非洲维和伙伴关系:联合国维和改革与中国的角色
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摘要
构建联合国非洲维和伙伴关系是联合国维和改革的重要方向,也是提升联合国非洲维和有效性的重要方式。联合国非洲维和伙伴关系的构建主要包括联合国维和体系内部的伙伴关系、联合国与非盟的伙伴关系、联合国与非洲新的安全范式的伙伴关系等方面。非洲维和伙伴关系的建设对安理会大国的意愿、维和决策中各相关方的协调、联合国维和的功能和角色转换以及非洲自身的安全治理能力提出了新的要求。当前构建联合国非洲维和伙伴关系,为中国更好地参与联合国维和以及非洲和平安全建设提供了重要机遇。
引文
(1)当前对维和伙伴关系的研究主要聚焦于维和行动中的伙伴关系,即partner peacekeeping,关注的对象主要是联合国、非盟、欧盟等国际组织间的维和伙伴关系。本文将维和伙伴关系界定为在维和决策、派遣和行动上各方构建的伙伴关系网络,重点是peacekeeping partnership。因此,它不仅包括维和行动中的伙伴关系,也包括维和决策、维和议程制定以及和平建设中的伙伴关系。关于维和伙伴关系的研究,可参见:Cedric De Conning,“The Emerging UN/AU Peacekeeping Partnership”,Conflict Trends,Issue 1,2010,pp.3-10;Paul D.Williams and Arthur Boutellis,“Partnership Peacekeeping:Challenges and Opportunities in the United Nations-African Union Relationship”,African Affairs,Vol.113,Issue 451,2014,pp.254-278;Marco Wyss,“France and the Economic Community of West African States:Peacekeeping Partnership in Theory and Practice”,Journal of Contemporary African Studies,Vol.35,Issue 4,2017,pp.487-505;Linnea Gelot,Legitimacy,Peace Operations and Global-Regional Security:The African Union-United Nations Partnership in Darfur,Routledge,2012;Katarina Grenfell,“Partnership in UN Peacekeeping”,International Organizations Law Review,Vol.13,Issue 1,2016,pp.55-73;Emanuele Candiotti,“‘Triangular’Relationships Between the United Nations and African Regional and SubRegional Organizations in Maintaining Peace”,International Organizations Law Review,Vol.14,Issue 2,2017,pp.321-345。
(2)Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support,A New Partnership A-genda:Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,New York,2009.
(3)Council of the European Union,Strengthening the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management:Priorities 2015-2018,Brussels,March 27,2015.
(4)Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support,A New Partnership A-genda:Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,p.2.
(1)“UN:World Facing Greatest Humanitarian Crisis Since 1945”,BBC,March 11,2017,http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39238808.
(2)Addis Getachew,“Africas Humanitarian Crisis Worsen:UN”,Anadolu Agency,August 16,2017,http://aa.com.tr/en/africa/africa-s-humanitarian-crises-worsen-un/885856.
(3)Audu Bulama Bukarti,“Embattled ISIS May Turn to Africa”,Tony Blair Institute for Global Change,October 24,2017,https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/embattled-isis-may-turn-africa.
(1)Ciara Aucoin,“Less Armed Conflict but More Political Violence in Africa”,Institute for Security Studies,April 12,2017,https://issafrica.org/iss-today/less-armed-conflict-but-more-political-violence-inafrica%20.
(2)Kyle Beardsley and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch,“Peacekeeping as Conflict Containment”,International Studies Review,Vol.17,Issue 1,2015,pp.67-89.
