强德性知识论的认知难题及其解决路径
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摘要
作为人类认知最为非凡的成就,知识与认知有着内在的关联,对知识的描绘离不开认知的术语。当代德性知识论就主张,知识是认知能力的产物,赋予一个主体知识需要赋予他相关的认知能力。然而,延展认知论题对认知能力之外的环境因素的强调,使得当代德性知识论特别是强德性知识论出现了认知难题。针对这一难题,国外学者指出了两条可能的解决路径:一是从强德性知识论转向弱德性知识论;二是从个体有机体的认知能动性走向分布的认知能动性。但是依托于这两条路径能否成功解决认知难题仍存在争论,问题的关键仍有赖于我们对能力及认知本质的理解。
As the most remarkable achievement of human cognition,knowledge has an inherent relation with cognition. Because depiction of knowledge depends on cognitive terms. Supporters of contemporary virtue epistemology claim that knowledge is the product of cognitive ability,and a subject with knowledge needs relevant cognitive abilities with him. However,the emphasis of the extended cognition thesis on environmental factors other than cognitive ability makes a cognitive problem for contemporary virtue epistemology,especially strong virtue epistemology. In view of this problem,foreign scholars have pointed out two possible solutions. One is from the strong virtue knowledge goes to the weak one; The second is from the individual cognitive agency to the distribution of cognitive agency. But it is still controversial whether these two approaches can successfully solve the cognitive problem. The key of this problem still depends on our understanding of ability and the mark of cognition.
As the most remarkable achievement of human cognition,knowledge has an inherent relation with cognition. Because depiction of knowledge depends on cognitive terms. Supporters of contemporary virtue epistemology claim that knowledge is the product of cognitive ability,and a subject with knowledge needs relevant cognitive abilities with him. However,the emphasis of the extended cognition thesis on environmental factors other than cognitive ability makes a cognitive problem for contemporary virtue epistemology,especially strong virtue epistemology. In view of this problem,foreign scholars have pointed out two possible solutions. One is from the strong virtue knowledge goes to the weak one; The second is from the individual cognitive agency to the distribution of cognitive agency. But it is still controversial whether these two approaches can successfully solve the cognitive problem. The key of this problem still depends on our understanding of ability and the mark of cognition.
引文
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[6]Vaesen K.Critical Discussion:Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition:A Reply to Kelp and Greco[J].Erkenntnis,2013,78(4):963-970.
[7]Pritchard,D.Knowledge,Luck and Virtue[J].Journal of Dialectics of Nature,2016,38(5):1-9.
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[9]Michael David Kirchhoff,Will Newsome.Distributed cognitive agency in virtue epistemology[J].Philosophical Explorations,2012,15(2):165-180.
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[2]Michaelian,K.Jfgi:from distributed cognition to distributed reliabilism*[J].Philosophical Issues,2014,24(1):314-346.
[3]Vaesen K.Knowledge without credit,exhibit 4:extended cognition[J].Synthese,2011,181(3):515-529.
[4]Kelp,C.Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology[J].Erkenntnis,2013,78(2):245-252.
[5]Greco,J.A(Different)Virtue Epistemology[J].Philosophy&Phenomenological Research,2012,85(1):1-26.
[6]Vaesen K.Critical Discussion:Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition:A Reply to Kelp and Greco[J].Erkenntnis,2013,78(4):963-970.
[7]Pritchard,D.Knowledge,Luck and Virtue[J].Journal of Dialectics of Nature,2016,38(5):1-9.
[8]Kenneth Aizawa.Distinguishing virtue epistemology and extended cognition[J].Philosophical Explorations,2012,15(2):91-106.
[9]Michael David Kirchhoff,Will Newsome.Distributed cognitive agency in virtue epistemology[J].Philosophical Explorations,2012,15(2):165-180.
[10]Clark,A.Supersizing the Mind:Embodied,Action,and Cognitive Extension[M].Oxford University Press,2008.
[11]Ronald N.Giere.Distributed cognition without distributed knowing[J].Social Epistemology,2007,21(3):313-320.
[12]于小晶,李建会.对延展认知的再审视[J].自然辩证法研究,2014(12):23-29.
[13]费多益.记忆的建构论研究[J].哲学动态,2010(8):92-98.