巴西“9.13”远西北电网解列及停电事故分析及启示
|
摘要
2016年9月13日15时50分,±600kV Madeira Ⅰ直流沿线山火造成双极先后故障跳闸,在直流线路故障及再启动过程中,大量潮流反复转移至另一小容量交直流并联输电通道,引起系统振荡等异常现象,造成巴西远西北部两州ACRO电网与巴西国家互联电网解列。ACRO孤网频率升高,电压降低,引起大量切机和切负荷。与巴西电网曾发生的多次大停电相似,此次停电再次表明:虽然近年巴西输电网基础设施投资和建设已显著加大力度,但是,影响巴西电网安全稳定运行的网架结构、运行管理和系统控制等深层次问题并未根本扭转,一是,此次故障与大容量水电厂交/直流、大容量、远距离点对点输电方式密切相关,表明巴西电源结构、电网网架、电网结构规划建设方案仍需优化;二是,由于未能正确看待系统仿真过程中已发现的N-2下系统小概率高风险事件,在系统运行方式安排时未充分考虑,导致事故发生,表明巴西电网运行方式安排具有提升空间;三是,故障发生和处理过程中,遇到了保护、控制、监控、站用电、通讯系统等一系列异常和故障,扩大了事故范围,增加了事故分析判断难度、延迟了故障恢复时间,表明电网运行维护水平可继续提升。"9.13"远西北电网解列和停电事故集中体现了巴西在电网规划、建设和运行、管理等方面的特点,表明巴西电网加强管理、保障电网安全任重道远,也对我国高压直流输电技术装备首次输出海外的巴西美丽山示范工程未来安全稳定运行提出了挑战。
At 13:50 pm, September 13 th, 2016, pole 2 and pole 1 of ±600 kV Madeira I tripped one by one which was caused by fire along the DC lines. In process of fault and restart of the DC line of ±600 kV Madeira Ⅰ, power flow had repeatedly transferred to another small-capacity AC/DC parallel transmission channel, system oscillations happened, which resulted in ACRO grid's islanding from Brazilian SIN. In ACRO isolated grid, frequency increased, voltage dropped, companying with plenty of generation and load shedding. Similar to other blackouts occurred in the Brazilian power grid, the "9.13" outage again shows that the critical issues which have been affecting safety and stability of Brazilian power grid, including network structure, operation management and system control, have not been fundamentally solved until now, even if investment and construction of the Brazilian transmission network infrastructure have been significantly strengthened from the year of 1999. Firstly, the fault was closely related to the AC/DC, high-capacity, long-distance point-to-point transmission mode of large-capacity hydropower plants, indicating that the power supply structure, power network structure and programs of Brazilian power grid's planning and construction need to be optimized. Secondly, N-2 event, with both small probability and high-risk, resulting in the outage, had not been fully taken into consideration in arrangement of system operation mode which indicates that there is room for improvement of the operation mode arrangement in Brazilian power grid. Thirdly, a series of abnormalities and faults, being related to protection, control, monitoring, station power supply and communication system, were encountered, which resulted in enlargement of accident area, difficulties of accident analysis and judgment, the delayed fault recovery time, which indicated that the power grid's operation and maintenance level need to be improved. "9.13" outage in Brazilian remote northwest power grid shows the characteristics of planning, construction, operation and management of Brazilian power grids. There is still room to be optimized in strengthening management aiming at ensuring safety of the Brazilian power grid. It shows that the 1~(st) oversea ±800 kV Brazilian Belmont project, exporting both Chinese UHVDC technologies and equipments to Brazil, has been facing a serious challenge of both security and stability of operation in Brazil in the future.
At 13:50 pm, September 13 th, 2016, pole 2 and pole 1 of ±600 kV Madeira I tripped one by one which was caused by fire along the DC lines. In process of fault and restart of the DC line of ±600 kV Madeira Ⅰ, power flow had repeatedly transferred to another small-capacity AC/DC parallel transmission channel, system oscillations happened, which resulted in ACRO grid's islanding from Brazilian SIN. In ACRO isolated grid, frequency increased, voltage dropped, companying with plenty of generation and load shedding. Similar to other blackouts occurred in the Brazilian power grid, the "9.13" outage again shows that the critical issues which have been affecting safety and stability of Brazilian power grid, including network structure, operation management and system control, have not been fundamentally solved until now, even if investment and construction of the Brazilian transmission network infrastructure have been significantly strengthened from the year of 1999. Firstly, the fault was closely related to the AC/DC, high-capacity, long-distance point-to-point transmission mode of large-capacity hydropower plants, indicating that the power supply structure, power network structure and programs of Brazilian power grid's planning and construction need to be optimized. Secondly, N-2 event, with both small probability and high-risk, resulting in the outage, had not been fully taken into consideration in arrangement of system operation mode which indicates that there is room for improvement of the operation mode arrangement in Brazilian power grid. Thirdly, a series of abnormalities and faults, being related to protection, control, monitoring, station power supply and communication system, were encountered, which resulted in enlargement of accident area, difficulties of accident analysis and judgment, the delayed fault recovery time, which indicated that the power grid's operation and maintenance level need to be improved. "9.13" outage in Brazilian remote northwest power grid shows the characteristics of planning, construction, operation and management of Brazilian power grids. There is still room to be optimized in strengthening management aiming at ensuring safety of the Brazilian power grid. It shows that the 1~(st) oversea ±800 kV Brazilian Belmont project, exporting both Chinese UHVDC technologies and equipments to Brazil, has been facing a serious challenge of both security and stability of operation in Brazil in the future.
