双积分政策下新能源汽车产业研发补贴研究
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摘要
双积分政策意在以市场机制引导新能源汽车产业发展,但缺乏对企业技术创新的激励,需要与研发补贴政策组合使用。基于此,本文构建了一个带有研发补贴的双积分政策下新能源汽车供应商制造商决定研发投入水平、供应商产量竞争及制造商产量竞争的三阶段博弈模型,阐释了正积分价格、市场规模对研发投入的影响以及研发补贴的作用机理与效果。研究表明:不考虑研发补贴时,当纵向研发溢出率超过阈值,企业研发投入将随正积分价格、市场规模增加而减少;其次,研发补贴对企业研发投入有激励效果,但应随纵向研发溢出率增加而减少,以规避"挤出效应"。为此提出,"逆溢出率变化"的研发补贴政策与双积分政策组合使用更能完善市场机制,推进技术创新,实现产业健康发展。
With the continuous fermentation of the"cheat up"incident in the new energy automobile industry,the relevant departments decided to completely stop the subsidies for promotion and application of new energy vehicles in 2020,and the"Parallel Management Measures for the Average Fuel Consumption of Passenger Vehicle Enterprises and New Energy Vehicle Points"( hereinafter,the"double integral policy") will continue to lead the development of the industry. However,the industry still has doubts about the double integral policy: Can the"improvisation"policy promote the market-oriented operation of China's new energy auto industry which is highly dependent on the policy with the opening market,and whether the"mileage is king"assessment mechanism can continuously drive independent R&D in the field of new energy automobile in China to enhance product competitiveness? Today,upon the coming of foreign brands,lack of key technologies caused by lack of independent R&D are subject to the disadvantages of China's new energy automobile industry. Therefore,how will the double integral policy affect the R&D investment of new energy auto companies? Second,what kind of policy should the government combine with the double integral policy to encourage independent R&D? Finally,what is the effectiveness of the R&D investment stimulus policy under the double integral policy? How could it be implemented? Answering these questions is critical to ensuring the healthy growth of the new energy automobile industry.With the gradual development of intelligence,networking and sharing,the new energy automobile industry will profoundlychange our lives,and vigorously drive technological changes and economic development. Major countries have successively introduced policies to support new energy automobile industry. Looking back at the literature,the research on new energy automobile industry focuses on exploring the shortcomings of existing policies to formulate more effective industrial policies. The exposure of the new energy automobile industry's"cheat up"incident has led the mainstream view that government failure is the main reason for the deviation of new energy automobile industry policy. Although the double integral policy will dominate the industry development with market mechanisms,the promotion of policies to corporate R&D is not yet known.Under this circumstance,with the combination of R&D subsidy and double integral policy for the new energy automobile industry,it is meaningful to improve the free operation of the market mechanism while improving the new energy automobile industry policy system dominated by the double integral policy. Although relevant research also proposes that China should increase the policy supply for the basic research and development of new energy automobile industry,increase funding,encourage independent R&D,technological innovation,to enhance industrial competitiveness,occupy new technology routes,but only propose suggestions about R&D subsidy. There are no subsidized methods and paths. China has a R&D policy supply for the new energy automobile industry since the " 863" and " 973" programs,but there are two main problems: First,the scale is small,compared with the subsidies for financial promotion and application,the amount of R&D subsidy is small,secondly the coverage is not comprehensive,the future mainstream technology of new energy automobile is difficult to determine in a short time. It is difficult to cultivate long-term industrial competitive advantages only for research project based on R&D funding for specific technology routes.Based on this,this paper constructs a three-stage game model in which the new energy vehicle supplier manufacturer decides the R&D investment level,the supplier output competition and the manufacturer output competition under the double integral policy with R&D subsidy,explaining the impact of the positive integral price and market scale on R&D investment and the mechanism of R&D subsidy.The research shows that:( 1) when the double integral policy is used alone,the R&D investment of new energy auto companies will increase with the increase of the positive integral price and market size before the vertical R&D overflow rate reaches the threshold. In the form of"market access"regulation,the double integral policy requires manufacturers to compensate for negative integral. Increasing R&D investment in new energy automobile business is the first choice of manufacturers. The demand of manufacturers will also drive R&D investment in the whole industry. However,after the technological innovation strength of new energy auto companies has increased and the vertical R&D spillover rate has reached the threshold,enterprises are more inclined to use R&D achievements to obtain more profits. At this stage,enterprises will reduce R&D investment as the positive credit price and market size increase,and turn to market development.