税收计划与企业税负
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摘要
基于2002—2012年中国省级税收计划的数据,本文发现地方税务机关很少出现未完成税收计划的情况;2008年金融危机以来,国税局的税收目标增长率有所下降,但是地税局的税收目标增长率反而逆势上升,与经济税源的偏离程度也相应拉大;与此同时,税务机关为避免出现未完成税收计划的情况,相机提高税务稽查的强度和平滑税收收入。这表明,在中国现行的税收征管体制下,税收计划具有很强的指令性,是税务机关必须完成的任务底线。进一步深入到企业层面,本文发现当地方税务机关完成税收计划的压力较大时,企业税负显著上升;而当年初税收目标增长率较高时,这一情况更加严重。此外,地方税务机关的税务稽查显著提高了非国有企业的税负,但是对地方国有企业没有显著影响。本文的研究揭示出,中央政府在运用税收政策进行宏观经济调控特别是治理衰退时,不能仅仅停留在政策设计本身,还需要改革当前脱胎于计划经济的税收征管体制。
Around the world, tax policy is becoming an important tool with which to manage the macro-economy, especially in confronting economic recessions. The central government of China introduced a series of counter-cyclical tax cut policies after the 2008 financial crisis. However, statistics show that tax rates have actually increased at both the macro and micro levels since 2008. In another striking contrast with various tax cut policies, local governments have launched tax plans to guarantee the growth of tax revenue, and tax authorities at all levels have taken corresponding measures to strengthen tax collection. These contradictory phenomena make one wonder what has hindered the implementation of tax cut policies and how local governments have achieved tax growth despite such policies.For a long time, Chinese tax administrators have used a tax plan management system. A tax plan is a tax revenue target for a given period that a tax authority must collect. Since the tax-sharing system reform in 1994, state provincial tax bureaus' plans are mainly issued by the head office of the State Administration of Taxation(SAT), while local provincial tax bureaus' plans are mainly issued by provincial governments. Both the SAT and local governments have long regarded the achievement of tax plan targets as the main basis for treating tax collection as an issue of overriding importance. The literature investigates why the government intervenes in the corporate tax burden from various perspectives. This paper explores the mechanism of this intervention from the perspective of tax collection by quantifying the pressure on provincial tax authorities to achieve their tax plans.Analyzing data on the tax plans of provincial tax authorities in China from 2002 to 2012, this paper finds that, on average, 99% of local and 97% of state tax bureaus at the provincial level completed their tax plans. However, as many as 55% of local tax bureaus and 42% of state tax bureaus stated in their annual work reports that they had difficulties achieving their plans. Faced with an economic downturn and shrinking tax sources after the financial crisis, state provincial tax bureaus reduced their tax targets, but those of local tax bureaus increased, causing tax targets to deviate more from tax sources. Meanwhile, tax authorities strengthened inspection to collect more tax revenues and achieve their targets. Using data of listed companies during the same period, this paper examines the impact of tax plans on the corporate tax burden. The regression results show that when tax authorities are under great pressure to achieve their tax plans, tax burdens on firms rise significantly, and this effect intensifies when the tax target growth rate is higher. Moreover, tax inspection increases the tax burdens of non-SOEs significantly, but it has no significant impact on local SOEs. This shows that tax authorities adopt different strategies for firms with different property rights.To meet the government's goal of ensuring tax growth, tax plans—especially those issued by local governments—may deviate from actual economic tax sources. At the same time, because achieving tax plans represents the "bottom-line" mission of a tax authority, authorities impose excessive taxes on firms and smooth taxes over time. This paper reveals that the tax plan management system born out of the planned economy is what accounts for the marginal impact of the central government's tax cut policies on individual enterprises. Amid the new wave of global tax cuts, merely introducing tax cut policies is far from sufficient to ease the tax burden on enterprises. It is equally important to reform the tax collection system. The integration of the national and local taxation offices would undoubtedly help improve the independence of tax authorities and reduce the intervention of local governments in tax collection.Given the global and domestic increase in economic uncertainty, a flexible tax plan that can be adjusted according to economic conditions might be preferred. When assessing the performance of tax authorities and their personnel, the government should avoid over-emphasizing the achievement of tax plans and instead put more emphasis on the quality of tax collection.