(3)相比之前,联合国维和在武力的使用上已经发生了很大变化,提出要“强制和平”(Peace Enforcement)、“强力维和”(Robust Peacekeeping)。联合国甚至第一次在刚果(金)派遣了联合国武力干涉行动部队(Force Intervention Brigade),并授权在中非和马里执行强力维和,然而,这只是限定在执行维和议程中的武力使用,并不是基于非洲的安全需求。有学者认为,关于武力使用的规范变化其实只是安理会常任理事国“保群行为”(group-preserving)的结果,即安理会大国协商和决议并不是为了探讨武力使用本身,而只是确保其权力合法性的方式。Lisa Morje Howard and Anjali Kaushlesh Dayal,“The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping”,International Organization,Vol.72,Issue 1,2018,pp.71-103。关于联合国维和议程的讨论,还可参见:John Karsrud,“The UN at War:Examining the Consequences of Peace-Enforcement Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the CAR,the DRC and Mali”,Third World Quarterly,Vol.36,Issue 1,2015,pp.40-54;Liaa Hultman,“UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians”,Journal of Peace Research,Vol.50,Issue 1,2013,pp.59-73。
(1)关于特朗普政府推动联合国财政改革的目的,可参见毛瑞鹏:《特朗普政府改革联合国财政制度的目标及策略分析》,《国际论坛》,2017年第6期。关于美国联合国维和的政策演变,可参见赵磊:《冷战后美国维和政策的演变及特征》,《美国研究》,2011年第4期。
(2)多国部队和观察行动(MFO)的任务是监督西奈的非军事化进程,与应对恐怖主义威胁并没有直接关系,这也从侧面反映了西方大国在非洲安全上的不同关切。Phil Stewart,“U.S.Reviewing Sinai Peacekeeper Mission,May Automate Jobs”,Reuters,April 12,2016,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sinai-peacekeepers/u-s-reviewing-sinai-peacekeeper-mission-may-automate-jobsidUSKCN0X920N.
(3)“Declaration of Support for United Nations Reform”,United States Mission to the United Nations,September 18,2017,https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7980.
(1)“Remarks by the Vice President to the UN Security Council”,The White House,September 20,2017,https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/20/remarks-vice-president-un-security-council.
(2)Steven Holland,“In First Visit,Trump Urges Reform so U.N.Can Meet Full Potential”,Reuters,September 18,2017,https://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKCN1BT1QI-OCATP.
(3)RFE/RL,“Russia,China Decline to Join Trump Declaration of Reform at UN”,Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,September 19,2017,https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-calls-un-reform-ahead-generalassembly-debate/28742491.html.
(4)有学者认为,安全利益是兵力贡献国参与维和的重要原因。一些研究指出,愿意参加国际维和行动的国家主要是与其他国家有冲突的国家,或者是自身政权面临安全威胁的国家,或者说是“自身的安全依赖其他地区的不安全”。可参见Jacob D.Kathman and Molly M.Melin,“Who Keeps the Peace?Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations”,International Studies Quarterly,Vol.61,Issue 1,2017,pp.150-162。
(5)Jair van der Lijn,Rob de Rave,Timo Smit and Rianne Siebenga,“Progress on UN Peacekeeping Reform:HIPPO and Beyond”,Clingendael Report,Netherlands Institute of International Relations,October 2017,p.8.
(1)Jennifer G.Cooke,Boris Toucas and Katrin Heger,“Understanding the G5Sahel Joint Force:Fighting Terror,Building Regional Security?”CSIS,November 15,2017,https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security.
(1)UN,“Secretary-Generals Remark at Security Council High-Level Open Debate on Peacekeeping Operations Regarding the Reform of UN Peacekeeping:Implementation and Follow Up”,The United Nations,September 20,2017,https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-09-20/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-high-level-open-debate.
(2)如在马里,法国主要通过单边行动和支持五国集团的方式执行本国的安全议程。在法国看来,MINUSMA主要是配合法国的角色。关于法国对联合国维和的复杂态度,可参见Thierry Tardy,“France:The Unlikely Return to UN Peacekeeping”,International Peacekeeping,Vol.23,Issue 5,2016,pp.610-629。
(1)Security Council Report,“In Hindsight:Better Negotiations for Clearer Mandates”,Monthly Forecast,May 2016,http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-05/in_hindsight_better_negotiations_for_clearer_mandates.php.
