上市公司私有化退市的“安全港”制度研究
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摘要
经过三十余年的理论争议和判例矫正,2014年美国特拉华州最高法院在Kahn v.MFW中最终为上市公司私有化退市的"安全港"制度背书。经董事会特别委员会和少数股东多数决的公司治理内部机制是对控股股东重大利益冲突的双重清洁,商事裁判标准也由完全公平转为商业判断规则。美国式"安全港"的功能发挥有赖于诸多前提,整体运作成本较高,法律移植殊为不易。中国证券监管机构强制性地部分引入清洁机制,积极功能表现在迫使控股股东向公众股东披露信息,赋予公共股东一定的谈判力量,同时也导致法权保护的财产规则理论所预测的"敲竹杠"问题与效率减损。未来中国A股上市公司私有化退市中的利益冲突问题应从外部规制和内部治理机制两个层面进行制度完善。
Through the theoretical controversy and case correction over thirty years,the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware of United States,finally endorsed the"safe harbor"for listed company privatization of delisting in v.MFW in 2014.Through double cleaning of major interest conflicts of majority stockholders by the internal company governance,which is decided by the Special Committee of board of directors and a majority of the minority shareholders,standard of commercial referee will fairly transform into business judgment rule.However,the functioning of American double-cleaning system depends on several premises,leading to higher overall operation costs and especial difficulties in legal transplantation.At present,Chinese securities regulators have compulsively introduced partial cleaning system to force majority stockholders to disclose the information to the public shareholders so as to endow public shareholders with certain negotiating power and have also led to the"hold-up"issue and efficiency loss predicted by the property rule theory of legal right protection.The institutional perfection for conflicts of interest in A shares listed company privatization of delisting in China should be conducted from two perspectives,external regulations and internal governance mechanism.
Through the theoretical controversy and case correction over thirty years,the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware of United States,finally endorsed the"safe harbor"for listed company privatization of delisting in v.MFW in 2014.Through double cleaning of major interest conflicts of majority stockholders by the internal company governance,which is decided by the Special Committee of board of directors and a majority of the minority shareholders,standard of commercial referee will fairly transform into business judgment rule.However,the functioning of American double-cleaning system depends on several premises,leading to higher overall operation costs and especial difficulties in legal transplantation.At present,Chinese securities regulators have compulsively introduced partial cleaning system to force majority stockholders to disclose the information to the public shareholders so as to endow public shareholders with certain negotiating power and have also led to the"hold-up"issue and efficiency loss predicted by the property rule theory of legal right protection.The institutional perfection for conflicts of interest in A shares listed company privatization of delisting in China should be conducted from two perspectives,external regulations and internal governance mechanism.
引文
1.Richard Booth,“Majority-of-Minority Voting and Fairness in Freeze-out Mergers”,Villanova Law Review,Vol.59.No.6(2014).
2.Guhan Subramanian,“Fixing Freezeouts”,The Yale Law Journal,Vol.115,No.1(2005).
3.Vikramaditya Khanna and Umakanth Varottil,“Regulating Squeeze-Outs in India:A Comparative Perspective”,The American Journal of Comparative Law,Vol.63,No.4(2015).
(1)See Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman,“A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law”,Harvard Law Review,Vol.109,No.8(1996),pp.1958-1960.
(2)See Luca Enriques,“Related Party Transactions:Policy Options and Real-World Challenges(with a Critique of the European-Commission Proposal)”,European Business Organization Law Review,Vol.16,No.1(2015),p.20.
(3)See Kahn v.Lynch Communication Systems,Inc.,638 A.2d 1110(Del.,1994).
(4)参见中银国际证券有限责任公司:“关于招商局公路网络科技控股股份有限公司换股吸收合并华北高速公路股份有限公司暨关联交易之估值报告”(2017年6月),第16-17页。
(5)See M.Todd Henderson and Richard A.Epstein,“The Going-private Phenomenon:Causes and Implications”,The University of Chicago Law Review,Vol.76,No.1(2009),p.2.
