核武器、美苏关系与冷战的起源
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摘要
第二次世界大战中,美英两国联手研制原子弹,由此确定了双方对核武器的垄断。虽然美国政府主要出于减少美军伤亡和加速战争进程的双重需要对日本实施了核打击,但此举对美苏关系产生了深刻影响。围绕着核武器垄断与反垄断,美苏之间展开了激烈较量。美国将原子弹视为实现政治和外交目标的重要工具,对苏政策愈发强硬;而苏联则采取针锋相对的态度,加紧核武器研制。尽管出于政治和宣传需要,双方都表示赞成对原子能实施国际控制,但实际上双方立场迥异,且互不让步,最终导致原子能国际控制计划以失败告终。核武器虽然并非冷战的产物,但在促使战时美英苏同盟瓦解、冷战发生的过程中起到重要作用。
In World War II,the joint development of the atom bomb by the United States and Britain meant that the two shared a monopoly of nuclear weapons.Although the main reason the US launched a nuclear attack on Japan was to reduce its military casualties and shorten the war,this act had a profound impact on US-Soviet relations.The US and the Soviet Union fiercely contested the preservation or abandonment of the nuclear monopoly.The United States,which regarded the atom bomb as an important tool for achieving its political and foreign policy goals,toughened its Soviet policy,while the Soviet Union adopted a tit-for-tat approach and sped up its nuclear program.Despite their political and propaganda needs,both sides expressed support for international control of atomic energy,but in fact the differences in their positions and their refusal to compromise meant that this move ended in failure.Although nuclear weapons were not a Cold War product,they played an important role in the collapse of the alliance among the US,Britain and the Soviet Union and in the development of the Cold War.
In World War II,the joint development of the atom bomb by the United States and Britain meant that the two shared a monopoly of nuclear weapons.Although the main reason the US launched a nuclear attack on Japan was to reduce its military casualties and shorten the war,this act had a profound impact on US-Soviet relations.The US and the Soviet Union fiercely contested the preservation or abandonment of the nuclear monopoly.The United States,which regarded the atom bomb as an important tool for achieving its political and foreign policy goals,toughened its Soviet policy,while the Soviet Union adopted a tit-for-tat approach and sped up its nuclear program.Despite their political and propaganda needs,both sides expressed support for international control of atomic energy,but in fact the differences in their positions and their refusal to compromise meant that this move ended in failure.Although nuclear weapons were not a Cold War product,they played an important role in the collapse of the alliance among the US,Britain and the Soviet Union and in the development of the Cold War.
引文
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(8)Bundy, “Memorandum of Meeting at 10 Downing Street on July 22, 1943,” Harrison-Bundy Files Relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb(以下简称Harrison-Bundy Files), 1942-1946, Record Group 77, Roll 3, Folder 47, National Archives; Groves, “Diplomatic History of Manhattan Project,” Record Group 77, Manhattan Engineer District Files, Roll 10, National Archives.
(9)Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, pp.1117-1119.
(10)Niels Bohr, The Political Arena, Oxford: Elsevier, 2008, pp.87-88; Herman Feshbach, Tetsuo Matsui and Alexandra Oleson, eds., Niels Bohr: Physics and the World, London: Routledge, 2014, pp.319-330; Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr’s Times, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p.498.
(11)Frankfurter to Halifax, April 18, 1945, Frankfurter-Bohr Folder, Box 34, Oppenheimer Papers, Library of Congress; Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986, pp.526-527.
(12)Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945, London: Macmillan Press, 1964, p.352; Joseph Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945-1949, Boston: Houghton, 1970, pp.32-33.
(13)Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945, p.355.
(14)Bohr to Churchill, May 22, 1945, Frankfurter-Bohr Folder, Box 34, Oppenheimer Papers; Kevin Ruane, Churchill and the Bomb in War and Cold War, London: Bloomsbury, 2016, p.80.
(15)Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed, p.108.
(16)Bohr to Roosevelt, July 3, 1944, Frankfurter-Bohr Folder, Box 34, Oppenheimer Papers; Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr’s Times, p.501; Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, pp.42-44.
(17)Stefan Rozental, ed.,Niels Bohr, New York: Wiley, 1967, pp.197-199; Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945, p. 357.