(2)United Nations,“The Future of United Nations Peace Operations:Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations”,Report of the Secretary-General,A/70/357-S/2015/682,September 2,2015,pp.13-14.
(3)United Nations,“Statement by the President of the Security Council”,Security Council,S/PRST/2015/26,December 31,2015.
(4)安理会“执笔人”起草决议文本主要是在大国间进行讨论和磋商,很大程度上其他国家并没有实力影响最终的决议。这一机制在确保安理会的反应效率上发挥着重要作用,但即使是安理会的报告也明确指出,由于“执笔人”所在国优先关切不同,相应的反应时间和应对举措可能与现实有偏差,甚至误导。“Penholders and Chairs”,Security Council Report,February 2,2017,http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/pen-holders-and-chairs.php.
(5)Jair van der Lijn,Rob de Rave,Timo Smit and Rianne Siebenga,“Progress on UN Peacekeeping Reform:HIPPO and Beyond”,p.9.
(1)例如,非盟领导的马里、中非维和最后移交给联合国,非盟领导的索马里维和最开始的设想也是尽快移交给联合国维和。关于非洲维和行动的类型,可参见Paul D.Williams and Arthur Boutellis,“Partnership Peacekeeping:Challenges and Opportunities in the United Nations-African Union Relationship”,pp.254-278。
(2)United Nations,“Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security”,April 19,2017,pp.2-5,https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/signed_joint_framework.pdf.
(1)这些平台包括联合国秘书长非盟特别代表与非盟委员会的定期会晤,联合国非盟事务办公室、联合国相关部门代表、非盟和平安全司、非盟政治事务司在制定和执行联合工作计划上的年度会晤,联合国、非盟、次地区组织官员在不同级别层面上的年度会晤等。United Nations,“Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security”,pp.8-9.
(1)Paul D.Williams,“UN Support to Regional Peace Operations:Lessons from UNSOA”,International Peace Institute,February 2017.
(2)具体支持可参见United Nations Support Office for AMISOM,“UNSOA Booklet”,https://unsoa.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unsoa-booklet.pdf。
(1)Gustavo de Carvalho and Lesley Connolly,“Can the AU and UN Work Together to Reform African Peace Operations?”IPI Global Observatory,September 19,2017,https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/09/african-union-united-nations-peacekeeping/.
(2)Rodrigo Campos and Aaron Ross,“U.S.Pledges up to$60 Million for Security in Sahel Region”,Reuters,October 30,2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-security-usa/u-s-pledges-up-to-60-million-for-security-in-sahel-region-idUSKBN1CZ1OX.
(1)虽然中国在国际维和中发挥了越来越重要的作用,然而中国在联合国维和事务中存在严重的话语权赤字,近年来,国内学者也在呼吁加强中国在联合国维和事务中的话语权建设。可参见何银:《联合国维和事务与中国话语权建设》,《世界经济与政治》,2016年第11期。
(1)有学者指出,向非盟领导的维和行动提供融资应成为未来联合国维和融资计划改革的一个重要方向。参见Katharina P.Coleman,“Extending UN Peacekeeping Financing Beyond UN Peacekeeping Operations?The Prospects and Challenges of Reform”,Global Governance:A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations,Vol.23,Issue 1,2017,pp.101-120。
(2)这里的维和行动指军事维和,是狭义上的维和。维和方案指更宽泛意义上的维和,即包括促和、维和与建和等各方面的和平努力。关于联合国维和的转型,可参见Ronald Hatto,“From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding:The Evolution of the Role of the United Nations in Peace Operations”,International Review of the Red Cross,Vol.95,Issue 891-892,2013,pp.495-515。
(1)有学者认为,联合国维和建和的中国方案的核心是“发展和平”,即以发展消除冲突的根源,然而,如何建立发展与安全之间的有效关联其实存在着很大空间。参见何银:《发展和平:联合国维和建和中的中国方案》,《国际政治研究》,2017年第4期。
(2)在中国参与联合国维和建和问题上,李东燕认为,中国不仅需要坚持传统的维和基本原则,发挥传统领域的优势,还应该超越以“修路筑桥建医院”为主的参与方式,尤其是加强对维和建和政治和决策方面的参与,加强“中国思路”与“西方思路”的相互促进和补充。李东燕:《中国参与联合国维和建和的前景与路径》,《外交评论》,2012年第3期。
(3)有学者认为,伙伴关系已成为联合国非洲维和的规范。联合国必须更清楚地认识联合国维和的本质和不足,明确联合国维和与非盟等地区组织的关系,从而确保维和能够真正发挥作用。Paul D.Williams,“Global and Regional Peacekeepers:Trends,Opportunities,Risks and a Way Ahead”,Global Policy,Vol.8,Issue 1,2017,pp.124-129.
