“高官”还是“高薪”:何种更易留人?
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摘要
文章基于经理人市场理论和契约参照点理论,以中国上市公司2007-2016年数据为样本,从多维薪酬参照点效应角度,探究了CEO的货币薪酬和晋升激励对其主动离职行为的影响。研究发现,CEO的货币薪酬和晋升激励都抑制了其主动离职行为,而晋升激励的抑制作用更强;当上一期CEO薪酬低于参照点薪酬时,当期越容易发生主动离职;当存在多维薪酬参照点效应时,CEO的货币薪酬和晋升激励仍能抑制其主动离职行为,但两种激励方式同时存在时,外部参照点效应下货币薪酬激励的抑制作用更加显著,而个人参照点效应下晋升激励的抑制作用更加显著。进一步研究发现,对国有企业来说,实施晋升激励更能留住人才。文章不仅丰富了经理人市场理论的研究,还为企业如何选择有效的激励方式来留住人才提供了参考。
"The Strategy of Talented Persons Powering the Nation" has become a basic strategy for China's economic and social development. Talents are not only important to improving China's competitiveness and comprehensive strength,but also related to the development of enterprises. As the senior management talent of enterprises,the CEO directly affects the stability of the senior management team and the competitiveness of enterprises. However,there is little literature that explores the impact of CEO voluntary turnover from the perspective of non-compensation incentives at present,particularly in terms of CEO promotion incentives. When there are both compensation incentives(monetary compensation incentives) and noncompensation incentives(promotion incentives),which incentives are more effective? This question has not been clearly answered in previous literature studies. Therefore,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to explore how to retain CEO talents.and the theory of contract reference point for the first time. By sorting out relevant data manually including CEO promotion,CEO voluntary turnover,CEO characteristic variables and so on,this paper uses the multiple regression analysis to empirically explore the impact of monetary compensation incentives and promotion incentives on CEO voluntary turnover from the perspective of the multi-dimensional compensation reference point effect,and uses the two-stage regression analysis of instrumental variables to solve endogenous problems. At the same time,this paper uses the multiple regression analysis to explore the impact of factors such as political promotion,property and salary fluctuations on CEO voluntary turnover in the further research. Finally,the accuracy of the research conclusions is verified by various robustness tests. The results of empirical studies indicate that both monetary compensation incentives and promotion incentives can inhibit CEO voluntary turnover. However,when both incentives exist simultaneously,promotion incentives have a stronger inhibitory effect on CEO voluntary turnover. When the CEO compensation is lower than the reference point compensation in the previous period,more prone the CEO is to voluntarily turnover in this period. When there is a multi-dimensional compensation reference point effect,compensation incentives and promotion incentives can still inhibit CEO voluntary turnover. However,when the two incentive modes exist simultaneously,the inhibition of compensation incentives on CEO voluntary turnover is more significant under the external reference point effect,while the inhibition of promotion incentives on CEO voluntary turnover is more significant under the individual reference point effect. The further research finds that compared with non-state-owned enterprises,promotion incentives of state-owned enterprises can inhibit CEO voluntary turnover more effectively. After considering the impact of endogenous problems,the above conclusions are still established. This paper has the following revelations: First,we should adopt different methods of incentives to retain CEO talents. We must pay attention not only to the role of monetary compensation incentives in retaining talents,but also to the supplement and effects of promotion incentives when monetary compensation incentives are insufficient. Second,we should strengthen the understanding of the multi-dimensional compensation reference point effect. We must fully understand CEO voluntary turnover from the perspective of the multi-dimensional reference point effect at present,and take effective incentives based on specific reasons for the CEO's resignation. Third,we should pay attention to the role of compensation incentives in the reform of the compensation system of state-owned enterprises. It is recommended to combine short-term monetary compensation incentives with long-term equity incentives. This paper has the following contributions:(1) It expands the research on the reference point effect,and considers the impact of the multi-dimensional salary reference point such as the external reference point,the internal reference point and the personal reference point on CEO voluntary turnover.(2) It enriches the research of the manager market theory.(3) It deepens the understanding on how to retain talents effectively,providing theoretical and empirical support for how to choose effective incentives and formulate policies of gaining CEO talents.