Around the world, tax policy is becoming an important tool with which to manage the macro-economy, especially in confronting economic recessions. The central government of China introduced a series of counter-cyclical tax cut policies after the 2008 financial crisis. However, statistics show that tax rates have actually increased at both the macro and micro levels since 2008. In another striking contrast with various tax cut policies, local governments have launched tax plans to guarantee the growth of tax revenue, and tax authorities at all levels have taken corresponding measures to strengthen tax collection. These contradictory phenomena make one wonder what has hindered the implementation of tax cut policies and how local governments have achieved tax growth despite such policies.For a long time, Chinese tax administrators have used a tax plan management system. A tax plan is a tax revenue target for a given period that a tax authority must collect. Since the tax-sharing system reform in 1994, state provincial tax bureaus' plans are mainly issued by the head office of the State Administration of Taxation(SAT), while local provincial tax bureaus' plans are mainly issued by provincial governments. Both the SAT and local governments have long regarded the achievement of tax plan targets as the main basis for treating tax collection as an issue of overriding importance. The literature investigates why the government intervenes in the corporate tax burden from various perspectives. This paper explores the mechanism of this intervention from the perspective of tax collection by quantifying the pressure on provincial tax authorities to achieve their tax plans.Analyzing data on the tax plans of provincial tax authorities in China from 2002 to 2012, this paper finds that, on average, 99% of local and 97% of state tax bureaus at the provincial level completed their tax plans. However, as many as 55% of local tax bureaus and 42% of state tax bureaus stated in their annual work reports that they had difficulties achieving their plans. Faced with an economic downturn and shrinking tax sources after the financial crisis, state provincial tax bureaus reduced their tax targets, but those of local tax bureaus increased, causing tax targets to deviate more from tax sources. Meanwhile, tax authorities strengthened inspection to collect more tax revenues and achieve their targets. Using data of listed companies during the same period, this paper examines the impact of tax plans on the corporate tax burden. The regression results show that when tax authorities are under great pressure to achieve their tax plans, tax burdens on firms rise significantly, and this effect intensifies when the tax target growth rate is higher. Moreover, tax inspection increases the tax burdens of non-SOEs significantly, but it has no significant impact on local SOEs. This shows that tax authorities adopt different strategies for firms with different property rights.To meet the government's goal of ensuring tax growth, tax plans—especially those issued by local governments—may deviate from actual economic tax sources. At the same time, because achieving tax plans represents the "bottom-line" mission of a tax authority, authorities impose excessive taxes on firms and smooth taxes over time. This paper reveals that the tax plan management system born out of the planned economy is what accounts for the marginal impact of the central government's tax cut policies on individual enterprises. Amid the new wave of global tax cuts, merely introducing tax cut policies is far from sufficient to ease the tax burden on enterprises. It is equally important to reform the tax collection system. The integration of the national and local taxation offices would undoubtedly help improve the independence of tax authorities and reduce the intervention of local governments in tax collection.Given the global and domestic increase in economic uncertainty, a flexible tax plan that can be adjusted according to economic conditions might be preferred. When assessing the performance of tax authorities and their personnel, the government should avoid over-emphasizing the achievement of tax plans and instead put more emphasis on the quality of tax collection.
