风险规避下二级供应链的低碳减排运营策略
|
摘要
针对由一个风险厌恶型制造商和一个风险厌恶型零售商组成的二级供应链,分别建立了低碳减排约束下零售商为主导者和制造商为主导者的供应链模型。当制造商在碳限额交易政策下会投资减排技术来降低碳排放时,利用均值方差方法求解两类模型的博弈均衡策略。进一步分析集中式供应链决策模型,将其分别与零售商主导和制造商主导供应链的利润和碳排放进行比较。最后通过数值算例验证理论结果并分析了零售商和制造商风险厌恶系数的变化对供应链运营策略的影响。研究结果表明:与零售商主导和制造商主导供应链相比,尽管制造商和零售商合作能够使得供应链利润增加但是存在利润增加的上界值,而且碳排放量可能会增加;对于固定的碳配额,供应链成员的风险厌恶属性使得具有主导地位的成员能够获得更多利润;与零售商主导供应链相比,制造商在其为主导者供应链中会投资水平略低的减排技术但能产生更少的碳排放量。
Considering a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a risk-averse manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer, this paper proposes two optimization models for manufacturer-dominated and retailer-dominated decentralized cases under the constraint of carbon emission reduction. A mean-variance method is used to solve the game equilibrium strategy for each optimization model when the manufacturer invests in the emission reduction technology to reduce the carbon emissions under the cap-and-trade regulation. An optimization model for the centralized case is further proposed and compared with those two optimization models mentioned above. Finally, several numerical examples are used to illustrate the theoretical results and to study the effects of risk aversion coefficients on operational decisions of the supply chain. The results show that,compared with manufacturer-dominated and retailer-dominated supply chains, cooperation between the manufacturer and the retailer increases the profit of the supply chain and may reduce the carbon emissions, while there is an upper bound for the increase of the profit. For a fixed carbon cap, the risk aversion attribute makes the dominant member gain more profit. Compared with the retailer-dominated supply chain, the manufacture in the manufacturer-dominated supply chain invests in the emission reduction technology at a slightly lower level and less carbon emissions are emitted.
Considering a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a risk-averse manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer, this paper proposes two optimization models for manufacturer-dominated and retailer-dominated decentralized cases under the constraint of carbon emission reduction. A mean-variance method is used to solve the game equilibrium strategy for each optimization model when the manufacturer invests in the emission reduction technology to reduce the carbon emissions under the cap-and-trade regulation. An optimization model for the centralized case is further proposed and compared with those two optimization models mentioned above. Finally, several numerical examples are used to illustrate the theoretical results and to study the effects of risk aversion coefficients on operational decisions of the supply chain. The results show that,compared with manufacturer-dominated and retailer-dominated supply chains, cooperation between the manufacturer and the retailer increases the profit of the supply chain and may reduce the carbon emissions, while there is an upper bound for the increase of the profit. For a fixed carbon cap, the risk aversion attribute makes the dominant member gain more profit. Compared with the retailer-dominated supply chain, the manufacture in the manufacturer-dominated supply chain invests in the emission reduction technology at a slightly lower level and less carbon emissions are emitted.
引文
[1] Dong C W,et al.Sustainability investment under cap-and-rade regulation[J].Annals of Operations Research,2016,240:509～531.
[2] Cao K Y,Xu X P,Wu Q,Zhang Q P.Optimal production and carbon emission reduction level under cap-and-trade and low carbon subsidy policies[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,167:505～513.
[3] Yang L,et al.Pricing and carbon emission reduction decisions in supply chains with vertical and horizontal cooperation[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017,191:286～297.
[4] Yang L,Ji J N,Wang M Z,Wang Z Z.The manufacturer’s joint decisions of channel selections and carbon emission reductions under the cap-and-trade regulation[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2018,193:506～523.
[5] Bai Q G,Gong Y Y,Jin M Z,Xu X H.Effects of carbon emission reduction on supply chain coordination with vendor-managed deteriorating product inventory[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2019,208:83～99.
[6] 杨宽,刘信钰.基于消费者低碳偏好和内部融资的供应链减排决策[J].系统工程,2016,34(11):87～97.
[7] 刘名武等.消费者低碳偏好下零售商主导供应链减排合作与协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(12):3109～3117.
[8] 张永明,楼高翔.竞争型低碳供应链下参考参考效应的微分博弈[J].系统工程,2018,36(6):101～108.
[9] 陈晓红,曾祥宇,王傅强.碳限额交易机制下碳交易价格对供应链碳排放的影响[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(10):2562～2571.
[10] 周艳菊,鲍茂景,陈晓红,徐选华.基于公平关切的低碳供应链广告合作-减排成本分担契约与协调[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(2):121～129.
[11] Zhou Y,Ye X.Differential game model of joint emission reduction strategies and contract design in a dual-channel supply chain[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,190:592～607.
[12] Feng B,et al.Analysis of the market-based adjustable outsourcing contract under uncertainties[J].Production and Operations Management,2013,22(1):278～288.