"The Strategy of Talented Persons Powering the Nation" has become a basic strategy for China's economic and social development. Talents are not only important to improving China's competitiveness and comprehensive strength,but also related to the development of enterprises. As the senior management talent of enterprises,the CEO directly affects the stability of the senior management team and the competitiveness of enterprises. However,there is little literature that explores the impact of CEO voluntary turnover from the perspective of non-compensation incentives at present,particularly in terms of CEO promotion incentives. When there are both compensation incentives(monetary compensation incentives) and noncompensation incentives(promotion incentives),which incentives are more effective? This question has not been clearly answered in previous literature studies. Therefore,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to explore how to retain CEO talents.and the theory of contract reference point for the first time. By sorting out relevant data manually including CEO promotion,CEO voluntary turnover,CEO characteristic variables and so on,this paper uses the multiple regression analysis to empirically explore the impact of monetary compensation incentives and promotion incentives on CEO voluntary turnover from the perspective of the multi-dimensional compensation reference point effect,and uses the two-stage regression analysis of instrumental variables to solve endogenous problems. At the same time,this paper uses the multiple regression analysis to explore the impact of factors such as political promotion,property and salary fluctuations on CEO voluntary turnover in the further research. Finally,the accuracy of the research conclusions is verified by various robustness tests. The results of empirical studies indicate that both monetary compensation incentives and promotion incentives can inhibit CEO voluntary turnover. However,when both incentives exist simultaneously,promotion incentives have a stronger inhibitory effect on CEO voluntary turnover. When the CEO compensation is lower than the reference point compensation in the previous period,more prone the CEO is to voluntarily turnover in this period. When there is a multi-dimensional compensation reference point effect,compensation incentives and promotion incentives can still inhibit CEO voluntary turnover. However,when the two incentive modes exist simultaneously,the inhibition of compensation incentives on CEO voluntary turnover is more significant under the external reference point effect,while the inhibition of promotion incentives on CEO voluntary turnover is more significant under the individual reference point effect. The further research finds that compared with non-state-owned enterprises,promotion incentives of state-owned enterprises can inhibit CEO voluntary turnover more effectively. After considering the impact of endogenous problems,the above conclusions are still established. This paper has the following revelations: First,we should adopt different methods of incentives to retain CEO talents. We must pay attention not only to the role of monetary compensation incentives in retaining talents,but also to the supplement and effects of promotion incentives when monetary compensation incentives are insufficient. Second,we should strengthen the understanding of the multi-dimensional compensation reference point effect. We must fully understand CEO voluntary turnover from the perspective of the multi-dimensional reference point effect at present,and take effective incentives based on specific reasons for the CEO's resignation. Third,we should pay attention to the role of compensation incentives in the reform of the compensation system of state-owned enterprises. It is recommended to combine short-term monetary compensation incentives with long-term equity incentives. This paper has the following contributions:(1) It expands the research on the reference point effect,and considers the impact of the multi-dimensional salary reference point such as the external reference point,the internal reference point and the personal reference point on CEO voluntary turnover.(2) It enriches the research of the manager market theory.(3) It deepens the understanding on how to retain talents effectively,providing theoretical and empirical support for how to choose effective incentives and formulate policies of gaining CEO talents.
引文
[1]曹伟,杨德明,赵璨.政治晋升预期与高管腐败--来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].经济学动态,2016,(2):59-77.
[2]韩晓梅,龚启辉,吴联生.薪酬抵税与企业薪酬安排[J].经济研究,2016,(10):140-154.
[3]江伟.行业薪酬基准与管理者薪酬增长--基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].金融研究,2010,(4):144-159.
[4]江伟.市场化程度、行业竞争与管理者薪酬增长[J].南开管理评论,2011,(5):58-67.
[5]孔东民,徐茗丽,孔高文.企业内部薪酬差距与创新[J].经济研究,2017,(10):144-157.