(1)《王毅:探索具有中国特色、行之有效的非洲热点问题解决之道》,新华网,2015年12月6日,http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-12/06/c_128502250.htm。
(2)Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support,A New Partnership A-genda:Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,New York,2009.
(3)Council of the European Union,Strengthening the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management:Priorities 2015-2018,Brussels,March 27,2015.
(4)Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support,A New Partnership A-genda:Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,p.2.
(1)“UN:World Facing Greatest Humanitarian Crisis Since 1945”,BBC,March 11,2017,http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39238808.
(2)Addis Getachew,“Africas Humanitarian Crisis Worsen:UN”,Anadolu Agency,August 16,2017,http://aa.com.tr/en/africa/africa-s-humanitarian-crises-worsen-un/885856.
(3)Audu Bulama Bukarti,“Embattled ISIS May Turn to Africa”,Tony Blair Institute for Global Change,October 24,2017,https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/embattled-isis-may-turn-africa.
(1)Ciara Aucoin,“Less Armed Conflict but More Political Violence in Africa”,Institute for Security Studies,April 12,2017,https://issafrica.org/iss-today/less-armed-conflict-but-more-political-violence-inafrica%20.
(2)Kyle Beardsley and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch,“Peacekeeping as Conflict Containment”,International Studies Review,Vol.17,Issue 1,2015,pp.67-89.
(3)相比之前,联合国维和在武力的使用上已经发生了很大变化,提出要“强制和平”(Peace Enforcement)、“强力维和”(Robust Peacekeeping)。联合国甚至第一次在刚果(金)派遣了联合国武力干涉行动部队(Force Intervention Brigade),并授权在中非和马里执行强力维和,然而,这只是限定在执行维和议程中的武力使用,并不是基于非洲的安全需求。有学者认为,关于武力使用的规范变化其实只是安理会常任理事国“保群行为”(group-preserving)的结果,即安理会大国协商和决议并不是为了探讨武力使用本身,而只是确保其权力合法性的方式。Lisa Morje Howard and Anjali Kaushlesh Dayal,“The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping”,International Organization,Vol.72,Issue 1,2018,pp.71-103。关于联合国维和议程的讨论,还可参见:John Karsrud,“The UN at War:Examining the Consequences of Peace-Enforcement Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the CAR,the DRC and Mali”,Third World Quarterly,Vol.36,Issue 1,2015,pp.40-54;Liaa Hultman,“UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians”,Journal of Peace Research,Vol.50,Issue 1,2013,pp.59-73。
(1)关于特朗普政府推动联合国财政改革的目的,可参见毛瑞鹏:《特朗普政府改革联合国财政制度的目标及策略分析》,《国际论坛》,2017年第6期。关于美国联合国维和的政策演变,可参见赵磊:《冷战后美国维和政策的演变及特征》,《美国研究》,2011年第4期。
(2)多国部队和观察行动(MFO)的任务是监督西奈的非军事化进程,与应对恐怖主义威胁并没有直接关系,这也从侧面反映了西方大国在非洲安全上的不同关切。Phil Stewart,“U.S.Reviewing Sinai Peacekeeper Mission,May Automate Jobs”,Reuters,April 12,2016,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sinai-peacekeepers/u-s-reviewing-sinai-peacekeeper-mission-may-automate-jobsidUSKCN0X920N.