( 2) R&D subsidy has a stimulating effect on R&D investment of new energy auto companies within the effective range. The improvement of competitiveness is a process from quantitative change to qualitative change,which requires sustained high intensity investment,and the company bears high risks and uncertainties. The government's R&D subsidy clarify the direction of industrial development and market development expectations,reduce R&D risks,and enhance the enthusiasm and initiative of R&D investment.( 3) The government should inspect the development status of the new energy automobile industry in stages,and adjust the amount of R&D subsidy according to the changes in the vertical R&D spillover rate of new energy automobile industry suppliers and manufacturers,so that the policy role remains in the positive effect range. The combination of R&D subsidy and double integral policy with "reverse spillover rate changes"can promote industrial technology innovation and build competitive advantage while improving market mechanisms.The above conclusions bring the following enlightenment:( 1) The industrial policy of new energy automobile should have R&D subsidy face to the core basic components( components),advanced basic processes,key basic materials and industrial technology foundation " four basics" engineering,multi-disciplinary and multi-field motors and batteries,as well as process technology,modular technology,system integration technology,innovative design,software development for research and design testing,and R&D of standards,especially international standards,form the core competitiveness of China's new energy automobile industry.( 2) Emerging industrial policies should be re-evaluated according to the stage of industrial development and market performance,focusing on solving the"reverse selection"and"moral hazard"problems arising from information asymmetry in the implementation process,avoiding structural deviations of industrial policies and ensuring the incentive process. Ensure the controllability of the incentive process and improve the resource allocation of emerging industries to the Pareto optimal state.
With the continuous fermentation of the"cheat up"incident in the new energy automobile industry,the relevant departments decided to completely stop the subsidies for promotion and application of new energy vehicles in 2020,and the"Parallel Management Measures for the Average Fuel Consumption of Passenger Vehicle Enterprises and New Energy Vehicle Points"( hereinafter,the"double integral policy") will continue to lead the development of the industry. However,the industry still has doubts about the double integral policy: Can the"improvisation"policy promote the market-oriented operation of China's new energy auto industry which is highly dependent on the policy with the opening market,and whether the"mileage is king"assessment mechanism can continuously drive independent R&D in the field of new energy automobile in China to enhance product competitiveness? Today,upon the coming of foreign brands,lack of key technologies caused by lack of independent R&D are subject to the disadvantages of China's new energy automobile industry. Therefore,how will the double integral policy affect the R&D investment of new energy auto companies? Second,what kind of policy should the government combine with the double integral policy to encourage independent R&D? Finally,what is the effectiveness of the R&D investment stimulus policy under the double integral policy? How could it be implemented? Answering these questions is critical to ensuring the healthy growth of the new energy automobile industry.With the gradual development of intelligence,networking and sharing,the new energy automobile industry will profoundlychange our lives,and vigorously drive technological changes and economic development. Major countries have successively introduced policies to support new energy automobile industry. Looking back at the literature,the research on new energy automobile industry focuses on exploring the shortcomings of existing policies to formulate more effective industrial policies. The exposure of the new energy automobile industry's"cheat up"incident has led the mainstream view that government failure is the main reason for the deviation of new energy automobile industry policy. Although the double integral policy will dominate the industry development with market mechanisms,the promotion of policies to corporate R&D is not yet known.Under this circumstance,with the combination of R&D subsidy and double integral policy for the new energy automobile industry,it is meaningful to improve the free operation of the market mechanism