高新认定办法、研发操纵与企业技术创新效率
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摘要
基于2008-2017年中国高新技术上市公司的创新数据,从"达标型"和"避税型"研发操纵这一新视角,研究了高新认定办法对企业技术创新效率的影响。实证结果表明:高新认定激励了企业技术创新效率,而两类研发操纵抑制了这种激励效应;达标型研发操纵集中在高新认定初审阶段,且高新开发区以外、销售收入较高的企业更显著;避税型研发操纵集中在高新认定复审阶段,且高新开发区以内、销售收入较低的企业更显著。本文为高新认定办法提供了政策建议。
In order to encourage the development of high-tech industries,the high-tech identification policy was firstly promulgated in 2008 and revised in 2016,and it gives policy benefits to the enterprises that satisfy the judicial recognition. However,some enterprises manipulate the collection scope of R&D expenses to obtain the policy benefits,resulting in loss of national fiscal and tax resources and the benefits of real high-tech enterprises. Therefore,the research of R&D manipulation is helpful to improve the high-tech identification policy,and has an important practical significance for the development of high-tech industries.However,previous studies of innovation policy had explained mainly from the perspective of policy tools such as the public subsidy and tax incentive,but rarely focused on the high-tech identification policy that has different research conclusions. For instance,Sun et al. (2016) believed that the title of high-tech enterprise can obtain policy benefits such as fiscal support and financing convenience,which stimulate enterprise to engage in technological innovation activities. Xu (2017) proved this stimulation by using the data of A-share listed private high-tech companies. However,Yang et al. (2017) found that high-tech identification policy has a stimulation distortion effect,which induces enterprises to reach the R&D threshold by R&D manipulating,resulting in the decline of R&D performance. Therefore,the effect of high-tech identification policy needs to be tested.Furthermore,there still have two points that need to be studied further. Firstly,it is the study on different stages of high-tech identification policy. Enterprises need to participate in review-trail before the expiration of high-tech enterprise certification. According to the statistics given in this paper,the total enterprise technological innovation efficiency is increased by 16% after the first-trail of high-tech identification,but no significant changes occurred after the review-trail of high-tech identification. However,previous studies only regard passing the first-trail of high-tech identification as a condition,ignoring the difference of policy effect in different identification stages. Secondly,it is the study on tax avoidance motivation of R&D manipulation. Previous studies proved that enterprises manipulated R&D expenses in order to reach the R&D threshold. However,according to enterprise tax law,it can be additional deducted whenever R&D investment is capitalized or expensed,which means that the enterprises that have already reached the R&D threshold also have a possibility to manipulate R&D expenses for decreasing the tax burden.Firstly,this papertheoretically divided R&D manipulation into two types by the motivation of manipulation. One type is called target achieved R&D manipulation. Enterprises with target achieved motivation manipulate R&D expenses,so that they can obtain the policy benefits from the title of high-tech enterprise. These Enterprises actually did not reach R&D threshold,or even not engaged in R&D activities. Based on the tradeoff between policy benefits and violation costs,such enterprises control their R&D expenses around R&D threshold. The other type is called Tax avoided R&D manipulation. The enterprises with tax avoided motivation were reached R&D threshold,manipulating R&D expenses to decrease the tax burden. These enterprises regard R&D expenses as a tax avoidance approach,even though they can obtain generous policy benefits. Especially in the fierce market competition,enterprises are more incentive to keep profits by decreasing the tax burden. Therefore,such enterprises report that the R&D investment is much higher than actual situation,and the degree of manipulation is more than the target achieved type.Then the paper proposes four hypotheses: H1a,there is a positive effect of high-tech identification policy on enterprise technological innovation efficiency; H1b,there is a negative effect of high-tech identification policy on enterprise technological innovation efficiency; H2,R&D manipulation has a negative moderating effect on the relation between high-tech identification policy and enterprise technological innovation efficiency; H3,target achieved R&D manipulation is more significant on the firms which are outside the high-tech development zone or have a higher sale,whereas tax avoided R&D manipulation is more significant on the firms which are inside