CVC竞争强度与被投资企业技术创新绩效——基于卷入强度的中介效应分析
|
摘要
作为大企业获取外部技术源的重要模式,公司创业投资(CVC)对企业的创新发展意义重大。文章运用中小板、创业板市场的IPO企业数据,实证研究了CVC母公司与被投资企业之间的行业竞争强度对被投资企业创新投入与产出的影响,以及母公司卷入强度的作用机制。研究发现,CVC母公司与被投资企业间的行业竞争强度促进了被投资企业的创新投入,但对其创新产出却具有显著的抑制作用;行业竞争强度显著增加了CVC母公司对被投资企业的卷入强度,母公司的卷入强度促进了被投资企业的创新投入和产出。研究还表明,CVC母公司通过进入被投资企业的董事会、监事会乃至管理层,在一定程度上参与企业的管理,对被投资企业的创新绩效具有积极作用。
In the context of rapid change, innovation is the key for enterprises to maintain sustainable competitiveness and survive and develop in an increasingly competitive market environment. As an important mode for large enterprises to obtain external technology sources,CVC is the main tool for value creation and an important form of corporate entrepreneurial activities. It has the general purpose of obtaining high financial returns as traditional venture capital, and also has the unique strategic goal of maintaining open innovation, acquiring new technologies and entering new markets by investing in start-ups in the same or different industries.Whether the CVC parent company can effectively promote the technological innovation performance and capabilities of invested enterprises while paying attention to its own strategic benefits, researches have not yet formed consensus conclusions. And empirical studies on the reasons for the differentiated impact of CVC investment on innovation performance of invested enterprises are still relatively few.Based on the 2008-2016 GEM and SME IPO enterprise sample data, this paper uses the random effect model of non-Balanced panel data to study the impact of the industry competition intensity between the CVC parent company and invested enterprises on the innovation input and output of invested enterprises in the Chinese context, and analyzes the mechanism of the CVC parent company's involvement intensity in the board of directors, supervisors, and the management of the invested enterprises. It is found that the CVC parent company which is competitive with invested enterprises is more likely to generate opportunistic behaviors such as imitation and theft, which will inhibit the innovation efforts of invested enterprises. Therefore, the industry competition intensity between the two parties has a significant inhibitory effect on the innovation patent output of invested enterprises. However, the involvement intensity of the CVC parent company has actively promoted the innovative R&D investment and patent output of invested enterprises. In addition, the competitive CVC parent company increases its involvement in the board of directors, board of supervisors and management of invested enterprises, which can partially reduce the information asymmetry, supervise and restrain the behavior of invested enterprises, and thus promote the R&D of invested enterprises.Based on the above conclusions, this paper points out that: we should encourage large enterprises with good conditions to develop the innovative combination of industry and finance such as "industry + venture capital funds", strengthen the protection and enforcement of intellectual property, take the joint investment strategy with independent venture capital institutions, give priority to the investment in start-ups located close to each other, and increase the participation of the CVC parent company in the management of invested enterprises,effectively improving the efficiency of technological innovation output of invested enterprises and promoting the technology innovation performance of invested enterprises.
