数字支付中心化规制的争议与可能
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摘要
支付不仅涉及货币移转的技术架构,还蕴含安全与效率价值衡平的法律考量。随着货币形态"脱实向虚",电子货币的出现使数字支付成为可能。实践中,尤其是第三方支付发展迅速,其脱媒化运作打破了银行主导下的中心化跨行清算模式,但也导致资金挪用和违规结算问题频发。监管采取集中存管备付金和设立"网联"的双重举措,如此压抑式监管无益于数字支付的发展,还受到以区块链技术为支撑的新型数字货币带来的支付"去中心化"的挑战。而支付关乎国家金融安全和经济运作畅通,中心化规制具有正当性,应围绕电子货币和法定数字货币的差异和共性进行二向度的塑造,通过制定"货币法",确保支付中心化规制的适当推行。
Payment involves not only the technical framework of currency transfer,but also the legal consideration of balancing the value of security and efficiency. With the emergence of electronic money,digital payment becomes possible. In practice,especially the rapid development of third-party payment,its disintermediation operation has innovatively broken the centralized inter-bank liquidation model led by the bank,but also led to the frequent misappropriation of funds and illegal settlement problems. Supervisory measures take the dual measures of centralized deposit and reserve payment and setting up a"networking network". Such repressive supervision is not conducive to the development of digital payment. It is also challenged by the"de-centralization"of payment brought by the new digital currency supported by block chain technology. Payment is related to national financial security and smooth economic operation,and centralized regulation is legitimate. We should focus on the differences and commonalities between electronic currency and legal digital currency to shape two-dimensional,and ensure the proper implementation of centralized payment regulation by enacting"monetary law".
Payment involves not only the technical framework of currency transfer,but also the legal consideration of balancing the value of security and efficiency. With the emergence of electronic money,digital payment becomes possible. In practice,especially the rapid development of third-party payment,its disintermediation operation has innovatively broken the centralized inter-bank liquidation model led by the bank,but also led to the frequent misappropriation of funds and illegal settlement problems. Supervisory measures take the dual measures of centralized deposit and reserve payment and setting up a"networking network". Such repressive supervision is not conducive to the development of digital payment. It is also challenged by the"de-centralization"of payment brought by the new digital currency supported by block chain technology. Payment is related to national financial security and smooth economic operation,and centralized regulation is legitimate. We should focus on the differences and commonalities between electronic currency and legal digital currency to shape two-dimensional,and ensure the proper implementation of centralized payment regulation by enacting"monetary law".
引文
[1]中国支付清算协会.支付清算理论与实务[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2017:4-7.
[2]JEFFREY E GLASS.What is a digital currency[J].The journal of the Franklin Pierce Center for intellectual property,2017(3):465-467.
[3]戴维·欧瑞尔,罗曼·克鲁帕提.人类货币历史[M].北京:中信出版社,2017:9-11.
[4]NIALL FERGUSON.The ascent of money:a financial history of the world[M].New York:Penguin publishing group,2008:741.
[5]王学龙,于潇,白雪秋.货币契约、金融功能与经济发展[J].财经问题研究,2012(1):3-9.
[6]励跃.中国支付体系[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2017:40-41.
[7]DAN AWREY,KRISTIN VAN ZWIETEN.The shadow payment system[J].The journal of corporation law,2018(4):776-816.
[8]中国人民银行.已获许可机构(支付机构)[EB/OL].(2019-01-10)[2019-05-12].http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengwugongkai/127924/128041/295 1606/1923625/1923629/index.html.
[9]薛白,李栋.5000亿备付金挥别“监管套利”[EB/OL].(2017-01-23)[2019-05-10].http://money.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0123/c42877-29042938.html.
[10]朱子琳.对设立网联平台的批判[EB/OL].(2018-05-14)[2019-04-30].http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/bank/yhpl/2018-05-14/doc-ihapkuvk7429833.shtml.
[11]REUBEN FRINBERG.Bitcoin:an innovative alternative digital currency[J].Hastings science&technology law journal,2012(1):160-207.
[12]PAUL VIGNA,MICHAEL J CASEY.Bitcoin for the unbanked:cryptocurrencies that go where big banks won’t[JB/OL].(2017-10-26)[2019-05-06].http://www.foreignaffairs.com/node/1113762.
[13]ELIZABETH SARA ROSS.Nobody puts blockchain in a corner:the disruptive role of blockchain technology in the financial services industry and current regulatory issues[J].Cath. U. J. L.&Tech,2017(2):353.
[14]ANGELA WALCH.The Bitcoin blockchain as financial market infrastructure:a consideration of operational risk[J].New York university journal of legislation and public policy,2015(4):837-841.