while improving the new energy automobile industry policy system dominated by the double integral policy. Although relevant research also proposes that China should increase the policy supply for the basic research and development of new energy automobile industry,increase funding,encourage independent R&D,technological innovation,to enhance industrial competitiveness,occupy new technology routes,but only propose suggestions about R&D subsidy. There are no subsidized methods and paths. China has a R&D policy supply for the new energy automobile industry since the " 863" and " 973" programs,but there are two main problems: First,the scale is small,compared with the subsidies for financial promotion and application,the amount of R&D subsidy is small,secondly the coverage is not comprehensive,the future mainstream technology of new energy automobile is difficult to determine in a short time. It is difficult to cultivate long-term industrial competitive advantages only for research project based on R&D funding for specific technology routes.Based on this,this paper constructs a three-stage game model in which the new energy vehicle supplier manufacturer decides the R&D investment level,the supplier output competition and the manufacturer output competition under the double integral policy with R&D subsidy,explaining the impact of the positive integral price and market scale on R&D investment and the mechanism of R&D subsidy.The research shows that:( 1) when the double integral policy is used alone,the R&D investment of new energy auto companies will increase with the increase of the positive integral price and market size before the vertical R&D overflow rate reaches the threshold. In the form of"market access"regulation,the double integral policy requires manufacturers to compensate for negative integral. Increasing R&D investment in new energy automobile business is the first choice of manufacturers. The demand of manufacturers will also drive R&D investment in the whole industry. However,after the technological innovation strength of new energy auto companies has increased and the vertical R&D spillover rate has reached the threshold,enterprises are more inclined to use R&D achievements to obtain more profits. At this stage,enterprises will reduce R&D investment as the positive credit price and market size increase,and turn to market development.( 2) R&D subsidy has a stimulating effect on R&D investment of new energy auto companies within the effective range. The improvement of competitiveness is a process from quantitative change to qualitative change,which requires sustained high intensity investment,and the company bears high risks and uncertainties. The government's R&D subsidy clarify the direction of industrial development and market development expectations,reduce R&D risks,and enhance the enthusiasm and initiative of R&D investment.( 3) The government should inspect the development status of the new energy automobile industry in stages,and adjust the amount of R&D subsidy according to the changes in the vertical R&D spillover rate of new energy automobile industry suppliers and manufacturers,so that the policy role remains in the positive effect range. The combination of R&D subsidy and double integral policy with "reverse spillover rate changes"can promote industrial technology innovation and build competitive advantage while improving market mechanisms.The above conclusions bring the following enlightenment:( 1) The industrial policy of new energy automobile should have R&D subsidy face to the core basic components( components),advanced basic processes,key basic materials and industrial technology foundation " four basics" engineering,multi-disciplinary and multi-field motors and batteries,as well as process technology,modular technology,system integration technology,innovative design,software development for research and design testing,and R&D of standards,especially international standards,form the core competitiveness of China's new energy automobile industry.( 2) Emerging industrial policies should be re-evaluated according to the stage of industrial development and market performance,focusing on solving the"reverse selection"and"moral hazard"problems arising from information asymmetry in the implementation process,avoiding structural deviations of industrial policies and ensuring the incentive process. Ensure the controllability of the incentive process and improve the resource allocation of emerging industries to the Pareto optimal state.
引文
[1] MAX A. Government policy and the development of electrical vehicles in Japan[J]. Energy policy,2006 34(4):433-443.
[2] GASS V,SCHMIDT J,SCHMID E. Analysis of alternative policy instruments to promote electric vehicles in Austria[J].Renewable energy,2014,61:96-101.
[3] BERGEK A,BERGGREN C,KITE Research Group. The impact of environmental policy instruments on innovation:A review of energy and automotive industry studies[J]. Ecological economics,2014,106:112-123.