(6)See In re Cox Communications,Inc.Shareholders Litigation,879 A.2d 604(Del.Ch.2005).
(7)See Leo E.Strine,Jr.,“Derivative Impact?Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle”,The Business Lawyer,Vol.57,No.4(2002),p.1376.
(8)See Scott V.Simpson,“The Emerging Role of the Special Committee-Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest”,The Business Lawyer,Vol.43,No.2(1988),p.666.
(9)In re Digex,Inc.Shareholders Litig,Consol.C.A.No.18336,slip op.at 72(Del.Ch.Dec.13,2000,revised Jan.19,2001).
(10)See Melvin Eisenberg,“Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law”,The Journal of Corporation Law,Vol.13,No.4(1988),p.999.
(11)See Richard Booth,“Majority-of-Minority Voting and Fairness in Freeze-out Mergers”,Villanova Law Review,Vol.59.No.6(2014),p.94.
(12)See J.Robert Brown,Jr.,“Disloyalty without Limits,‘Independent’Directors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty”,Kentucky Law Journal,Vol.95,No.1(2006),pp.55-56.
(13)William Allen,Jack Jacobs and Leo Strine,Jr.,“Function Over Form:A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law”,The Business Lawyer,Vol.56,No.4(2001),p.1308.
(14)See Miriam Bitton and Odelia Minnes,“Exploring the Standard of Review of Transactions with Controlling Shareholders after in re MFWShareholders Litigation(Decided May 29th,2013)”,Business,Entrepreneurship&Law,Vol.7,No.2(2014),pp.457-461.
(15)See James S.Linck,Jeffrey M Netter and Tina Yang,“The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand of Directors”,Review of Financial Studies,Vol.22,No.8(2009),p.3287.
(16)See Guhan Subramanian,“Fixing Freezeouts”,The Yale Law Journal,Vol.115,No.1(2005),p.2.
(17)Ibid,p.63.
(18)See In re CNX Gas Corporation Shareholders Litigation,2010 WL 2291842,Case No.5377-VCL(Del.Ch.May 25,2010).
(19)See Stephen M.Bainbridge,Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis,New York:Oxford University Press,2012,p.64.
(20)In re John Q.Hammons Hotels Inc.Shareholder Litigation,2009 WL 3165613,at*12 n.38(Del.Ch.Oct.2,2009)(“[I]t is not sufficient for the special committee to merely be disinterested and independent.Rather,the committee must be given sufficient authority and opportunity to bargain on behalf of the minority stockholders,including the ability to hire independent legal and financial advisers.”).
(21)See William T.Allen,“Independent Directors in MBO Transactions:Are They Fact or Fantasy?”,The Business Lawyer,Vol.45,No.4(1990),p.2055.
(22)See Gregory Varallo,Srinivas Raju and Michael Allen,Special Committees,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.21.
(23)See Scott V.Simpson and Katherine Brody,“The Evolving Role of Special Committees in M&A Transactions:Seeking Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Controlling Shareholder Transactions and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest”,The Business Lawyer,Vol.69,No.4(2014),p.1129.
(24)Potter Anderson&Corroon LLP,Special Committees:A Primer,Corporate Governance Advisor,New York:Aspen Publishers,March/A-pril 2007,Vol.15,No.2,available at http://www.potteranderson.com/media/publication/167_Special_20Committees_20A_20Primer_20_20JFG_20MKR_20Corp_20Gov_20Adv_20April_2027_202007.pdf.
(25)See Reinier Kraakman,The Anatomy of Corporate Law(second edition),New York:Oxford University Press,2009,pp.35-37.
(26)See Edwin W.Hecker,“Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities Revisited”,University of Kansas Law Review,Vol.61,No.5(2013),p.923.
(27)See note(16),p.53.
(28)See note(16),pp.53-54.
(29)See note(11),pp.94-96.
(30)See note(11),p.96.
(31)See note(11),p.94.