(18)Niels Bohr, The Political Arena, pp.109-110; Bohr to Roosevelt, September 7, 1944; Bohr to Roosevelt, March 25, 1945, Frankfurter-Bohr Folder, Box 34, Oppenheimer Papers.
(19)Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, The New World, 1939-1946, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1962, pp.328-329; James G. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age, New York: Knopf, 1993, pp.198-199; Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed, p.118.
(20)“Agreement and Declaration of Trust,” June 13, 1944, Harrison-Bundy Files, Roll 3, Folder 49; Jonathan E.Helmreich, Gathering Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, 1943-1954, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, p.48; Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, The New World, 1939-1946, pp. 285-286.
(21)FRUS, The Conference at Quebec, 1944, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, pp.492-493.
(22)Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed, p.284; Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p.358.
(23)Bush, “Memo for Conant, September 25, 1944,” Bush-Conant File Relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1940-1945, Record 277, Roll 2, Folder 10, National Archives; James G. Hershberg, James B. Conant, p.216; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.471.
(24)Bush and Conant to Stimson, September 30, 1944, Harrison-Bundy Files, Roll 5, Folder 69.
(25)Stimson Diaries, December 31, 1944, vol.49, p.143, Yale University Library; February 15, 1945, vol.80, pp.112-113; Sean L. Malloy, Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb against Japan, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, p.85.
(26)J. W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, eds.,The Mackenzie King Record, vol.2, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, pp.326-327; Warren F. Kimball, Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War, New York: William Morrow, 1997, p.280; Barton Bernstein, “The Uneasy Alliance: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Atomic Bomb, 1940-1945,” Western Political Quarterly, vol.29, no.2(June 1976), p.228.
(27)Leslie Groves, Now It Can be Told, New York: Harper, 1962, pp.237-238; Francis Smith, “Memorandum for the Files,” April 7, 1945, Correspondence of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, Microfilm Publication M1109, Roll 2, File 7F, National Archives.
(28)Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1971, p.636.
(29)“Memo Discussed with President,” April 25, 1945, Harrison-Bundy Files, Roll 4, Folder 60; Stimson Diaries, April 25, 1945, vol.51, pp.68-69;May 14, 1945, vol.51, p.126; Michael Stoff, Jonathan Fanton and R. Hal Williams, eds., The Manhattan Project: A Documentary Introduction to the Atomic Age, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991, pp.93-96.
(30)Albert Berger, Life and Times of the Atomic Bomb, New York: Routledge, 2016, p.76; Leo Szilard, “Atomic Bomb and the Postwar Position of the United States in the World,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.3, no.12(December 1947), pp.351-353; Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists’ Movement in America, 1945-47, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971, pp.28-29.
(31)“A Report to the Secretary of War,” June 1945, Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, vol.1, no.10(May 1946), pp.2-4; Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope, pp.43-46, 371-383; Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, pp.44-47.
(32)Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p.749; Harrison, “Memorandum for the Secretary of War,” June 26, 1945, Harrison-Bundy Files, Roll 6, Folder 77.
(33)G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999, pp.215-216.
(34)Arneson, “Notes on the Basic Interim Committee Meeting,” June 21, 1945, Harrison-Bundy Files, Roll 8, Folder 100; Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, The New World, 1939-1946, pp.356-357.
(35)Arneson, “Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting,” May 31, 1945, Harrison-Bundy Files, Roll 8, Folder 100; FRUS, 1945, vol.2, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, pp.12-13; Stimson Diaries, May 31, 1945, vol.51, p.146; July 3, 1945, vol.52, p.12; Barton Bernstein, “Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945,” Political Science Quarterly, vol.90, no.1(Spring 1975), p.40.
(36)Stimson Diaries, June 6, 1945, vol.51, pp.159-160.
(37)Leo Szilard, “Reminiscences,” Perspectives in American History, vol.2, 1968, p.128; J. Samuel Walker, Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004, p.18.
(38)Arneson, “Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting,”May 31, 1945, Harrison-Bundy Files, Roll 8, Folder 100; Michael Stoff, Jonathan Fanton and R. Hal Williams, eds.,The Manhattan Project, pp.114-115.
(39)Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth, pp.148-149; Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer, New York: Knopf, 2005, p.304.
