限薪令与企业创新:一项准自然实验
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摘要
创新是维护中国经济可持续增长的重要手段,高管激励与企业创新之间的关系一直是学术界研究的热点话题,但由于存在内生性问题,高管薪酬与企业创新之间是否存在因果关系尚无定论。以2009年出台并实施的针对国有企业的限薪令作为外生政策冲击,选取2007年至2015年全部A股上市企业为样本,采用配对样本和双重差分回归分析的方法,实证检验与非国有企业相比,限薪令后国有企业高管货币薪酬是否降低;在此基础之上,检验高管货币薪酬与企业创新投入之间是否存在因果关系,并进一步利用主成分分析的方法测量公司治理水平,考察公司治理水平对于高管货币薪酬与企业创新投入之间关系的调节作用;最后对比国有企业与非国有企业在风险承担水平上的差异,探讨高管货币薪酬的降低可能引起的负面效应。研究结果表明,与非国有企业相比,限薪令后国有企业高管的相对货币薪酬降低,限薪令发挥了预期的作用;进一步检验发现国有企业的相对创新投入水平降低,证实了高管货币薪酬与企业创新投入之间的因果关系。此外,公司治理越差的国有企业,其创新投入降低的越多;高管货币薪酬的降低最终导致国有企业整体风险承担水平下降。使用全样本分析和倾向得分匹配法进行稳健性检验,结论依然成立。利用强制性降低高管货币薪酬这一外生事件,为高管激励与企业创新之间的因果关系提供了新的可靠证据,具有重要的学术价值。在实践意义上,高管货币薪酬的降低抑制了企业创新投入的意愿,进而导致企业整体风险承担水平下降,长此以往将损害企业长期发展能力,同时有悖于现阶段中国倡导的企业走创新发展之路,对中国现阶段正在进行的国有企业改革提供政策启示。
Innovation is an important means to maintain the sustainable development of the Chinese economy. The relation between management incentives and corporate innovation has attracted significant attention in academia. However,due to the existence of an endogenous problem,whether there is a causal relationship between executive compensation and corporate innovation or not is still inconclusive.This study employs the government-imposed executive compensation limit regulation( hereafter pay limit) for the state-owned enterprises( hereafter SOEs),issued and implemented on 2009,as an exogenous research setting. The sample consists of all Ashare listed companies from 2007 to 2015. By adopting matched samples and difference-in-difference( DID) method,this study first tests whether the executive monetary compensation of the SOEs is lower than that of the non-state-owned enterprises( hereafter NSOEs) after the Pay Limit. Then this study examines whether there is a causal relationship between executive monetary compensation and corporate innovation investment. Furthermore,using the Principal Component Analysis to measure the level of corporate governance,this study tests the moderating role of corporate governance in the relationship between executive monetary compensation and corporate innovation investment. In addition,this study explores the potential negative effects of the reduction in executive monetary compensation by comparing the differences in the level of risk-taking between SOEs and NSOEs.The result shows that the executive monetary compensation of SOEs is decreased compared with that of NSOEs after the Pay Limit. This finding indicates that the implementation of the Pay Limit has played its expected role. Further evidence reveals that the corporate innovation investment of SOEs is decreased relatively to NSOEs,proving the existence of a causal relationship between executive monetary compensation and corporate innovation. In addition,the worse the corporate governance of SOEs,the more their innovation investment is reduced. The reduction of executive monetary compensation ultimately leads to a decline in the level of risk-taking. The results still hold by using the full sample analysis and propensity score matched( PSM) approach.By taking the exogenous event of a mandatory reduction of executive monetary compensation,this study provides fresh and reliable evidence for the relationship between executive incentives and corporate innovation,which has important academic contributions. Practically,the study finds that the reduction of executive monetary compensation inhibits the willingness of enterprises to invest in innovation,which in turn leads to a decline in the overall level of firms' risk-taking. In the long run,it will not only damage firms' long-term development capability but is contrary to the vision of innovative development which is advocated by the Chinese government at the present stage. The study provides policy implications for the reform of SOEs that are currently underway in China.