(32)See note(11),p.94.
(33)Lewis v.Vogelstein,699 A.2d 327(Del.Ch.1997).Also See William Allen,Reinier Kraakman and Guhan Subramania,Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization(fourth edition),New York:Wolters Kluwer,2012,pp.293-294.
(34)See note(13),p.1308.
(35)See J.Robert Brown,“Speaking with Complete Candor:Shareholder Ratification and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty”,Hastings Law Journal,Vol.54,No.3(2002),p.641.
(36)See note(13),p.1308.
(37)See Stephen M.Bainbridge,The Complete Guide to Sarbanes-Oxley,New York:Adams Business,2007,pp.38-72.
(38)Ibid note(13),p.1307.
(39)See note(14),pp.464-465.
(40)See In re MFW Shareholders Litigation,67 A.3d 496,530(Del.Ch.2013).
(41)Ibid.
(42)See In re Pure Resources Inc.,Shareholders Litigation,808 A.2d 421(Del.Ch.2002).
(43)See A.C.Pritchard,“Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders:The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price”,Berkeley Business Law Journal,Vol.83,No.1(2004),pp.101-104.
(44)See note(35),p.641.
(45)See Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock,“Embattled CEOs”,Texas Law Review,Vol.88,No.5(2010),p.987;Paul Rose,“The Corporate Governance Industry”,The Journal of Corporation Law,Vol.32,No.4(2007),p.897;Leo E.Strine,Jr.,“The Delaware Way:How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We(and Europe)Face”,Delaware Journal of Corporate Law,Vol.30,No.3(2005),p.688.
(46)See Donald C.Langewoor,t“The SEC,Retail Investors,and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets”,Virginia Law Review,Vol.95,No.4(2009),pp.1060-1061.
(47)See Vikramaditya Khanna and Umakanth Varotti,l“Regulating Squeeze-Outs in India:A Comparative Perspective”,The American Journal of Comparative Law,Vol.63,No.4(2015),p.1045.
(48)See David H.Webber,“Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions:An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiff in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions”,Delaware Journal of Corporate Law,Vol.38,No.3(2014),p.907.
(49)See Stephen Choi,Jill Fisch and Marcel Kahan,“The Power of Proxy Advisors:Myth or Reality”,Emory Law Journal,Vol.59,No.4(2010),p.869.
(50)See note(18).
(51)See note(42).
(52)See note(47),p.1045.
(53)参见财政部《企业会计准则第20号---企业合并》第二章“同一控制下的企业合并”。
(54)See Hideki Kanda and Curtis Milhaup,t“Re-examining Legal Transplants:The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law”,The American Journal of Comparative Law,Vol.51,No.4(2003),pp.893-896.
(55)这个判断是基于两个法律实证研究的一致结论。参见甘培忠等主编:《新类型公司诉讼疑难问题研究》,北京大学出版社2009年版,第343-344页;王军:“公司经营者忠实和勤勉义务诉讼研究---以14省、直辖市的137件判决书为样本”,《北方法学》2011年第4期,第30页。
(56)《上市公司重大资产重组管理办法》2016年修订依然沿袭一直以来的惯例,参见其第45条第1款。
(57)See Lucian Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan,“Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts”,in:Randall Morch,ed.,Concentrated Corporate Ownership,Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,2000,pp.250-252;also see note(16),pp.34-36.
(58)参见《证券法》(2014)第50条第(二)项、第55条(暂停上市)和第56条(终止上市)。
(59)参见《收购办法》(2014年)第35条第1款。
(60)参见郭雳:“中国式监事会:安于何处,去向何方?”,《比较法研究》2016年第2期,第74页。
(61)指上市公司拟与关联人达成的总额高于300万元或高于上市公司最近经审计净资产值5%的关联交易。
(62)参见2001年中国证监会《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》第五(一)1段。
(63)参见张辉:《上市公司法律规范体系重构》,社会科学文献出版社2010年版,第45页。
(64)例如《上市公司证券发行管理办法》第44条。
(65)参见《公司法》第16条第3款。
(66)坊间俗称控股股东、实际控制人向中小股东“拜票”。各种案例参见童璐:“反对有效!30天13家公司议案遭股东大会否决”,载证券时报网http://www.stcn.com/2016/0701/12777484.shtml,2018年3月1日访问。
(67)See Guido Calabresi and A.Douglas Melamed,“Property Rules,Liability Rules,and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral”,Harvard Law Review,Vol.85,No.6(1972),p.1089.