[6]卢馨,何雨晴,吴婷.国企高管政治晋升激励是长久之计吗?[J].经济管理,2016,(7):94-106.
[7]罗昆.薪酬契约参照点效应及其对我国高管行为的影响研究[D].上海:华东师范大学博士学位论文,2017.
[8]吕长江,张海平.上市公司股权激励计划对股利分配政策的影响[J].管理世界,2012,(11):133-143.
[9]徐细雄.晋升与薪酬的治理效应:产权性质的影响[J].经济科学,2012,(2):102-116.
[10]徐细雄,谭瑾.高管薪酬契约、参照点效应及其治理效果:基于行为经济学的理论解释与经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2014,(4):36-45.
[11]张洪辉,章琳一.高管晋升激励与财务舞弊--来自上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2017,(4):176-194.
[12]张兴亮,夏成才.非CEO高管患寡还是患不均[J].中国工业经济,2016,(9):144-160.
[13]Albuquerque A M,Franco G D,Verdi R S.Peer choice in CEO compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2013,108(1):160-181.
[14]Chakraborty A,Sheikh S,Subramanian N.The relationship between incentive compensation and performance related CEO turnover[J].Journal of Economics and Business,2009,61(4):295-311.
[15]Fehr E,Hart O,Zehnder C.Contracts,reference points,and competition-behavioral effects of the fundamental transformation[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2008,7(2-3):561-572.
[16]Fehr E,Hart O,Zehnder C.Contracts as reference points:Experimental evidence[J].American Economic Review,2011,101(2):493-525.
[17]Fiegenbaum A,Hart S,Schendel D.Strategic reference point theory[J].Strategic Management Journal,1996,17(3):219-235.
[18]Gao H H,Luo J,Tang T L.Effects of managerial labor market on executive compensation:Evidence from jobhopping[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2015,59(2-3):203-220.
[19]Gayle G L,Golan L,Miller R A.Promotion,turnover,and compensation in the executive labor market[J].Econometrica,2015,83(6):2293-2369.
[20]Giroud X,Mueller H M.Corporate governance,product market competition,and equity prices[J].The Journal of Finance,2011,66(2):563-600.
[21]Greve H R.A behavioral theory of R&D expenditures and innovations:Evidence from shipbuilding[J].The Academy of Management Journal,2003,46(6):685-702.
[22]Hart O,Moore J.Contracts as reference points[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2008,123(1):1-48.
[23]He L R,Shaw T S,Fang J X.Managerial labor market during institutional transition:A study of CEO compensation and voluntary turnover[J].Corporate Governance an International Review,2017,25(3):167-185.
[24]Holcomb T R,Holmes R M Jr,Connelly B L.Making the most of what you have:Managerial ability as a source of resource value creation[J].Strategic Management Journal,2009,30(5):457-485.
[25]Kale J R,Reis E,Venkateswaran A.Rank-order tournaments and incentive alignment:The effect on firm performance[J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(3):1479-1512.
[26]Kale J R,Reis E,Venkateswaran A.Pay inequalities and managerial turnover[J].Journal of Empirical Finance,2014,27:21-39.
[27]Mackey A,Molloy J C,Morris S S.Scarce human capital in managerial labor markets[J].Journal of Management,2014,40(2):399-421.
[28]Malmendier U,Tate G.Superstar CEOs[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2009,124(4):1593-1638.
[29]Mehran H,Taggart R A,Yermack D.CEO ownership,leasing,and debt financing[J].Financial Management,1999,28(2):5-14.
[30]Park K.Pay disparities within top management teams and earning management[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2017,36(1):59-81.
[31]Ridge J W,Hill A D,Aime F.Implications of multiple concurrent pay comparisons for top-team turnover[J].Journal of Management,2014,43(3):671-690.
[2]韩晓梅,龚启辉,吴联生.薪酬抵税与企业薪酬安排[J].经济研究,2016,(10):140-154.
[3]江伟.行业薪酬基准与管理者薪酬增长--基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].金融研究,2010,(4):144-159.
