绿色供应链中不对称需求预测下的信息共享研究
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摘要
研究了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的绿色供应链和他们的需求预测信息共享问题。考虑了两种方案:订货型生产方案和库存型生产方案,两种方案下分别考虑了无信息共享和信息共享两种情况。分析了预测信息对两种方案下制造商利润、零售商利润和信息共享价值的影响,同时研究了绿色成本系数对信息共享的影响。研究表明,两种方案中制造商始终能从信息共享中获利,而零售商只有在制造商绿色成本系数较低时才会自愿共享预测信息。当绿色成本系数较高时,制造商可以通过一个讨价还价合同,促进零售商进行信息共享。当绿色成本系数很高时,供应链成员之间不存在信息共享。此外,库存型生产方案中信息共享带来的总收益增量要高于订货型生产方案,因此,库存型生产方案中参与者信息共享的可能性要高于订货型生产方案。
Due to the rapid changes in business environment,it is difficult for green supply chain members to make accurate decisions in the face of highly uncertain market conditions.However,supply chain members can forecast uncertain market demand based on past sales data.Given this background,aproblem of information sharing under asymmetric demand forecasting in green supply chain is studied.Two scenarios are investigated:the"make-to-order"scenario and the"make-to-stock"scenario,considering two situations:with information sharing and without information sharing.The optimal decision and optimal expected profit of the manufacturers and retailers in several cases are obtained.Through the comparison of the optimal expected profits,it is found the value of information sharing and a bargaining mechanism can coordinate the supply chain.The research shows thatmanufacturers are always profitable from information sharing in both scenarios.Unlike previous studies,retailers can also benefit from information sharing when the green cost factor is low.When the green cost factor is high,manufacturers can promote retailers to share information through a bargaining contract.Additionally,when the green cost factor is high,there is no information sharing between members of the green supply chain.Furthermore,the increase of total revenue brought by information sharing in"make-to-stock"scenario is higher than that of the total revenue in"make-to-order"scenario.Therefore,the possibility of participant information sharing in the"make-to-stock"scenario is higher than that of the"make-to-order"scenario.Finally,the sensitivity analysis of some parameters influences the accuracy and correlation of the forecast information on the profit of the manufacturer,the value of the manufacturer's information sharing,and the value of the information sharing of the supply chain.
Due to the rapid changes in business environment,it is difficult for green supply chain members to make accurate decisions in the face of highly uncertain market conditions.However,supply chain members can forecast uncertain market demand based on past sales data.Given this background,aproblem of information sharing under asymmetric demand forecasting in green supply chain is studied.Two scenarios are investigated:the"make-to-order"scenario and the"make-to-stock"scenario,considering two situations:with information sharing and without information sharing.The optimal decision and optimal expected profit of the manufacturers and retailers in several cases are obtained.Through the comparison of the optimal expected profits,it is found the value of information sharing and a bargaining mechanism can coordinate the supply chain.The research shows thatmanufacturers are always profitable from information sharing in both scenarios.Unlike previous studies,retailers can also benefit from information sharing when the green cost factor is low.When the green cost factor is high,manufacturers can promote retailers to share information through a bargaining contract.Additionally,when the green cost factor is high,there is no information sharing between members of the green supply chain.Furthermore,the increase of total revenue brought by information sharing in"make-to-stock"scenario is higher than that of the total revenue in"make-to-order"scenario.Therefore,the possibility of participant information sharing in the"make-to-stock"scenario is higher than that of the"make-to-order"scenario.Finally,the sensitivity analysis of some parameters influences the accuracy and correlation of the forecast information on the profit of the manufacturer,the value of the manufacturer's information sharing,and the value of the information sharing of the supply chain.
引文
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[19]Yue Xiaohang,Liu J.Demand forecast sharing in a dual-channel supply chain[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2006,174(1):646-667.
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[22]谢印成,高鹏,聂佳佳.考虑制造商竞争的绿色供应链信息分享策略研究[J].科技管理研究,2015,(8):174-179.