(68)See Richard A.Epstein,“A Clear View of the Cathedral:The Dominance of Property Rules”,The Yale Law Journal,Vol.106,No.7(1997),p.2091.
(69)See Zohar Goshen,“The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing:Theory Meets Reality”,California Law Review,Vol.91,No.2(2003),p.395.
(70)Ibid,p.395.
(71)参见王高英:“表决权排除适用例外之可行性分析”,《公司法律评论》(2009年卷),上海人民出版社2010年版,第415页。在Google网站输入“被少数股东否决”等词条进行检索,有相当数量的报道是关于上市公司关联交易由于MOM被否决的例子,例如注(67)。
(72)Ibid note(69),p.424.
(73)参见《收购办法》第83条关于一致行动人的若干情形推定。
(74)See Bernard Black,Reinier Kraakman and Anna Tarassova,“Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance:What Went Wrong”,Stanford Law Review,Vol.52,No.6(2000),pp.1731-1807.中文译本参见[美]伯纳德·布莱克、芮里尔·柯艾克曼、安娜·塔若索瓦:“俄罗斯私有化与公司治理:错在何处”,彭冰译,载许章润主编:《清华法学》(第3辑),清华大学出版社2003年版,第192-254页。本文参考了彭冰的译文,下同。
(75)See note(74),p.1755.
(76)根据世界银行的“Doing Dusiness in China”项目对中国公司少数股东保护程度的评估和打分(以0-10分为范围,10分为最佳),2017年上海的“少数股东保护度指数”为4.5,“利益冲突的监管指数”为5,“股东治理指数”为4.5分,“董事责任的指数”为1,“股东诉讼的容易度指数”为1,“股东权指数”为1。北京的得分也类似。均不及格,其中公司商事司法审判的短板是重要原因。参见世界银行网http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/china#protecting-minority-investors,2018年3月1日访问。
(77)根据亚洲公司治理协会出版的《亚洲公司治理观察》,中国上市公司的治理水平近四年不断下降。See The Asian Corporate Governance Association,CG Watch 2016:Ecosystems Matter,http://www.acga-asia.org/upload/files/research_preview/20161014021202_3.pdf;[英]史蒂夫·约翰逊:“中国公司治理退步”,FT中文网http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001070081?full=y,2018年3月1日访问。
(78)Ibid note(74),p.1783.
(79)参见郭雳:“上市公司私有化交易的审查标准与利益平衡”,《北大法律评论》(第15卷第2辑),北京大学出版社2014年版,第402-403页。
(80)参见彭冰:“中央和地方关系中的上市公司治理”,《北京大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)2008年第6期,第80页。
(81)关于在控股股东存在的情况下增强独立董事独立性的Bebchuk新方案,See Lucian A.Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdan,i“Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders”,University of Pennsylvania Law Review,Vol.165,No.6(2017),p.1272.
(82)See note(74),p.1752.
2.Guhan Subramanian,“Fixing Freezeouts”,The Yale Law Journal,Vol.115,No.1(2005).
3.Vikramaditya Khanna and Umakanth Varottil,“Regulating Squeeze-Outs in India:A Comparative Perspective”,The American Journal of Comparative Law,Vol.63,No.4(2015).
(1)See Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman,“A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law”,Harvard Law Review,Vol.109,No.8(1996),pp.1958-1960.
(2)See Luca Enriques,“Related Party Transactions:Policy Options and Real-World Challenges(with a Critique of the European-Commission Proposal)”,European Business Organization Law Review,Vol.16,No.1(2015),p.20.