In the context of rapid change, innovation is the key for enterprises to maintain sustainable competitiveness and survive and develop in an increasingly competitive market environment. As an important mode for large enterprises to obtain external technology sources,CVC is the main tool for value creation and an important form of corporate entrepreneurial activities. It has the general purpose of obtaining high financial returns as traditional venture capital, and also has the unique strategic goal of maintaining open innovation, acquiring new technologies and entering new markets by investing in start-ups in the same or different industries.Whether the CVC parent company can effectively promote the technological innovation performance and capabilities of invested enterprises while paying attention to its own strategic benefits, researches have not yet formed consensus conclusions. And empirical studies on the reasons for the differentiated impact of CVC investment on innovation performance of invested enterprises are still relatively few.Based on the 2008-2016 GEM and SME IPO enterprise sample data, this paper uses the random effect model of non-Balanced panel data to study the impact of the industry competition intensity between the CVC parent company and invested enterprises on the innovation input and output of invested enterprises in the Chinese context, and analyzes the mechanism of the CVC parent company's involvement intensity in the board of directors, supervisors, and the management of the invested enterprises. It is found that the CVC parent company which is competitive with invested enterprises is more likely to generate opportunistic behaviors such as imitation and theft, which will inhibit the innovation efforts of invested enterprises. Therefore, the industry competition intensity between the two parties has a significant inhibitory effect on the innovation patent output of invested enterprises. However, the involvement intensity of the CVC parent company has actively promoted the innovative R&D investment and patent output of invested enterprises. In addition, the competitive CVC parent company increases its involvement in the board of directors, board of supervisors and management of invested enterprises, which can partially reduce the information asymmetry, supervise and restrain the behavior of invested enterprises, and thus promote the R&D of invested enterprises.Based on the above conclusions, this paper points out that: we should encourage large enterprises with good conditions to develop the innovative combination of industry and finance such as "industry + venture capital funds", strengthen the protection and enforcement of intellectual property, take the joint investment strategy with independent venture capital institutions, give priority to the investment in start-ups located close to each other, and increase the participation of the CVC parent company in the management of invested enterprises,effectively improving the efficiency of technological innovation output of invested enterprises and promoting the technology innovation performance of invested enterprises.
引文
[1]曹献飞.融资约束与企业研发投资——基于企业层面数据的实证研究[J].软科学,2014,(12).
[2]陈寒松,张玉利.项目管理适用于公司创业活动的研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2005,(10).
[3]陈衍泰,司春林,徐震.有限专利保护下创业阶段性融资中投资者道德风险行为分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2006,(1).
[4]董静,徐婉渔.公司风险投资:“鱼水相依”抑或“与鲨共舞”?——文献评述与理论建构[J].外国经济与管理,2018,(2).
[5]冯根福,温军.中国上市公司治理与企业技术创新关系的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2008,(7).
[6]黄晓,陈金丹,于斌斌.环境不确定性与本地投资偏好——基于中国本土VC样本的研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2015,(9).
[7]姜彦福,张帏,孙悦.大企业参与风险投资的动因和机制探讨[J].中国软科学,2001,(1).
[8]李新春,林子尧.公司创业投资研究的前沿探析与未来展望[J].中大管理研究,2012,(2).
[9]刘春玉.研发投资融资约束及其外部融资依赖性——基于上市公司的实证研究[J].科技进步与对策,2014,(4).
[10]刘松,方世建.企业家与联盟公司在不完全契约下的创新行为博弈[J].财经科学,2008,(8).
[11]鲁桐,党印.公司治理与技术创新:分行业比较[J].经济研究,2014,(6).
[12]乔明哲,张玉利,凌玉,等.公司创业投资究竟怎样影响创业企业的IPO抑价——来自深圳创业板市场的证据[J].南开管理评论,2017,(1).
[13]田轩,王茅.美国风投支持创业的内在机制[J].清华金融评论,2014,(11).
[14]田增瑞,田颖,赵袁军.公司创业投资研究的热点与前沿——基于知识图谱的可视化分析[J].技术经济,2017,(3).
[15]万坤扬,陆文聪.公司创业投资与企业技术创新——吸收能力、卷入强度和治理结构的调节作用[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2014,(11).
[16]万坤扬,陆文聪.创业企业知识异质性与公司投资者知识创造[J].科研管理,2016,(2).
[17]王雷,周方召.公司创业投资比独立创业投资更能促进创新吗?——基于上市公司的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2017,(10).
[18]温忠麟,叶宝娟.中介效应分析:方法和模型发展[J].心理科学进展,2014,(5).
[19]吴超鹏,唐菂.知识产权保护执法力度、技术创新与企业绩效——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].经济研究,2016,(11).
[20]姚铮,王嵩.创业投资机构持股对企业研发绩效影响的实证研究[J].金融理论与实践,2014,(2).
[21]翟丽,鹿溪,宋学明.上市公司参与公司风险投资的收益及其影响因素实证研究[J].研究与发展管理,2010,(5).
[22]中小企业上市资源调研小组.我国中小企业上市资源调研报告[J].证券市场导报,2005,(5).