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[24]Xu Xiaoping,He Ping,Xu Hao,et al.Supply chain coordination with green technology under cap-andtrade regulation[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017,183:433-442.
[25]Zhang Qiao,Tang Wansheng,Zhang Jianxiong.Green supply chain performance with cost learning and operational inefficiency effects[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016,112:3267-3284.
[26]Nagarajan M,Bassok Y.A bargaining framework in supply chains:The assembly problem[J].Management Science,2008,54(8):1482-1496.
[2]Zhu Qinghua,Cote RP.Integrating green supply chain management into an embryonic eco-industrial development:A case study of the Guitang group[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2004,12(8):1025-1035.
[3]Sarkis J,Zhu Qinghua,Geng Yong.Greening the supply chain[J].Apparel Magazine,2006,100(9):63-63.
[4]朱庆华,窦一杰.基于政府补贴分析的绿色供应链管理博弈模型[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(6):86-95.
[5]Srivastava S K.Green supply chain management:Astate of the art literture reviw[J].International Journal of Management Reviews,2007,9(1):53-80.
[6]Wati Y,Koo C.The green IT practices of Nokia,Samsung,Sony,and Sony Ericsson:Content analysis approach[C]//43rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences,Huwaii,IEEE,2010:1-10.
[7]戴远程.海尔启动绿色战略[N],南方日报,2011-11-05.
[8]Bemporad R,Baranowski M.Conscious consumers are changing the rules of marketing.Are you ready?Highlights from the BBMG conscious consumer report[Z].http://www.bbmg.com,2007.
[9]OECD.Report of the OECD workshop on information and consumer decisionmaking for sustainable consumption[R].Working Paper,Working Party on National Environmental Policy,2002.
[10]Ghosh D,Shah J.A comparative analysis of greening policies across supply chain structures[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,135(2):568-583.
[11]Liu Z,Anderson T D,Cruz J M.Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2012,218(3):602-613.
[12]Ghosh D,Shah J.Supply chain analysis under green sensitive consumer demand and cost sharing contract[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015,164:319-329.
[13]Li Bo,Zhu Mengyan,Jiang Yushan,et al.Pricing policies of a competitive dual-channel green supply chain[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016,112(20):2029-2042.
[14]Zhu Wenge,He Yuanjie.Green product design in supply chains under competition[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2017,258(1):165-180.
[15]朱庆华,窦一杰.基于政府补贴分析的绿色供应链管理博弈模型[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(6):86-95.
[16]江世英,李随成.考虑产品绿色度的绿色供应链博弈模型及收益共享契约[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(6):169-176.
[17]陈志松.政府激励政策下人造板绿色供应链谈判-协调机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(2):115-124.
[18]Shang Weixin,Ha A Y,Tong Shilu.Information sharing in a supply chain with a common retailer[J].Management Science,2015,62(1):245-263.
[19]Yue Xiaohang,Liu J.Demand forecast sharing in a dual-channel supply chain[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2006,174(1):646-667.
[20]Mishra B K,Raghunathan S,Yue X.Demand forecast sharing in supply chains[J].Production&Operations Management,2010,18(2):152-166.
[21]高鹏,聂佳佳,谢忠秋.考虑消费者绿色偏好的供应链信息分享策略研究[J].系统科学与数学,2013,33(12):1435-1446.
[22]谢印成,高鹏,聂佳佳.考虑制造商竞争的绿色供应链信息分享策略研究[J].科技管理研究,2015,(8):174-179.
[23]Winkler R L.Combining probability distributions from dependent information sources[J].Management Science,1981,27(4):479-488.
[24]Xu Xiaoping,He Ping,Xu Hao,et al.Supply chain coordination with green technology under cap-andtrade regulation[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017,183:433-442.
[25]Zhang Qiao,Tang Wansheng,Zhang Jianxiong.Green supply chain performance with cost learning and operational inefficiency effects[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016,112:3267-3284.
[26]Nagarajan M,Bassok Y.A bargaining framework in supply chains:The assembly problem[J].Management Science,2008,54(8):1482-1496.