(3)See Kahn v.Lynch Communication Systems,Inc.,638 A.2d 1110(Del.,1994).
(4)参见中银国际证券有限责任公司:“关于招商局公路网络科技控股股份有限公司换股吸收合并华北高速公路股份有限公司暨关联交易之估值报告”(2017年6月),第16-17页。
(5)See M.Todd Henderson and Richard A.Epstein,“The Going-private Phenomenon:Causes and Implications”,The University of Chicago Law Review,Vol.76,No.1(2009),p.2.
(6)See In re Cox Communications,Inc.Shareholders Litigation,879 A.2d 604(Del.Ch.2005).
(7)See Leo E.Strine,Jr.,“Derivative Impact?Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle”,The Business Lawyer,Vol.57,No.4(2002),p.1376.
(8)See Scott V.Simpson,“The Emerging Role of the Special Committee-Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest”,The Business Lawyer,Vol.43,No.2(1988),p.666.
(9)In re Digex,Inc.Shareholders Litig,Consol.C.A.No.18336,slip op.at 72(Del.Ch.Dec.13,2000,revised Jan.19,2001).
(10)See Melvin Eisenberg,“Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law”,The Journal of Corporation Law,Vol.13,No.4(1988),p.999.
(11)See Richard Booth,“Majority-of-Minority Voting and Fairness in Freeze-out Mergers”,Villanova Law Review,Vol.59.No.6(2014),p.94.
(12)See J.Robert Brown,Jr.,“Disloyalty without Limits,‘Independent’Directors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty”,Kentucky Law Journal,Vol.95,No.1(2006),pp.55-56.
(13)William Allen,Jack Jacobs and Leo Strine,Jr.,“Function Over Form:A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law”,The Business Lawyer,Vol.56,No.4(2001),p.1308.
(14)See Miriam Bitton and Odelia Minnes,“Exploring the Standard of Review of Transactions with Controlling Shareholders after in re MFWShareholders Litigation(Decided May 29th,2013)”,Business,Entrepreneurship&Law,Vol.7,No.2(2014),pp.457-461.
(15)See James S.Linck,Jeffrey M Netter and Tina Yang,“The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand of Directors”,Review of Financial Studies,Vol.22,No.8(2009),p.3287.
(16)See Guhan Subramanian,“Fixing Freezeouts”,The Yale Law Journal,Vol.115,No.1(2005),p.2.
(17)Ibid,p.63.
(18)See In re CNX Gas Corporation Shareholders Litigation,2010 WL 2291842,Case No.5377-VCL(Del.Ch.May 25,2010).
(19)See Stephen M.Bainbridge,Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis,New York:Oxford University Press,2012,p.64.
(20)In re John Q.Hammons Hotels Inc.Shareholder Litigation,2009 WL 3165613,at*12 n.38(Del.Ch.Oct.2,2009)(“[I]t is not sufficient for the special committee to merely be disinterested and independent.Rather,the committee must be given sufficient authority and opportunity to bargain on behalf of the minority stockholders,including the ability to hire independent legal and financial advisers.”).
(21)See William T.Allen,“Independent Directors in MBO Transactions:Are They Fact or Fantasy?”,The Business Lawyer,Vol.45,No.4(1990),p.2055.
(22)See Gregory Varallo,Srinivas Raju and Michael Allen,Special Committees,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.21.
(23)See Scott V.Simpson and Katherine Brody,“The Evolving Role of Special Committees in M&A Transactions:Seeking Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Controlling Shareholder Transactions and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest”,The Business Lawyer,Vol.69,No.4(2014),p.1129.
(24)Potter Anderson&Corroon LLP,Special Committees:A Primer,Corporate Governance Advisor,New York:Aspen Publishers,March/A-pril 2007,Vol.15,No.2,available at http://www.potteranderson.com/media/publication/167_Special_20Committees_20A_20Primer_20_20JFG_20MKR_20Corp_20Gov_20Adv_20April_2027_202007.pdf.
