动态经济环境下CoPS合作双方违约机理及防范
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摘要
研究了经济环境动态性对复杂产品系统项目合作双方违约行为的影响机理及违约行为防范方法。创新性地使用案例研究和博弈研究两种方法,从经济环境动态性的视角,分为经济上行、经济下行两种动态性的表现,通过多案例分析得到理论模型;再使用博弈分析深入揭示机理,更进一步,应用风险共担利益共享的理念提出改进的博弈模型。研究发现:①复杂产品系统项目合作双方的违约行为主要归因于外部经济环境变化较大时,违约一方的利益受到重大影响,而当外部环境变化较小时不会发生违约行为;②当经济处于上行期且变化较大时,集成商会采取违约行为;③当经济处于下行期且变化较大时,用户会采取违约行为;④风险共担利益共享的事前控制型合约,可以有效促进双方履约,达到双方整体收益最优。
This paper studies the effect of a dynamic economic environment on default behaviors of project partners in a complex product of systems(CoPS) project and gives prevention measures to reduce the default behaviors. It uses case study and game study to settle the above problem. From the perspective of dynamic economic environment, including economic upswing and economic downturn, it obtains the theoretical framework for default by case analysis first, and then uncovers the default mechanism by game analysis, and finally, improves the game model, taking into consideration risk-sharing and benefit-sharing into consideration, to reduce the possibility of default behaviors. The results indicate that the key factor causing default behaviors of parties of the CoPS project is the great change in external economic environment which has significantly affected the interests of the defaulting party. When the change in external economic environment is not so great, there is no default behavior. The maker will conduct default behaviors when the economy is in the upswing and changes greatly. The user will conduct default behaviors when the economy is in the downturn and changes greatly. The improved game model, which takes risk-sharing and benefit-sharing into consideration, can reduce the default behaviors effectively and promote both parties to honor the contract. As the result, the whole revenue can reach maximization.
This paper studies the effect of a dynamic economic environment on default behaviors of project partners in a complex product of systems(CoPS) project and gives prevention measures to reduce the default behaviors. It uses case study and game study to settle the above problem. From the perspective of dynamic economic environment, including economic upswing and economic downturn, it obtains the theoretical framework for default by case analysis first, and then uncovers the default mechanism by game analysis, and finally, improves the game model, taking into consideration risk-sharing and benefit-sharing into consideration, to reduce the possibility of default behaviors. The results indicate that the key factor causing default behaviors of parties of the CoPS project is the great change in external economic environment which has significantly affected the interests of the defaulting party. When the change in external economic environment is not so great, there is no default behavior. The maker will conduct default behaviors when the economy is in the upswing and changes greatly. The user will conduct default behaviors when the economy is in the downturn and changes greatly. The improved game model, which takes risk-sharing and benefit-sharing into consideration, can reduce the default behaviors effectively and promote both parties to honor the contract. As the result, the whole revenue can reach maximization.
引文
[1] 工业和信息化部,国家发展与改革委员会,财政部. 高端装备制造业“十二五”发展规划[EB/OL]. http: / /www. miit. gov. cn /n11293472 /nll293832 /n11293832 /n11293907 /n11368223 /14580681. html. 2012-05-07.
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[12] 宋砚秋, 卢梓烨. 复杂产品系统项目组织敏捷性作用机制研究[J]. 管理评论, 2013, 25(9): 29-39.
[13] 寿涌毅, 宋淳江. 复杂产品系统研发项目合作伙伴选择优化[J]. 科研管理, 2014, 35(10): 144-149.
[14] 闫华锋, 仲伟俊. 基于集成解决方案的复杂产品系统创新模型研究——智能电网调度技术支持系统案例研究[J]. 研究与发展管理, 2014, 26(2): 87-97.
[15] 戴大双, 谭崇梅, 常静. 复杂产品系统合作创新博弈分析[J]. 技术经济,2013, 32(5): 6-10.
[16] 盛亚, 王节祥, 吴俊杰. 复杂产品系统创新风险生成机理研究——利益相关者权利对称性视角[J]. 研究与发展管理, 2012, 24 (3): 110-116.
[17] 盛亚, 王节祥. 利益相关者权利非对称、机会主义行为与CoPS 创新风险生成[J]. 科研管理, 2013, 34 (3): 31-40.
[18] 王智生, 胡珑瑛, 李慧颖. 复杂产品系统合作创新网络中信任修复的羊群行为模型[J]. 运筹与管理, 2012, 21(6): 119-125, 138.
[19] 宋砚秋, 李玉龙, 李桂君, 等. 复杂产品系统项目的治理结构——基于利益相关者理论的研究[J]. 技术经济, 2014, 33(6): 90-100.
[20] Xu Zhe, Li Hongbo. Assessing performance risk for complex product development: A simulation-based model[J]. Quality and Reliability Engineering International, 2013, 29: 276-275.
[21] Akgün A, Keskin H, Byrne J, et al. Complex adaptive system mechanisms, adaptive management practices, and firm product innovativeness[J]. R&D Management, 2014, 44 (1): 18-41.
[22] 石晓军, 张顺明, Hiroshi Tsuji. 嵌入期权的激励相容型软件外包付款合约设计[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2013, 33(11): 2822-2830.
[23] 伍海军, 马永开. 带违约罚金的商品房预售合同[J]. 系统管理学报, 2012, 21(2): 218-223.