[4]王洛忠,张艺君.我国新能源汽车产业政策协同问题研究——基于结构、过程与内容的三维框架[J].中国行政管理,2017(3):101-107.Wang Luozhong,Zhang Yijun. Research on policy synergy of new energy automobile industry in China-Based on threedimensional analysis framework of structure,process and content[J]. Chinese Public Administration,2017(3):101-107.
[5]汪涛,赵国栋,王婧.战略性新兴产业创新政策研究:以NEVI为例[J].科研管理,2016,37(6):01-09.Wang Tao,Zhao Guodong,Wang Jing. A research on innovation policies of strategic emerging industry based on the new energy vehicle industry in China[J]. Science Research Management,2016,37(6):01-09.
[6]白雪洁,孟辉.新兴产业、政策支持与激励约束缺失——以新能源汽车产业为例[J].经济学家,2018(1):50-60.Bai Xuejie,Meng Hui. Emerging industries,lack of policy support and incentives and constraints:Taking the new energyautomobile industry as an example[J]. Economist,2018(1):50-60.
[7]李珒,战建华.中国新能源汽车产业的政策变迁与政策工具选择[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(10):198-208.Li Jin,Zhan Jianhua. Policy changes and policy instruments selection of China’s new energy vehicle industry[J]. China Population,Resources and Environment,2017,27(10):198-208.
[8]张国强,徐艳梅.新能源汽车政策工具运用的国际镜鉴与引申[J].改革,2017(3):130-138.Zhang Guoqiang,Xu Yanmei. International mirror and extension of new energy vehicle policy tool[J]. Reform,2017(3):130-138.
[9]卢超,尤建新,戎珂,石涌江,陈衍泰.新能源汽车产业政策的国际比较研究[J].科研管理,2014,35(12):26-35.Lu Chao,You Jianxin,Rong Ke,Shi Yongjiang,Chen Yantai. International comparison of industrial policies for newenergy vehicles[J]. Science Research Management,2014,35(12):26-35.
[10]李苏秀,刘颖琦,王静宇,张雷.基于市场表现的中国新能源汽车产业发展政策剖析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(9):158-166.Li Suxiu,Liu Yingqi,Wang Jingyu,Zhang Lei. China’s new energy vehicle industry development policy:Based on the market performance[J]. China Population,Resources and Environment,2016,26(9):158-166.
[11]张永安,周怡园.新能源汽车补贴政策工具挖掘及量化评价[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(10):188-197.Zhang Yongan,Zhou Yiyuan. Policy instrument mining and quantitative evaluation of new energy vehicles subsidies[J].China Population, Resources and Environment,2017,27(10):188-197.
[12]周叔莲,吕铁,贺俊.新时期我国高增长行业的产业政策分析[J].中国工业经济,2008(9):46-57.Zhou Shulian,Lu Tie,He Jun. Transformation of industrial policy for Chinese high-growth industries in the new age[J]. China Industrial Economics,2008(9):46-57.
[13]李晓静,艾兴政,唐小我.基于供应链竞争的技术创新价值与溢出效应[J].系统工程学报,2017,32(6):808-817.Li Xiaojing,Ai Xingzheng,Tang Xiaowo. Technological innovation value and spillover effect based on supply chain competition[J]. Journal of Systems Engineering,2017,32(6):808-817.
[14]徐和,彭伟真.信息不对称下制造商激励合同及价格策略研究[J].系统工程学报,2017,32(4):474-485.Xu He,Peng Weizhen. The optimal price decision and incentive contract design under asymmetric information[J]. Journal of Systems Engineering,2017,32(4):474-485.
[15]魏守道,杨仕辉.碳税政策下低碳技术研发形式比较[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(S1):771-777.Wei Shoudao,Yang Shihui. Comparison between organizations of environmental R&D under carbon tax policy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science,2015,23(S1):771-777.
[2] GASS V,SCHMIDT J,SCHMID E. Analysis of alternative policy instruments to promote electric vehicles in Austria[J].Renewable energy,2014,61:96-101.