[15]Coinbase.Bitcoin price(BTC)[EB/OL].(2019-05-13)[2019-05-13].https://www.coinbase.com/price/bitcoin.
[16]ALLEN,HILARY J.$=Euro=Bitcoin[J].Maryland law review,2017(4):877-939.
[17]ANUSHA PIRANI.Cryptocurrency:a magical bubble or the future of currency[J].Court Uncourt,2018(5):29.
[18]LAWRENCE G BAXTER.Adaptive financial regulation and regtech:a concept article on realistic protection for victims of bank failures[J].Duke law journal,2016(3):567-577.
[19]ANISHA REDDY.Coinsensus:the need for uniform national virtual currency regulations[J].Dickinson law review,2018(1):251-280.
[20]姚前,汤莹伟.关于央行法定数字货币的若干思考[J].金融研究,2017(7):78-85.
[21]CHRISTIAN BARONTINI,HENRY HOLDEN.Proceeding with caution-a survey on central bank digital currency[R].BIS Papers,2019.
[22]庄雷,郭宗微,郭嘉仁.数字货币的发行模式与风险控制研究[J].武汉金融,2019(3):57-63.
[23]刘少军.法定数字货币的法理与权义分配研究[J].中国政法大学学报,2018(3):165-179.
[24]Committee on the Global Financial System.Central Bank Operating Frameworks and Collateral Markets[R].CGFS Papers,2015.
[25]武培云,胡佳妮.反洗钱视角下数字货币监管研究[J].北方金融,2018(5):59-63.
[26]RUBEN LEE.Running the world’s markets:the governance of financial infrastructure[M].New Jersey:Princeton University Press,2011:10-11.
[27]张阳.金融市场基础设施论纲:风险治理、科技革新与规制重塑[J].经济法学评论,2018(2):88-111.
(1)货币还发挥着“价值尺度”(Unit of Account)“贮藏手段”(Method of Storing Value)等功能。
(2)清算和结算在我国的定义与国际通例相反,国际清算银行(BIS)规定,清算是对支付指令交换、计算待偿债权债务的结果,是信息记账过程;结算是将清算结果进行资金划拨的过程。因此,央行支付清算系统更准确的称谓应是“央行支付结算系统”。
(3)如上海畅购、浙江易士、广州益民等第三方支付公司被相继查出挪用客户备付金,导致支付资金链条发生断裂,被央行注销了支付业务许可证。
(4)2015年,欧盟法院层级的比特币第一案中强调,比特币难被认为是合法货币(Legal Tender),其关键功用应是作为一种支付手段(Means of Payment);美国金融犯罪执法网络(FinCEn)也认为数字货币不具有真实货币的所有属性,但可作为一种交易媒介。
(5)非公有链的原因:去中心分布、全网公开、各节点共同参与,导致缺乏支付的中心权威;非联盟链的原因:缺乏实质中心,开放范围限于部分主体,且容易产生交易回滚的问题,数据支付被篡改的风险较大。
(6)但与传统“证券货币”有不同,其转移方式由物流运送转为银行系统间的数字划转,保管方式也由央行发行库和商业银行库存向云计算空间储存转变。
(7)此外,在《中国人民银行法》中单列一章“支付结算法”亦是一种方案,但考虑到《中国人民银行法》作为综合性的基础法律,其专章设计的体例篇幅仍然有限,无法全面展开。而且,关于货币发行、纠纷等内容无法在一章中规定,不利于维持既有《中国人民银行法》的体例结构和逻辑脉络。
(8)两种货币各有利弊,客户有一定喜好偏向是正常的。例如,法定数字货币没有“利息”,但其背后信用是央行(国家)信用,更安全;而电子货币是商业银行的信用,有利息收益,但有违约、破产之可能。
[2]JEFFREY E GLASS.What is a digital currency[J].The journal of the Franklin Pierce Center for intellectual property,2017(3):465-467.
[3]戴维·欧瑞尔,罗曼·克鲁帕提.人类货币历史[M].北京:中信出版社,2017:9-11.
[4]NIALL FERGUSON.The ascent of money:a financial history of the world[M].New York:Penguin publishing group,2008:741.
[5]王学龙,于潇,白雪秋.货币契约、金融功能与经济发展[J].财经问题研究,2012(1):3-9.
[6]励跃.中国支付体系[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2017:40-41.
[7]DAN AWREY,KRISTIN VAN ZWIETEN.The shadow payment system[J].The journal of corporation law,2018(4):776-816.
[8]中国人民银行.已获许可机构(支付机构)[EB/OL].(2019-01-10)[2019-05-12].http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengwugongkai/127924/128041/295 1606/1923625/1923629/index.html.
[9]薛白,李栋.5000亿备付金挥别“监管套利”[EB/OL].(2017-01-23)[2019-05-10].http://money.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0123/c42877-29042938.html.
