内部控制与管理层盈余预测披露行为——基于我国半强制半自愿制度的实证检验
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摘要
目前,我国的上市公司管理层盈余预测执行的是独特的半强制半自愿并存的披露监管制度。基于这一独特的制度背景,以A股上市公司为研究对象,利用内部控制评价指数,可就内部控制对上市公司管理层盈余预测的披露行为进行研究。研究发现,内部控制对上市公司管理层盈余预测的自愿披露行为有显著影响。上市公司的内部控制质量越好,公司管理层越倾向于自愿披露盈余预测。作为上市公司的内部控制五要素机制,公司内部良好的信息沟通水平与控制活动水平使得管理层具有更好的盈余预测能力,而公司良好的内部环境和内部监督会增强管理层披露盈余预测的意愿,促使其自愿披露盈余预测。
China management earnings forecast regime is based on the semi-mandatory and semi-voluntary regulation.In light of the current disclosure system for management earnings forecast,using the internal control evaluation index issued by the internal control group of Xiamen University and the sample of all A-share listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2012,this paper investigates the influence that internal control exerts on the behavior of management earnings forecast. Empirical study results show that internal control has significant effects on voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecast. The better quality of the internal control,the more inclined to voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecast. As part of the five elements of internal control,good information communication and control activities inside companies endow management with a better ability for earnings forecast. The high-grade internal environment and internal oversight enhance management's willingness to disclose earnings forecasts and eventually lead to voluntary disclosure of earnings forecast.
China management earnings forecast regime is based on the semi-mandatory and semi-voluntary regulation.In light of the current disclosure system for management earnings forecast,using the internal control evaluation index issued by the internal control group of Xiamen University and the sample of all A-share listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2012,this paper investigates the influence that internal control exerts on the behavior of management earnings forecast. Empirical study results show that internal control has significant effects on voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecast. The better quality of the internal control,the more inclined to voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecast. As part of the five elements of internal control,good information communication and control activities inside companies endow management with a better ability for earnings forecast. The high-grade internal environment and internal oversight enhance management's willingness to disclose earnings forecasts and eventually lead to voluntary disclosure of earnings forecast.
引文
白晓宇,2009:《管理当局的业绩预告对分析师行为的多重影响》,《金融研究》第4期。
董望、陈汉文,2011:《内部控制,应计质量与盈余反应---基于中国2009年A股上市公司的经验证据》,《审计研究》第4期。
方红星、金玉娜,2011:《高质量内部控制能抑制盈余管理吗?---基于自愿性内部控制鉴证报告的经验研究》,《会计研究》第8期。
王善平、赵聪聪、赵国宇,2014:《扭亏动机下审计师变更决策与年报披露的及时研究》,《审计与经济研究》第1期。王雄元、陈文娜、顾俊,2008:《年报及时性的信号效应》,《会计研究》第12期。
袁振超、岳衡、谈文峰,2014:《代理成本、所有权性质与业绩预告精确度》,《南开管理评论》第3期。
张翼、林小驰,2005:《公司治理结构与管理层盈利预测》,《中国会计评论》第2期。
Ajinkya,B.,Bhojraj,S.,2005,“Sengupta,P.The association between outside directors,institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts”,Journal of Accounting Research,43(3),343-376.
Ashbaugh-Skaife,H.,D.W.Collins,et al.,2008,“The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies and Their Remediation on Accrual Quality”,Accounting Review,83(1):217.
Ball,R,B.Jayaraman and L.Shivakumar.,2012,“Audited Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure as Complements”,Journal of Accounting and Economics,53(1):136-166.
Basu S.,1997,“The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings”,Journal of accounting and economics,24(1):3-37.
Doyle,J.T.,G.Weili,et al.,2007,“Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting”,Accounting Review,82(5):1141-1170.
Gibbins,M.L.,Richardson,A.and Waterhouse,J.,1990.“The Management of Corporate Financial Disclosure:Opportunism,Ritualism,Policies,and Process”,Journal of Accounting Research,(28):121-143.
Healy and Palepu.2001,“Information asymmetry,corporate disclosure,and the capital markets:A review of the empirica disclosure literature”,Journal of accounting andE conomics,31:405-440.