引文
陈冬、孔墨奇、王红建,2016:《投我以桃,报之以李:经济周期与国企避税》,《管理世界》第5期。
陈晓光,2016:《财政压力、税收征管与地区不平等》,《中国社会科学》第4期。
财政部税务总局,1961:《切实加强工商税收计划工作》,《中国财政》第6期。
方红生、张军,2009:《中国地方政府竞争、预算软约束与扩张偏向的财政行为》,《经济研究》第12期。
傅勇、张晏,2007:《中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价》,《管理世界》第3期。
高培勇,2006:《中国税收持续高速增长之谜》,《经济研究》第12期。
贾俊雪、应世为,2016:《财政分权与企业税收激励——基于地方政府竞争视角的分析》,《中国工业经济》第10期。
金鑫、刘志城、王绍飞,1991:《中国税务百科全书》,经济管理出版社。
吕冰洋、郭庆旺,2011:《中国税收高速增长的源泉:税收能力和税收努力框架下的解释》,《中国社会科学》第2期。
吕冰洋、马光荣、毛捷,2016:《分税与税率:从政府到企业》,《经济研究》第7期。
刘骏、刘峰,2014:《财政集权、政府控制与企业税负》,《会计研究》第1期。
李明、赵旭杰、冯强,2016:《经济波动中的中国地方政府与企业税负:以企业所得税为例》,《世界经济》第11期。
马光荣、李力行,2012:《政府规模、地方治理与企业逃税》,《世界经济》第6期。
田彬彬、范子英,2016:《税收分成、税收努力与企业逃税——来自所得税分享改革的证据》,《管理世界》第12期。
王亚平、吴联生、白云霞,2005:《中国上市公司盈余管理的频率与幅度》,《经济研究》第12期。
曾亚敏、张俊生,2009:《税收征管能够发挥公司治理功用吗?》,《管理世界》第3期。
Bischoff,I.,and W.Gohout,2010,“The Political Economy of Tax Projections”,International Tax and Public Finance,17(2),133—150.
Bradshaw,M.T.,G.Liao,and M.Ma,2016,“Ownership Structure and Tax Avoidance:Evidence from Agency Costs of State Ownership in China”,Social Science Electronic Publishing.
Chatagny,F.,2015,“Incentive Effects of Fiscal Rules on the Finance Minister's Behaviour:Evidence from Revenue Projections in Swiss Cantons”,European Journal of Political Economy,39,184—200.
Chen,S.X.,2017,“The Effect of a Fiscal Squeeze on Tax Enforcement:Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China”,Journal of Public Economics,147,62—76.
Derashid,C.,and H.Zhang,2003,“Effective Tax Rates and the “Industrial Policy”Hypothesis:Evidence from Malaysia”,Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation,12(1),45—62.
Huang,B.,and K.Chen,2012,“Are Intergovernmental Transfers in China Equalizing?”,China Economic Review,23(3),534—551.
Jochimsen,B.,and R.Lehmann,2017,“On the Political Economy of National Tax Revenue Forecasts:Evidence from OECD Countries”,Public Choice,170(3),211—230.
Li,H.,and L.Zhou,2005,“Political Turnover and Economic Performance:the Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China”,Journal of Public Economics,89,1743—1762.
Lin,J.Y.,F.Cai,and Z.Li,1998,“Competition,Policy Burdens,and State-owned Enterprise Reform”,American Economic Review,88(2),422—427.
Pina,A.M.,and N.M.Venes,2011,“The Political Economy of EDP Fiscal Forecasts:an Empirical Assessment”,European Journal of Political Economy,27(3),534—546.
Wu,L.,Y.Wang,B.Lin,C.Li,and S.Chen,2007,“Local Tax Rebates,Corporate Tax Burdens,and Firm Migration:Evidence from China”,Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,26(5),555—583.
