高管团队激励分散度、企业风险承担与战略绩效研究
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摘要
代理问题的存在会导致管理者"短视",出于私利,管理者往往不愿意承担风险,这虽然会给企业带来短期经济利益,但也会给未来发展埋下隐患。为解决此类代理问题,高管团队成员激励将发挥关键作用。因此,研究高管团队激励对企业绩效影响,高管薪酬激励对企业风险承担影响以及企业风险承担对企业绩效影响,对于中国企业的激励契约设计、经济增长和潜在风险认识均具有重要实践意义。
The presence of agency problems leads to managers "short-sightedness". Self-interest managers are often unwilling to take risks. Although this will bring short-term economic benefits to the enterprise,but also hide risks for the future development. To solve the problem of such agents, executive team member incentives will play a key role. This paper reviews the literature on the impact of executive team incentive on enterprise performance, the impact of executive compensation incentive on enterprise risk-taking and the impact of enterprise risk-taking on enterprise performance. On this basis, it is considered that the evaluation index of enterprise strategy should be evaluated, and constructed a research framework for the influence of executive team incentives on corporate risk-taking and strategic performance, analyzing the incentive dispersion of executive teams, the mechanism of corporate risk-taking and strategic performance, and moderating role of enterprise life cycle, industry characteristics, property rights nature, R&D density, geographical distribution and team cooperation time. This is of great practical significance to the design of incentive contracts, economic growth and potential risks of Chinese enterprises.
The presence of agency problems leads to managers "short-sightedness". Self-interest managers are often unwilling to take risks. Although this will bring short-term economic benefits to the enterprise,but also hide risks for the future development. To solve the problem of such agents, executive team member incentives will play a key role. This paper reviews the literature on the impact of executive team incentive on enterprise performance, the impact of executive compensation incentive on enterprise risk-taking and the impact of enterprise risk-taking on enterprise performance. On this basis, it is considered that the evaluation index of enterprise strategy should be evaluated, and constructed a research framework for the influence of executive team incentives on corporate risk-taking and strategic performance, analyzing the incentive dispersion of executive teams, the mechanism of corporate risk-taking and strategic performance, and moderating role of enterprise life cycle, industry characteristics, property rights nature, R&D density, geographical distribution and team cooperation time. This is of great practical significance to the design of incentive contracts, economic growth and potential risks of Chinese enterprises.
引文
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[2] Lee K B, Lev B, Yeo G. Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm performance[J]. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2008, 30(3):315-338.
[3] Kale J, Reis E, Venkateswaran A. Rank-order tournaments and incentive alignment: the effect on firm performance[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2009, 64(3):1479-1512.
[4] 梅春,赵晓菊.薪酬差异、高管主动离职率与公司绩效[J].外国经济与管理,2016(4):19-35.
[5] Adams S. Inequity in social exchange[J]. Advances in Experimental Social Psycholog, 1965, 2:267-299.
[6] Festinger L. A theory of social comparison process[J]. Human Relations, 1954, 7(2):117-140.
[7] Martin J. Relative deprivation:A theory of distributive injustice for an era of shrinking resources[J]. Research in Organizational Behavior, 1981, 3:53-107.
[8] Devers C, Cannella A, Reilly G, Yoder M. Executive compensation:A multidisciplinary review of recent development[J]. Journal of Management, 2007, 33(6):1016-1072.
[9] 黎文靖,岑永嗣,胡玉明. 外部薪酬差距激励了高管吗——基于中国上市公司经理人市场与产权性质的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2014(4):24-35.
[10] 杨志强,王华. 公司内部薪酬差距、股权集中度与盈余管理行为——基于高管团队内和高管与员工之间薪酬的比较分析[J].会计研究,2014(6):57-65.
[11] Bebchuk L, Creamers M, Peyer U. The CEO pay slice[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2011, 102(1):199-221.
[12] 王浩,向显湖. 高管权力、内部薪酬差距与公司业绩预告行为——基于中国证券市场的经验证据[J].投资研究,2015(10):124-141.
[13] Li F, Minnis M, Nagar V, Rajan M. Knowledge, compensation, and firm value:An empirical analysis of firm communication[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2014, 58(1):96-116.
[14] Lazear E P. Pay equality and industrial politics[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1989, 97(3):561-580.
[15] Holmstrom B. Moral hazard in teams[J]. Bell Journal of Economics (Autumn):1982, 13(2):324-340.
[16] Rasmusen E. Moral hazard in risk-averse teams[J]. The Rand Journal of Economics, 1987, 18 (3):428-435.
[17] Edmans A, Goldstein I, Zhu J. Contracting with synergies[R]. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of Business, 2013.
