地区环境治理压力、高管经历与企业环保投资——一项基于《环境空气质量标准(2012)》的准自然实验
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摘要
本文从政治经济学分析视角,以《环境空气质量标准(2012)》的实施为准自然实验,将地方官员动机、企业环保决策与高管工作经历置于同一研究场景,采用倍差法检验了新标准实施引致的官员动机变化对企业环保决策的影响。研究结果显示,新标准实施前,高管具有公职经历企业的环保投资规模显著低于其他企业。而新标准实施后,高管具有公职经历企业的环保投资提升程度则显著高于其他企业。在财政环保支出较低和政府干预较强的地区,以及国有企业和高管的"先天"公职经历企业样本中,官员动机增强对高管具有公职经历企业的环保投资提升效果更强。此外,政府给予此类企业环保补助可能是激励其投资减排的重要经济手段。本文以宏观政策实施来外生化地方官员环境治理动机的变化,有利于因果识别官员动机、高管工作经历与企业环保决策间的逻辑关系。其政策意义在于,中国环境治理的症结是地方官员动机的缺失,当中央环境规制能有效激发官员环保意愿时,高管的公职经历将有利于提升企业环境治理水平。
Industrial activity, while rapidly accumulating economic benefits, has caused severe environmental problems. Yet it is difficult for enterprises to invest their limited financial resources in environmental protection, as the short-term benefit is to the public rather than the enterprise. Furthermore, as enterprise tax on profit-making activities contributes to local economic growth and helps local officials achieve their performance goals, when effective outside intervention is lacking, local governments may even be pleased to see enterprises invest in profit-making rather than environmental protection.Although China's central government has set up a series of polices, regulations, and institutions for environmental protection over the last 20 years, local government supervision of enterprises in polluting industries has not reached the expected goal. One reason is that the sheltering of local enterprises by local governments decreases their willingness to invest in environmental protection, as enterprises with executives who have working experiences in public office prefer low-cost penalties to high-cost environmental governance. The other possible reason is a lack of incentive for local officials to improve the environment. In the past, local officials were able to "tactically" modify environmental quality data to make them appear to meet central government targets. Under such circumstances, local governments use environmental deregulation to boost the local economy and tolerate or even permit excessive emissions by polluting enterprises. Identifying the main reason for the local environmental governance dilemma requires consideration of the combination of central government environmental policies, local official incentives to improve the environment, enterprise environmental protection decisions, and executive's working expenience. Assuming that the connections between polluting enterprises and local governments are stable, we can systematically analyze the differential impact of a change in local official incentives on the environmental investment decisions of enterprises with and without executives who have working experiences in public office.We take the release of the "Ambient Air Quality Standards 2012" as an exogenous policy shock that gave local officials less control over environmental data and greater environmental governance incentives. Based on a difference in differences test, we find that before implementation of the new standards, enterprises with executives who have working experiences in public office invested significantly less in the environment than other enterprises; after implementation of the standards there was a significantly greater increase in environmental protection investment by enterprises with executives who have working experiences in public office than those without. Further analysis shows that(1) the more limited a local government's financial resources, the more it relies on environmental protection investment by enterprises with executives who have working experiences in public office; the more capable the government is to intervene to protect the environment, the more willing this type of enterprises are to invest in environmental governance;(2) being state-owned and working experiences in government significantly increase the willingness of this type of enterprises to improve environmental governance; and(3) environmental subsidies may be an approach for governments to stimulate this type of enterprises to reduce pollution.The possible contributions of our study include the following. First, we investigate the influence of macro-environmental policy on micro-level environmental protection decisions by enterprises from the perspective of political economics. Second, we clarify the logical relations between local official incentives, executive's working experiences, and environmental governance by local enterprises, and find that the core issue in China's environmental governance is being lack of incentives for officials. When central government regulations effectively stimulate the willingness of officials to protect the environment, the inhibiting effect on environmental governance of collusion through government-enterprise connections is significantly alleviated.