[10]朱子琳.对设立网联平台的批判[EB/OL].(2018-05-14)[2019-04-30].http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/bank/yhpl/2018-05-14/doc-ihapkuvk7429833.shtml.
[11]REUBEN FRINBERG.Bitcoin:an innovative alternative digital currency[J].Hastings science&technology law journal,2012(1):160-207.
[12]PAUL VIGNA,MICHAEL J CASEY.Bitcoin for the unbanked:cryptocurrencies that go where big banks won’t[JB/OL].(2017-10-26)[2019-05-06].http://www.foreignaffairs.com/node/1113762.
[13]ELIZABETH SARA ROSS.Nobody puts blockchain in a corner:the disruptive role of blockchain technology in the financial services industry and current regulatory issues[J].Cath. U. J. L.&Tech,2017(2):353.
[14]ANGELA WALCH.The Bitcoin blockchain as financial market infrastructure:a consideration of operational risk[J].New York university journal of legislation and public policy,2015(4):837-841.
[15]Coinbase.Bitcoin price(BTC)[EB/OL].(2019-05-13)[2019-05-13].https://www.coinbase.com/price/bitcoin.
[16]ALLEN,HILARY J.$=Euro=Bitcoin[J].Maryland law review,2017(4):877-939.
[17]ANUSHA PIRANI.Cryptocurrency:a magical bubble or the future of currency[J].Court Uncourt,2018(5):29.
[18]LAWRENCE G BAXTER.Adaptive financial regulation and regtech:a concept article on realistic protection for victims of bank failures[J].Duke law journal,2016(3):567-577.
[19]ANISHA REDDY.Coinsensus:the need for uniform national virtual currency regulations[J].Dickinson law review,2018(1):251-280.
[20]姚前,汤莹伟.关于央行法定数字货币的若干思考[J].金融研究,2017(7):78-85.
[21]CHRISTIAN BARONTINI,HENRY HOLDEN.Proceeding with caution-a survey on central bank digital currency[R].BIS Papers,2019.
[22]庄雷,郭宗微,郭嘉仁.数字货币的发行模式与风险控制研究[J].武汉金融,2019(3):57-63.
[23]刘少军.法定数字货币的法理与权义分配研究[J].中国政法大学学报,2018(3):165-179.
[24]Committee on the Global Financial System.Central Bank Operating Frameworks and Collateral Markets[R].CGFS Papers,2015.
[25]武培云,胡佳妮.反洗钱视角下数字货币监管研究[J].北方金融,2018(5):59-63.
[26]RUBEN LEE.Running the world’s markets:the governance of financial infrastructure[M].New Jersey:Princeton University Press,2011:10-11.
[27]张阳.金融市场基础设施论纲:风险治理、科技革新与规制重塑[J].经济法学评论,2018(2):88-111.
(1)货币还发挥着“价值尺度”(Unit of Account)“贮藏手段”(Method of Storing Value)等功能。
(2)清算和结算在我国的定义与国际通例相反,国际清算银行(BIS)规定,清算是对支付指令交换、计算待偿债权债务的结果,是信息记账过程;结算是将清算结果进行资金划拨的过程。因此,央行支付清算系统更准确的称谓应是“央行支付结算系统”。
(3)如上海畅购、浙江易士、广州益民等第三方支付公司被相继查出挪用客户备付金,导致支付资金链条发生断裂,被央行注销了支付业务许可证。
(4)2015年,欧盟法院层级的比特币第一案中强调,比特币难被认为是合法货币(Legal Tender),其关键功用应是作为一种支付手段(Means of Payment);美国金融犯罪执法网络(FinCEn)也认为数字货币不具有真实货币的所有属性,但可作为一种交易媒介。
(5)非公有链的原因:去中心分布、全网公开、各节点共同参与,导致缺乏支付的中心权威;非联盟链的原因:缺乏实质中心,开放范围限于部分主体,且容易产生交易回滚的问题,数据支付被篡改的风险较大。
(6)但与传统“证券货币”有不同,其转移方式由物流运送转为银行系统间的数字划转,保管方式也由央行发行库和商业银行库存向云计算空间储存转变。
(7)此外,在《中国人民银行法》中单列一章“支付结算法”亦是一种方案,但考虑到《中国人民银行法》作为综合性的基础法律,其专章设计的体例篇幅仍然有限,无法全面展开。而且,关于货币发行、纠纷等内容无法在一章中规定,不利于维持既有《中国人民银行法》的体例结构和逻辑脉络。
(8)两种货币各有利弊,客户有一定喜好偏向是正常的。例如,法定数字货币没有“利息”,但其背后信用是央行(国家)信用,更安全;而电子货币是商业银行的信用,有利息收益,但有违约、破产之可能。