面向关键设备系统多层级维修服务的性能合同设计及激励机制
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摘要
近年来,设备制造业商务模式逐渐由卖产品转变为卖服务,性能合同成为管理关键设备生产-服务模式的新兴工具。针对多个供应商与运营商构成的多层级维修服务供应链,引入制造阶段的可靠性能力以及售后阶段的维修能力作为供应商的跨阶段服务能力决策变量,运营商以基于性能的合同(PBC)、基于资源的合同(RBC)为合同选项,采用两阶段序贯博弈为建模框架,研究多层级维修服务合同设计模型,着重分析两类合同对多个供应商投资服务能力的激励机制,发现:RBC导致供应商对可靠性能力投资不足,而PBC过度激励供应商投资可靠性能力。结论表明:可靠性能力和服务供应链结构的复杂性是关键设备服务合同设计的重要决策因素。该结论有助于更深入了解PBC合同的激励机制和无效性根源。
Recently the change from goods orientation toward service orientation has extensively transformed the business of manufacturing firms. Performance-based contracting(PBC) has emerged as a new means to manage collaborative relationship in the product-service businesses of mission-critical equipment. The significant characteristics of multi-indenture service supply chain are focused on, where each subsystem of mission-critical equipment is built by independent supplier and where multiple suppliers provide distinct and customized services to support their own subsystems. Each supplier makes intertemporal decisions on the reliability improvement capacity in the development stage and the repair capacity in the after-sales stage. The PBC and the resource-based contract(RBC) are considered respectively by the customer. The two multi-indenture service contract design models are proposed in a two-stage sequential game theory framework. The inter-supplier incentive dynamics resulted in the two contracts is analyzed. The unexpected results reveal that the suppliers using the RBC lack enough incentive to invest in reliability while the PBC results in an overinvestment in reliability. The new findings suggest that the reliability capacity and the complexity of service supply chain structure have a very significant effect on the service contracts design. The analysis helps customers deeply understand the incentive mechanism and the source of inefficiencies of the PBC contract.
Recently the change from goods orientation toward service orientation has extensively transformed the business of manufacturing firms. Performance-based contracting(PBC) has emerged as a new means to manage collaborative relationship in the product-service businesses of mission-critical equipment. The significant characteristics of multi-indenture service supply chain are focused on, where each subsystem of mission-critical equipment is built by independent supplier and where multiple suppliers provide distinct and customized services to support their own subsystems. Each supplier makes intertemporal decisions on the reliability improvement capacity in the development stage and the repair capacity in the after-sales stage. The PBC and the resource-based contract(RBC) are considered respectively by the customer. The two multi-indenture service contract design models are proposed in a two-stage sequential game theory framework. The inter-supplier incentive dynamics resulted in the two contracts is analyzed. The unexpected results reveal that the suppliers using the RBC lack enough incentive to invest in reliability while the PBC results in an overinvestment in reliability. The new findings suggest that the reliability capacity and the complexity of service supply chain structure have a very significant effect on the service contracts design. The analysis helps customers deeply understand the incentive mechanism and the source of inefficiencies of the PBC contract.
引文
[1] Hypko P, Tilebein M, Gleich R. Benefits and uncertainties of performance-based contracting in manufacturing industries: An agency theory perspective[J]. Journal of Service Management, 2010, 21(4):461-489.
[2] Ng I C L, Nudurupati S S. Outcome-based service contracts in the defense industry-mitigating the challenges [J]. Journal of Service Management, 2010, 21(5):656-674.
[3] Glader P. GE’s focus on service faces test[N]. Wall Street Journal, 2009, March 3.
[4] Cohen M A, Agrawal N, Agrawal V. Winning in the aftermarket[J]. Harvard Business Review, 2006, 84(5):129-138.
[5] Guajardo J A, Cohen M A, Kim S H, et al. Impact of performance-based contracting on product reliability: An empirical analysis [J]. Management Science, 2012, 58(5): 961-979.
[6] Hypko P, Tilebein M, Gleich R. Clarifying the concept of performance-based contracting in manufacturing industries: A research synthesis [J]. Journal of Service Management, 2010, 21(5): 625-655.
[7] Selviaridis K, Wynstra F. Performance-based contracting: A literature review and future research directions [J], International Journal of Production Research, 2015, 53(12): 3505-3540.