Industrial activity, while rapidly accumulating economic benefits, has caused severe environmental problems. Yet it is difficult for enterprises to invest their limited financial resources in environmental protection, as the short-term benefit is to the public rather than the enterprise. Furthermore, as enterprise tax on profit-making activities contributes to local economic growth and helps local officials achieve their performance goals, when effective outside intervention is lacking, local governments may even be pleased to see enterprises invest in profit-making rather than environmental protection.Although China's central government has set up a series of polices, regulations, and institutions for environmental protection over the last 20 years, local government supervision of enterprises in polluting industries has not reached the expected goal. One reason is that the sheltering of local enterprises by local governments decreases their willingness to invest in environmental protection, as enterprises with executives who have working experiences in public office prefer low-cost penalties to high-cost environmental governance. The other possible reason is a lack of incentive for local officials to improve the environment. In the past, local officials were able to "tactically" modify environmental quality data to make them appear to meet central government targets. Under such circumstances, local governments use environmental deregulation to boost the local economy and tolerate or even permit excessive emissions by polluting enterprises. Identifying the main reason for the local environmental governance dilemma requires consideration of the combination of central government environmental policies, local official incentives to improve the environment, enterprise environmental protection decisions, and executive's working expenience. Assuming that the connections between polluting enterprises and local governments are stable, we can systematically analyze the differential impact of a change in local official incentives on the environmental investment decisions of enterprises with and without executives who have working experiences in public office.We take the release of the "Ambient Air Quality Standards 2012" as an exogenous policy shock that gave local officials less control over environmental data and greater environmental governance incentives. Based on a difference in differences test, we find that before implementation of the new standards, enterprises with executives who have working experiences in public office invested significantly less in the environment than other enterprises; after implementation of the standards there was a significantly greater increase in environmental protection investment by enterprises with executives who have working experiences in public office than those without. Further analysis shows that(1) the more limited a local government's financial resources, the more it relies on environmental protection investment by enterprises with executives who have working experiences in public office; the more capable the government is to intervene to protect the environment, the more willing this type of enterprises are to invest in environmental governance;(2) being state-owned and working experiences in government significantly increase the willingness of this type of enterprises to improve environmental governance; and(3) environmental subsidies may be an approach for governments to stimulate this type of enterprises to reduce pollution.The possible contributions of our study include the following. First, we investigate the influence of macro-environmental policy on micro-level environmental protection decisions by enterprises from the perspective of political economics. Second, we clarify the logical relations between local official incentives, executive's working experiences, and environmental governance by local enterprises, and find that the core issue in China's environmental governance is being lack of incentives for officials. When central government regulations effectively stimulate the willingness of officials to protect the environment, the inhibiting effect on environmental governance of collusion through government-enterprise connections is significantly alleviated.
引文
陈硕、章元,2014:《治乱无需重典:转型期中国刑事政策效果分析》,《经济学(季刊)》第4期。
郭峰、石庆玲,2017:《官员更替、合谋震慑与空气质量的临时性改善》,《经济研究》第7期。
贾明、张喆,2010:《高管的政治关联影响公司慈善行为吗》,《管理世界》第4期。
李玲、陶锋,2012:《中国制造业最优环境规制强度的选择——基于绿色全要素生产率的视角》,《中国工业经济》第5期。
梁平汉、高楠,2014:《人事变更、法制环境和地方环境污染》,《管理世界》第6期。
罗党论、刘晓龙,2009:《政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《管理世界》第5期。
罗党论、佘国满,2015:《地方官员变更与地方债发行》,《经济研究》第6期。
潘红波、夏新平、余明桂,2008:《政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购》,《经济研究》第4期。
邵帅、李欣、曹建华、杨莉莉,2016:《中国雾霾污染治理的经济政策选择——基于空间溢出效应的视角》,《经济研究》第9期。
宋马林、王舒鸿,2013:《环境规制、技术进步与经济增长》,《经济研究》第3期。
唐国平、李龙会、吴德军,2013:《环境管制、行业属性与企业环保投资》,《会计研究》第6期。
王小鲁、樊纲、余静文,2016:《中国分省份市场话指数报告(2016)》,社会科学文献出版社。
王永钦、孟大文,2006:《代理人有限承诺下的规制合约设计——以环境规制为例》,《财经问题研究》第1期。
徐现祥、李书娟,2015:《政治资源与环境污染》,《经济学报》第1期。
朱平芳、张征宇、姜国麟,2011:《FDI与环境规制:基于地方分权视角的实证研究》,《经济研究》第6期。
Alder,S,L.Shao,and F.Zilibotti,2013,“Economic Reforms and Industrial Policy in a Panel of Chinese Cities”,Journal of Economic Growth,21(4),1—45.