引文
[1]Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico-ONS.ONS RE3/0150/2016 Análise da perturba??o ocorrida em13/09/2016às 15h50min,que envolveu os estados de rond?nia e Acre[R].Rio de Janeiro.Brazil:Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico,2016.
[2]Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico-ONS.NotaàImprensa(30/08/2016)Ocorrência nas regi?es Norte e Nordeste em 30/08/2016[R].Rio de Janeiro.Brazil:Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico,2016.
[3]Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico-ONS.NotaàImprensa(19/01/2015)[R].Rio de Janeiro.Brazil:Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico,2015.
[4]Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico-ONS.NotaàImprensa(26/10/2012)Ocorrência afeta regi?es Nordeste e Norte[R].Rio de Janeiro.Brazil:Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico,2012.
[5]Ministério de Minas e Energia.ATA DA 119aREUNI?O(Extraordinária)[R].Brasília,Brazil:Ministério de Minas e Energia,2012.
[6]Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico O-NS.Anális E da perturba??o do dia 10/11/2009 as 22h13min envolveu o desligamento dostres circuitos da LT 765k V Itaberá-Ivaipor?[R].Rio de Janeiro.Brazil:Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico,2009.
[7]刘宇,舒治淮,程逍,等.从巴西电网“2.4”大停电事故看继电保护技术应用原则[J].电力系统自动化,2011,35(5):12-71.Liu Yu,Shu Zhihuai,Cheng Xiao,et al.Analyzing principle of protection through the blackout in brazil power grid on February 4,2011[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2011,35(8):12-71(in Chinese).
[8]林伟芳,汤涌,孙华东,等.巴西“2.4”大停电事故及对电网安全稳定运行的启示[J].电力系统自动化,2011,35(9):1-5.Lin Weifang,Tang Yong,Sun Huadong,et al.Blackout in Brazil Power Grid on February 4,2011 and Inspirations for Stable Operation of Power Grid[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2011,35(9):1-5(in Chinese).
[9]林伟芳,孙华东,汤涌,等.巴西“11?10”大停电事故分析及启示[J].电力系统自动化,2010,34(7):1-5.Lin Weifang,Sun Huadong,Tang Yong,et al.Analysis and lessons of the blackout in Brazil power grid on November 10,2009[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2010,34(7):1-5(in Chinese).
[10]刘云.我国特高压直流输电技术的巴西本地化工程实施方案[J].电网技术,2017,41(10):3323-3229.Liu Yun.Preliminary study on project localization in Brazil utilizing Chinese UHVDC technologies[J].Power System Technology,2017,41(10):3323-3229(in Chinese).
[11]Faugstad K,Magg T,Damgaard P,et al.HVDC environment planning guidelines[J].Electra,2012(264):39.
[12]Aneel-agência nacional de energia elétrica.edital de leil?o NO 007/2015-ANEEL,Anexo 6[Z].
[13]曾庆禹.我国未来电网建设从巴西电网大停电应吸取的经验[J].电网与清洁能源,2010,26(2):3-8.Zeng Qingyu.Lessons learned by China's future power grid construction from Brazilian blackout[J].Advances of Power System&Hydroelectric Engineering,2010,2(2):3-8(in Chinese).
[14]徐遐龄,林涛,徐颢霖.近年来国内外大停电原因分析及启示[J].湖北电力,2013,37(2):45-47.Xu Xialing,Lin Tao,Xu Haolin.Cause analysis and inspiration of large scale outage in home and abroad for recent years[J].Hubei Electric Power,2013,37(2):45-47(in Chinese).
[15]Graham J F,Holmgren T,Fischer P,et al.The Rio madeira HVDC system-design aspects of Bipole 1 and the connector to Acre-Rond?nia[C]//Proceedings of CIGRésession.Paris:CIGRE,2012.
[16]Esmeraldo P C V,Araújo E M A,Carvalho D S Jr.HVDC madeira transmission system-planning development and final design[R].Paper B4-306-2010.Paris:CIGRE,2010.
