县级监察委治理基层“微腐败”:实践价值、现实问题与应对策略
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摘要
基层"微腐败"是一种重要的腐败类型,健全县级监察委治理基层"微腐败"的体制机制对提升基层民众在腐败治理中的获得感和培育清正廉洁的基层政治生态具有重要价值。目前县级监察委在治理基层"微腐败"时通常存在着"微腐败"案件多发易发与基层监察力量"三个不增加"之间的矛盾比较突出、监察人员容易受到基层人情关系的干扰和基层公职人员与黑恶势力相互勾结增加"微腐败"治理的难度等现实问题。鉴于此,县级监察委在健全治理基层"微腐败"的体制机制时需要从以下三个方面入手:通过加强监察人员培训与内设机构整合提升县级监察委的腐败治理效能,综合运用异地交叉巡察和报请提级管辖等手段排除基层人情因素的干扰,将基层"微腐败"治理与扫黑除恶专项治理结合起来。
Grassroots"micro-corruption"is an important type of corruption.It is of great value for county-level supervisory committees to perfect the governance mechanism for controlling grassroots "micro-corruption",to enhance grassroots people's sense of gains,and to foster a clean and honest grassroots political ecology.At present,county-level supervisory committees usually have the following problems when they conduct grassroots"micro-corruption"governance:the contradiction between the frequent occurrences of"micro-corruption"cases at the grassroots levels and the "three non-increase"of the supervisory force at county-level supervisory committees,the easy interference of personal Guanxi,and the increase of difficulties in"micro-corruption"governance as a result of collusion between grassroots officials and evil forces.In view of this,county-level supervisory committees need to start from the following three aspects when perfecting the governance mechanism for control of grassroots"micro-corruption":enhancing corruption governance efficiency of county supervision committees bystrengthening the inspectors training and the integration of internal organizations;taking comprehensive measures such as cross-examination and level-up jurisdiction to eliminate interference from basic human factors;combining "micro-corruption"governance at the grassroots levels with the special efforts of cracking down on evil forces.
Grassroots"micro-corruption"is an important type of corruption.It is of great value for county-level supervisory committees to perfect the governance mechanism for controlling grassroots "micro-corruption",to enhance grassroots people's sense of gains,and to foster a clean and honest grassroots political ecology.At present,county-level supervisory committees usually have the following problems when they conduct grassroots"micro-corruption"governance:the contradiction between the frequent occurrences of"micro-corruption"cases at the grassroots levels and the "three non-increase"of the supervisory force at county-level supervisory committees,the easy interference of personal Guanxi,and the increase of difficulties in"micro-corruption"governance as a result of collusion between grassroots officials and evil forces.In view of this,county-level supervisory committees need to start from the following three aspects when perfecting the governance mechanism for control of grassroots"micro-corruption":enhancing corruption governance efficiency of county supervision committees bystrengthening the inspectors training and the integration of internal organizations;taking comprehensive measures such as cross-examination and level-up jurisdiction to eliminate interference from basic human factors;combining "micro-corruption"governance at the grassroots levels with the special efforts of cracking down on evil forces.
引文
[1]习近平.坚定不移推进党风廉政建设和反腐败斗争[M]∥习近平谈治国理政(第2卷).北京:外文出版社,2017.
[2]决胜全面建成小康社会,夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利[N].人民日报,2017-10-19(4).
[3]赵乐际.以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导,坚定不移落实党的十九大全面从严治党战略部署[J].中国纪检监察,2018(2):6-13.
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[5] The World Bank.Helping Countries Combat Corruption:The Role of World Bank[M].Washington,D.C.:The World Bank,1997.
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[9]杰瑞米·波普.制约腐败:建构国家廉政体系[M].清华大学公共管理学院廉政研究室,译.北京:中国方正出版社,2003.
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[12]杜治洲.改善基层政治生态必须治理“微腐败”[J].中国党政干部论坛,2016(11):37-38.
[13]马怀德.国家监察体制改革的重要意义和主要任务[J].国家行政学院学报,2016(6):15-21.
[14]吕永祥,王立峰.县级监察委员会的公权力监督存在的现实问题与优化路径[J].河南社会科学,2018(7):14-22.
[15]金太军,张劲松,沈承诚.政治文明建设与权力监督机制研究[M].北京:人民出版社,2010:590.
[16]国家监察体制改革试点取得实效[N].人民日报,2017-11-06(1).
[17]张维.扶贫办与中纪委建立线索移送机制[N].法制日报,2017-07-11(6).
[18] Quah J S T.Anti-corruption Agencies in Four Asian Countries:A Comparative Analysis[J].Research in Public Policy Analysis&Management,2007,8(2):85-109.
[19] Quah J S T.Benchmarking for Excellence:A Comparative Analysis of Seven Asian Anti-corruption Agencies[J].Asian Journal of Public Administration,2009,31(2):171-195.