[8] 戴勇. 基于服务主导逻辑的PBC模式价值创新机理研究[J]. 科研管理, 2014, 35(7): 67-74.
[9] Öner K B, Kiesmüller G P, Houtum G J V. Optimization of component reliability in the design phase of capital goods [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 205 (6): 615-624.
[10] Mirzahosseinian H, Piplani R. A study of repairable parts inventory system operating under performance-based contract [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2011, 214(3): 256-261.
[11] Jin T, Tian Y. Optimizing reliability and service parts logistics for a time-varying installed base [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 218 (2): 152-162.
[12] Kim S H, Cohen M A, Netessine S. Performance contracting in after-sales service supply chains [J]. Management Science, 2007, 53 (12):1843-1858.
[13] Kim S H, Cohen M A, Netessine S, et al. Contracting for infrequent restoration and recovery of mission-critical systems[J]. Management Science, 2010, 56(9): 1551-1567.
[14] Jain N, Hasija S, Popescu D G. Optimal contracts for outsourcing of repair and restoration wervices[J]. Operations Research, 2013, 61(6):1295-1311.
[15] 谢文明,江志斌, 汪益新, 等. 基于服务型制造的设备维护外包合同设计[J]. 系统管理学报, 2013, 22(3):289-294.
[16] Kim S H, Tomlin B. Guilt by association: Strategic failure prevention and recovery capacity investments[J]. Management Science, 2013, 59(7):1631-1649.
[17] Kim S H, Cohen M A, Netessine S. Reliability or inventory? An analysis of performance-based contracts for product support services[M]//Handbook of Information Exchange in Supply Chain Management. Ha A, Tang C Eds. New York: Springer, 2016.
[2] Ng I C L, Nudurupati S S. Outcome-based service contracts in the defense industry-mitigating the challenges [J]. Journal of Service Management, 2010, 21(5):656-674.
[3] Glader P. GE’s focus on service faces test[N]. Wall Street Journal, 2009, March 3.
[4] Cohen M A, Agrawal N, Agrawal V. Winning in the aftermarket[J]. Harvard Business Review, 2006, 84(5):129-138.
[5] Guajardo J A, Cohen M A, Kim S H, et al. Impact of performance-based contracting on product reliability: An empirical analysis [J]. Management Science, 2012, 58(5): 961-979.
[6] Hypko P, Tilebein M, Gleich R. Clarifying the concept of performance-based contracting in manufacturing industries: A research synthesis [J]. Journal of Service Management, 2010, 21(5): 625-655.
[7] Selviaridis K, Wynstra F. Performance-based contracting: A literature review and future research directions [J], International Journal of Production Research, 2015, 53(12): 3505-3540.
[8] 戴勇. 基于服务主导逻辑的PBC模式价值创新机理研究[J]. 科研管理, 2014, 35(7): 67-74.
[9] Öner K B, Kiesmüller G P, Houtum G J V. Optimization of component reliability in the design phase of capital goods [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 205 (6): 615-624.
[10] Mirzahosseinian H, Piplani R. A study of repairable parts inventory system operating under performance-based contract [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2011, 214(3): 256-261.
[11] Jin T, Tian Y. Optimizing reliability and service parts logistics for a time-varying installed base [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 218 (2): 152-162.
[12] Kim S H, Cohen M A, Netessine S. Performance contracting in after-sales service supply chains [J]. Management Science, 2007, 53 (12):1843-1858.
[13] Kim S H, Cohen M A, Netessine S, et al. Contracting for infrequent restoration and recovery of mission-critical systems[J]. Management Science, 2010, 56(9): 1551-1567.
[14] Jain N, Hasija S, Popescu D G. Optimal contracts for outsourcing of repair and restoration wervices[J]. Operations Research, 2013, 61(6):1295-1311.
[15] 谢文明,江志斌, 汪益新, 等. 基于服务型制造的设备维护外包合同设计[J]. 系统管理学报, 2013, 22(3):289-294.
[16] Kim S H, Tomlin B. Guilt by association: Strategic failure prevention and recovery capacity investments[J]. Management Science, 2013, 59(7):1631-1649.
[17] Kim S H, Cohen M A, Netessine S. Reliability or inventory? An analysis of performance-based contracts for product support services[M]//Handbook of Information Exchange in Supply Chain Management. Ha A, Tang C Eds. New York: Springer, 2016.