[23]邹双,成力为.风险投资进入对企业创新绩效的影响——基于创业板制造业企业的PSM检验[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2017,(2).
[24]Allen S A,Hevert K T. Venture capital investing by information technology companies:Did it pay?[J].Journal of Business Venturing,2007,22(2):262–282.
[25]Alvarez S A,Barney J B. How entrepreneurial firms can benefit from alliances with large partners[J]. The Academy of Management Executive,2001,15(1):139–148.
[26]BachmannR,SchindeleI.Theftandsyndicationinventurecapitalfinance[EB/OL].SSRN,2006,doi:10.2139/ssrn.896025.
[27]Barney J. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage[J]. Journal of Management,1991,17(1):99–120.
[28]Baron R M,Kenny D A. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research:Conceptual,strategic,and statistical considerations[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1986,51(6):1173–1182.
[29]Benson D,Ziedonis R H. Corporate venture capital and the returns to acquiring portfolio companies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,98(3):478–499.
[30]Chemmanur T J,Loutskina E,Tian X. Corporate venture capital,value creation,and innovation[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,2014,27(8):2434–2473.
[31]Chesbrough H W. Making sense of corporate venture capital[J]. Harvard Business Review,2002,80(3):90–99,133.
[32]Chiao C. Relationship between debt,R&D and physical investment,evidence from US firm-level data[J].Applied Financial Economics,2002,12(2):105–121.
[33]Colombo M G,Shafi K. Swimming with sharks in Europe:When are they dangerous and what can new ventures do to defend themselves?[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2016,37(11):2307–2322.
[34]Dhanaraj C,Lyles M A,Steensma H K,et al. Managing tacit and explicit knowledge transfer in IJVs:The role of relational embeddedness and the impact on performance[J]. Journal of International Business Studies,2004,35(5):428–442.
[35]Dushnitsky G,Lenox M J. When do firms undertake R&D by investing in new ventures?[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2005,26(10):947–965.
[36]Dushnitsky G,Shaver J M. Limitations to interorganizational knowledge acquisition:The paradox of corporate venture capital[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2009,30(10):1045–1064.
[37]Fulghieri P,Sevilir M. Organization and financing of innovation,and the choice between corporate and independent venture capital[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2009,44(6):1291–1321.
[38]Gaba V,Bhattacharya S. Aspirations,innovation,and corporate venture capital:A behavioral perspective[J].Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal,2012,6(2):178–199.
[39]IrelandRD,HittMA,SirmonDG.Amodelofstrategicentrepreneurship:Theconstructandits dimensions[J]. Journal of Management,2003,29(6):963–989.
[40]Judd C M,Kenny D A. Process analysis:Estimating mediation in treatment evaluations[J]. Evaluation Review,1981,5(5):602–619.
[41]Keil T,Maula M,Schildt H,et al. The effect of governance modes and relatedness of external business development activities on innovative performance[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2008,29(8):895–907.
[42]Kim K,Gopal A,Hoberg G. Does product market competition drive CVC investment? Evidence from the U.S. IT industry[EB/OL]. Information Systems Research,2016,27(2),doi:10.1287/isre.2016.0620.
[43]Lane P J,Lubatkin M. Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational learning[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1998,19(5):461–477.
[44]Masulis R W,Nahata R. Financial contracting with strategic investors:Evidence from corporate venture capital backed IPOs[J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation,2009,18(4):599–631.
[45]Maula M V J,Autio E,Murray G C. Corporate venture capital and the balance of risks and rewards for portfolio companies[J]. Journal of Business Venturing,2009,24(3):274–286.
[46]Park H D,Steensma H K. When does corporate venture capital add value for new ventures?[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2012,33(1):1–22.
[47]Park J H,Bae Z T. When are “sharks” beneficial? Corporate venture capital investment and startup innovation performance[J]. Technology Analysis&Strategic Management,2018,30(3):324–336.
[48]Schildt H A,Maula M V J,Keil T. Explorative and exploitative learning from external corporate ventures[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2005,29(4):493–515.
