管理幅度、专业匹配与部门间关系:对政府副职分管逻辑的解释
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摘要
分管型副职是中国政府领导体制与组织结构的关键维度之一,但是对其进行的研究却很少见。本文利用中国28个省份的副省长分工数据,实证分析副职分管部门的内在逻辑。研究显示,副省长的管理幅度平均为7个部门,平均分管3-4个不同职能。担任常委、平调而来的副省长会分管更多的部门和职能,而性别、年龄、任期、政治排序等变量的影响并不明显。副省长分管的业务领域有四分之一同其工作背景有关,而多数部门的职能同分管领导的专业背景关系不大。综合性业务多放在一起由一位副省长分管,而专业性较强的职能通常由不同副省长分别主管。这些发现为我们理解副职领导的分管逻辑提供了初步证据,也对政府结构优化提出了政策启示。本文最后从管理幅度、专业匹配和部门间关系的理论视角,提出了副职领导分管方面值得研究的若干问题。
The steering deputy chief system is one key component of the government organization in China,but few studies pay attention to this phenomenon.An empirical analysis of 201 vice governors of 28 provinces reveals the logic of steering leaders.We find that on average a vice governor is in charge of seven agencies and three to four varying functions.Vice governors who are members of the standing committee and transferred from other provinces are more likely to control more agencies and functions,while their gender,age,tenure in office,and rank order are insignificant.Vice governors are usually coordinating functions irrelevant to their professional background,and nonprofessional functions are often coordinated by the same vice governors.These findings generate tentative evidence to understand the mechanisms of steering leadership,and also help restructure the government.In this paper,we draw on the theoretical perspectives of span of control,expertise matching,and interagency network to elicit the core questions concerning steering leaders.
The steering deputy chief system is one key component of the government organization in China,but few studies pay attention to this phenomenon.An empirical analysis of 201 vice governors of 28 provinces reveals the logic of steering leaders.We find that on average a vice governor is in charge of seven agencies and three to four varying functions.Vice governors who are members of the standing committee and transferred from other provinces are more likely to control more agencies and functions,while their gender,age,tenure in office,and rank order are insignificant.Vice governors are usually coordinating functions irrelevant to their professional background,and nonprofessional functions are often coordinated by the same vice governors.These findings generate tentative evidence to understand the mechanisms of steering leadership,and also help restructure the government.In this paper,we draw on the theoretical perspectives of span of control,expertise matching,and interagency network to elicit the core questions concerning steering leaders.
引文
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[2]张康之.新时代机构改革的新探索[J].公共管理与政策评论,2018(5).
[3]Ma L,Christensen T.Mapping the Evolution of the Central Government Apparatus in China.International Review of Administrative Sciences,2018.
[4]Chan HS,Gao J.The Politics of Personnel Redundancy:The Non-leading Cadre System in the Chinese Bureaucracy.The China Quarterly,2018(235).
[5][24]胡涵,杨锋,赵力.250个地级市近九成配副市长6-8名[N].新京报,2013-11-25.
[6]马亮.公共管理改革和公共服务绩效:来自中国大部制改革的实证研究[J].公共管理与政策评论,2014(2).
[7][17][18]Meier KJ,Bohte J.Span of Control and Public Organizations:Implementing Luther Gulick’s Research Design.Public Administration Review,2003,63(1).
[8][28]杨光斌.当代中国政治制度导论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2015.
[9]朱光磊,李利平.从“分管”到“辅佐”:中国副职问题研究[J].政治学研究,2007(3).
[10]张艺,杨志军,何学勤.大部制改革:实现从“分管型”副职向“辅佐型”副职转变[J].云南行政学院学报,2009(3).
[11]曾明.基层副职官员的晋升激励:官员晋升的激励相容[J].南昌大学学报(人文社会科学版),2012(3).
[12]王卫.论地方政府领导副职配置的科学化--基于全国286个地级市的实证分析[J].广东行政学院学报,2015(3).
[13]马骏,侯一麟.中国省级预算中的非正式制度:一个交易费用理论框架[J].经济研究,2004(10).
[14]Gulick LH.Notes on the Theory of Organization.In:Gulick LH,Urwick LF.Papers on the Science of Administration.New York:Institute of Public Administration,1937.pp1-46.
[15][美]赫伯特·西蒙.管理行为[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2014.
[16][美]德怀特·沃尔多.行政国家:美国公共行政的政治理论研究[M].北京:中央编译出版社,2017.
[19]Meier KJ,Bohte J.Ode to Luther Gulick:Span of Control and Organizational Performance.Administration&Society,2000(2).
[20]左才.社会绩效、一票否决与官员晋升[J].公共管理与政策评论,2017(3).
[21]Goodall AH.Socrates in the Boardroom:Why Research Universities Should be Led by Top Scholars.Princeton:Princeton University Press,2009.
[22]Ma L,Christensen T.Same Bed,Different Dreams?Structural Factors and Leadership Characteristics of Central Government Agency Reform in China.International Public Management Journal,2018.
[23]Rolland VW,Roness PG.Mapping Organizational Units in the State:Challenges and Classifications.International Journal of Public Administration,2010,33(10).
[25]Ma L.Does Super-Department Reform Improve Public Service Performance in China?.Public Manage ment Review,2016,18(3).
[26]马亮.官员晋升激励与政府绩效目标设置--中国省级面板数据的实证研究[J].公共管理学报,2013(2).
[27]Borgatti SP,Everett MG,Freeman LC.Ucinet for Windows:Software for Social Network Analysis.Harvard,MA:Analytic Technologies,Inc.,2002.
[29]傅高义.邓小平时代[M].北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,2013.
[30]Zhu J,Zhang D.Does Corruption Hinder Private Businesses?Leadership Stability and Predictable Corruption in China.Governance,2017,30(3).
[31]Gao N,Long CX,Xu LC.Collective Leadership,Career Concern,and the Housing Market in China:The Role of Standing Committees.Review of Development Economics,2016,20(1).
[32]Ma L.Central Government Agencies in China:Toward A Research Agenda.Economic and Political Studies,2017,5(2).
[33]Wong SH-W,Zeng Y.Getting Ahead by Getting On the Right Track:Horizontal Mobility in China’s Political Selection Process.Journal of Contemporary China,2018,27(109).