Innovation is an important means to maintain the sustainable development of the Chinese economy. The relation between management incentives and corporate innovation has attracted significant attention in academia. However,due to the existence of an endogenous problem,whether there is a causal relationship between executive compensation and corporate innovation or not is still inconclusive.This study employs the government-imposed executive compensation limit regulation( hereafter pay limit) for the state-owned enterprises( hereafter SOEs),issued and implemented on 2009,as an exogenous research setting. The sample consists of all Ashare listed companies from 2007 to 2015. By adopting matched samples and difference-in-difference( DID) method,this study first tests whether the executive monetary compensation of the SOEs is lower than that of the non-state-owned enterprises( hereafter NSOEs) after the Pay Limit. Then this study examines whether there is a causal relationship between executive monetary compensation and corporate innovation investment. Furthermore,using the Principal Component Analysis to measure the level of corporate governance,this study tests the moderating role of corporate governance in the relationship between executive monetary compensation and corporate innovation investment. In addition,this study explores the potential negative effects of the reduction in executive monetary compensation by comparing the differences in the level of risk-taking between SOEs and NSOEs.The result shows that the executive monetary compensation of SOEs is decreased compared with that of NSOEs after the Pay Limit. This finding indicates that the implementation of the Pay Limit has played its expected role. Further evidence reveals that the corporate innovation investment of SOEs is decreased relatively to NSOEs,proving the existence of a causal relationship between executive monetary compensation and corporate innovation. In addition,the worse the corporate governance of SOEs,the more their innovation investment is reduced. The reduction of executive monetary compensation ultimately leads to a decline in the level of risk-taking. The results still hold by using the full sample analysis and propensity score matched( PSM) approach.By taking the exogenous event of a mandatory reduction of executive monetary compensation,this study provides fresh and reliable evidence for the relationship between executive incentives and corporate innovation,which has important academic contributions. Practically,the study finds that the reduction of executive monetary compensation inhibits the willingness of enterprises to invest in innovation,which in turn leads to a decline in the overall level of firms' risk-taking. In the long run,it will not only damage firms' long-term development capability but is contrary to the vision of innovative development which is advocated by the Chinese government at the present stage. The study provides policy implications for the reform of SOEs that are currently underway in China.
引文
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[2]李林木,郭存芝.巨额减免税是否有效促进中国高新技术产业发展.财贸经济,2014,35(5):14-26.LI Linmu,GUO Cunzhi.Do huge amounts of tax concessions effectively promote the development of hi-tech industries in China?.Finance&Trade Economics,2014,35(5):14-26.(in Chinese)
[3]杨洋,魏江,罗来军.谁在利用政府补贴进行创新?所有制和要素市场扭曲的联合调节效应.管理世界,2015(1):75-86,98.YANG Yang,WEI Jiang,LUO Laijun.Who innovates from the government subsidies?The joint moderate effects of the ownership and the factor market distortions.Management World,2015(1):75-86,98.(in Chinese)
[4]余明桂,范蕊,钟慧洁.中国产业政策与企业技术创新.中国工业经济,2016(12):5-22.YU Minggui,FAN Rui,ZHONG Huijie.Chinese industrial policy and corporate technological innovation.China Industrial Economics,2016(12):5-22.(in Chinese)
[5]HSU P H,TIAN X,XU Y.Financial development and innovation:cross-country evidence.Journal of Financial Economics,2014,112(1):116-135.
[6]CORNAGGIA J,MAO Y F,TIAN X,et al.Does banking competition affect innovation?.Journal of Financial Economics,2015,115(1):189-209.