(40)Stimson Diaries, July 23, 1945, vol.52, pp.35-36; Robert Ferrell, ed.,Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, New York: Harper & Row, 1980, p.54; Robert Messer, The End of an Alliance, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982, p.105.
(41)Leon Sigal, Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, p.97; Wilson Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.202.
(42)Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, pp.160-165; Frank Settle, General George C. Marshall and the Atomic Bomb, Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2016, p.122.
(43)J. Samuel Walker, Utter Destruction, pp.64-65; Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed, p.224.
(44)Kevin Ruane, Churchill and the Bomb in War and Cold War, p.129.
(45)Sean L.Malloy, Atomic Tragedy, p.133; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, pp.638-639.
(46)Stimson Diaries, July 21, 22 and 23, 1945, vol.52, pp.31-36; Michael Stoff, Jonathan Fanton and R. Hal Williams, eds.,The Manhattan Project, pp.209-210.
(47)Harry Truman, Memoirs:Years of Decision, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955, p.416; James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947, p.263.
(48)Barton Bernstein, “The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946,” The Journal of American History, vol.60, no.4(March 1974), p.1025.
(49)John L. Gaddis et al., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.45; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, p.42.
(50)Joseph Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p.198; Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, London: Macmillan Press, 1987, p.60.
(51)Robert Messer, The End of an Alliance, pp.127-128; Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War, pp.97-98.
(52)刘玉宝、张广翔:《国外核情报与苏联原子弹的研制——基于俄罗斯解密档案文献的研究》,《历史研究》2015年第1期,第139页。
(53)Stephen Zaloga, Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race, 1945-1964, Novato: Presidio, 1993, p.27; John L. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.95-96.
(54)David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, p.20; Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds.,The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-45, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, pp.216-217.
(55)Mark Kramer, “Documenting the Early Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, pp.269-270; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, p.129; Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War, p.96.
(56)David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp.148, 149; “Stalin’s Secret Order,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Fall 1994, p.5.
(57)“Memo for the Record,” August 18, 1945, Harrison-Bundy Files, Roll 8, Folder 98; FRUS, 1945, vol.2, pp.56, 60-62.
(58)George Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967, pp.296-297.
(59)Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, pp.640-641.
(60)FRUS, 1945, vol.2, pp.40-41; Stimson Diaries, September 4, 1945, vol.52, p.90; September 5, 1945, vol.52, p.92; September 17, 1945, vol.52, p.136.
(61)Stimson, “Memorandum for the President: Proposed Action for Control of Atomic Bombs,” September 11, 1945, Stimson Papers, Roll 113; FRUS, 1945, vol.2, pp.41-44; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, pp.642-646.
(62)Bush, “Scientific Interchange on Atomic Energy,” September 25, 1945, Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), Nuclear Non-Proliferation, NP 00004.
(63)FRUS, 1945, vol.2, pp.48-50, 54-55; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, New York: W.W.Norton, 1969, pp.124-125.
(64)Walter Mills, ed.,The Forrestal Diaries, New York: Viking Press, 1951, pp.95-96; James Forrestal, “Atomic Bomb,” October 1, 1945, DNSA, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, NP 00005.
(65)“Keep Bomb Secret, Gen. Groves Urges,”The New York Times, September 22, 1945; Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth, p.133; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950, New York: Knopf, 1980, pp.111-112.
(66)James Schnabel and Robert Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947, Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996, pp.120, 128; The Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Memorandum for the President,” October 23, 1945, DNSA, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, NP 00006.
(67)Haynes Johnson and Bernard Gwertzman, Fulbright: The Dissenter, Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, pp.99-100.
(68)Shane Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010, p.36; C. P. Trussell, “Congress is Keyed to Receive Message of Truman Today,” The New York Times, September 6, 1945; Felix Belair, “Plea to Give Soviet Atom Secret Stirs Debate in Cabinet,” The New York Times, September 22, 1945; “House Group Asks Secrecy on Bomb,” The New York Times, October 2, 1945.
(69)U.S. Department of State, The International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948, p.13; Hazel G. Erskine, “The Polls: Atomic Weapons and Nuclear Energy,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, vol.27, no.2(Summer 1963), p.164.
(70)“64 Educators Ask Atom Data Sharing,”The New York Times, September 10, 1945; Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope, pp.93-95.
(71)Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994, p.52.
