双层股权结构:演进、价值、风险及其应对进路
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摘要
双层股权结构较单一股权结构而言,具有化解控制权保持与融资需求矛盾、抵御敌意收购、满足股东异质化需求等特点与优势。近百年来双层股权结构在被世界各地商事广泛应用的同时也带来了代理成本加剧、监督机制失效等问题。根据这些问题产生的原因,本文提出事前应对机制与事后应对机制相联结的应对策略,结合新加坡和香港等地的同股不同权制度实践提出了强制信息披露制度、在重大事项上对超级投票权加以限制、限制超级表决权的比重、确保独立董事的独立性与监督作用、引入定期日落条款与燕尾条款、完善股东救济制度、确立完备的控制股东信义义务审查标准等具体方案。
Compared with the single shareholding structure,the dual-class share structure has the characteristics and advantages of resolving the contradiction between maintain of control rights and financing needs,resisting hostile takeovers,and satisfying the heterogeneous needs of shareholders.In the past 100 years,while the dual-class share structure has been widely used in commercial applications around the world,it has also brought about problems such as increased agency costs and ineffective supervision mechanisms.Based on the reasons for these problems,this paper proposes a coping strategy which combines the pre-existing coping mechanism and the post-response coping mechanism,and combines the practice of"same share's holding different rights"system in Singapore and Hong Kong.Finally,this paper proposes that we should establish a mandatory information disclosure system,restrict the super-voting rights on major issues,restrict the proportion of super-voting rights,ensure the independence and supervision of independent directors,introduce regular sunset clauses and dovetail clauses,improve the shareholder relief system,and establish a complete review of the shareholders'beliefs and obligations.
Compared with the single shareholding structure,the dual-class share structure has the characteristics and advantages of resolving the contradiction between maintain of control rights and financing needs,resisting hostile takeovers,and satisfying the heterogeneous needs of shareholders.In the past 100 years,while the dual-class share structure has been widely used in commercial applications around the world,it has also brought about problems such as increased agency costs and ineffective supervision mechanisms.Based on the reasons for these problems,this paper proposes a coping strategy which combines the pre-existing coping mechanism and the post-response coping mechanism,and combines the practice of"same share's holding different rights"system in Singapore and Hong Kong.Finally,this paper proposes that we should establish a mandatory information disclosure system,restrict the super-voting rights on major issues,restrict the proportion of super-voting rights,ensure the independence and supervision of independent directors,introduce regular sunset clauses and dovetail clauses,improve the shareholder relief system,and establish a complete review of the shareholders'beliefs and obligations.
引文
[1]黄臻.双层股权结构公司的投资者保护问题研究[J].上海:华东政法大学博士学位论文,2015.
[2]高菲.争议中的双层股权结构:国际经验及对中国启示[J].理论月刊,2018(8).
[3]冯果.股东异质化视角下的双层股权结构[J].政法论坛,2016(4).
[4]弗兰克·伊斯特布鲁克,丹尼尔·费希尔.公司法的经济结构[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2014.
[5]彭真明,曹晓路.控制权博弈中的双层股权结构探析--以破解股权融资与稀释的困境为视角[J].证券市场导报,2016(7).
[6]马一.股权稀释过程中公司控制权保持:法律途径与边界--以双层股权结构和马云“中国合伙人制”为研究对象[J].中外法学,2014(3).
[7]郑志刚,吴新春,梁昕雯.高控制权溢价的经济后果:基于“隧道挖掘”的证据[J].世界经济,2014(9).
[8]章武生.我国证券集团诉讼的模式选择与制度重构[J].中国法学,2017(2).
[9]陈若英.论双层股权结构的公司实践及制度配套--兼论我国的监管应对[J].证券市场导报,2014(3).
[10]施天涛.公司法论:第四版[M].北京:法律出版社,2018.
[11]张巍.同股不同权:香港还缺什么?[Z].比较公司治理公众微信号,2019-1-6.
[12]Adolf A.Berle.Non-voting stock and bankers control(1925-1926)[J].Harvard Law Review,1926(39).
[13]Joel Seligman.Equal protection in shareholder voting rights:the one common share,one vote contro‐versy[J].The George Washington Law Review,1986(54).
[14]Onur Arugaslan,Douglas O.Cook,Robert L.Kie‐schnick.On the decision to go public with dual class stock[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2010(16).
[15]Ronald W.Masulis,Cong Wang,Fei Xie.Agency problems at dual-class companies[J].The Journal of fi‐nance,2009,64(4).
[16]Lucian A.Bebchuk,Reinier Kraakman,George Triantis.Agency conflicts,controlling owner proximity,and firm value:An analysis of dual-class firms in the United States[R].NBER Working Paper No.w6951,2000.
[17]Frank H.Easterbrook,Daniel R.Fischel.Voting in Corporate Law[J].The Journal of Law and Economics1983(26).
[18]Andrew Winden.Sunrise,sunset:An empirical and theoretical assessment of dual-class stock structures[J]Columbia Business Law Review,2018(3).
[19]Lucian A.Bebchuk,Kobi Kastiel.The untenable case for perpetual dual-class Stock[J].Virginia Law Re‐view,2017(103).
[20]Martijn Cremers,Beni Lauterbach,Anete Pajuste The life-cycle of dual class firm valuation[R].ECGI Fi‐nance Working Paper,2018.