[49]Thornhill S,Amit R. A dynamic perspective of internal fit in corporate venturing[J]. Journal of Business Venturing,2001,16(1):25–50.
[50]Wadhwa A,Basu S. Exploration and resource commitments in unequal partnerships:An examination of corporate venture capital investments[J]. Journal of Product Innovation Management,2013,30(5):916–936.
[51]Wadhwa A,Kotha S. Knowledge creation through external venturing:Evidence from the telecommunications equipment manufacturing industry[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2006,49(4):819–835.
(1)本文在进行面板数据回归之前对所有模型均进行了Hausman检验,Prob>chi2值均说明面板数据随机效应模型优于固定效应模型,限于篇幅我们仅报告了面板数据随机效应模型的结果。
[2]陈寒松,张玉利.项目管理适用于公司创业活动的研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2005,(10).
[3]陈衍泰,司春林,徐震.有限专利保护下创业阶段性融资中投资者道德风险行为分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2006,(1).
[4]董静,徐婉渔.公司风险投资:“鱼水相依”抑或“与鲨共舞”?——文献评述与理论建构[J].外国经济与管理,2018,(2).
[5]冯根福,温军.中国上市公司治理与企业技术创新关系的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2008,(7).
[6]黄晓,陈金丹,于斌斌.环境不确定性与本地投资偏好——基于中国本土VC样本的研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2015,(9).
[7]姜彦福,张帏,孙悦.大企业参与风险投资的动因和机制探讨[J].中国软科学,2001,(1).
[8]李新春,林子尧.公司创业投资研究的前沿探析与未来展望[J].中大管理研究,2012,(2).
[9]刘春玉.研发投资融资约束及其外部融资依赖性——基于上市公司的实证研究[J].科技进步与对策,2014,(4).
[10]刘松,方世建.企业家与联盟公司在不完全契约下的创新行为博弈[J].财经科学,2008,(8).
[11]鲁桐,党印.公司治理与技术创新:分行业比较[J].经济研究,2014,(6).
[12]乔明哲,张玉利,凌玉,等.公司创业投资究竟怎样影响创业企业的IPO抑价——来自深圳创业板市场的证据[J].南开管理评论,2017,(1).
[13]田轩,王茅.美国风投支持创业的内在机制[J].清华金融评论,2014,(11).
[14]田增瑞,田颖,赵袁军.公司创业投资研究的热点与前沿——基于知识图谱的可视化分析[J].技术经济,2017,(3).
[15]万坤扬,陆文聪.公司创业投资与企业技术创新——吸收能力、卷入强度和治理结构的调节作用[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2014,(11).
[16]万坤扬,陆文聪.创业企业知识异质性与公司投资者知识创造[J].科研管理,2016,(2).
[17]王雷,周方召.公司创业投资比独立创业投资更能促进创新吗?——基于上市公司的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2017,(10).
[18]温忠麟,叶宝娟.中介效应分析:方法和模型发展[J].心理科学进展,2014,(5).
[19]吴超鹏,唐菂.知识产权保护执法力度、技术创新与企业绩效——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].经济研究,2016,(11).
[20]姚铮,王嵩.创业投资机构持股对企业研发绩效影响的实证研究[J].金融理论与实践,2014,(2).
[21]翟丽,鹿溪,宋学明.上市公司参与公司风险投资的收益及其影响因素实证研究[J].研究与发展管理,2010,(5).
[22]中小企业上市资源调研小组.我国中小企业上市资源调研报告[J].证券市场导报,2005,(5).
[23]邹双,成力为.风险投资进入对企业创新绩效的影响——基于创业板制造业企业的PSM检验[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2017,(2).
[24]Allen S A,Hevert K T. Venture capital investing by information technology companies:Did it pay?[J].Journal of Business Venturing,2007,22(2):262–282.
[25]Alvarez S A,Barney J B. How entrepreneurial firms can benefit from alliances with large partners[J]. The Academy of Management Executive,2001,15(1):139–148.
[26]BachmannR,SchindeleI.Theftandsyndicationinventurecapitalfinance[EB/OL].SSRN,2006,doi:10.2139/ssrn.896025.