[7]成力为,戴小勇.研发投入分布特征与研发投资强度影响因素的分析:基于我国30万个工业企业面板数据.中国软科学,2012(8):152-165.CHENG Liwei,DAI Xiaoyong.The distribution of R&D investment and influence factors of R&D intensity based on300,000 industrial enterprises'panel data in China.China Soft Science,2012(8):152-165.(in Chinese)
[8]解维敏,方红星.金融发展、融资约束与企业研发投入.金融研究,2011(5):171-183.XIE Weimin,FANG Hongxing.Financial development,financing constrains and firms'R&D investment.Journal of Financial Research,2011(5):171-183.(in Chinese)
[9]唐跃军,左晶晶.所有权性质、大股东治理与公司创新.金融研究,2014(6):177-192.TANG Yuejun,ZUO Jingjing.Ownership property,blockholders governance and corporate innovation.Journal of Financial Research,2014(6):177-192.(in Chinese)
[10]栾强,罗守贵.R&D资助、企业创新和技术进步:基于国有企业与民营企业对比的实证研究.科学学研究,2017,35(4):625-632.LUAN Qiang,LUO Shougui.R&D subsidies,innovation and technological progress:an empirical study of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises based on comparison.Studies in Science of Science,2017,35(4):625-632.(in Chinese)
[11]江轩宇.政府放权与国有企业创新:基于地方国企金字塔结构视角的研究.管理世界,2016(9):120-135.JIANG Xuanyu.Government decentralization and corporate innovation:a study of pyramidal structure in China's local SOEs.Management World,2016(9):120-135.(in Chinese)
[12]张杰,郑文平,翟福昕.竞争如何影响创新:中国情景的新检验.中国工业经济,2014(11):56-68.ZHANG Jie,ZHENG Wenping,ZHAI Fuxin.How does competition affect innovation:evidence from China.China Industrial Economics,2014(11):56-68.(in Chinese)
[13]卢馨,郑阳飞,李建明.融资约束对企业R&D投资的影响研究:来自中国高新技术上市公司的经验证据.会计研究,2013(5):51-58,96.LU Xin,ZHENG Yangfei,LI Jianming.Research on the impact of financing constraints on corporate R&D investment:evidence from the hi-tech listed companies in China.Accounting Research,2013(5):51-58,96.(in Chinese)
[14]潘越,潘健平,戴亦一.公司诉讼风险、司法地方保护主义与企业创新.经济研究,2015,50(3):131-145.PAN Yue,PAN Jianping,DAI Yiyi.Litigation risk,judicial local protectionism and innovation.Economic Research Journal,2015,50(3):131-145.(in Chinese)
[15]ALLEN M R,ADOMDZA G K,MEYER M H.Managing for innovation:managerial control and employee level outcomes.Journal of Business Research,2015,68(2):371-379.
[16]顾露露,蔡良,雷悦.家族治理、所有权变更与企业创新:基于中国家族企业的实证研究.管理科学,2017,30(2):39-53.GU Lulu,CAI Liang,LEI Yue.Family governance,alteration of ownership and firm innovation:empirical study based on Chinese family-owned firms.Journal of Management Science,2017,30(2):39-53.(in Chinese)
[17]GARCA-MECA E,SNCHEZ-BALLESTA J P.Corporate governance and earnings management:a meta-analysis.Corporate Governance:An International Review,2009,17(5):594-610.
[18]杨建君,王婷,刘林波.股权集中度与企业自主创新行为:基于行为动机视角.管理科学,2015,28(2):1-11.YANG Jianjun,WANG Ting,LIU Linbo.Ownership concentration and corporation indigenous innovation behavior:from the perspective of behavior motivation.Journal of Management Science,2015,28(2):1-11.(in Chinese)
[19]AGHION P,REENEN J V,ZINGALES L.Innovation and institutional ownership.The American Economic Review,2013,103(1):277-304.
[20]张瑞君,李小荣,许年行.货币薪酬能激励高管承担风险吗.经济理论与经济管理,2013(8):84-100.ZHANG Ruijun,LI Xiaorong,XU Nianhang.Do cash compensation encourage managers taking risk?.Economic Theory and Business Management,2013(8):84-100.(in Chinese)
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