心智成本、有限理性与中国封建王朝周期性兴衰——基于新制度经济学视角的分析
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摘要
导致中国封建王朝周期性兴衰的原因是多方面的,而统治者偏好与有限理性无疑是其中最重要的原因之一。心智成本的高低对封建最高统治者的偏好与理性有着重要的影响。皇帝作为中国封建王朝的最高统治者,其所作所为对王朝的兴衰有着决定性的作用,从中国封建王朝两千多年的历史来看,可以将封建君主分为两种类型:有限历史理性的君主和异化的君主。通过构建并分析包含有心智成本的"成本—收益"模型来看,有限历史理性的君主在收益较大化原则下行动,不顾及心智成本高低,愿意付出更多的工作以延续王朝的统治,为王朝基业殚精竭虑;异化的君主则在成本较小化原则下行动,尽可能地节约心智成本,偏好于个人的享乐、追求眼前的短期利益,往往导致王朝的动荡与衰落。影响封建君主心智成本的因素,既包括政治制度等正式制度,也包括文化传统等非正式制度。由于路径依赖、制度的自我执行等影响,随着王朝存续时间的延长,心智成本将不断深化最高统治者的有限理性与集权偏好,它们的相互作用使封建王朝一步步走向动荡与衰亡。
The causes for the cyclical rise and fall of the feudal dynasty in China are multifaceted, and the preference and limited rationality of the ruler is undoubtedly one of the most important ones.The level of mental cost has an important influence on the ruler's preference and rationality.The emperor, as the supreme ruler of the Chinese feudal dynasty, plays a decisive role in the rise and fall of the dynasty. From the history of the Chinese feudal dynasty for two thousand years, the feudal monarchy can be divided into two types: limited historical rational monarch and alienated monarch.By constructing and analyzing the "cost-benefit" model, which contains mental cost, the limited rational monarch acts under the principle of greater benefit, regardless of the mental cost, and would like to pay more work to continue the reign of the dynasty;the alienated monarch acts under the principle of smaller cost,saves the mental cost as much as possible,and prefers to personal pleasure and short-term interests,which often lead to turbulence and decline.The factors that affect the mental cost of feudal monarchy include both the formal institutions such as the political institution and the informal institutions such as the cultural traditions.With the prolongation of the dynasty,the mental cost will continue to deepen the limited rationality and centralization of the supreme ruler under the influence of path-dependence and the self-execution of the institution,and their interaction leads the feudal dynasty to turbulence and decline.
The causes for the cyclical rise and fall of the feudal dynasty in China are multifaceted, and the preference and limited rationality of the ruler is undoubtedly one of the most important ones.The level of mental cost has an important influence on the ruler's preference and rationality.The emperor, as the supreme ruler of the Chinese feudal dynasty, plays a decisive role in the rise and fall of the dynasty. From the history of the Chinese feudal dynasty for two thousand years, the feudal monarchy can be divided into two types: limited historical rational monarch and alienated monarch.By constructing and analyzing the "cost-benefit" model, which contains mental cost, the limited rational monarch acts under the principle of greater benefit, regardless of the mental cost, and would like to pay more work to continue the reign of the dynasty;the alienated monarch acts under the principle of smaller cost,saves the mental cost as much as possible,and prefers to personal pleasure and short-term interests,which often lead to turbulence and decline.The factors that affect the mental cost of feudal monarchy include both the formal institutions such as the political institution and the informal institutions such as the cultural traditions.With the prolongation of the dynasty,the mental cost will continue to deepen the limited rationality and centralization of the supreme ruler under the influence of path-dependence and the self-execution of the institution,and their interaction leads the feudal dynasty to turbulence and decline.
引文
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[19]邢义田.天下一家:皇帝、官僚与社会[M].北京:中华书局,2011.
[20]司马光.资治通鉴[M].长沙:岳麓书社,1990.
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[22]阿弗纳·格雷夫.自我执行的制度:比较历史制度分析[J].经济社会体制比较,2008,(2).
(1)本文在充分借鉴刘伟博士“理性的昏君”模型基础上,通过将心智成本细化为心理成本、思维成本并将之作为变量纳入新构建的模型中,以更贴近历史真实来分析个人偏好、有限理性对统治者行为的影响。(刘伟.中国专制王朝衰亡的经济学分析[M].上海:复旦大学博士学位论文,2003年,第22、43、82页)
(2)参见《史记》卷87《李斯列传》。
(3)参见《管子》卷十七。
(4)参见《荀子·强国》。
(5)参见《后汉书》卷8《孝灵帝纪》。
(6)参见《后汉书》卷78《宦者吕强传》。
(7)参见《汉书》卷52《田蚡传》。
(8)参见《汉书》卷82《史丹传》。
(9)参见《史记·秦始皇本纪》。
[2]邢义田.天下一家:皇帝、官僚与社会[M].北京:中华书局,2011.
[3]道格拉斯·C.诺思.经济史上的结构与变迁[M].厉以平译.北京:商务印书馆,1999.
[4]道格拉斯·C.诺思.理解经济变迁过程[M].钟正生等译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2008.
[5]邓宏图.理性、偏好、意识形态与社会演化[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2008.
[6]卿志琼.有限理性、心智成本与经济秩序[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2006.
[7]杨德才,赵文静.利益集团、制度僵化与王朝兴衰[M].江苏社会科学,2016,(4).
[8]刘伟.国专制王朝衰亡的经济学分析[M].上海:复旦大学博士学位论文,2003.
[9]卿志琼.有限理性、心智成本与经济秩序[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2006.
[10]道格拉斯·C.诺思.经济史上的结构与变迁[M].厉以平译.北京:商务印书馆,1999.
[11]韩非子·主道[A].韩非子集释[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1974.
[12]王毅.中国皇权制度研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2007.
[13]孟森.明清史讲义:上册[M].北京:中华书局,1981.
[14]杨文霞.古代儒家德治论[M].北京:中共中央党校博士学位论文,2006.
[15]班固.白虎通德论:卷一[M].上海:上海古籍出版社,1990.
[16]董仲舒.春秋繁露[M].北京:中华书局,1975.
[17]商君书·修权.商君书注释[M].北京:中华书局,1974.
[18]北京大学哲学系外国哲学史教研室编译.十八世纪法国哲学[M].北京:商务印书馆,1979.
[19]邢义田.天下一家:皇帝、官僚与社会[M].北京:中华书局,2011.
[20]司马光.资治通鉴[M].长沙:岳麓书社,1990.
[21]Paul.A.David(1985),Clio and the Economics of QWERTY[J].American Economic Review,75(2),May.
[22]阿弗纳·格雷夫.自我执行的制度:比较历史制度分析[J].经济社会体制比较,2008,(2).
(1)本文在充分借鉴刘伟博士“理性的昏君”模型基础上,通过将心智成本细化为心理成本、思维成本并将之作为变量纳入新构建的模型中,以更贴近历史真实来分析个人偏好、有限理性对统治者行为的影响。(刘伟.中国专制王朝衰亡的经济学分析[M].上海:复旦大学博士学位论文,2003年,第22、43、82页)
(2)参见《史记》卷87《李斯列传》。
(3)参见《管子》卷十七。
(4)参见《荀子·强国》。
(5)参见《后汉书》卷8《孝灵帝纪》。
(6)参见《后汉书》卷78《宦者吕强传》。
(7)参见《汉书》卷52《田蚡传》。
(8)参见《汉书》卷82《史丹传》。
(9)参见《史记·秦始皇本纪》。