是否收购:目标企业核心竞争力与收购企业能力
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摘要
本文在不完全契约环境下考虑收购方企业与目标企业之间的并购博弈,分析目标企业的核心竞争力对于收购方企业的收购动机和收购价格的影响。结果表明:(1)收购方企业是否对目标企业报高价,取决于收购方企业自身的相对能力,而不是目标企业的核心竞争力,收购方企业自身相对能力越强,越有可能对目标企业报高价。(2)目标企业没有很强的核心竞争力时,更有可能发生收购。(3)尽管知道高价收购目标企业很可能是不值得的,但一些具有高能力的收购方企业仍然愿意高价收购目标企业。
In the current paper we consider the acquisition game between an acquiring firm and a target firm in an incomplete contract environment, to analyze the impacts of the target firm's core competency of and the acquiring firm's ability to the acquiring incentive and price. We prove that:(1) whether the acquiring firm would bid a high acquiring price to the target firm depends on the acquiring firm's capability rather than the target firm's core competency:the higher is the acquiring firm's ability,the more possible that the acquiring firm bid a high acquiring price:(2) the acquisition is more possible to happen when the target firm has not much core competency:(3) some acquiring firms whose abilities are sufficiently high would bid a high price the target firm although they know that the target firm is probably not worth the high price.
In the current paper we consider the acquisition game between an acquiring firm and a target firm in an incomplete contract environment, to analyze the impacts of the target firm's core competency of and the acquiring firm's ability to the acquiring incentive and price. We prove that:(1) whether the acquiring firm would bid a high acquiring price to the target firm depends on the acquiring firm's capability rather than the target firm's core competency:the higher is the acquiring firm's ability,the more possible that the acquiring firm bid a high acquiring price:(2) the acquisition is more possible to happen when the target firm has not much core competency:(3) some acquiring firms whose abilities are sufficiently high would bid a high price the target firm although they know that the target firm is probably not worth the high price.
引文
[7]Ang,J.S.and C.P.Wu.2011.The Role of Technological Synergy in Mergers and Acquisitions,Available at SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2024805.
[8]Bena,J.and K.Li.2014.Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions,The Journal of Finance,69(5).
[9]Cloodt,M.,J.Hagedoorn and H.Van Kranenburg2006.Mergers and Acquisitions:Their Effect on the Innovative Performance of Companies in High-tech Industries,Research Policy.
[10]Correia-da-Silva,J.and J.Pinho.2018.Collusion in Mixed Oligopolies and the Coordinated Effects of Privatization,Journal of Economics,124.
[11]Demerjian,P.,B.Lev and S.E.McVay.2012Quantifying Managerial Ability:A New Measure and Validity Tests,Management Science,58(7).
[12]Entezarkheir,M.and S.Moshiri.2017.Mergers and Innovation:Evidence from a Panel of US Frims,Economics of Innovation and New Technology,27(2).
[13]Gautam,A.,and R.Katila.2001.Technology Acquisitions and the Innovation Performance of Acquiring Firms:A Longitudinal Study,Strategic Management Journal,22(3).
[14]Grossman,S.J.and O.Hart.1986.The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,Journal of Political Economy,94(4).
[15]Hart,O.and J.Moore.1990.Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,Journal of Political Economy,98(6).
[16]Hart,O.,J.Tirole,D.W.Carlton and O.E.Williamson.1990.Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure,Brookings Papers on Economic Activity(Special Issue).
[17]Hoberg,G.and G.M.Phillips.2010.Product Market Synergies and Competition in Mergers and Acquisitions:A Test-based Analysis,Review of Financial Studies,23.
[18]Liu,C.C.,A.Mukherjee and L.F.S.Wang.2015.Horizontal merger under strategic tax policy,Economics Letters,136.
[19]Mason,R.and H.Weeds.2013.Merger Policy,Entry,and Entrepreneurship,European Economic Review,57.
[20]Pepall,L.,Dan.Richards and G.Norman.2013.Industrial Organization:Contemporary Theory and Empirical Applications,Published by John Wiley&Sons.
[21]Perry,M.and R.Porter.1985.Oligopoly and the Incentive of Horizontal Merger,American Economic Review,75(1).
[22]Salent,S.,S.Switzer and R.Reynolds.1983.Losses from Horizontal Mergers:The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium,Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(5).
[23]Shapley,L.S.1953.A Value for n-Person Games,In Contributions to the Theory of Games,Eds.by Kuhn H.W.and A.W.Tucker,Published by Princeton University Press.