the high-tech development zone or have a lower sale.Finally the study applies the empirical research paradigm based on the innovation data of Chinese high-tech listed enterprises from 2008-2017. The empirical results are as follow: (1) High-tech identification policy is an important factor for enterprise technological innovation efficiency. Firm can obtain more innovation resources and better market signals after passing the high-tech identification,which can improve enterprise technological innovation efficiency; (2) Target achieved R&D manipulations and tax avoided R&D manipulations are not conducive to the stimulation of high-tech identification policy. Both R&D manipulations increase R&D expenses by including the expenses that not belong to R&D activities into the R&D expense column,or purchasing the equipment that is not in operation,which reduce the allocation efficiency of enterprise innovation resources.Meanwhile,executives use the regulatory vacuum and information advantages of R&D manipulation to realize their personal benefits,resulting in short-sighted decision-making; and (3) Target achieved R&D manipulation is clustered in the first-trail of high-tech identification,and it's more significant on the firms which are outside the high-tech development zone or have a higher sale. Tax avoided R&D manipulation is clustered in the review-trail of high-tech identification,and it's more significant on the firms which are inside the high-tech development zone or have a lower sale.The intention of high-tech identification policy is to encourage high-tech industries,but this paper finds that high-tech identification policy has a stimulation distortion effect,inducing enterprises to manipulate R&D expenses. Policy maker should adjust high-tech identification policy from the perspectives of violation cost,audit process and R&D threshold,so as to explore more effective policy.
In order to encourage the development of high-tech industries,the high-tech identification policy was firstly promulgated in 2008 and revised in 2016,and it gives policy benefits to the enterprises that satisfy the judicial recognition. However,some enterprises manipulate the collection scope of R&D expenses to obtain the policy benefits,resulting in loss of national fiscal and tax resources and the benefits of real high-tech enterprises. Therefore,the research of R&D manipulation is helpful to improve the high-tech identification policy,and has an important practical significance for the development of high-tech industries.However,previous studies of innovation policy had explained mainly from the perspective of policy tools such as the public subsidy and tax incentive,but rarely focused on the high-tech identification policy that has different research conclusions. For instance,Sun et al. (2016) believed that the title of high-tech enterprise can obtain policy benefits such as fiscal support and financing convenience,which stimulate enterprise to engage in technological innovation activities. Xu (2017) proved this stimulation by using the data of A-share listed private high-tech companies. However,Yang et al. (2017) found that high-tech identification policy has a stimulation distortion effect,which induces enterprises to reach the R&D threshold by R&D manipulating,resulting in the decline of R&D performance. Therefore,the effect of high-tech identification policy needs to be tested.Furthermore,there still have two points that need to be studied further. Firstly,it is the study on different stages of high-tech identification policy. Enterprises need to participate in review-trail before the expiration of high-tech enterprise certification. According to the statistics given in this paper,the total enterprise technological innovation efficiency is increased by 16% after the first-trail of high-tech identification,but no significant changes occurred after the review-trail of high-tech identification. However,previous studies only regard passing the first-trail of high-tech identification as a condition,ignoring the difference of policy effect in different identification stages. Secondly,it is the study on tax avoidance motivation of R&D manipulation. Previous studies proved that enterprises manipulated R&D expenses in order to reach the R&D threshold. However,according to enterprise tax law,it can be additional deducted whenever R&D investment is capitalized or expensed,which means that the enterprises that have already reached the R&D threshold also have a possibility to manipulate R&D expenses for decreasing the tax burden.Firstly,this papertheoretically divided R&D manipulation into two types by the motivation of manipulation. One type is called target achieved R&D manipulation. Enterprises