgogni L,Petitta L.Goal setting and performance management in the public sector[J].International Public Management Journal,2008,11(4):385-403.
[17]Sitkin S B,See K E,Miller C C,et al.The paradox of stretch goals:Organizations in pursuit of the seemingly impossible[J].Academy of Management Review,2011,36(3):544-566.
[18]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[19]马建飞,王建康.五年规划量化指标中期评估方法[J].技术经济与管理研究,2016,(9):114-118.
[20]西安市2016年度省考指标任务分解表[EB/OL].http://www.xa.gov.cn/ptl/def/def/index_1121_6774_ci_trid_2164722.html.
[21]Chun Y H,Rainey H G.Goal ambiguity in US federal agencies[J].Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,2005,15(1):1-30.
[22]刘焕,吴建南,徐萌萌.不同理论视角下的目标偏差及影响因素研究述评[J].公共行政评论,2016,9(1):151-171,186.
[23]Bevan G,Hood C.What’s measured is what matters:Targets and gaming in the English public health care system[J].Public administration,2006,84(3):517-538.
[24]Kelman S,Friedman J N.Performance improvement and performance dysfunction:An empirical examination of distortionary impacts of the emergency room wait-time target in the English National Health Service[J].Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,2009,19(4):917-946.
[25]朱国云.科层制与中国社会组织管理模式[J].管理世界,1999,(5):207-208.