[18] Bushman R, Dai Z, Zhang W. Management team incentive: dispersion and firm performance[J]. The Accounting Review, 2016, 91(1):21-45.
[19] John K, Litov L, Yeung B. Corporate governance and risk-taking[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2008, 63(4):1679-1728.
[20] Wright P, Kroll M, Jeffrey A K, Pettus M. Influences of top management team incentives on firm risk taking[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2007, 28(1):81-89.
[21] 张瑞君,李小荣,许年行.货币薪酬能激励高管承担风险吗?[J].经济理论与经济管理,2013(8):84-100.
[22] Low A. Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2009, 92(3):470-490.
[23] 解维敏,唐清泉. 公司治理与风险承担——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].财经问题研究,2013(1):92-97.
[24] Jiraporn P, Chatjuthamardb P, Tongc S, Kimd Y S. Does corporate governance influence corporate risk-taking? evidence from the Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS)[J]. Finance Research Letters, 2015, 13:105-112.
[25] Colesa J L, Danielb N D, Naveenb L. Managerial incentives and risk-taking[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 79(2):431-468.
[26] Dong Z Y, Wang C, Xie F. Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2010, 34(10):2518-2529.
[27] Hayes R M, Lemmon M, Qiu M. Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2012, 105(1):174-190.
[28] Armstrong C S, Vashishtha R. Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2012, 104(1):70-88.
[29] DeFusco R A. The association between executive stock option plan changes and managerial decision making[J]. Financial Management, 1991, 20(1):36-43.
[30] Samuel B, Maria B, Gregorio S. Executive stock options, gender diversity in the top management team, and firm risk taking[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2015, 68(2):451-463.
[31] 李小荣,张瑞君.股权激励影响风险承担:代理成本还是风险规避[J].会计研究,2014(1):57-63.
[32] Laux V. Executive pay, innovation, and risk-taking[J]. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2015, 24(2):275-305.
[33] Kini O, Williams R. Tournament incentives, firm risk and corporate policies[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2012, 103(2):350-376.
[34] Chintrakarn P. How do powerful CEOs view corporate risk-taking? Evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)[J]. Applied Economics Letters, 2015, 22(2):104-109.
[35] Acemoglu D, Zilibotti F. Was prometheus unbound by chance? risk, diversification, and growth[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1997, 105(4):709-751.
[36] Cootner P H, Holland D M. Rate of return and business risk[J]. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1970, 1(2):211-226.
[37] Nguyen P. Corporate governance and risk-taking:Evidence from Japanese firms[J]. Pacific-Basin in Finance Journal, 2011, 19(3):278-297.
[38] 余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担[J].金融研究,2011(1):149-163.
[39] Faccio M, Marchica M T, Mura R. CEO gender, corporate risk-taking, and the efficiency of capital allocation[R]. Working paper, 2012.
[40] Moreno A M, Casillas J C. Entrepreneurial orientation and growth of SMEs:a causal model[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2008, 32(3):507-528.
[41] 董保宝, 风险需要平衡吗:新企业风险承担与绩效倒U型关系及创业能力的中介作用[J].管理世界,2014(1):120-131.
[42] Fiegenbaum A. Prospect theory and the risk-return association:An empirical examination in 85 industries[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1990, 14(2):187-203.
[43] Cohen D A. Corporate governance reform and executive incentives:Implications for investments and risk taking[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2013, 30(4):1296-1332.
[44] Colesa J L, Danielb N D, Naveenb L. Managerial incentives and risk-taking[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 79(2):431-468.
[2] Lee K B, Lev B, Yeo G. Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm performance[J]. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2008, 30(3):315-338.
[3] Kale J, Reis E, Venkateswaran A. Rank-order tournaments and incentive alignment: the effect on firm performance[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2009, 64(3):1479-1512.
[4] 梅春,赵晓菊.薪酬差异、高管主动离职率与公司绩效[J].外国经济与管理,2016(4):19-35.
[5] Adams S. Inequity in social exchange[J]. Advances in Experimental Social Psycholog, 1965, 2:267-299.
[6] Festinger L. A theory of social comparison process[J]. Human Relations, 1954, 7(2):117-140.
[7] Martin J. Relative deprivation:A theory of distributive injustice for an era of shrinking resources[J]. Research in Organizational Behavior, 1981, 3:53-107.
[8] Devers C, Cannella A, Reilly G, Yoder M. Executive compensation:A multidisciplinary review of recent development[J]. Journal of Management, 2007, 33(6):1016-1072.
[9] 黎文靖,岑永嗣,胡玉明. 外部薪酬差距激励了高管吗——基于中国上市公司经理人市场与产权性质的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2014(4):24-35.
