上市公司治理结构对信息性盈余管理的影响研究
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摘要
为了有效监督公司内部利害关系各方的行为,有效降低基于各种委托代理关系的代理成本,在阐述国内外盈余管理文献的基础上,假设拥有健全公司治理结构的上市公司管理者更愿意进行信息性盈余管理,通过构建合理的并可度量的信息性盈余管理衡量方法,使用沪、深两市全部A股上市公司2014—2016年公司季度财务数据,实证研究了信息性盈余管理视角下公司治理对盈余管理的影响。结果表明,市场监管者和投资者需要关注两种不同的盈余管理行为,投机性盈余管理更倾向于误导投资者,信息性盈余管理则是通过盈余管理的手段向投资者传递有用的内部信息。股权制衡对上市公司的信息性盈余管理行为具有明显促进作用,促使管理层进行信息性盈余管理,就要优化股权结构,形成产权多样化的股东制衡机制,实现股权结构的合理优化。拥有健全公司治理结构的上市公司管理者更愿意进行信息性盈余管理,公司治理结构对管理者进行信息性盈余管理具有积极的影响,健全的公司治理结构能够提高财务报告透明度和盈余信息含量。因此,保障财务报告的真实性和可靠性,以信息性盈余管理为动机探究公司治理对盈余管理的影响具有现实意义。
In order to effectively monitor the behavior of stakeholders within the company and reduce the agency cost based on various principal-agent relations,on the basis of the literature of earnings management at home and abroad and assuming that managers of listed companies who have sound corporate governance are more willing to manage information earnings,the influence of corporate governance in Chinese listed companies on information earnings management is empirically studied by constructing a reasonable and measurable information measure of earnings management and using company quarterly financial data of Shanghai and Shenzhen all A share listed companies from 2014 to 2016.The results show that market supervisors and investors need to pay attention to two different earnings management behaviors:opportunistic earnings management tends to mislead investors,while informative earnings management transfers useful internal information to investors through earningsmanagement.Equity checks and balance play a significant role in promoting earnings management behavior of listed companies because it is necessary to optimize the ownership structure for the management to carry out informative earnings management,form a shareholder balance mechanism with diversified property rights,and achieve a reasonable optimization of the equity structure.The managers of listed companies with sound corporate governance are more willing to manage information earnings.Corporate governance structure has a positive impact on managers' informative earnings management.A sound corporate governance structure can improve the transparency and surplus information content of financial statements.It is meaningful to guarantee the authenticity and reliability of the financial report and explore the impact of corporate governance on earnings management based on informative earning management.
In order to effectively monitor the behavior of stakeholders within the company and reduce the agency cost based on various principal-agent relations,on the basis of the literature of earnings management at home and abroad and assuming that managers of listed companies who have sound corporate governance are more willing to manage information earnings,the influence of corporate governance in Chinese listed companies on information earnings management is empirically studied by constructing a reasonable and measurable information measure of earnings management and using company quarterly financial data of Shanghai and Shenzhen all A share listed companies from 2014 to 2016.The results show that market supervisors and investors need to pay attention to two different earnings management behaviors:opportunistic earnings management tends to mislead investors,while informative earnings management transfers useful internal information to investors through earningsmanagement.Equity checks and balance play a significant role in promoting earnings management behavior of listed companies because it is necessary to optimize the ownership structure for the management to carry out informative earnings management,form a shareholder balance mechanism with diversified property rights,and achieve a reasonable optimization of the equity structure.The managers of listed companies with sound corporate governance are more willing to manage information earnings.Corporate governance structure has a positive impact on managers' informative earnings management.A sound corporate governance structure can improve the transparency and surplus information content of financial statements.It is meaningful to guarantee the authenticity and reliability of the financial report and explore the impact of corporate governance on earnings management based on informative earning management.
引文
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[21]王化成,佟岩.控股股东与盈余质量——基于盈余反应系数的考察[J].会计研究,2006(2):66-74.WANG Huacheng,TONG Yan.Controlling share holders and earnings quality:An empirical study based on earnings response coefficients[J].Accounting Research,2006(2):66-74.
[22]LA PORTA R,Lopez-De-Sisanes Florencio,Shleifer Andrei.1999.Corporate Ownership around the World.Journal of Finance,54(2):471-517.
