从“股东”中心到“企业家”中心:公司治理制度变革的全球趋势
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摘要
"同股不同权"股票的发行长期以来被认为是与"一股一票"的"同股同权"相比,不利于投资者利益保护的股权设计。然而,近二十年来,伴随着第四次工业革命浪潮的深入,越来越多的互联网相关企业选择发行AB双重股权结构股票上市。来自中国的阿里通过合伙人制度,腾讯通过"大股东背书"模式变相实现了"不平等投票权"股票的发行。公司治理制度变革由此出现从传统的股东中心向企业家中心的全球变革趋势,在股权结构设计上体现为从"同股同权"转变为"不平等投票权",在董事会制度建设上体现为从专职的内部董事为主转变为以兼职的独立董事为主,而在对外部接管角色认识上,则体现为从被视为重要的外部治理机制转变为在反并购条款中加入相关限制。本文在剖析公司治理范式从股东中心到企业家中心全球变革趋势下的理论和现实背景的基础上,从股权结构设计、董事会组织和反并购条款等三个方面梳理和总结了企业家中心公司治理范式全球变革特征,并揭示这种全球变革趋势背后所包含的经济学逻辑,为公司治理理论和实务界未来如何顺应这种全球变革趋势进行理论和实践的准备。
"Unequal voting rights"scheme for stock issuance has been considered as the ownership structure design going against the principle of investor protection compared with the "one-stock-one-vote"scheme. However,the past two decades have witnessed more and more IT enterprises have issued dual-class stocks among the fourth industrial revolution.Alibaba's partnership and Tencent's controlling shareholder endorsement model are also practically the form of unequal voting rights structure under the"one-stock-one-vote"scheme. In addition to the ownership structure shifting from ‘oneshare-one-vote'to‘unequal voting rights',the board of directors' system has changed from the full-time internal director to the part-time independent director,while the external takeover has been regarded as from external governance mechanism into the restrictions in anti-merger terms. The reform of corporate governance system has therefore evolved into the global trend of corporate governance from shareholder-centered to entrepreneur-centered paradigm. Base on the analysis of the theoretical and practical background of corporate governance paradigm from the shareholder-centered into the entrepreneurcentered,this paper summarizes the reform feature of entrepreneur-centered corporate governance paradigm on the following aspects: the ownership structure,the board of directors' system and anti-merger terms,and finally reveals the economic logic behind this global trend. This paper has both theoretical and practical implications on how to reform corporate governance structure in order to follow the global trend from shareholder-centered to entrepreneur-centered paradigm.
"Unequal voting rights"scheme for stock issuance has been considered as the ownership structure design going against the principle of investor protection compared with the "one-stock-one-vote"scheme. However,the past two decades have witnessed more and more IT enterprises have issued dual-class stocks among the fourth industrial revolution.Alibaba's partnership and Tencent's controlling shareholder endorsement model are also practically the form of unequal voting rights structure under the"one-stock-one-vote"scheme. In addition to the ownership structure shifting from ‘oneshare-one-vote'to‘unequal voting rights',the board of directors' system has changed from the full-time internal director to the part-time independent director,while the external takeover has been regarded as from external governance mechanism into the restrictions in anti-merger terms. The reform of corporate governance system has therefore evolved into the global trend of corporate governance from shareholder-centered to entrepreneur-centered paradigm. Base on the analysis of the theoretical and practical background of corporate governance paradigm from the shareholder-centered into the entrepreneurcentered,this paper summarizes the reform feature of entrepreneur-centered corporate governance paradigm on the following aspects: the ownership structure,the board of directors' system and anti-merger terms,and finally reveals the economic logic behind this global trend. This paper has both theoretical and practical implications on how to reform corporate governance structure in order to follow the global trend from shareholder-centered to entrepreneur-centered paradigm.
引文
唐雪松、申慧、杜军(2010):《独立董事监督中的动机---基于独立意见的经验证据》,《管理世界》,第9期。郑志刚、孙娟娟、Rui,O.(2012):《任人唯亲的董事会文化和经理人超额薪酬问题》,《经济研究》,第12期。
郑志刚、梁昕雯、吴新春(2014):《经理人产生来源与企业未来绩效改善》,《经济研究》,第4期。
郑志刚、李俊强、黄继承、胡波(2016a):《独立董事否定意见发表与换届未连任》,《金融研究》,第12期。
郑志刚、邹宇、崔丽(2016b):《合伙人制度与创业团队控制权安排模式选择---基于阿里巴巴的案例研究》,《中国工业经济》,第10期。
郑志刚(2016):《中国公司治理的理论与实践》,北京大学出版社。
郑志刚(2017):《从万科到阿里:分散股权时代的公司治理》,北京大学出版社。
郑志刚、梁昕雯、黄继承(2017):《中国上市公司应如何为独立董事制定薪酬激励合约》,《中国工业经济》,第2期。
郑志刚(2018):《当野蛮人遭遇内部人---中国公司治理现实困境》,北京大学出版社。
Berle,A.and G.Means(1932):The Modern Corporation and Private Property,New York:Macmillan.
Bolton,P.,J.Scheinkman and W.Xiong(2006):“Pay for Short-Term Performance:Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets”,Review of Economic Studies,73,577-610.
Coase,H.(1937):“The Nature of the Firm”,Economica,4,386-405.
Desai,M.(2017):“Capitalism the Apple Way vs.Capitalism the Google Way”,Atlantic,10.
Frieder,L.and A.Subrahmanyam(2007):“Executive Compensation and Investor Clientele”,Purdue University Working Paper.
Gordon,N.and M.Roe(2004):Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Grossman,J.and O.Hart(1986):“The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:a Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”,Journal of Political Economy,94,691-719.