(25)See Reinier Kraakman,The Anatomy of Corporate Law(second edition),New York:Oxford University Press,2009,pp.35-37.
(26)See Edwin W.Hecker,“Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities Revisited”,University of Kansas Law Review,Vol.61,No.5(2013),p.923.
(27)See note(16),p.53.
(28)See note(16),pp.53-54.
(29)See note(11),pp.94-96.
(30)See note(11),p.96.
(31)See note(11),p.94.
(32)See note(11),p.94.
(33)Lewis v.Vogelstein,699 A.2d 327(Del.Ch.1997).Also See William Allen,Reinier Kraakman and Guhan Subramania,Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization(fourth edition),New York:Wolters Kluwer,2012,pp.293-294.
(34)See note(13),p.1308.
(35)See J.Robert Brown,“Speaking with Complete Candor:Shareholder Ratification and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty”,Hastings Law Journal,Vol.54,No.3(2002),p.641.
(36)See note(13),p.1308.
(37)See Stephen M.Bainbridge,The Complete Guide to Sarbanes-Oxley,New York:Adams Business,2007,pp.38-72.
(38)Ibid note(13),p.1307.
(39)See note(14),pp.464-465.
(40)See In re MFW Shareholders Litigation,67 A.3d 496,530(Del.Ch.2013).
(41)Ibid.
(42)See In re Pure Resources Inc.,Shareholders Litigation,808 A.2d 421(Del.Ch.2002).
(43)See A.C.Pritchard,“Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders:The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price”,Berkeley Business Law Journal,Vol.83,No.1(2004),pp.101-104.
(44)See note(35),p.641.
(45)See Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock,“Embattled CEOs”,Texas Law Review,Vol.88,No.5(2010),p.987;Paul Rose,“The Corporate Governance Industry”,The Journal of Corporation Law,Vol.32,No.4(2007),p.897;Leo E.Strine,Jr.,“The Delaware Way:How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We(and Europe)Face”,Delaware Journal of Corporate Law,Vol.30,No.3(2005),p.688.
(46)See Donald C.Langewoor,t“The SEC,Retail Investors,and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets”,Virginia Law Review,Vol.95,No.4(2009),pp.1060-1061.
(47)See Vikramaditya Khanna and Umakanth Varotti,l“Regulating Squeeze-Outs in India:A Comparative Perspective”,The American Journal of Comparative Law,Vol.63,No.4(2015),p.1045.
(48)See David H.Webber,“Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions:An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiff in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions”,Delaware Journal of Corporate Law,Vol.38,No.3(2014),p.907.
(49)See Stephen Choi,Jill Fisch and Marcel Kahan,“The Power of Proxy Advisors:Myth or Reality”,Emory Law Journal,Vol.59,No.4(2010),p.869.
(50)See note(18).
(51)See note(42).
(52)See note(47),p.1045.
(53)参见财政部《企业会计准则第20号---企业合并》第二章“同一控制下的企业合并”。
(54)See Hideki Kanda and Curtis Milhaup,t“Re-examining Legal Transplants:The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law”,The American Journal of Comparative Law,Vol.51,No.4(2003),pp.893-896.
(55)这个判断是基于两个法律实证研究的一致结论。参见甘培忠等主编:《新类型公司诉讼疑难问题研究》,北京大学出版社2009年版,第343-344页;王军:“公司经营者忠实和勤勉义务诉讼研究---以14省、直辖市的137件判决书为样本”,《北方法学》2011年第4期,第30页。
(56)《上市公司重大资产重组管理办法》2016年修订依然沿袭一直以来的惯例,参见其第45条第1款。
(57)See Lucian Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan,“Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts”,in:Randall Morch,ed.,Concentrated Corporate Ownership,Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,2000,pp.250-252;also see note(16),pp.34-36.