[24] 代建生. 风险规避销售商促销下基于收益共享契约的协调模型[J]. 系统管理学报, 2014, 23(6): 900-908.
[25] 张宗明, 廖貅武, 刘树林. IT外包的质量风险防范契约设计与分析[J]. 系统管理学报, 2014, 23(4): 463-471.
[26] Eisenhardt M K. Building theories from case study research[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1989, 14(4): 532-550.
[27] Ozcan P, Eisenhardt M K. Origin of alliance portfolios: Entrepreneurs, network strategies, and firm performance[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2009, 52(2): 246-279.
[28] Yin R K. Case study research: Design and methods[M]. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2009.
[29] 吕力. 深度情境化与诠释:管理学的质性研究方法[J]. 科学学与科学技术管理, 2012, 33(11): 31-37.
[2] 国家自然科学基金委员会, 中国科学院. 未来10年中国学科发展战略[M]. 北京: 科学出版社, 2012.
[3] Hobday M, Brady T. Rational vs soft management in complex software: Lessons from flight simulation[J]. International Journal of Innovation Management, 1998, 2(1): 1-43.
[4] 陈占夺, 齐丽云, 牟莉莉. 价值网络视角的复杂产品系统企业竞争优势研究——一个双案例的探索性研究[J]. 管理世界, 2013(10): 156-169.
[5] Hansen K L, Rush H. Hotspots in complex product systems: Emerging issues in innovation management[J]. Technovation, 1998, 18(8/9): 555-561, 589-590.
[6] Hobday M, Rush H. Technology management in complex product systems (CoPS): Ten questions answered[J]. International Journal of Technology Management, 1999, 17(6): 618-638.
[7] 陈劲, 景劲松. 驭险创新——企业复杂产品系统创新项目风险管理[M]. 北京: 知识产权出版社, 2005.
[8] Yeo K T, Ren Y T. Risk management capability maturity model for complex product systems (CoPS) projects[J]. Systems Engineering, 2009 12(4): 275-294.
[9] Olausson D, Berggren C. Managing uncertain, complex product development in high-tech furms: In search of controlled flexibility[J]. R&D Management, 2010, 40(4): 383-400.
[10] Das T K, Rahman N. Determinants of partner opportunism in strategic alliances: A conceptual framework[J]. Journal of Business and Psychology, 2010, 25(1): 55-74.
[11] 苏敬勤, 刘静. 复杂产品系统创新的动态能力构建——基于探索性案例研究[J]. 研究与发展管理, 2014, 26(1): 128-135.
[12] 宋砚秋, 卢梓烨. 复杂产品系统项目组织敏捷性作用机制研究[J]. 管理评论, 2013, 25(9): 29-39.
[13] 寿涌毅, 宋淳江. 复杂产品系统研发项目合作伙伴选择优化[J]. 科研管理, 2014, 35(10): 144-149.
[14] 闫华锋, 仲伟俊. 基于集成解决方案的复杂产品系统创新模型研究——智能电网调度技术支持系统案例研究[J]. 研究与发展管理, 2014, 26(2): 87-97.
[15] 戴大双, 谭崇梅, 常静. 复杂产品系统合作创新博弈分析[J]. 技术经济,2013, 32(5): 6-10.
[16] 盛亚, 王节祥, 吴俊杰. 复杂产品系统创新风险生成机理研究——利益相关者权利对称性视角[J]. 研究与发展管理, 2012, 24 (3): 110-116.
[17] 盛亚, 王节祥. 利益相关者权利非对称、机会主义行为与CoPS 创新风险生成[J]. 科研管理, 2013, 34 (3): 31-40.
[18] 王智生, 胡珑瑛, 李慧颖. 复杂产品系统合作创新网络中信任修复的羊群行为模型[J]. 运筹与管理, 2012, 21(6): 119-125, 138.
[19] 宋砚秋, 李玉龙, 李桂君, 等. 复杂产品系统项目的治理结构——基于利益相关者理论的研究[J]. 技术经济, 2014, 33(6): 90-100.
[20] Xu Zhe, Li Hongbo. Assessing performance risk for complex product development: A simulation-based model[J]. Quality and Reliability Engineering International, 2013, 29: 276-275.
[21] Akgün A, Keskin H, Byrne J, et al. Complex adaptive system mechanisms, adaptive management practices, and firm product innovativeness[J]. R&D Management, 2014, 44 (1): 18-41.
[22] 石晓军, 张顺明, Hiroshi Tsuji. 嵌入期权的激励相容型软件外包付款合约设计[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2013, 33(11): 2822-2830.
[23] 伍海军, 马永开. 带违约罚金的商品房预售合同[J]. 系统管理学报, 2012, 21(2): 218-223.
[24] 代建生. 风险规避销售商促销下基于收益共享契约的协调模型[J]. 系统管理学报, 2014, 23(6): 900-908.
[25] 张宗明, 廖貅武, 刘树林. IT外包的质量风险防范契约设计与分析[J]. 系统管理学报, 2014, 23(4): 463-471.
[26] Eisenhardt M K. Building theories from case study research[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1989, 14(4): 532-550.
[27] Ozcan P, Eisenhardt M K. Origin of alliance portfolios: Entrepreneurs, network strategies, and firm performance[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2009, 52(2): 246-279.
[28] Yin R K. Case study research: Design and methods[M]. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2009.
[29] 吕力. 深度情境化与诠释:管理学的质性研究方法[J]. 科学学与科学技术管理, 2012, 33(11): 31-37.