(3)“Declaration of Support for United Nations Reform”,United States Mission to the United Nations,September 18,2017,https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7980.
(1)“Remarks by the Vice President to the UN Security Council”,The White House,September 20,2017,https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/20/remarks-vice-president-un-security-council.
(2)Steven Holland,“In First Visit,Trump Urges Reform so U.N.Can Meet Full Potential”,Reuters,September 18,2017,https://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKCN1BT1QI-OCATP.
(3)RFE/RL,“Russia,China Decline to Join Trump Declaration of Reform at UN”,Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,September 19,2017,https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-calls-un-reform-ahead-generalassembly-debate/28742491.html.
(4)有学者认为,安全利益是兵力贡献国参与维和的重要原因。一些研究指出,愿意参加国际维和行动的国家主要是与其他国家有冲突的国家,或者是自身政权面临安全威胁的国家,或者说是“自身的安全依赖其他地区的不安全”。可参见Jacob D.Kathman and Molly M.Melin,“Who Keeps the Peace?Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations”,International Studies Quarterly,Vol.61,Issue 1,2017,pp.150-162。
(5)Jair van der Lijn,Rob de Rave,Timo Smit and Rianne Siebenga,“Progress on UN Peacekeeping Reform:HIPPO and Beyond”,Clingendael Report,Netherlands Institute of International Relations,October 2017,p.8.
(1)Jennifer G.Cooke,Boris Toucas and Katrin Heger,“Understanding the G5Sahel Joint Force:Fighting Terror,Building Regional Security?”CSIS,November 15,2017,https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security.
(1)UN,“Secretary-Generals Remark at Security Council High-Level Open Debate on Peacekeeping Operations Regarding the Reform of UN Peacekeeping:Implementation and Follow Up”,The United Nations,September 20,2017,https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-09-20/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-high-level-open-debate.
(2)如在马里,法国主要通过单边行动和支持五国集团的方式执行本国的安全议程。在法国看来,MINUSMA主要是配合法国的角色。关于法国对联合国维和的复杂态度,可参见Thierry Tardy,“France:The Unlikely Return to UN Peacekeeping”,International Peacekeeping,Vol.23,Issue 5,2016,pp.610-629。
(1)Security Council Report,“In Hindsight:Better Negotiations for Clearer Mandates”,Monthly Forecast,May 2016,http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-05/in_hindsight_better_negotiations_for_clearer_mandates.php.
(2)United Nations,“The Future of United Nations Peace Operations:Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations”,Report of the Secretary-General,A/70/357-S/2015/682,September 2,2015,pp.13-14.
(3)United Nations,“Statement by the President of the Security Council”,Security Council,S/PRST/2015/26,December 31,2015.
(4)安理会“执笔人”起草决议文本主要是在大国间进行讨论和磋商,很大程度上其他国家并没有实力影响最终的决议。这一机制在确保安理会的反应效率上发挥着重要作用,但即使是安理会的报告也明确指出,由于“执笔人”所在国优先关切不同,相应的反应时间和应对举措可能与现实有偏差,甚至误导。“Penholders and Chairs”,Security Council Report,February 2,2017,http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/pen-holders-and-chairs.php.
(5)Jair van der Lijn,Rob de Rave,Timo Smit and Rianne Siebenga,“Progress on UN Peacekeeping Reform:HIPPO and Beyond”,p.9.