[2]GUAY W R,KOTHARI S P,WATTS R L.A market-based evaluation of discretionary accrual models[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1996,34(34):83-105.
[3]GUL F A,LEUNG S,SRINIDHI B.Informative and opportunistic earnings management and the value relevance of earnings:Some evidence on the role of IOS[J].Ssm Electronic Journal,2003,2(2):459-463.
[4]JIRAPORN P,MILLER G A,YOON S S,et al.Is earnings management opportunistic or beneficial?An agency theory perspective[J].International Review of Financial Analysis,2008,17(3):622-634.
[5]纪茂利,赵立平,郭艺馨.管理层盈余预测与不对称及时性实证研究[J].河北工业科技,2018,35(1):1-6.JI Maoli,ZHAO Liping,GUO Yixin.Management earnings forecasts and measured[J].Hebei Journal of Industrial Science and Technology,2018,35(1):1-6.
[6]LIN Z,LIU M,NORONHA C.The impact of corporate governance on informative earnings management in the Chinese market[J].Abacus,2016,52(3):568-609.
[7]刘淑花,乔贵涛.区域经营环境、会计盈余质量与公司债定价[J].河北科技大学学报(社会科学版),2016,16(03):23-30.LIU Shuhua,QIAO Guitao.Regional operating environment and accounting earnings quality on corporate bond pricing[J].Journal of Hebei University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences),2016,16(3):23-30.
[8]DUNN K A,MAYHEW B W.Audit firm industry specialization and client disclosure quality[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2004,9(1):35-58.
[9]林钟高,储姣娇.内部控制对股权结构与盈余质量的传导效应[J].税务与经济,2012,15(6):1-11.LIN Zhonggao,CHU Jiaojiao.Conduction effect of internal control in the ownership structure and earnings quality[J].Taxation and Economy,2012,15(6):1-11.
[10]杜亭.股权结构与会计信息质量——2010-2012年我国A股主板上市公司的经验研究[J].财会通讯,2015(6):17-21.
[11]王昌锐,倪娟.股权结构、董事会特征与盈余管理[J].安徽大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2012(1):141-149.
[12]陆唯文,刘涛.上市公司股权激励盈余管理及影响因素研究[J].河北工业科技,2013,30(2):92-96.LU Weiwen,LIU Tao.Study on earnings management of share options in listed companies and its influential factors[J].Hebei Journal of Industrial Science and Technology,2013,30(2):92-96.
[13]毛世平.金字塔控制结构与股权制衡效应——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2009(1):140-152.
[14]吴红军,吴世农.股权制衡、大股东掏空与企业价值[J].经济管理,2009,31(3):44-52.WU Hongjun,WU Shinong.Theoretical analysis and empirical test to check-and-balance ownership structure,tunneling and corporate value[J].Economic Management Journal,2009,31(3):44-52.
[15]CONGER J A,FINEGOLD D,LAWLER E.Appraising boardroom performance[J].Harvard Business Review,1998,76(1):136-148.
[16]于东智.公司治理、股权安排与经营绩效[J].山东社会科学,2001(2):57-59.
[17]沈艺峰,张俊生.ST公司董事会治理失败若干成因分析[J].证券市场导报,2002(3):21-25.
[18]李常青,赖建清.董事会特征影响公司绩效吗?[J].金融研究,2004(5):64-77.
[19]夏俊彬.上市公司董事会特征对会计信息质量影响的实证研究[J].当代会计,2015(3):9-11.
[20]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,等.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(2):81-91.BAI Chongen,LIU Qiao,LU Zhou,et al.An empirical syudy on Chinese listed firms’corporate governance[J].Economic Research Journal,2005(2):81-91.
[21]王化成,佟岩.控股股东与盈余质量——基于盈余反应系数的考察[J].会计研究,2006(2):66-74.WANG Huacheng,TONG Yan.Controlling share holders and earnings quality:An empirical study based on earnings response coefficients[J].Accounting Research,2006(2):66-74.
[22]LA PORTA R,Lopez-De-Sisanes Florencio,Shleifer Andrei.1999.Corporate Ownership around the World.Journal of Finance,54(2):471-517.