Bertrand,M.,F.Kramarz,A.Schoar,and D.Thesmar,2007,“Politicians,Firms and the Political Business Cycle:Evidence from France”,Working Paper.
Chen,S.,Z.Sun,and S.Tang,2011,“Government Intervention and Investment Ef?ciency:Evidence from China”,Journal of Corporate Finance,17,259—271.
Clarkson,P.M.,and G.D.Richardson,2004,“The Market Valuation of Environmental Capital Expenditures by Pulp and Paper Companies”,Accounting Review,79(2),329—353.
Fan J.P.H.,T.J.Wong,and T.Y.Zhang,2007,“Politically Connected CEOs,Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of China's Newly Partially Privatized Firms”,Journal of Financial Economics,84(2),330—357.
Ghanem,D.,and J.Zhang,2013,“Effortless Perfection:Do Chinese Cities Manipulate Air Pollution Data?”,Journal of Environmental Economics & Management,68(2),203—225.
Gilje,E.P.,and J.P.Taillard,2016,“Do Private Firms Invest Differently than Public Firms?Taking Cues from the Natural Gas Industry”,Journal of Finance,71(4),1733—1778.
Gray,W.B.,and R.J.Shadbegian,1993,“Environmental Regulation and Manufacturing Productivity at the Plant Level”,Working Paper.
Jia,R.,2012,“Pollution for Promotion”,IIES,Stockholm University,Job Market Paper.
Kudamatsu,M.,2012,“Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality in sub-Saharan Africa?Evidence From Micro Data”,Journal of the European Economic Association,10 (6),1294—1317.
Li,W.,and X.Lu,2016,“Institutional Interest,Ownership Type,and Environmental Capital Expenditures:Evidence from the Most Polluting Chinese Listed Firms”,Journal of Business Ethics,138(3),1—18.
Orsato.R.J.,2006,“Competitive Environmental Strategies:When Does It Pay to be Green?”,California Management Review,48 (2),127—143.
Porter,M.E.,and C.V.D.Linde,1995,“Toward a New Conception of the Environment Competitiveness Relationship”,Journal of Economic Perspective,9(4),97—118.
Shleifer,A.,and R.W.Vishny,1994,“Politicians and Firms”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,109(4),995—1025.
Wu,J.,Y.Deng,J.Huang,R.Morck,and B.Yeung,2014,“Incentives and Outcomes:China's Environmental Policy”,Capitalism and Society,9(1),1—41.
Zhang,J.,C.Marquis,and K.Qiao,2016,“Do Political Connections Buffer Firms from or Bind Firms to the Government?A Study of Corporate Charitable Donations of Chinese Firms”,Organization Science,27,1307—1324.