[27]Barney J. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage[J]. Journal of Management,1991,17(1):99–120.
[28]Baron R M,Kenny D A. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research:Conceptual,strategic,and statistical considerations[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1986,51(6):1173–1182.
[29]Benson D,Ziedonis R H. Corporate venture capital and the returns to acquiring portfolio companies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,98(3):478–499.
[30]Chemmanur T J,Loutskina E,Tian X. Corporate venture capital,value creation,and innovation[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,2014,27(8):2434–2473.
[31]Chesbrough H W. Making sense of corporate venture capital[J]. Harvard Business Review,2002,80(3):90–99,133.
[32]Chiao C. Relationship between debt,R&D and physical investment,evidence from US firm-level data[J].Applied Financial Economics,2002,12(2):105–121.
[33]Colombo M G,Shafi K. Swimming with sharks in Europe:When are they dangerous and what can new ventures do to defend themselves?[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2016,37(11):2307–2322.
[34]Dhanaraj C,Lyles M A,Steensma H K,et al. Managing tacit and explicit knowledge transfer in IJVs:The role of relational embeddedness and the impact on performance[J]. Journal of International Business Studies,2004,35(5):428–442.
[35]Dushnitsky G,Lenox M J. When do firms undertake R&D by investing in new ventures?[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2005,26(10):947–965.
[36]Dushnitsky G,Shaver J M. Limitations to interorganizational knowledge acquisition:The paradox of corporate venture capital[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2009,30(10):1045–1064.
[37]Fulghieri P,Sevilir M. Organization and financing of innovation,and the choice between corporate and independent venture capital[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2009,44(6):1291–1321.
[38]Gaba V,Bhattacharya S. Aspirations,innovation,and corporate venture capital:A behavioral perspective[J].Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal,2012,6(2):178–199.
[39]IrelandRD,HittMA,SirmonDG.Amodelofstrategicentrepreneurship:Theconstructandits dimensions[J]. Journal of Management,2003,29(6):963–989.
[40]Judd C M,Kenny D A. Process analysis:Estimating mediation in treatment evaluations[J]. Evaluation Review,1981,5(5):602–619.
[41]Keil T,Maula M,Schildt H,et al. The effect of governance modes and relatedness of external business development activities on innovative performance[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2008,29(8):895–907.
[42]Kim K,Gopal A,Hoberg G. Does product market competition drive CVC investment? Evidence from the U.S. IT industry[EB/OL]. Information Systems Research,2016,27(2),doi:10.1287/isre.2016.0620.
[43]Lane P J,Lubatkin M. Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational learning[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1998,19(5):461–477.
[44]Masulis R W,Nahata R. Financial contracting with strategic investors:Evidence from corporate venture capital backed IPOs[J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation,2009,18(4):599–631.
[45]Maula M V J,Autio E,Murray G C. Corporate venture capital and the balance of risks and rewards for portfolio companies[J]. Journal of Business Venturing,2009,24(3):274–286.
[46]Park H D,Steensma H K. When does corporate venture capital add value for new ventures?[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2012,33(1):1–22.
[47]Park J H,Bae Z T. When are “sharks” beneficial? Corporate venture capital investment and startup innovation performance[J]. Technology Analysis&Strategic Management,2018,30(3):324–336.
[48]Schildt H A,Maula M V J,Keil T. Explorative and exploitative learning from external corporate ventures[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2005,29(4):493–515.
[49]Thornhill S,Amit R. A dynamic perspective of internal fit in corporate venturing[J]. Journal of Business Venturing,2001,16(1):25–50.
[50]Wadhwa A,Basu S. Exploration and resource commitments in unequal partnerships:An examination of corporate venture capital investments[J]. Journal of Product Innovation Management,2013,30(5):916–936.
[51]Wadhwa A,Kotha S. Knowledge creation through external venturing:Evidence from the telecommunications equipment manufacturing industry[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2006,49(4):819–835.
(1)本文在进行面板数据回归之前对所有模型均进行了Hausman检验,Prob>chi2值均说明面板数据随机效应模型优于固定效应模型,限于篇幅我们仅报告了面板数据随机效应模型的结果。