(1)例如,非盟领导的马里、中非维和最后移交给联合国,非盟领导的索马里维和最开始的设想也是尽快移交给联合国维和。关于非洲维和行动的类型,可参见Paul D.Williams and Arthur Boutellis,“Partnership Peacekeeping:Challenges and Opportunities in the United Nations-African Union Relationship”,pp.254-278。
(2)United Nations,“Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security”,April 19,2017,pp.2-5,https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/signed_joint_framework.pdf.
(1)这些平台包括联合国秘书长非盟特别代表与非盟委员会的定期会晤,联合国非盟事务办公室、联合国相关部门代表、非盟和平安全司、非盟政治事务司在制定和执行联合工作计划上的年度会晤,联合国、非盟、次地区组织官员在不同级别层面上的年度会晤等。United Nations,“Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security”,pp.8-9.
(1)Paul D.Williams,“UN Support to Regional Peace Operations:Lessons from UNSOA”,International Peace Institute,February 2017.
(2)具体支持可参见United Nations Support Office for AMISOM,“UNSOA Booklet”,https://unsoa.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unsoa-booklet.pdf。
(1)Gustavo de Carvalho and Lesley Connolly,“Can the AU and UN Work Together to Reform African Peace Operations?”IPI Global Observatory,September 19,2017,https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/09/african-union-united-nations-peacekeeping/.
(2)Rodrigo Campos and Aaron Ross,“U.S.Pledges up to$60 Million for Security in Sahel Region”,Reuters,October 30,2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-security-usa/u-s-pledges-up-to-60-million-for-security-in-sahel-region-idUSKBN1CZ1OX.
(1)虽然中国在国际维和中发挥了越来越重要的作用,然而中国在联合国维和事务中存在严重的话语权赤字,近年来,国内学者也在呼吁加强中国在联合国维和事务中的话语权建设。可参见何银:《联合国维和事务与中国话语权建设》,《世界经济与政治》,2016年第11期。
(1)有学者指出,向非盟领导的维和行动提供融资应成为未来联合国维和融资计划改革的一个重要方向。参见Katharina P.Coleman,“Extending UN Peacekeeping Financing Beyond UN Peacekeeping Operations?The Prospects and Challenges of Reform”,Global Governance:A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations,Vol.23,Issue 1,2017,pp.101-120。
(2)这里的维和行动指军事维和,是狭义上的维和。维和方案指更宽泛意义上的维和,即包括促和、维和与建和等各方面的和平努力。关于联合国维和的转型,可参见Ronald Hatto,“From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding:The Evolution of the Role of the United Nations in Peace Operations”,International Review of the Red Cross,Vol.95,Issue 891-892,2013,pp.495-515。
(1)有学者认为,联合国维和建和的中国方案的核心是“发展和平”,即以发展消除冲突的根源,然而,如何建立发展与安全之间的有效关联其实存在着很大空间。参见何银:《发展和平:联合国维和建和中的中国方案》,《国际政治研究》,2017年第4期。
(2)在中国参与联合国维和建和问题上,李东燕认为,中国不仅需要坚持传统的维和基本原则,发挥传统领域的优势,还应该超越以“修路筑桥建医院”为主的参与方式,尤其是加强对维和建和政治和决策方面的参与,加强“中国思路”与“西方思路”的相互促进和补充。李东燕:《中国参与联合国维和建和的前景与路径》,《外交评论》,2012年第3期。
(3)有学者认为,伙伴关系已成为联合国非洲维和的规范。联合国必须更清楚地认识联合国维和的本质和不足,明确联合国维和与非盟等地区组织的关系,从而确保维和能够真正发挥作用。Paul D.Williams,“Global and Regional Peacekeepers:Trends,Opportunities,Risks and a Way Ahead”,Global Policy,Vol.8,Issue 1,2017,pp.124-129.
(1)《王毅:探索具有中国特色、行之有效的非洲热点问题解决之道》,新华网,2015年12月6日,http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-12/06/c_128502250.htm。