存在垂直质量差异的出行平台定价机制研究
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摘要
基于垂直差异理论,分析了出行平台中存在垂直质量差异的专车和快车出行服务定价问题。研究结果显示:当网络外部性较小时,垄断平台对乘客收取接入费用,且对专车司机收取较高提成;当网络外部性增强时,平台在乘客市场上的接入定价将提高,在司机市场上,对快车司机的使用定价将降低,而对专车司机的使用定价则不变;当网络外部型增强时,垄断平台在用户市场上的规模将增大,在司机市场上,提供专车和快车服务的司机规模均会增大。
The pricing mechanism of a travel platform with different levels of service quality is studied based on the vertical differentiation theory. In detail,Di Di express and Di Di premier have different service qualities. The results show that when network externality is small,the monopoly platform will charge passengers an access fee,and charge the premier drivers a higher use-fee than the express drivers. With increasing network externalities,the platform would raise the access fee from passengers,while the use-fee of express drivers would be reduced and the use-fee of premier drivers remain unchanged. With increasing network externalities,the platform would gain an increasing size in the passenger market,and the market size of express drivers and premier drivers would also increase.
The pricing mechanism of a travel platform with different levels of service quality is studied based on the vertical differentiation theory. In detail,Di Di express and Di Di premier have different service qualities. The results show that when network externality is small,the monopoly platform will charge passengers an access fee,and charge the premier drivers a higher use-fee than the express drivers. With increasing network externalities,the platform would raise the access fee from passengers,while the use-fee of express drivers would be reduced and the use-fee of premier drivers remain unchanged. With increasing network externalities,the platform would gain an increasing size in the passenger market,and the market size of express drivers and premier drivers would also increase.
引文
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[2]ROCHET J C,TIROLE J.Platform competition in two-sided markets[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2003,1(4):990-1029.
[3]HAGIU A.Strategic decisions for multisided platforms[J].MIT Sloan Management Review,2014,55(2):71-80.
[4]BOUDREAU K J,JEPPESEN L B.Unpaid crowd complementors:the platform network effect mirage[J].Strategic Management Journal,2015,36(12):1761-1777.
[5]MCINTYRE D P,SRINIVASAN A.Networks,Platforms,and Strategy:Emerging Views and Next steps[J].Strategic Management Journal,2017,38(1):141-160.
[6]TELLIS G J,YIN E,NIRAJ R.Does quality win?Network effects versus quality in high-tech markets[J].Journal of Marketing Research,2009,46(2):135-149.
[7]MCINTYRE D P.In a network industry,does product quality matter?[J].Journal of Product Innovation Management,2011,28(1):99-108.
[8]ARMSTRONG M.Competition in two-sided markets[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2005,37(3):668-691.
[9]吴汉洪,孟剑.双边市场理论与应用述评[J].中国人民大学学报,2014,28(2):149-156.
[10]程贵孙,陈宏民,孙武军.双边市场视角下的平台企业行为研究[J].经济理论与经济管理,2006,2006(9):55-60.
[11]熊艳.产业组织的双边市场理论---一个文献综述[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2010(4):49-54.
[12]PAN L.Pricing of media platforms with vertical differentiation[J].Economic Computation&Economic Cybernetics Studies&Research,2017,51.
[13]ROGER,G.Two-sided competition with vertical differentiation[J].Journal of Economics,2016.120(3),193-217.
[14]BENDER M,GAL-OR E,GEYLANI T.Daily Deal Websites in Markets with Asymmetric Information[R].University of Pittsburgh,Working Paper.2012:1-36.
[15]ZENNYO Y.Competition between vertically differentiated platforms[J].Journal of Industry Competition&Trade,2015,16(3):1-13.
[16]SERIO L,TEDESCHI P,URSINO G.Making sense of(ultra)low-cost flights vertical differentiation in two-sided markets[J].Management Science,2018,64(1):401-420.