科技补贴政策的微观效率研究——基于企业寻租动机的分析与验证
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摘要
在科技补贴政策的微观效率研究上,基于挤入或者挤出效应研究者文献较多,但是基于寻租视角研究者却甚少,亦或有忽视。本文通过寻租视角分析和研究了政府科技补贴的微观创新效率。结果证实,在寻租企业中科技补贴未能达到预期的政策效应,企业的科技创新效率没并有显著提升。进一步的研究结果表明,寻租企业在获得科技补贴后其在职消费显著增加,这意味着企业可能挪用或者减少了原本用于研发的投入资金。本文结论的政策含义是,腐败治理和科技创新并非两个完全无关的领域,腐败治理能够在净化社会政治环境的同时提高科技补贴政策的微观创新效率。
In the study of the micro-efficiency of subsidy policy of science and technology,there are many literatures based on the crowding in or crowding out effect,but there is little or no attention from the perspective of rent-seeking. This paper analyzes and studies the micro-innovation efficiency from the perspective of rent-seeking. The results show that the efficiency of technological innovation has not improved significantly in the rent-seeking enterprises. Further studies show that rent-seeking enterprises have significantly increased their perquisite consumption after obtaining technology subsidies,which may mean that enterprises have misappropriated or reduced the input funds for research and development. The policy implication of this article is that anti-corruption governance and technological innovation are not completely unrelated. Corruption control can improve the micro innovation efficiency of subsidy policy as well as purify the social political environment.
In the study of the micro-efficiency of subsidy policy of science and technology,there are many literatures based on the crowding in or crowding out effect,but there is little or no attention from the perspective of rent-seeking. This paper analyzes and studies the micro-innovation efficiency from the perspective of rent-seeking. The results show that the efficiency of technological innovation has not improved significantly in the rent-seeking enterprises. Further studies show that rent-seeking enterprises have significantly increased their perquisite consumption after obtaining technology subsidies,which may mean that enterprises have misappropriated or reduced the input funds for research and development. The policy implication of this article is that anti-corruption governance and technological innovation are not completely unrelated. Corruption control can improve the micro innovation efficiency of subsidy policy as well as purify the social political environment.
引文
[1]陈冬华.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2).
(1)这里的非生产经营性支出是指管理费用、销售费用、财务管理和营业外支出四项的合计数。
(1)“在职消费”的估算方法借鉴陈冬华在“国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费”一文中采用的方法。
(1)这里的非生产经营性支出是指管理费用、销售费用、财务管理和营业外支出四项的合计数。
(1)“在职消费”的估算方法借鉴陈冬华在“国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费”一文中采用的方法。