[17]ANEEL.Edital do leil?o NO 007/2008-ANEEL[R].Brasília:ANEEL,2008.
[18]Graham J F,Holmgren T,Fischer P.The rio madeira HVDC system:design aspects of bipole 1 and the connector to Acre-Rond?nia[C]//CIGRE2012.Paris,France,2012.
[19]da Silva R A,Campos P C G,Spinelli I L,et al.Controle mestre do sistema de transimiss?o HVDC do Rio madeira[C]//Proceedings of the 27th Seminário Nacional de Produ??o e Transmiss?o de Energia ElétricaSNPTEE.Brasília:2013.
[20]Lopes F R,Sobrinho F A,Eletronorte,et al.Modelagem do master control e do controle do bipolo 1 do elo ccat do rio madeira no anatem:principais malhas de controle,desempenho,valida??o e análise de perturba??es reais[C]//Proceedings of the Seminário Nacional de Produ??o e Transmiss?o de Energia ElétricaSNPTEE.Curitiba:2017.
[21]Tolmasquim M.Power sector reform in brazil[M].Brazil:EPE Press,2012:73-102.
[22]毕玉明.巴西电改:向“大停电”说不[J].能源,2013(6):83-85.Bi Yuming.Electricity reform in Brazil:saying no to“Blackouts”[J].Energy,2013(6):83-85(in Chinese).
[23]Itapúa Dam.2009 Brazil and Paraguay blackout[EB/OL].(2009-11-15)[2009-01-05].http://en.wikipedia.org.
[24]Almeida Pedroso F R V,Graham J F,Bassini M T.Grupo de Estudo de AnáLise e TéCnicas de Sistemas de PotêNcia-Gat AnáLise Multi-Infeed do Sistema EléTrico Brasileiro[C]//Proceedings of the Seminário Nacional de Produ??o e Transmiss?o de Energia ElétricaSNPTEE.Curitiba:2017.
[25]胥威汀,戴松灵,张全明,等.区域互联电网故障解列方法综述[J].中国电机工程学报,2015,35(11):2756-2769.Xu Weiting,Dai Songling,Zhang Quanming,et a1.Comments and overviews on the islanding methods of large interconnected power grid[J].Proceedings of the CSEE,2015,35(11):2756-2769(in Chinese).
[26]甘德强,胡江溢,韩祯祥.2003年国际若干停电事故思考[J].电力系统自动化,2004,28(3):1-4,9.Gan Deqiang,Hu Jiangyi,Han Zhenxiang.After the 2003blackouts across several continentals[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2004,28(3):1-4,9(in Chinese).
[27]薛禹胜,肖世杰.综合防御高风险的小概率事件:对日本相继天灾引发大停电及核泄漏事件的思考[J].电力系统自动化,2011,35(8):1-11.Xue Yusheng,Xiao Shijie.Comprehensively defending high risk events with low probability[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2011,35(8):1-11(in Chinese).
[2]Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico-ONS.NotaàImprensa(30/08/2016)Ocorrência nas regi?es Norte e Nordeste em 30/08/2016[R].Rio de Janeiro.Brazil:Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico,2016.
[3]Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico-ONS.NotaàImprensa(19/01/2015)[R].Rio de Janeiro.Brazil:Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico,2015.
[4]Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico-ONS.NotaàImprensa(26/10/2012)Ocorrência afeta regi?es Nordeste e Norte[R].Rio de Janeiro.Brazil:Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico,2012.
[5]Ministério de Minas e Energia.ATA DA 119aREUNI?O(Extraordinária)[R].Brasília,Brazil:Ministério de Minas e Energia,2012.
[6]Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico O-NS.Anális E da perturba??o do dia 10/11/2009 as 22h13min envolveu o desligamento dostres circuitos da LT 765k V Itaberá-Ivaipor?[R].Rio de Janeiro.Brazil:Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico,2009.
[7]刘宇,舒治淮,程逍,等.从巴西电网“2.4”大停电事故看继电保护技术应用原则[J].电力系统自动化,2011,35(5):12-71.Liu Yu,Shu Zhihuai,Cheng Xiao,et al.Analyzing principle of protection through the blackout in brazil power grid on February 4,2011[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2011,35(8):12-71(in Chinese).
[8]林伟芳,汤涌,孙华东,等.巴西“2.4”大停电事故及对电网安全稳定运行的启示[J].电力系统自动化,2011,35(9):1-5.Lin Weifang,Tang Yong,Sun Huadong,et al.Blackout in Brazil Power Grid on February 4,2011 and Inspirations for Stable Operation of Power Grid[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2011,35(9):1-5(in Chinese).