① 2016年的目标是减轻企业和个人负担5000多亿元,2017年的目标是减少企业税负3500亿元左右、涉企收费约2000亿元,2018年的目标是企业和个人减税8000多亿元、非税负担3000多亿元。详见2016—2018年国务院政府工作报告。
② 除此之外,也存在一些交叉派任务的情况,即国家税务总局给地税局下达征税任务,省政府给国税局下达征税任务。
(1)摘自四川省国税局关于2008年工作总结和2009年工作安排的报告。
(2)详见《国务院机构改革方案》,http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2018-03/17/content_5275116.htm。
(3)详见2007年9月7日陕西日报的报道《省地税局全力以赴确保完成全年收入任务》,http://shaanxi.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/sjshangwudt/200709/20070905072774.html。
(4)由于2002年以前相关税收原始资料难以获得,2012年以后地方税务机关陆续不再公开发布税收计划的完成比例,所以样本期间为2002—2012年。在税收工作总结和年鉴中,国税局公布的主要是国家税务总局下达税收计划的完成情况,地税局公布的主要是省政府下达税收计划的完成情况。因此,本文主要分析这两种税收计划。
(5)详见国家税务总局关于印发《税务稽查工作规程》的通知(国税发[2009]157号)。
(6)详见新浪网2008年12月17日报道《卡拿要让企业扛不住》,http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2008-12-17/134014894809s.shtml。
(7)数据来源为2003—2013年《中国税务年鉴》。
(8)基于国家统计局的划分标准,本文将31个省级行政单位划分为四大经济区域,分别是东部地区、中部地区、西部地区、东北地区。其中,东部地区包括北京市、天津市、河北省、上海市、江苏省、浙江省、福建省、山东省、广东省、海南省;中部地区包括山西省、安徽省、江西省、河南省、湖北省、湖南省;西部地区包括内蒙古自治区、广西壮族自治区、重庆市、四川省、贵州省、云南省、西藏自治区、陕西省、甘肃省、青海省、宁夏回族自治区、新疆维吾尔自治区;东北地区包括辽宁省、吉林省、黑龙江省。
(9)受篇幅限制,回归结果未报告,感兴趣者可向作者索取。
(10)受篇幅限制,回归结果未报告,感兴趣者可向作者索取。
陈晓光,2016:《财政压力、税收征管与地区不平等》,《中国社会科学》第4期。
财政部税务总局,1961:《切实加强工商税收计划工作》,《中国财政》第6期。
方红生、张军,2009:《中国地方政府竞争、预算软约束与扩张偏向的财政行为》,《经济研究》第12期。
傅勇、张晏,2007:《中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价》,《管理世界》第3期。
高培勇,2006:《中国税收持续高速增长之谜》,《经济研究》第12期。
贾俊雪、应世为,2016:《财政分权与企业税收激励——基于地方政府竞争视角的分析》,《中国工业经济》第10期。
金鑫、刘志城、王绍飞,1991:《中国税务百科全书》,经济管理出版社。
吕冰洋、郭庆旺,2011:《中国税收高速增长的源泉:税收能力和税收努力框架下的解释》,《中国社会科学》第2期。
吕冰洋、马光荣、毛捷,2016:《分税与税率:从政府到企业》,《经济研究》第7期。
刘骏、刘峰,2014:《财政集权、政府控制与企业税负》,《会计研究》第1期。
李明、赵旭杰、冯强,2016:《经济波动中的中国地方政府与企业税负:以企业所得税为例》,《世界经济》第11期。
马光荣、李力行,2012:《政府规模、地方治理与企业逃税》,《世界经济》第6期。
田彬彬、范子英,2016:《税收分成、税收努力与企业逃税——来自所得税分享改革的证据》,《管理世界》第12期。
王亚平、吴联生、白云霞,2005:《中国上市公司盈余管理的频率与幅度》,《经济研究》第12期。
曾亚敏、张俊生,2009:《税收征管能够发挥公司治理功用吗?》,《管理世界》第3期。
Bischoff,I.,and W.Gohout,2010,“The Political Economy of Tax Projections”,International Tax and Public Finance,17(2),133—150.
Bradshaw,M.T.,G.Liao,and M.Ma,2016,“Ownership Structure and Tax Avoidance:Evidence from Agency Costs of State Ownership in China”,Social Science Electronic Publishing.