with target achieved motivation manipulate R&D expenses,so that they can obtain the policy benefits from the title of high-tech enterprise. These Enterprises actually did not reach R&D threshold,or even not engaged in R&D activities. Based on the tradeoff between policy benefits and violation costs,such enterprises control their R&D expenses around R&D threshold. The other type is called Tax avoided R&D manipulation. The enterprises with tax avoided motivation were reached R&D threshold,manipulating R&D expenses to decrease the tax burden. These enterprises regard R&D expenses as a tax avoidance approach,even though they can obtain generous policy benefits. Especially in the fierce market competition,enterprises are more incentive to keep profits by decreasing the tax burden. Therefore,such enterprises report that the R&D investment is much higher than actual situation,and the degree of manipulation is more than the target achieved type.Then the paper proposes four hypotheses: H1a,there is a positive effect of high-tech identification policy on enterprise technological innovation efficiency; H1b,there is a negative effect of high-tech identification policy on enterprise technological innovation efficiency; H2,R&D manipulation has a negative moderating effect on the relation between high-tech identification policy and enterprise technological innovation efficiency; H3,target achieved R&D manipulation is more significant on the firms which are outside the high-tech development zone or have a higher sale,whereas tax avoided R&D manipulation is more significant on the firms which are inside the high-tech development zone or have a lower sale.Finally the study applies the empirical research paradigm based on the innovation data of Chinese high-tech listed enterprises from 2008-2017. The empirical results are as follow: (1) High-tech identification policy is an important factor for enterprise technological innovation efficiency. Firm can obtain more innovation resources and better market signals after passing the high-tech identification,which can improve enterprise technological innovation efficiency; (2) Target achieved R&D manipulations and tax avoided R&D manipulations are not conducive to the stimulation of high-tech identification policy. Both R&D manipulations increase R&D expenses by including the expenses that not belong to R&D activities into the R&D expense column,or purchasing the equipment that is not in operation,which reduce the allocation efficiency of enterprise innovation resources.Meanwhile,executives use the regulatory vacuum and information advantages of R&D manipulation to realize their personal benefits,resulting in short-sighted decision-making; and (3) Target achieved R&D manipulation is clustered in the first-trail of high-tech identification,and it's more significant on the firms which are outside the high-tech development zone or have a higher sale. Tax avoided R&D manipulation is clustered in the review-trail of high-tech identification,and it's more significant on the firms which are inside the high-tech development zone or have a lower sale.The intention of high-tech identification policy is to encourage high-tech industries,but this paper finds that high-tech identification policy has a stimulation distortion effect,inducing enterprises to manipulate R&D expenses. Policy maker should adjust high-tech identification policy from the perspectives of violation cost,audit process and R&D threshold,so as to explore more effective policy.
引文
[1]武咸云,陈艳,李秀兰,等.战略性新兴产业研发投入、政府补助与企业价值[J].科研管理,2017,38(9):30-34.Wu Xianyun,Chenyan,Li Xiulan,et al.R&D investment,government subsidies and corporate value of strategic emerging industries[J].Science Research Management,2017,38(9):30-34.
[2]江希和,王水娟.企业研发投资税收优惠政策效应研究[J].科研管理,2015,36(6):46-52.Jiang Xihe,Wang Shuijuan.A study of the effects of preferential tax policy on corporate R&D investment[J].Science Research Management,2015,36(6):46-52.
[3]孙刚,孙红,朱凯.高科技资质认定与上市企业创新治理[J].财经研究,2016,42(1):30-39.Sun Gang,Sun Hong,Zhu Kai.High-tech qualification accreditation and innovation governance of Chinese listed firms[J].Journal of Finance and Economics,2016,42(1):30-39.
[4]许玲玲.高新技术企业认定、政治关联与民营企业技术创新[J].管理评论,2017,29(9):84-94.Xu Lingling.Identification of high-tech enterprises,political connections and private enterprises’technology innovation[J].Business Review,2017,29(9):84-94.
[5]杨国超,刘静,廉鹏,等.减税激励、研发操纵与研发绩效[J].经济研究,2017,63(8):110-124.Yang Guochao,Liu Jing,Lian Peng,et al.Tax-reducing incentives,R&D manipulation and R&D performance[J].Economic Research Journal,2017,63(8):110-124.
[6]Cai H,Liu Q.Competition and corporate tax avoidance:Evidence from Chinese industrial firms[J].Economic Journal,2009,119(537):764-795.