① 参见耶鲁大学发布的《环境绩效指数(2016)》,引自http://epi.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2016EPI_Full_Report_opt.pdf。
② 引自《习近平总书记系列重要讲话读本》(学习出版社、人民出版社,2014年6月版)。
③ 三种废气排放比例根据国家统计局《环境统计数据(2014)》计算所得。
(1)如《国务院关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的决定》、《环境保护违法违纪行为处分暂行规定》等。
(2)引自《中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要》。
(3)数据来源于重污染行业上市公司年报中的在建工程本期增加额明细项目。图1表示按重污染企业数平均后的各年环保投资水平,图中的年份点为年末时点。
(4)详见人民网2005年6月2日国家环保总局副局长汪纪戎在国务院新闻发布会上的发言《地方保护主义影响了环境执法》。
(5)详见中央政府门户网站2006年12月12日国家环保总局局长周生贤的讲话:《我国环境保护法律体系仍存在四大“软肋”》。
(6)据人民日报、新京报、新华网等报道,西安、临汾等地均出现地方官员为了应对上级环境考核,而篡改环境质量数据的事件。地方官员具备充足的动机,通过操控环境质量数据,规避中央和上级严格的环境考核(Ghanem & Zhang,2013)。
(7)详见《南方日报》2011年12月5日的新闻报道《美使馆PM2.5数据再度爆表》。该报道被新浪网、凤凰网、百度贴吧等多家门户网站和论坛转载并置顶。
(8)为了排除窗口期过长可能带来的噪音,我们仅选择环境空气新标准实施前后各一年的窗口期进行观测。图2中的年度点位均代表当年12月31日的数据。
(9)需要说明的是,两类企业的新增环保投资额均呈现下降趋势,但环保投资累积额仍逐年增加。
(10)综合引自《被PM2.5秒杀的北京空气》(载于2011年第44期《南都周刊》)与《政府公信力少,奇怪争论就多》(载于2011年11月2日的《环球时报》)等报道。
(11)在该文中,作者以一些地区2003年后陆续发现页岩气作为外生冲击,代理当地投资机会的突发性变化,观测该地区公共公司与私人公司面对投资机会变化后分别作出的不同投资决策反应。
(12)受篇幅限制,我们没有列出本部分回归结果。如有需要,可以联系作者索取。
郭峰、石庆玲,2017:《官员更替、合谋震慑与空气质量的临时性改善》,《经济研究》第7期。
贾明、张喆,2010:《高管的政治关联影响公司慈善行为吗》,《管理世界》第4期。
李玲、陶锋,2012:《中国制造业最优环境规制强度的选择——基于绿色全要素生产率的视角》,《中国工业经济》第5期。
梁平汉、高楠,2014:《人事变更、法制环境和地方环境污染》,《管理世界》第6期。
罗党论、刘晓龙,2009:《政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《管理世界》第5期。
罗党论、佘国满,2015:《地方官员变更与地方债发行》,《经济研究》第6期。
潘红波、夏新平、余明桂,2008:《政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购》,《经济研究》第4期。
邵帅、李欣、曹建华、杨莉莉,2016:《中国雾霾污染治理的经济政策选择——基于空间溢出效应的视角》,《经济研究》第9期。
宋马林、王舒鸿,2013:《环境规制、技术进步与经济增长》,《经济研究》第3期。
唐国平、李龙会、吴德军,2013:《环境管制、行业属性与企业环保投资》,《会计研究》第6期。
王小鲁、樊纲、余静文,2016:《中国分省份市场话指数报告(2016)》,社会科学文献出版社。
王永钦、孟大文,2006:《代理人有限承诺下的规制合约设计——以环境规制为例》,《财经问题研究》第1期。
徐现祥、李书娟,2015:《政治资源与环境污染》,《经济学报》第1期。
朱平芳、张征宇、姜国麟,2011:《FDI与环境规制:基于地方分权视角的实证研究》,《经济研究》第6期。
Alder,S,L.Shao,and F.Zilibotti,2013,“Economic Reforms and Industrial Policy in a Panel of Chinese Cities”,Journal of Economic Growth,21(4),1—45.
Bertrand,M.,F.Kramarz,A.Schoar,and D.Thesmar,2007,“Politicians,Firms and the Political Business Cycle:Evidence from France”,Working Paper.
Chen,S.,Z.Sun,and S.Tang,2011,“Government Intervention and Investment Ef?ciency:Evidence from China”,Journal of Corporate Finance,17,259—271.
Clarkson,P.M.,and G.D.Richardson,2004,“The Market Valuation of Environmental Capital Expenditures by Pulp and Paper Companies”,Accounting Review,79(2),329—353.
Fan J.P.H.,T.J.Wong,and T.Y.Zhang,2007,“Politically Connected CEOs,Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of China's Newly Partially Privatized Firms”,Journal of Financial Economics,84(2),330—357.
Ghanem,D.,and J.Zhang,2013,“Effortless Perfection:Do Chinese Cities Manipulate Air Pollution Data?”,Journal of Environmental Economics & Management,68(2),203—225.