Chatagny,F.,2015,“Incentive Effects of Fiscal Rules on the Finance Minister's Behaviour:Evidence from Revenue Projections in Swiss Cantons”,European Journal of Political Economy,39,184—200.
Chen,S.X.,2017,“The Effect of a Fiscal Squeeze on Tax Enforcement:Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China”,Journal of Public Economics,147,62—76.
Derashid,C.,and H.Zhang,2003,“Effective Tax Rates and the “Industrial Policy”Hypothesis:Evidence from Malaysia”,Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation,12(1),45—62.
Huang,B.,and K.Chen,2012,“Are Intergovernmental Transfers in China Equalizing?”,China Economic Review,23(3),534—551.
Jochimsen,B.,and R.Lehmann,2017,“On the Political Economy of National Tax Revenue Forecasts:Evidence from OECD Countries”,Public Choice,170(3),211—230.
Li,H.,and L.Zhou,2005,“Political Turnover and Economic Performance:the Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China”,Journal of Public Economics,89,1743—1762.
Lin,J.Y.,F.Cai,and Z.Li,1998,“Competition,Policy Burdens,and State-owned Enterprise Reform”,American Economic Review,88(2),422—427.
Pina,A.M.,and N.M.Venes,2011,“The Political Economy of EDP Fiscal Forecasts:an Empirical Assessment”,European Journal of Political Economy,27(3),534—546.
Wu,L.,Y.Wang,B.Lin,C.Li,and S.Chen,2007,“Local Tax Rebates,Corporate Tax Burdens,and Firm Migration:Evidence from China”,Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,26(5),555—583.
① 2016年的目标是减轻企业和个人负担5000多亿元,2017年的目标是减少企业税负3500亿元左右、涉企收费约2000亿元,2018年的目标是企业和个人减税8000多亿元、非税负担3000多亿元。详见2016—2018年国务院政府工作报告。
② 除此之外,也存在一些交叉派任务的情况,即国家税务总局给地税局下达征税任务,省政府给国税局下达征税任务。
(1)摘自四川省国税局关于2008年工作总结和2009年工作安排的报告。
(2)详见《国务院机构改革方案》,http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2018-03/17/content_5275116.htm。
(3)详见2007年9月7日陕西日报的报道《省地税局全力以赴确保完成全年收入任务》,http://shaanxi.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/sjshangwudt/200709/20070905072774.html。
(4)由于2002年以前相关税收原始资料难以获得,2012年以后地方税务机关陆续不再公开发布税收计划的完成比例,所以样本期间为2002—2012年。在税收工作总结和年鉴中,国税局公布的主要是国家税务总局下达税收计划的完成情况,地税局公布的主要是省政府下达税收计划的完成情况。因此,本文主要分析这两种税收计划。
(5)详见国家税务总局关于印发《税务稽查工作规程》的通知(国税发[2009]157号)。
(6)详见新浪网2008年12月17日报道《卡拿要让企业扛不住》,http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2008-12-17/134014894809s.shtml。
(7)数据来源为2003—2013年《中国税务年鉴》。
(8)基于国家统计局的划分标准,本文将31个省级行政单位划分为四大经济区域,分别是东部地区、中部地区、西部地区、东北地区。其中,东部地区包括北京市、天津市、河北省、上海市、江苏省、浙江省、福建省、山东省、广东省、海南省;中部地区包括山西省、安徽省、江西省、河南省、湖北省、湖南省;西部地区包括内蒙古自治区、广西壮族自治区、重庆市、四川省、贵州省、云南省、西藏自治区、陕西省、甘肃省、青海省、宁夏回族自治区、新疆维吾尔自治区;东北地区包括辽宁省、吉林省、黑龙江省。
(9)受篇幅限制,回归结果未报告,感兴趣者可向作者索取。
(10)受篇幅限制,回归结果未报告,感兴趣者可向作者索取。