Irene Karamanou and Nikos Vafeas.,2005,“The Association between Corporate Boards,Audit Committees,and Management Earnings Forecasts:An Empirical Analysis”,Journal ofA ccounting Research,43(6):963-989.
Kam C.Chan,Barbara Farrell Farrell,and Picheng Lee.,2008,“Earnings Management of Firms Reporting Material Internal Control Weaknesses under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”,Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,27:161-179.
Lang,M.,and R.Lundholm.2000,“Voluntary disclosure and equity offerings:reducing information asymmetry or hyping the stock?”,Contemporary Accounting Research,17:623-662.
Skinner,D.,1994,“Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news”,Journal of Accounting Research,(32):38-60.
Rogers,J.L.,2008,“Disclosure quality and management trading incentives”,Journal of Accounting Research.,(46):1265-1296.
Verrecchia R E.,1983,“Information quality and discretionary disclosure”,Journal of Accounting and Economics,12(4):365-380.
Wang,I.,2007,“Private Earnings Guidance and Its Implications for Disclosure Regulation”,The Accounting Review,82:1299-1332.
董望、陈汉文,2011:《内部控制,应计质量与盈余反应---基于中国2009年A股上市公司的经验证据》,《审计研究》第4期。
方红星、金玉娜,2011:《高质量内部控制能抑制盈余管理吗?---基于自愿性内部控制鉴证报告的经验研究》,《会计研究》第8期。
王善平、赵聪聪、赵国宇,2014:《扭亏动机下审计师变更决策与年报披露的及时研究》,《审计与经济研究》第1期。王雄元、陈文娜、顾俊,2008:《年报及时性的信号效应》,《会计研究》第12期。
袁振超、岳衡、谈文峰,2014:《代理成本、所有权性质与业绩预告精确度》,《南开管理评论》第3期。
张翼、林小驰,2005:《公司治理结构与管理层盈利预测》,《中国会计评论》第2期。
Ajinkya,B.,Bhojraj,S.,2005,“Sengupta,P.The association between outside directors,institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts”,Journal of Accounting Research,43(3),343-376.
Ashbaugh-Skaife,H.,D.W.Collins,et al.,2008,“The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies and Their Remediation on Accrual Quality”,Accounting Review,83(1):217.
Ball,R,B.Jayaraman and L.Shivakumar.,2012,“Audited Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure as Complements”,Journal of Accounting and Economics,53(1):136-166.
Basu S.,1997,“The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings”,Journal of accounting and economics,24(1):3-37.
Doyle,J.T.,G.Weili,et al.,2007,“Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting”,Accounting Review,82(5):1141-1170.
Gibbins,M.L.,Richardson,A.and Waterhouse,J.,1990.“The Management of Corporate Financial Disclosure:Opportunism,Ritualism,Policies,and Process”,Journal of Accounting Research,(28):121-143.
Healy and Palepu.2001,“Information asymmetry,corporate disclosure,and the capital markets:A review of the empirica disclosure literature”,Journal of accounting andE conomics,31:405-440.
Irene Karamanou and Nikos Vafeas.,2005,“The Association between Corporate Boards,Audit Committees,and Management Earnings Forecasts:An Empirical Analysis”,Journal ofA ccounting Research,43(6):963-989.
Kam C.Chan,Barbara Farrell Farrell,and Picheng Lee.,2008,“Earnings Management of Firms Reporting Material Internal Control Weaknesses under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”,Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,27:161-179.
Lang,M.,and R.Lundholm.2000,“Voluntary disclosure and equity offerings:reducing information asymmetry or hyping the stock?”,Contemporary Accounting Research,17:623-662.
Skinner,D.,1994,“Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news”,Journal of Accounting Research,(32):38-60.
Rogers,J.L.,2008,“Disclosure quality and management trading incentives”,Journal of Accounting Research.,(46):1265-1296.
Verrecchia R E.,1983,“Information quality and discretionary disclosure”,Journal of Accounting and Economics,12(4):365-380.
Wang,I.,2007,“Private Earnings Guidance and Its Implications for Disclosure Regulation”,The Accounting Review,82:1299-1332.