[4]江伟.市场化程度、行业竞争与管理者薪酬增长[J].南开管理评论,2011,(5):58-67.
[5]孔东民,徐茗丽,孔高文.企业内部薪酬差距与创新[J].经济研究,2017,(10):144-157.
[6]卢馨,何雨晴,吴婷.国企高管政治晋升激励是长久之计吗?[J].经济管理,2016,(7):94-106.
[7]罗昆.薪酬契约参照点效应及其对我国高管行为的影响研究[D].上海:华东师范大学博士学位论文,2017.
[8]吕长江,张海平.上市公司股权激励计划对股利分配政策的影响[J].管理世界,2012,(11):133-143.
[9]徐细雄.晋升与薪酬的治理效应:产权性质的影响[J].经济科学,2012,(2):102-116.
[10]徐细雄,谭瑾.高管薪酬契约、参照点效应及其治理效果:基于行为经济学的理论解释与经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2014,(4):36-45.
[11]张洪辉,章琳一.高管晋升激励与财务舞弊--来自上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2017,(4):176-194.
[12]张兴亮,夏成才.非CEO高管患寡还是患不均[J].中国工业经济,2016,(9):144-160.
[13]Albuquerque A M,Franco G D,Verdi R S.Peer choice in CEO compensation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2013,108(1):160-181.
[14]Chakraborty A,Sheikh S,Subramanian N.The relationship between incentive compensation and performance related CEO turnover[J].Journal of Economics and Business,2009,61(4):295-311.
[15]Fehr E,Hart O,Zehnder C.Contracts,reference points,and competition-behavioral effects of the fundamental transformation[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2008,7(2-3):561-572.
[16]Fehr E,Hart O,Zehnder C.Contracts as reference points:Experimental evidence[J].American Economic Review,2011,101(2):493-525.
[17]Fiegenbaum A,Hart S,Schendel D.Strategic reference point theory[J].Strategic Management Journal,1996,17(3):219-235.
[18]Gao H H,Luo J,Tang T L.Effects of managerial labor market on executive compensation:Evidence from jobhopping[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2015,59(2-3):203-220.
[19]Gayle G L,Golan L,Miller R A.Promotion,turnover,and compensation in the executive labor market[J].Econometrica,2015,83(6):2293-2369.
[20]Giroud X,Mueller H M.Corporate governance,product market competition,and equity prices[J].The Journal of Finance,2011,66(2):563-600.
[21]Greve H R.A behavioral theory of R&D expenditures and innovations:Evidence from shipbuilding[J].The Academy of Management Journal,2003,46(6):685-702.
[22]Hart O,Moore J.Contracts as reference points[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2008,123(1):1-48.
[23]He L R,Shaw T S,Fang J X.Managerial labor market during institutional transition:A study of CEO compensation and voluntary turnover[J].Corporate Governance an International Review,2017,25(3):167-185.
[24]Holcomb T R,Holmes R M Jr,Connelly B L.Making the most of what you have:Managerial ability as a source of resource value creation[J].Strategic Management Journal,2009,30(5):457-485.
[25]Kale J R,Reis E,Venkateswaran A.Rank-order tournaments and incentive alignment:The effect on firm performance[J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(3):1479-1512.
[26]Kale J R,Reis E,Venkateswaran A.Pay inequalities and managerial turnover[J].Journal of Empirical Finance,2014,27:21-39.
[27]Mackey A,Molloy J C,Morris S S.Scarce human capital in managerial labor markets[J].Journal of Management,2014,40(2):399-421.
[28]Malmendier U,Tate G.Superstar CEOs[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2009,124(4):1593-1638.
[29]Mehran H,Taggart R A,Yermack D.CEO ownership,leasing,and debt financing[J].Financial Management,1999,28(2):5-14.
[30]Park K.Pay disparities within top management teams and earning management[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2017,36(1):59-81.
[31]Ridge J W,Hill A D,Aime F.Implications of multiple concurrent pay comparisons for top-team turnover[J].Journal of Management,2014,43(3):671-690.