[7]Calantone R J,Stanko M A.Drivers of outsourced innovation:An exploratory study[J].Journal of Product Innovation Management,2007,24(3):230-241.
[8]许玲玲,郑春美.高新技术企业认定公告的市场反应研究[J].科研管理,2016,37(12):01-09.Xu Lingling,Zheng Chunmei.A study on the market reaction to announcements of identification of high and new-tech enterprises[J].Science Research Management,2016,37(12):01-09.
[9]朱红军,王迪,李挺.真实盈余管理动机下的研发投资决策后果---基于创新和税收的分析视角[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(4):36-48.Zhu Hongjun,Wang Di,Li Ting.Decision-making consequences of R&D investment under real earnings management motivation:Based on the analysis perspective of innovation and taxation[J].Nankai Business Review,2016,19(4):36-48.
[10]Eldenburg L G,Gunny K A,Hee K W,et al.Earnings management using real activities:Evidence from nonprofit hospitals[J].Accounting Review,2007,86(5):1605-1630.
[11]顾元媛,沈坤荣.简单堆积还是创新园地?---考察高新区的创新绩效[J].科研管理,2015,36(9):65-71.Gu Yuanyuan,Shen Kunrong.Simple accumulation or innovation corner,to be determined by examining the performance of hi-tech development zones.[J].Science Research Management,2015,36(9):65-71.
[12]Lerner J,Wulf J.Innovation and incentives:Evidence from corporate R&D[J].Nber Working Papers,2007,89(4):634-644.
[13]肖文,林高榜.政府支持、研发管理与技术创新效率---基于中国工业行业的实证分析[J].管理世界,2014,30(4):71-80.Xiao Wen,Lin Gaobang.Government support,R&D management and technological innovation efficiency:An empirical study of Chinese industries[J].Management World,2014,30(4):71-80.
[14]卢方元,李彦龙.政府支持有助于提升高技术产业R&D效率吗?[J].科学学研究,2016,34(12):1800-1806.Lu Fangyuan,Li Yanlong.Is government support helpful to improve the R&D efficiency of high-tech industry?[J].Studies in Science of Science,2016,34(12):1800-1806.
[15]Battese G E,Coelli T J.A model for technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic frontier production function for panel data[J].Empirical Economics,1995,20(2):325-332.
[16]Gilliam T A,Heflin F,Paterson J S.Evidence that the zero-earnings discontinuity has disappeared[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2015,60(1):117-132.
[17]刘行,叶康涛.企业的避税活动会影响投资效率吗?[J].会计研究,2013 34(6):47-53.Liu Hang,Ye Kangtao.Does corporate tax avoidance affect investment efficiency?[J].Accounting Research,2013 34(6):47-53.
[18]Czarnitzki D,Kraft K.Capital control,debt financing and innovative activity[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2009,71(2):372-383.
(1)高新认定办法规定了研发比例门槛:销售收入小于5000万元的企业,研发投入与销售收入之比不低于6%(2016年修订后为5 %);销售收入5000万元至2亿元的企业,该比例不低于4%;销售收入大于等于2亿元的企业,该比例不低于3%.
(1)高新认定办法对销售收入不同的企业制定了不同的研发比例门槛,但销售收入小于5000万的样本观测值太少,无法进行相关检验,故本文剔除这部分企业。
[2]江希和,王水娟.企业研发投资税收优惠政策效应研究[J].科研管理,2015,36(6):46-52.Jiang Xihe,Wang Shuijuan.A study of the effects of preferential tax policy on corporate R&D investment[J].Science Research Management,2015,36(6):46-52.
[3]孙刚,孙红,朱凯.高科技资质认定与上市企业创新治理[J].财经研究,2016,42(1):30-39.Sun Gang,Sun Hong,Zhu Kai.High-tech qualification accreditation and innovation governance of Chinese listed firms[J].Journal of Finance and Economics,2016,42(1):30-39.