Gilje,E.P.,and J.P.Taillard,2016,“Do Private Firms Invest Differently than Public Firms?Taking Cues from the Natural Gas Industry”,Journal of Finance,71(4),1733—1778.
Gray,W.B.,and R.J.Shadbegian,1993,“Environmental Regulation and Manufacturing Productivity at the Plant Level”,Working Paper.
Jia,R.,2012,“Pollution for Promotion”,IIES,Stockholm University,Job Market Paper.
Kudamatsu,M.,2012,“Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality in sub-Saharan Africa?Evidence From Micro Data”,Journal of the European Economic Association,10 (6),1294—1317.
Li,W.,and X.Lu,2016,“Institutional Interest,Ownership Type,and Environmental Capital Expenditures:Evidence from the Most Polluting Chinese Listed Firms”,Journal of Business Ethics,138(3),1—18.
Orsato.R.J.,2006,“Competitive Environmental Strategies:When Does It Pay to be Green?”,California Management Review,48 (2),127—143.
Porter,M.E.,and C.V.D.Linde,1995,“Toward a New Conception of the Environment Competitiveness Relationship”,Journal of Economic Perspective,9(4),97—118.
Shleifer,A.,and R.W.Vishny,1994,“Politicians and Firms”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,109(4),995—1025.
Wu,J.,Y.Deng,J.Huang,R.Morck,and B.Yeung,2014,“Incentives and Outcomes:China's Environmental Policy”,Capitalism and Society,9(1),1—41.
Zhang,J.,C.Marquis,and K.Qiao,2016,“Do Political Connections Buffer Firms from or Bind Firms to the Government?A Study of Corporate Charitable Donations of Chinese Firms”,Organization Science,27,1307—1324.
① 参见耶鲁大学发布的《环境绩效指数(2016)》,引自http://epi.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2016EPI_Full_Report_opt.pdf。
② 引自《习近平总书记系列重要讲话读本》(学习出版社、人民出版社,2014年6月版)。
③ 三种废气排放比例根据国家统计局《环境统计数据(2014)》计算所得。
(1)如《国务院关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的决定》、《环境保护违法违纪行为处分暂行规定》等。
(2)引自《中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要》。
(3)数据来源于重污染行业上市公司年报中的在建工程本期增加额明细项目。图1表示按重污染企业数平均后的各年环保投资水平,图中的年份点为年末时点。
(4)详见人民网2005年6月2日国家环保总局副局长汪纪戎在国务院新闻发布会上的发言《地方保护主义影响了环境执法》。
(5)详见中央政府门户网站2006年12月12日国家环保总局局长周生贤的讲话:《我国环境保护法律体系仍存在四大“软肋”》。
(6)据人民日报、新京报、新华网等报道,西安、临汾等地均出现地方官员为了应对上级环境考核,而篡改环境质量数据的事件。地方官员具备充足的动机,通过操控环境质量数据,规避中央和上级严格的环境考核(Ghanem & Zhang,2013)。
(7)详见《南方日报》2011年12月5日的新闻报道《美使馆PM2.5数据再度爆表》。该报道被新浪网、凤凰网、百度贴吧等多家门户网站和论坛转载并置顶。
(8)为了排除窗口期过长可能带来的噪音,我们仅选择环境空气新标准实施前后各一年的窗口期进行观测。图2中的年度点位均代表当年12月31日的数据。
(9)需要说明的是,两类企业的新增环保投资额均呈现下降趋势,但环保投资累积额仍逐年增加。
(10)综合引自《被PM2.5秒杀的北京空气》(载于2011年第44期《南都周刊》)与《政府公信力少,奇怪争论就多》(载于2011年11月2日的《环球时报》)等报道。
(11)在该文中,作者以一些地区2003年后陆续发现页岩气作为外生冲击,代理当地投资机会的突发性变化,观测该地区公共公司与私人公司面对投资机会变化后分别作出的不同投资决策反应。
(12)受篇幅限制,我们没有列出本部分回归结果。如有需要,可以联系作者索取。