[9]林伟芳,孙华东,汤涌,等.巴西“11?10”大停电事故分析及启示[J].电力系统自动化,2010,34(7):1-5.Lin Weifang,Sun Huadong,Tang Yong,et al.Analysis and lessons of the blackout in Brazil power grid on November 10,2009[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2010,34(7):1-5(in Chinese).
[10]刘云.我国特高压直流输电技术的巴西本地化工程实施方案[J].电网技术,2017,41(10):3323-3229.Liu Yun.Preliminary study on project localization in Brazil utilizing Chinese UHVDC technologies[J].Power System Technology,2017,41(10):3323-3229(in Chinese).
[11]Faugstad K,Magg T,Damgaard P,et al.HVDC environment planning guidelines[J].Electra,2012(264):39.
[12]Aneel-agência nacional de energia elétrica.edital de leil?o NO 007/2015-ANEEL,Anexo 6[Z].
[13]曾庆禹.我国未来电网建设从巴西电网大停电应吸取的经验[J].电网与清洁能源,2010,26(2):3-8.Zeng Qingyu.Lessons learned by China's future power grid construction from Brazilian blackout[J].Advances of Power System&Hydroelectric Engineering,2010,2(2):3-8(in Chinese).
[14]徐遐龄,林涛,徐颢霖.近年来国内外大停电原因分析及启示[J].湖北电力,2013,37(2):45-47.Xu Xialing,Lin Tao,Xu Haolin.Cause analysis and inspiration of large scale outage in home and abroad for recent years[J].Hubei Electric Power,2013,37(2):45-47(in Chinese).
[15]Graham J F,Holmgren T,Fischer P,et al.The Rio madeira HVDC system-design aspects of Bipole 1 and the connector to Acre-Rond?nia[C]//Proceedings of CIGRésession.Paris:CIGRE,2012.
[16]Esmeraldo P C V,Araújo E M A,Carvalho D S Jr.HVDC madeira transmission system-planning development and final design[R].Paper B4-306-2010.Paris:CIGRE,2010.
[17]ANEEL.Edital do leil?o NO 007/2008-ANEEL[R].Brasília:ANEEL,2008.
[18]Graham J F,Holmgren T,Fischer P.The rio madeira HVDC system:design aspects of bipole 1 and the connector to Acre-Rond?nia[C]//CIGRE2012.Paris,France,2012.
[19]da Silva R A,Campos P C G,Spinelli I L,et al.Controle mestre do sistema de transimiss?o HVDC do Rio madeira[C]//Proceedings of the 27th Seminário Nacional de Produ??o e Transmiss?o de Energia ElétricaSNPTEE.Brasília:2013.
[20]Lopes F R,Sobrinho F A,Eletronorte,et al.Modelagem do master control e do controle do bipolo 1 do elo ccat do rio madeira no anatem:principais malhas de controle,desempenho,valida??o e análise de perturba??es reais[C]//Proceedings of the Seminário Nacional de Produ??o e Transmiss?o de Energia ElétricaSNPTEE.Curitiba:2017.
[21]Tolmasquim M.Power sector reform in brazil[M].Brazil:EPE Press,2012:73-102.
[22]毕玉明.巴西电改:向“大停电”说不[J].能源,2013(6):83-85.Bi Yuming.Electricity reform in Brazil:saying no to“Blackouts”[J].Energy,2013(6):83-85(in Chinese).
[23]Itapúa Dam.2009 Brazil and Paraguay blackout[EB/OL].(2009-11-15)[2009-01-05].http://en.wikipedia.org.
[24]Almeida Pedroso F R V,Graham J F,Bassini M T.Grupo de Estudo de AnáLise e TéCnicas de Sistemas de PotêNcia-Gat AnáLise Multi-Infeed do Sistema EléTrico Brasileiro[C]//Proceedings of the Seminário Nacional de Produ??o e Transmiss?o de Energia ElétricaSNPTEE.Curitiba:2017.
[25]胥威汀,戴松灵,张全明,等.区域互联电网故障解列方法综述[J].中国电机工程学报,2015,35(11):2756-2769.Xu Weiting,Dai Songling,Zhang Quanming,et a1.Comments and overviews on the islanding methods of large interconnected power grid[J].Proceedings of the CSEE,2015,35(11):2756-2769(in Chinese).
[26]甘德强,胡江溢,韩祯祥.2003年国际若干停电事故思考[J].电力系统自动化,2004,28(3):1-4,9.Gan Deqiang,Hu Jiangyi,Han Zhenxiang.After the 2003blackouts across several continentals[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2004,28(3):1-4,9(in Chinese).
[27]薛禹胜,肖世杰.综合防御高风险的小概率事件:对日本相继天灾引发大停电及核泄漏事件的思考[J].电力系统自动化,2011,35(8):1-11.Xue Yusheng,Xiao Shijie.Comprehensively defending high risk events with low probability[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2011,35(8):1-11(in Chinese).