[10] 杨志强,王华. 公司内部薪酬差距、股权集中度与盈余管理行为——基于高管团队内和高管与员工之间薪酬的比较分析[J].会计研究,2014(6):57-65.
[11] Bebchuk L, Creamers M, Peyer U. The CEO pay slice[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2011, 102(1):199-221.
[12] 王浩,向显湖. 高管权力、内部薪酬差距与公司业绩预告行为——基于中国证券市场的经验证据[J].投资研究,2015(10):124-141.
[13] Li F, Minnis M, Nagar V, Rajan M. Knowledge, compensation, and firm value:An empirical analysis of firm communication[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2014, 58(1):96-116.
[14] Lazear E P. Pay equality and industrial politics[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1989, 97(3):561-580.
[15] Holmstrom B. Moral hazard in teams[J]. Bell Journal of Economics (Autumn):1982, 13(2):324-340.
[16] Rasmusen E. Moral hazard in risk-averse teams[J]. The Rand Journal of Economics, 1987, 18 (3):428-435.
[17] Edmans A, Goldstein I, Zhu J. Contracting with synergies[R]. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of Business, 2013.
[18] Bushman R, Dai Z, Zhang W. Management team incentive: dispersion and firm performance[J]. The Accounting Review, 2016, 91(1):21-45.
[19] John K, Litov L, Yeung B. Corporate governance and risk-taking[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2008, 63(4):1679-1728.
[20] Wright P, Kroll M, Jeffrey A K, Pettus M. Influences of top management team incentives on firm risk taking[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2007, 28(1):81-89.
[21] 张瑞君,李小荣,许年行.货币薪酬能激励高管承担风险吗?[J].经济理论与经济管理,2013(8):84-100.
[22] Low A. Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2009, 92(3):470-490.
[23] 解维敏,唐清泉. 公司治理与风险承担——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].财经问题研究,2013(1):92-97.
[24] Jiraporn P, Chatjuthamardb P, Tongc S, Kimd Y S. Does corporate governance influence corporate risk-taking? evidence from the Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS)[J]. Finance Research Letters, 2015, 13:105-112.
[25] Colesa J L, Danielb N D, Naveenb L. Managerial incentives and risk-taking[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 79(2):431-468.
[26] Dong Z Y, Wang C, Xie F. Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2010, 34(10):2518-2529.
[27] Hayes R M, Lemmon M, Qiu M. Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2012, 105(1):174-190.
[28] Armstrong C S, Vashishtha R. Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2012, 104(1):70-88.
[29] DeFusco R A. The association between executive stock option plan changes and managerial decision making[J]. Financial Management, 1991, 20(1):36-43.
[30] Samuel B, Maria B, Gregorio S. Executive stock options, gender diversity in the top management team, and firm risk taking[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2015, 68(2):451-463.
[31] 李小荣,张瑞君.股权激励影响风险承担:代理成本还是风险规避[J].会计研究,2014(1):57-63.
[32] Laux V. Executive pay, innovation, and risk-taking[J]. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2015, 24(2):275-305.
[33] Kini O, Williams R. Tournament incentives, firm risk and corporate policies[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2012, 103(2):350-376.
[34] Chintrakarn P. How do powerful CEOs view corporate risk-taking? Evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)[J]. Applied Economics Letters, 2015, 22(2):104-109.
[35] Acemoglu D, Zilibotti F. Was prometheus unbound by chance? risk, diversification, and growth[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1997, 105(4):709-751.
[36] Cootner P H, Holland D M. Rate of return and business risk[J]. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1970, 1(2):211-226.
[37] Nguyen P. Corporate governance and risk-taking:Evidence from Japanese firms[J]. Pacific-Basin in Finance Journal, 2011, 19(3):278-297.
[38] 余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担[J].金融研究,2011(1):149-163.
[39] Faccio M, Marchica M T, Mura R. CEO gender, corporate risk-taking, and the efficiency of capital allocation[R]. Working paper, 2012.
[40] Moreno A M, Casillas J C. Entrepreneurial orientation and growth of SMEs:a causal model[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2008, 32(3):507-528.
[41] 董保宝, 风险需要平衡吗:新企业风险承担与绩效倒U型关系及创业能力的中介作用[J].管理世界,2014(1):120-131.
[42] Fiegenbaum A. Prospect theory and the risk-return association:An empirical examination in 85 industries[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1990, 14(2):187-203.
[43] Cohen D A. Corporate governance reform and executive incentives:Implications for investments and risk taking[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2013, 30(4):1296-1332.
[44] Colesa J L, Danielb N D, Naveenb L. Managerial incentives and risk-taking[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 79(2):431-468.