[1]李善民,曾昭灶,王彩萍,朱滔,陈玉罡.上市公司并购绩效及其影响因素研究[J].世界经济,2004,(9).
[2]李双燕,王彤.基于不完全契约的并购对赌协议激励模型与案例[J].系统管理学报,2018,6(27).
[3]王诗翔,魏江,路瑶.跨国技术并购中吸收能力与技术绩效关系研究--基于演化博弈论[J].科学学研究,2014,12(32).
[4]肖明,李海涛.管理层能力对企业并购的影响研究[J].管理世界,2017,(6).
[5]张伟,崔凯.混合寡头下的横向合并及反垄断控制研究[J].财经问题研究,2016,(1).
[6]张学勇,柳依依,罗丹,陈锐.创新能力对上市公司并购业绩的影响[J].金融研究,2017,(3).
(1)以上例子均发生在2004-2008年的全球第6次并购浪潮期间。在经过数年的相对平静之后,从2013年开始企业并购市场再掀波澜--2015年创下史上最高全球并购交易额,2016年实现全球史上第三高并购交易额。如今我们很可能正处在第7次全球并购浪潮之中,移动互联网是本轮并购发生的主要行业,与此前各次浪潮的一个重要区别是:中国企业是本轮并购浪潮的主力军之一。
(2)如果考虑S2也可以进行私人投资的情况,不会改变本文的基本机制和结论。
(3)这一设定背后的思想是“Shapley值法(Shapley value method)”,来自Shapley(1953)的贡献。对于“一个有多个参与人参与的博弈(交易)中,每一个参与人在最终收益中获得多少份额”这一问题,Shapley提供了一种计算每个参与人对于整个博弈(交易)的“贡献”的衡量方法。依照该方法,每个参与人对于整个博弈(交易)的“贡献”,称作该参与人的“Shapley贡献”或者“Shapley值”,应等于该参与人作为博弈(交易)所有参与人集合的任意包含该参与人的子集合中的一分子,对于该子集合交易价值的“边际贡献”的期望之和。这里一个参与人对于任意一个包含该参与人的子集合的交易价值的“边际贡献”,指在“有该参与人参与”和“没有该参与人参与”的情况下,该子集合的交易价值之差。运用Shapley值法的思想,本文模型中的收购方企业(B)和目标企业的核心竞争力部分(S1)都是整个交易不可或缺的参与方--缺少其中任意一方都将导致整个交易无法进行,从而使得其他所有参与人获得的价值归零--在所有参与人子集合中都会产生较大的边际贡献,这一边际贡献将增加其在交易总价值中分得的份额(除了凭借其各自产权在交易总价值中分得的份额);目标企业的普通竞争力部分(S2)对于交易而言不是不可或缺的,其对于所有参与人子集合的边际贡献均等于0,因此只能凭借其产权在交易总价值中分得的份额。本文采用的设定,只是上述思想的一个具体化,目的仅是为了分析的便利。
(4)也可以假设收购方企业B和目标企业S在决定收购价格时各自拥有一定的讨价还价能力,例如γ和1-γ,但这不会影响本文的基本机制和结论。
(5)这里假设θ服从均匀分布可以简化后续分析,若假设θ服从其他分布,不会改变本文的基本机制和结论。
[8]Bena,J.and K.Li.2014.Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions,The Journal of Finance,69(5).
[9]Cloodt,M.,J.Hagedoorn and H.Van Kranenburg2006.Mergers and Acquisitions:Their Effect on the Innovative Performance of Companies in High-tech Industries,Research Policy.
[10]Correia-da-Silva,J.and J.Pinho.2018.Collusion in Mixed Oligopolies and the Coordinated Effects of Privatization,Journal of Economics,124.
[11]Demerjian,P.,B.Lev and S.E.McVay.2012Quantifying Managerial Ability:A New Measure and Validity Tests,Management Science,58(7).
[12]Entezarkheir,M.and S.Moshiri.2017.Mergers and Innovation:Evidence from a Panel of US Frims,Economics of Innovation and New Technology,27(2).
[13]Gautam,A.,and R.Katila.2001.Technology Acquisitions and the Innovation Performance of Acquiring Firms:A Longitudinal Study,Strategic Management Journal,22(3).
[14]Grossman,S.J.and O.Hart.1986.The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,Journal of Political Economy,94(4).
[15]Hart,O.and J.Moore.1990.Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,Journal of Political Economy,98(6).