(58)参见《证券法》(2014)第50条第(二)项、第55条(暂停上市)和第56条(终止上市)。
(59)参见《收购办法》(2014年)第35条第1款。
(60)参见郭雳:“中国式监事会:安于何处,去向何方?”,《比较法研究》2016年第2期,第74页。
(61)指上市公司拟与关联人达成的总额高于300万元或高于上市公司最近经审计净资产值5%的关联交易。
(62)参见2001年中国证监会《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》第五(一)1段。
(63)参见张辉:《上市公司法律规范体系重构》,社会科学文献出版社2010年版,第45页。
(64)例如《上市公司证券发行管理办法》第44条。
(65)参见《公司法》第16条第3款。
(66)坊间俗称控股股东、实际控制人向中小股东“拜票”。各种案例参见童璐:“反对有效!30天13家公司议案遭股东大会否决”,载证券时报网http://www.stcn.com/2016/0701/12777484.shtml,2018年3月1日访问。
(67)See Guido Calabresi and A.Douglas Melamed,“Property Rules,Liability Rules,and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral”,Harvard Law Review,Vol.85,No.6(1972),p.1089.
(68)See Richard A.Epstein,“A Clear View of the Cathedral:The Dominance of Property Rules”,The Yale Law Journal,Vol.106,No.7(1997),p.2091.
(69)See Zohar Goshen,“The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing:Theory Meets Reality”,California Law Review,Vol.91,No.2(2003),p.395.
(70)Ibid,p.395.
(71)参见王高英:“表决权排除适用例外之可行性分析”,《公司法律评论》(2009年卷),上海人民出版社2010年版,第415页。在Google网站输入“被少数股东否决”等词条进行检索,有相当数量的报道是关于上市公司关联交易由于MOM被否决的例子,例如注(67)。
(72)Ibid note(69),p.424.
(73)参见《收购办法》第83条关于一致行动人的若干情形推定。
(74)See Bernard Black,Reinier Kraakman and Anna Tarassova,“Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance:What Went Wrong”,Stanford Law Review,Vol.52,No.6(2000),pp.1731-1807.中文译本参见[美]伯纳德·布莱克、芮里尔·柯艾克曼、安娜·塔若索瓦:“俄罗斯私有化与公司治理:错在何处”,彭冰译,载许章润主编:《清华法学》(第3辑),清华大学出版社2003年版,第192-254页。本文参考了彭冰的译文,下同。
(75)See note(74),p.1755.
(76)根据世界银行的“Doing Dusiness in China”项目对中国公司少数股东保护程度的评估和打分(以0-10分为范围,10分为最佳),2017年上海的“少数股东保护度指数”为4.5,“利益冲突的监管指数”为5,“股东治理指数”为4.5分,“董事责任的指数”为1,“股东诉讼的容易度指数”为1,“股东权指数”为1。北京的得分也类似。均不及格,其中公司商事司法审判的短板是重要原因。参见世界银行网http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/china#protecting-minority-investors,2018年3月1日访问。
(77)根据亚洲公司治理协会出版的《亚洲公司治理观察》,中国上市公司的治理水平近四年不断下降。See The Asian Corporate Governance Association,CG Watch 2016:Ecosystems Matter,http://www.acga-asia.org/upload/files/research_preview/20161014021202_3.pdf;[英]史蒂夫·约翰逊:“中国公司治理退步”,FT中文网http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001070081?full=y,2018年3月1日访问。
(78)Ibid note(74),p.1783.
(79)参见郭雳:“上市公司私有化交易的审查标准与利益平衡”,《北大法律评论》(第15卷第2辑),北京大学出版社2014年版,第402-403页。
(80)参见彭冰:“中央和地方关系中的上市公司治理”,《北京大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)2008年第6期,第80页。
(81)关于在控股股东存在的情况下增强独立董事独立性的Bebchuk新方案,See Lucian A.Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdan,i“Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders”,University of Pennsylvania Law Review,Vol.165,No.6(2017),p.1272.
(82)See note(74),p.1752.