[4]许玲玲.高新技术企业认定、政治关联与民营企业技术创新[J].管理评论,2017,29(9):84-94.Xu Lingling.Identification of high-tech enterprises,political connections and private enterprises’technology innovation[J].Business Review,2017,29(9):84-94.
[5]杨国超,刘静,廉鹏,等.减税激励、研发操纵与研发绩效[J].经济研究,2017,63(8):110-124.Yang Guochao,Liu Jing,Lian Peng,et al.Tax-reducing incentives,R&D manipulation and R&D performance[J].Economic Research Journal,2017,63(8):110-124.
[6]Cai H,Liu Q.Competition and corporate tax avoidance:Evidence from Chinese industrial firms[J].Economic Journal,2009,119(537):764-795.
[7]Calantone R J,Stanko M A.Drivers of outsourced innovation:An exploratory study[J].Journal of Product Innovation Management,2007,24(3):230-241.
[8]许玲玲,郑春美.高新技术企业认定公告的市场反应研究[J].科研管理,2016,37(12):01-09.Xu Lingling,Zheng Chunmei.A study on the market reaction to announcements of identification of high and new-tech enterprises[J].Science Research Management,2016,37(12):01-09.
[9]朱红军,王迪,李挺.真实盈余管理动机下的研发投资决策后果---基于创新和税收的分析视角[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(4):36-48.Zhu Hongjun,Wang Di,Li Ting.Decision-making consequences of R&D investment under real earnings management motivation:Based on the analysis perspective of innovation and taxation[J].Nankai Business Review,2016,19(4):36-48.
[10]Eldenburg L G,Gunny K A,Hee K W,et al.Earnings management using real activities:Evidence from nonprofit hospitals[J].Accounting Review,2007,86(5):1605-1630.
[11]顾元媛,沈坤荣.简单堆积还是创新园地?---考察高新区的创新绩效[J].科研管理,2015,36(9):65-71.Gu Yuanyuan,Shen Kunrong.Simple accumulation or innovation corner,to be determined by examining the performance of hi-tech development zones.[J].Science Research Management,2015,36(9):65-71.
[12]Lerner J,Wulf J.Innovation and incentives:Evidence from corporate R&D[J].Nber Working Papers,2007,89(4):634-644.
[13]肖文,林高榜.政府支持、研发管理与技术创新效率---基于中国工业行业的实证分析[J].管理世界,2014,30(4):71-80.Xiao Wen,Lin Gaobang.Government support,R&D management and technological innovation efficiency:An empirical study of Chinese industries[J].Management World,2014,30(4):71-80.
[14]卢方元,李彦龙.政府支持有助于提升高技术产业R&D效率吗?[J].科学学研究,2016,34(12):1800-1806.Lu Fangyuan,Li Yanlong.Is government support helpful to improve the R&D efficiency of high-tech industry?[J].Studies in Science of Science,2016,34(12):1800-1806.
[15]Battese G E,Coelli T J.A model for technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic frontier production function for panel data[J].Empirical Economics,1995,20(2):325-332.
[16]Gilliam T A,Heflin F,Paterson J S.Evidence that the zero-earnings discontinuity has disappeared[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2015,60(1):117-132.
[17]刘行,叶康涛.企业的避税活动会影响投资效率吗?[J].会计研究,2013 34(6):47-53.Liu Hang,Ye Kangtao.Does corporate tax avoidance affect investment efficiency?[J].Accounting Research,2013 34(6):47-53.
[18]Czarnitzki D,Kraft K.Capital control,debt financing and innovative activity[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2009,71(2):372-383.
(1)高新认定办法规定了研发比例门槛:销售收入小于5000万元的企业,研发投入与销售收入之比不低于6%(2016年修订后为5 %);销售收入5000万元至2亿元的企业,该比例不低于4%;销售收入大于等于2亿元的企业,该比例不低于3%.
(1)高新认定办法对销售收入不同的企业制定了不同的研发比例门槛,但销售收入小于5000万的样本观测值太少,无法进行相关检验,故本文剔除这部分企业。