[16]Hart,O.,J.Tirole,D.W.Carlton and O.E.Williamson.1990.Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure,Brookings Papers on Economic Activity(Special Issue).
[17]Hoberg,G.and G.M.Phillips.2010.Product Market Synergies and Competition in Mergers and Acquisitions:A Test-based Analysis,Review of Financial Studies,23.
[18]Liu,C.C.,A.Mukherjee and L.F.S.Wang.2015.Horizontal merger under strategic tax policy,Economics Letters,136.
[19]Mason,R.and H.Weeds.2013.Merger Policy,Entry,and Entrepreneurship,European Economic Review,57.
[20]Pepall,L.,Dan.Richards and G.Norman.2013.Industrial Organization:Contemporary Theory and Empirical Applications,Published by John Wiley&Sons.
[21]Perry,M.and R.Porter.1985.Oligopoly and the Incentive of Horizontal Merger,American Economic Review,75(1).
[22]Salent,S.,S.Switzer and R.Reynolds.1983.Losses from Horizontal Mergers:The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium,Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(5).
[23]Shapley,L.S.1953.A Value for n-Person Games,In Contributions to the Theory of Games,Eds.by Kuhn H.W.and A.W.Tucker,Published by Princeton University Press.
[1]李善民,曾昭灶,王彩萍,朱滔,陈玉罡.上市公司并购绩效及其影响因素研究[J].世界经济,2004,(9).
[2]李双燕,王彤.基于不完全契约的并购对赌协议激励模型与案例[J].系统管理学报,2018,6(27).
[3]王诗翔,魏江,路瑶.跨国技术并购中吸收能力与技术绩效关系研究--基于演化博弈论[J].科学学研究,2014,12(32).
[4]肖明,李海涛.管理层能力对企业并购的影响研究[J].管理世界,2017,(6).
[5]张伟,崔凯.混合寡头下的横向合并及反垄断控制研究[J].财经问题研究,2016,(1).
[6]张学勇,柳依依,罗丹,陈锐.创新能力对上市公司并购业绩的影响[J].金融研究,2017,(3).
(1)以上例子均发生在2004-2008年的全球第6次并购浪潮期间。在经过数年的相对平静之后,从2013年开始企业并购市场再掀波澜--2015年创下史上最高全球并购交易额,2016年实现全球史上第三高并购交易额。如今我们很可能正处在第7次全球并购浪潮之中,移动互联网是本轮并购发生的主要行业,与此前各次浪潮的一个重要区别是:中国企业是本轮并购浪潮的主力军之一。
(2)如果考虑S2也可以进行私人投资的情况,不会改变本文的基本机制和结论。
(3)这一设定背后的思想是“Shapley值法(Shapley value method)”,来自Shapley(1953)的贡献。对于“一个有多个参与人参与的博弈(交易)中,每一个参与人在最终收益中获得多少份额”这一问题,Shapley提供了一种计算每个参与人对于整个博弈(交易)的“贡献”的衡量方法。依照该方法,每个参与人对于整个博弈(交易)的“贡献”,称作该参与人的“Shapley贡献”或者“Shapley值”,应等于该参与人作为博弈(交易)所有参与人集合的任意包含该参与人的子集合中的一分子,对于该子集合交易价值的“边际贡献”的期望之和。这里一个参与人对于任意一个包含该参与人的子集合的交易价值的“边际贡献”,指在“有该参与人参与”和“没有该参与人参与”的情况下,该子集合的交易价值之差。运用Shapley值法的思想,本文模型中的收购方企业(B)和目标企业的核心竞争力部分(S1)都是整个交易不可或缺的参与方--缺少其中任意一方都将导致整个交易无法进行,从而使得其他所有参与人获得的价值归零--在所有参与人子集合中都会产生较大的边际贡献,这一边际贡献将增加其在交易总价值中分得的份额(除了凭借其各自产权在交易总价值中分得的份额);目标企业的普通竞争力部分(S2)对于交易而言不是不可或缺的,其对于所有参与人子集合的边际贡献均等于0,因此只能凭借其产权在交易总价值中分得的份额。本文采用的设定,只是上述思想的一个具体化,目的仅是为了分析的便利。
(4)也可以假设收购方企业B和目标企业S在决定收购价格时各自拥有一定的讨价还价能力,例如γ和1-γ,但这不会影响本文的基本机制和结论。
(5)这里假设θ服从均匀分布可以简化后续分析,若假设θ服从其他分布,不会改变本文的基本机制和结论。