Grossman,J.and O.Hart(1987):“One Share-One Vote and The Market For Corporate Control”,Journal of Financial Economics,20,175-202.
Harford,J.(2003):“Takeover Bids and Target Directors'Incentives:The Impact of a Bid on Directors'Wealth and Board Seats”,Journal of Financial Economics,69,51-83.
Harris,M.and A.Raviv(1988):“Corporate Governance:Voting Rights and Majority Rules”,Journal of Financial Economics,20,203-235.
Hart,O.and J.Moore(1990):“Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”,Journal of Political Economy,98,1119-1158.
Hart,O.(1995):“Corporate Governance-Some Theory and Implications”,Economic Journal,105,678-689.
Hirshleifer,D.and A.Thakor(1994):“Managerial Performance,Board of Directors and Takeover bidding”,Journal of Corporate Finance,1,63-90.
Jensen,M.(1993):“The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and The Failure Of Internal Control Systems”,Journal of Finance,48,831-880.
Jensen,M.and W.Meckling(1976):“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Financial Economics,3,305-360.
Lease,R.,J.Mcconnell and W.Mikkelson(1983):“The Market Value of Control in Publicly-traded Corporations”,Journal of Financial Economics,11,439-471.
Lease,R.,J.Mcconnell and W.Mikkelson(1984):“The Market value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations”,Journal of Business,57,443-467.
La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-De-Silanes,A.Shleifer,and R.Vishny,(1998):“Law and finance”,Journal of Political Economy,106,1113-1155.
La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-De-Silanesand A.Shleifer(1999):“Corporate Ownership Around the World”,Journal of Finance,54,471-517.
Nenova,T.(2004):“The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control:a Cross-country Analysis”,Journal of Financial Economics,68,325-351.
Scharfstein,D.(1988):“The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers”,Review of Economic Studies,55,185-199.
Shleifer,A.and R.Vishny(1997):“A Survey of Corporate Governance”,Journal of Finance,52,737-783.
Smith,A.(1937):The Wealth of Nations,New York:The Modern Library.
郑志刚、梁昕雯、吴新春(2014):《经理人产生来源与企业未来绩效改善》,《经济研究》,第4期。
郑志刚、李俊强、黄继承、胡波(2016a):《独立董事否定意见发表与换届未连任》,《金融研究》,第12期。
郑志刚、邹宇、崔丽(2016b):《合伙人制度与创业团队控制权安排模式选择---基于阿里巴巴的案例研究》,《中国工业经济》,第10期。
郑志刚(2016):《中国公司治理的理论与实践》,北京大学出版社。
郑志刚(2017):《从万科到阿里:分散股权时代的公司治理》,北京大学出版社。
郑志刚、梁昕雯、黄继承(2017):《中国上市公司应如何为独立董事制定薪酬激励合约》,《中国工业经济》,第2期。
郑志刚(2018):《当野蛮人遭遇内部人---中国公司治理现实困境》,北京大学出版社。
Berle,A.and G.Means(1932):The Modern Corporation and Private Property,New York:Macmillan.
Bolton,P.,J.Scheinkman and W.Xiong(2006):“Pay for Short-Term Performance:Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets”,Review of Economic Studies,73,577-610.
Coase,H.(1937):“The Nature of the Firm”,Economica,4,386-405.
Desai,M.(2017):“Capitalism the Apple Way vs.Capitalism the Google Way”,Atlantic,10.
Frieder,L.and A.Subrahmanyam(2007):“Executive Compensation and Investor Clientele”,Purdue University Working Paper.
Gordon,N.and M.Roe(2004):Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Grossman,J.and O.Hart(1986):“The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:a Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”,Journal of Political Economy,94,691-719.
Grossman,J.and O.Hart(1987):“One Share-One Vote and The Market For Corporate Control”,Journal of Financial Economics,20,175-202.
Harford,J.(2003):“Takeover Bids and Target Directors'Incentives:The Impact of a Bid on Directors'Wealth and Board Seats”,Journal of Financial Economics,69,51-83.
Harris,M.and A.Raviv(1988):“Corporate Governance:Voting Rights and Majority Rules”,Journal of Financial Economics,20,203-235.
Hart,O.and J.Moore(1990):“Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”,Journal of Political Economy,98,1119-1158.
Hart,O.(1995):“Corporate Governance-Some Theory and Implications”,Economic Journal,105,678-689.
Hirshleifer,D.and A.Thakor(1994):“Managerial Performance,Board of Directors and Takeover bidding”,Journal of Corporate Finance,1,63-90.
Jensen,M.(1993):“The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and The Failure Of Internal Control Systems”,Journal of Finance,48,831-880.
Jensen,M.and W.Meckling(1976):“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Financial Economics,3,305-360.
Lease,R.,J.Mcconnell and W.Mikkelson(1983):“The Market Value of Control in Publicly-traded Corporations”,Journal of Financial Economics,11,439-471.
Lease,R.,J.Mcconnell and W.Mikkelson(1984):“The Market value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations”,Journal of Business,57,443-467.
La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-De-Silanes,A.Shleifer,and R.Vishny,(1998):“Law and finance”,Journal of Political Economy,106,1113-1155.
La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-De-Silanesand A.Shleifer(1999):“Corporate Ownership Around the World”,Journal of Finance,54,471-517.
Nenova,T.(2004):“The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control:a Cross-country Analysis”,Journal of Financial Economics,68,325-351.
Scharfstein,D.(1988):“The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers”,Review of Economic Studies,55,185-199.
Shleifer,A.and R.Vishny(1997):“A Survey of Corporate Governance”,Journal of Finance,52,737-783.
Smith,A.(1937):The Wealth of Nations,New York:The Modern Library.