[21]Brian Frederick Smith,Ben Amoako-Adu,Madhu Kalimipalli.Concentrated control and corporate value:a comparative analysis of single and dual class structures in Canada[J].Applied Financial Economics,2009(19).
(1)数据来源:美国证券价格研究中心http://www.crsp.com/documentation.
(2)数据来源:不同投票权架构概念文件(香港证券交易所2014年8月发布)
(3)我国语境中存在着对“公司管理层”这一概念使用不统一的现象。本文根据2016年12月23日财政部修订的《中国注册会计师审计准则第1151号--与治理层的沟通第三条》,区分出治理层与管理层两个相对的概念,治理层包括上市公司的股东大会、董事会、监事会,管理层主要是指高级管理人员,但不仅限于高级管理人员。
(4)日落条款(Sunset Provision)主要包括定期日落条款(Fixed-Time Sunset Provision)、条件触发日落条款(Triggering-Event Sunset Provision)、股权百分比日落条款(Ownership-Percentage Sunset Provision)等类型,Bebchuk Lucian A.和Kastiel Kobi在The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock(Virginia Law Review,Vol.103,2017.)一文中对此有详细说明。
(5)参见香港证券交易所《主板上市规则》8A.17、8A.22,《上海证券交易所科创板股票上市规则》对此也有所规定,新交所《上市规则》亦有同类规定。
(6)参见《公司法》第151条,《公司法司法解释(四)》第23至26条。
[2]高菲.争议中的双层股权结构:国际经验及对中国启示[J].理论月刊,2018(8).
[3]冯果.股东异质化视角下的双层股权结构[J].政法论坛,2016(4).
[4]弗兰克·伊斯特布鲁克,丹尼尔·费希尔.公司法的经济结构[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2014.
[5]彭真明,曹晓路.控制权博弈中的双层股权结构探析--以破解股权融资与稀释的困境为视角[J].证券市场导报,2016(7).
[6]马一.股权稀释过程中公司控制权保持:法律途径与边界--以双层股权结构和马云“中国合伙人制”为研究对象[J].中外法学,2014(3).
[7]郑志刚,吴新春,梁昕雯.高控制权溢价的经济后果:基于“隧道挖掘”的证据[J].世界经济,2014(9).
[8]章武生.我国证券集团诉讼的模式选择与制度重构[J].中国法学,2017(2).
[9]陈若英.论双层股权结构的公司实践及制度配套--兼论我国的监管应对[J].证券市场导报,2014(3).
[10]施天涛.公司法论:第四版[M].北京:法律出版社,2018.
[11]张巍.同股不同权:香港还缺什么?[Z].比较公司治理公众微信号,2019-1-6.
[12]Adolf A.Berle.Non-voting stock and bankers control(1925-1926)[J].Harvard Law Review,1926(39).
[13]Joel Seligman.Equal protection in shareholder voting rights:the one common share,one vote contro‐versy[J].The George Washington Law Review,1986(54).
[14]Onur Arugaslan,Douglas O.Cook,Robert L.Kie‐schnick.On the decision to go public with dual class stock[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2010(16).
[15]Ronald W.Masulis,Cong Wang,Fei Xie.Agency problems at dual-class companies[J].The Journal of fi‐nance,2009,64(4).
[16]Lucian A.Bebchuk,Reinier Kraakman,George Triantis.Agency conflicts,controlling owner proximity,and firm value:An analysis of dual-class firms in the United States[R].NBER Working Paper No.w6951,2000.
[17]Frank H.Easterbrook,Daniel R.Fischel.Voting in Corporate Law[J].The Journal of Law and Economics1983(26).
[18]Andrew Winden.Sunrise,sunset:An empirical and theoretical assessment of dual-class stock structures[J]Columbia Business Law Review,2018(3).
[19]Lucian A.Bebchuk,Kobi Kastiel.The untenable case for perpetual dual-class Stock[J].Virginia Law Re‐view,2017(103).
[20]Martijn Cremers,Beni Lauterbach,Anete Pajuste The life-cycle of dual class firm valuation[R].ECGI Fi‐nance Working Paper,2018.
[21]Brian Frederick Smith,Ben Amoako-Adu,Madhu Kalimipalli.Concentrated control and corporate value:a comparative analysis of single and dual class structures in Canada[J].Applied Financial Economics,2009(19).
(1)数据来源:美国证券价格研究中心http://www.crsp.com/documentation.
(2)数据来源:不同投票权架构概念文件(香港证券交易所2014年8月发布)
(3)我国语境中存在着对“公司管理层”这一概念使用不统一的现象。本文根据2016年12月23日财政部修订的《中国注册会计师审计准则第1151号--与治理层的沟通第三条》,区分出治理层与管理层两个相对的概念,治理层包括上市公司的股东大会、董事会、监事会,管理层主要是指高级管理人员,但不仅限于高级管理人员。
(4)日落条款(Sunset Provision)主要包括定期日落条款(Fixed-Time Sunset Provision)、条件触发日落条款(Triggering-Event Sunset Provision)、股权百分比日落条款(Ownership-Percentage Sunset Provision)等类型,Bebchuk Lucian A.和Kastiel Kobi在The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock(Virginia Law Review,Vol.103,2017.)一文中对此有详细说明。
(5)参见香港证券交易所《主板上市规则》8A.17、8A.22,《上海证券交易所科创板股票上市规则》对此也有所规定,新交所《上市规则》亦有同类规定。
(6)参见《公司法》第151条,《公司法司法解释(四)》第23至26条。