[3] BERGEK A,BERGGREN C,KITE Research Group. The impact of environmental policy instruments on innovation:A review of energy and automotive industry studies[J]. Ecological economics,2014,106:112-123.
[4]王洛忠,张艺君.我国新能源汽车产业政策协同问题研究——基于结构、过程与内容的三维框架[J].中国行政管理,2017(3):101-107.Wang Luozhong,Zhang Yijun. Research on policy synergy of new energy automobile industry in China-Based on threedimensional analysis framework of structure,process and content[J]. Chinese Public Administration,2017(3):101-107.
[5]汪涛,赵国栋,王婧.战略性新兴产业创新政策研究:以NEVI为例[J].科研管理,2016,37(6):01-09.Wang Tao,Zhao Guodong,Wang Jing. A research on innovation policies of strategic emerging industry based on the new energy vehicle industry in China[J]. Science Research Management,2016,37(6):01-09.
[6]白雪洁,孟辉.新兴产业、政策支持与激励约束缺失——以新能源汽车产业为例[J].经济学家,2018(1):50-60.Bai Xuejie,Meng Hui. Emerging industries,lack of policy support and incentives and constraints:Taking the new energyautomobile industry as an example[J]. Economist,2018(1):50-60.
[7]李珒,战建华.中国新能源汽车产业的政策变迁与政策工具选择[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(10):198-208.Li Jin,Zhan Jianhua. Policy changes and policy instruments selection of China’s new energy vehicle industry[J]. China Population,Resources and Environment,2017,27(10):198-208.
[8]张国强,徐艳梅.新能源汽车政策工具运用的国际镜鉴与引申[J].改革,2017(3):130-138.Zhang Guoqiang,Xu Yanmei. International mirror and extension of new energy vehicle policy tool[J]. Reform,2017(3):130-138.
[9]卢超,尤建新,戎珂,石涌江,陈衍泰.新能源汽车产业政策的国际比较研究[J].科研管理,2014,35(12):26-35.Lu Chao,You Jianxin,Rong Ke,Shi Yongjiang,Chen Yantai. International comparison of industrial policies for newenergy vehicles[J]. Science Research Management,2014,35(12):26-35.
[10]李苏秀,刘颖琦,王静宇,张雷.基于市场表现的中国新能源汽车产业发展政策剖析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(9):158-166.Li Suxiu,Liu Yingqi,Wang Jingyu,Zhang Lei. China’s new energy vehicle industry development policy:Based on the market performance[J]. China Population,Resources and Environment,2016,26(9):158-166.
[11]张永安,周怡园.新能源汽车补贴政策工具挖掘及量化评价[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(10):188-197.Zhang Yongan,Zhou Yiyuan. Policy instrument mining and quantitative evaluation of new energy vehicles subsidies[J].China Population, Resources and Environment,2017,27(10):188-197.
[12]周叔莲,吕铁,贺俊.新时期我国高增长行业的产业政策分析[J].中国工业经济,2008(9):46-57.Zhou Shulian,Lu Tie,He Jun. Transformation of industrial policy for Chinese high-growth industries in the new age[J]. China Industrial Economics,2008(9):46-57.
[13]李晓静,艾兴政,唐小我.基于供应链竞争的技术创新价值与溢出效应[J].系统工程学报,2017,32(6):808-817.Li Xiaojing,Ai Xingzheng,Tang Xiaowo. Technological innovation value and spillover effect based on supply chain competition[J]. Journal of Systems Engineering,2017,32(6):808-817.
[14]徐和,彭伟真.信息不对称下制造商激励合同及价格策略研究[J].系统工程学报,2017,32(4):474-485.Xu He,Peng Weizhen. The optimal price decision and incentive contract design under asymmetric information[J]. Journal of Systems Engineering,2017,32(4):474-485.
[15]魏守道,杨仕辉.碳税政策下低碳技术研发形式比较[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(S1):771-777.Wei Shoudao,Yang Shihui. Comparison between organizations of environmental R&D under carbon tax policy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science,2015,23(S1):771-777.