[13] Li J,Choi T M,Cheng T C E.Mean variance analysis of fast fashion supply chains with returns policy[J].IEEE Transactions on Systems,Man,and Cybernetics:Systems,2014,44(4):422～434.
[14] Xiao T J,Xu T T.Pricing and product line strategy in a supply chain with risk-averse players[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2014,156:305～315.
[15] Cui Q Q,Chiu C H,Dai X,Li Z F.Store brand introduction in a two-echelon logistics system with a risk-averse retailer[J].Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review,2016,90:69～89.
[16] Chiu C H,Choi T M.Supply chain risk analysis with mean-variance models:A technical review[J].Annals of Operations Research,2016,240:489～507.
[17] Li Q H,et al.Dual-channel supply chain decisions under asymmetric information with a risk-averse retailer[J].Annals of Operations Research,2017,257:423～447.
[18] Zhao Y X,Choi T M,Cheng T C E,Wang S Y.Mean-risk analysis of wholesale price contracts with stochastic price-dependent demand[J].Annals of Operations Research,2017,257:491～518.
[19] Chen X,Hao G,Li L.Channel coordination with a loss-averse retailer and option contracts[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2014,150:52～57.
[20] Xie G,Yue W Y,Wang S Y.Optimal selection of cleaner production in a green supply chain with risk aversion[J].Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization,2015,11(2):515～528.
[21] 马利军,葛羊亮,薛巍立,田歆.不确定环境下损失厌恶零售商的提前支付决策[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(2):315～323.
[22] Chiu C H,Choi T M,Dai X,Shen B,Zheng J H.Optimal advertising budget allocation in luxury fashion markets with social influences:A mean- variance analysis[J].Production and Operations Management,2018,27(8):1611～1629.
[2] Cao K Y,Xu X P,Wu Q,Zhang Q P.Optimal production and carbon emission reduction level under cap-and-trade and low carbon subsidy policies[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,167:505～513.
[3] Yang L,et al.Pricing and carbon emission reduction decisions in supply chains with vertical and horizontal cooperation[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017,191:286～297.
[4] Yang L,Ji J N,Wang M Z,Wang Z Z.The manufacturer’s joint decisions of channel selections and carbon emission reductions under the cap-and-trade regulation[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2018,193:506～523.
[5] Bai Q G,Gong Y Y,Jin M Z,Xu X H.Effects of carbon emission reduction on supply chain coordination with vendor-managed deteriorating product inventory[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2019,208:83～99.
[6] 杨宽,刘信钰.基于消费者低碳偏好和内部融资的供应链减排决策[J].系统工程,2016,34(11):87～97.
[7] 刘名武等.消费者低碳偏好下零售商主导供应链减排合作与协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(12):3109～3117.
[8] 张永明,楼高翔.竞争型低碳供应链下参考参考效应的微分博弈[J].系统工程,2018,36(6):101～108.
[9] 陈晓红,曾祥宇,王傅强.碳限额交易机制下碳交易价格对供应链碳排放的影响[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(10):2562～2571.
[10] 周艳菊,鲍茂景,陈晓红,徐选华.基于公平关切的低碳供应链广告合作-减排成本分担契约与协调[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(2):121～129.
[11] Zhou Y,Ye X.Differential game model of joint emission reduction strategies and contract design in a dual-channel supply chain[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,190:592～607.
[12] Feng B,et al.Analysis of the market-based adjustable outsourcing contract under uncertainties[J].Production and Operations Management,2013,22(1):278～288.
[13] Li J,Choi T M,Cheng T C E.Mean variance analysis of fast fashion supply chains with returns policy[J].IEEE Transactions on Systems,Man,and Cybernetics:Systems,2014,44(4):422～434.
[14] Xiao T J,Xu T T.Pricing and product line strategy in a supply chain with risk-averse players[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2014,156:305～315.
[15] Cui Q Q,Chiu C H,Dai X,Li Z F.Store brand introduction in a two-echelon logistics system with a risk-averse retailer[J].Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review,2016,90:69～89.
[16] Chiu C H,Choi T M.Supply chain risk analysis with mean-variance models:A technical review[J].Annals of Operations Research,2016,240:489～507.
[17] Li Q H,et al.Dual-channel supply chain decisions under asymmetric information with a risk-averse retailer[J].Annals of Operations Research,2017,257:423～447.
[18] Zhao Y X,Choi T M,Cheng T C E,Wang S Y.Mean-risk analysis of wholesale price contracts with stochastic price-dependent demand[J].Annals of Operations Research,2017,257:491～518.
[19] Chen X,Hao G,Li L.Channel coordination with a loss-averse retailer and option contracts[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2014,150:52～57.
[20] Xie G,Yue W Y,Wang S Y.Optimal selection of cleaner production in a green supply chain with risk aversion[J].Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization,2015,11(2):515～528.
[21] 马利军,葛羊亮,薛巍立,田歆.不确定环境下损失厌恶零售商的提前支付决策[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(2):315～323.
[22] Chiu C H,Choi T M,Dai X,Shen B,Zheng J H.Optimal advertising budget allocation in luxury fashion markets with social influences:A mean- variance analysis[J].Production and Operations Management,2018,27(8):1611～1629.