(72)Alice K. Smith and Charles Weiner, eds., Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980, pp.293-294; Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, pp.751-752.
(73)James Schnabel and Robert Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947, p.116; Felix Belair,“Truman Suggests Atomic Ban, U.S. Control Body,” The New York Times, October 4, 1945.
(74)John L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, p.270.
(75)FRUS, 1945, vol.2, pp.63, 69-73; David Tal, The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, 1945-1963, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008, pp.13-14.
(76)“Three-Nation Declaration on Atomic Energy,”The New York Times, November 16, 1945.
(77)FRUS, 1945, vol.2, pp.75-76, 84-85.
(78)Samuel Tower, “Big 3 Talk Asked,” The New York Times, November 12, 1945; Brooks Atkinson, “Moscow Distrust Believed Growing,” The New York Times, November 17, 1945; Brooks Atkinson,“Russian Charges Atom Imperialism,” The New York Times, November 19, 1945; “Moscow Condemns Revision of Pacts,”The New York Times, December 10, 1945; Joseph Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, pp.201-203.
(79)Scott Parrish, “A Diplomat Reports,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Spring 1992, p.21; Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War, pp.100-101.
(80)FRUS, 1945, vol.2, p.83; vol.5, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p.923; Barton Bernstein, ed.,The Atomic Bomb, pp.133-134.
(81)Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, The New World, 1939-1946, p.470.
(82)David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p.159.
(83)FRUS, 1945, vol.2, pp.93, 96-97.
(84)Tom Connally, My Name is Tom Connally, New York: Crowell, 1954, p.287; Arthur Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952, pp.227-228.
(85)FRUS, 1945, vol.2, pp.609-610; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon, p.80.
(86)FRUS, 1946, vol.1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, pp. 761-764; Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin, American Prometheus, pp.340-341.
(87)David Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, vol.2, New York: Harper and Row, 1964, p.30; Harry Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Garden City: Doubleday, 1956, pp.8-9.
(88)Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p.155; FRUS, 1946, vol.1, pp.846-851.
(89)U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, vol.1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960, pp.7-16; “Baruch’s Speech at Opening Session of U.N. Atomic Energy Commission,” The New York Times, June 15, 1946.
(90)Drew Middleton, “Baruch Atom Plan Spurned by Pravda,”The New York Times, June 25, 1946; U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, vol. 1, pp.17-24.
(91)Harry Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, p.11; Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, p.149.
(92)David Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, vol.2, p.123; Larry Gerber, “The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War,” p.76.
(93)Hazel G. Erskine, “The Polls: Atomic Weapons and Nuclear Energy,” p.168.
(94)Shane Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid, pp.61-62; FRUS, 1946, vol.1, p.739.
(95)U.S. Department of State, The International Control of Atomic Energy, p.117; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival:Choices about Bomb in the First Fifty Years, New York: Random House, 1988, pp.133-134.
(96)Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory, p.109; Michael D. Gordin, Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly, New York: Picador, 2009, p.40.
(97)FRUS, 1946, vol.6, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969, pp.696-709; Thomas Etzold and John Gaddis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, New York: Columbia University Press, 1978, pp.50-71; Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992, pp.131-138.
(98)John L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, p.335; Walter Mills, ed.,The Forrestal Diaries, p.200.
(99)Lauris D. Norstad, “Memorandum for Major General Leslie Groves,” September 15, 1945, Correspondence of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, Roll 1, Folder 3, National Archives.
(100)Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Over-All Effect of Atomic Bomb on Warfare and Military Organization,” October 30, 1945, DNSA, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, NP 00007.
(101)FRUS, 1946, vol.1, p.744.
(102)Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p.116; Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, The New World, 1939-1946, p.575; Barton Bernstein, “The Quest for Security,” p.1036.
(103)Steven Ross, American War Plans, 1945-1950, London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp.25-50; Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-1945, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, pp.213-216.
(104)Drew Middleton, “Russian Questions U.S. Faith on Atom,” The New York Times, July 4, 1946; “Soviet Has Atomic Bomb Ready to Test, Russian Scientist Implies,” The New York Times, August 13, 1946.
(105)Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy, p.13; James Chance, “Sharing the Atom Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, vol.75, no.1(January-February 1996), pp.142-144.
(106)Leslie Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p.141; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon, p.106.