[20]彭训文.四大亮点引领国家反腐败立法(发布与解读)[N].人民日报(海外版),2018-03-26(5).
[21] Yang M M.Gifts,Favors,and Banquets:The Art of Social Relationships in China[M].Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1994.
[22] Zhan J V.Filling the Gap of Formal Institutions:The Effects of Guanxi Network on Corruption in Reform-era China[J].Crime Law&Social Change,2012,58(2):93-109.
[23]关于基层“微腐败”治理的调研[N].中国纪检监察报,2018-05-17(7).
[24]李支国,温钦仁.“异地交叉”巡察化解“场外”干扰[N].株洲日报,2017-08-08(3).
[25]罗伯特·克利特加德.控制腐败[M].杨光斌,译.北京:中央编译出版社,1998:94.
[26]李玉长,王娜,仝连茂.打掉黑恶势力“保护伞”[N].中国纪检监察报,2017-11-25(2).
[27]秦前红.地方人大监督权[M].北京:法律出版社,2013:1.
[28] de Sousa L. Anti-corruption Agencies:Between Empowerment and Irrelevances[J].Crime,Law and Social Change,2010,53(1):5-22.
[29]马勇.破解纪检体制改革基层之困[J].瞭望,2014(36):44-45.
[30]何增科.反腐新路:转型期中国腐败问题研究[M].北京:中央编译出版社,2002:309.
[31]周银山.破解“巡不深、察不透”难题——各地探索开展市县交叉巡察见闻[N].中国纪检监察报,2018-05-11(1).
[32]仝连茂,叶楠.衡水:交叉联动深化市县巡察[N].中国纪检监察报,2016-10-26(3).
[33]毛海峰.陕西宝鸡:基层监察体制改革面临三大难题[J].瞭望,2018(7):56.
(1)本文所说的县级监察委是对各县、自治县、县级市、市辖区、旗、自治旗等县一级国家监察机关的统称。
(1)以北京市为例,据统计,北京市纪委市监委机关共设29个内设机构,比改革前涉改单位机构编制总数减少4个,16个区纪委监委机关内设机构数在14到17个之间,共减少5个。参见:改革“一号工程”精准施工记——北京市坚持首善标准构建党统一指挥全面覆盖权威高效的监督体系[N].北京日报2017年11月13日第5版。
(1)以杭州市桐庐县为例,据桐庐县纪委书记、监察委主任张启成介绍说,针对桐庐县纪检监察机关存在的“熟人之间监督难”等问题,该县从2016年开始探索交叉巡察,从14个乡镇抽调纪检和其他职能科室骨干人员组建巡察组,由乡镇纪委书记任组长,县委巡察领导小组统一调度,按照异地交叉原则开展巡察。实行交叉巡察之后,“力量分散、单兵作战”转变为“联合行动、协同作战”,巡察监督效能实现新突破,发现问题线索的能力大大提升。参见:周银山.破解“巡不深、察不透”难题——各地探索开展市县交叉巡察见闻[N].中国纪检监察报2018年5月11日第1版。
[2]决胜全面建成小康社会,夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利[N].人民日报,2017-10-19(4).
[3]赵乐际.以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导,坚定不移落实党的十九大全面从严治党战略部署[J].中国纪检监察,2018(2):6-13.
[4] Heidenheimer A J.Political Corruption:Readings in Comparative Analysis[M].New York:Holt,Rinehart&Winston,1970.
[5] The World Bank.Helping Countries Combat Corruption:The Role of World Bank[M].Washington,D.C.:The World Bank,1997.
[6]塞谬尔·亨廷顿.变化社会中的政治秩序[M].王冠华,译.上海:上海三联书店,1998:54.
[7] Nye J S.Corruption and Political Development:A Costbenefit Analysis[J].American Political Science Review,1967,61(2):417-427.
[8]苏珊·罗斯·艾克曼.腐败与政府[M].王江,程文浩,译.北京:新华出版社,2000:298.
[9]杰瑞米·波普.制约腐败:建构国家廉政体系[M].清华大学公共管理学院廉政研究室,译.北京:中国方正出版社,2003.
[10]王沪宁.腐败与反腐败:当代国外腐败问题研究[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1990:1.
[11]王浦劬.“‘人民性’思维”:新时代政治发展的逻辑主线[N].光明日报,2018-05-18(11).
[12]杜治洲.改善基层政治生态必须治理“微腐败”[J].中国党政干部论坛,2016(11):37-38.
[13]马怀德.国家监察体制改革的重要意义和主要任务[J].国家行政学院学报,2016(6):15-21.
[14]吕永祥,王立峰.县级监察委员会的公权力监督存在的现实问题与优化路径[J].河南社会科学,2018(7):14-22.
[15]金太军,张劲松,沈承诚.政治文明建设与权力监督机制研究[M].北京:人民出版社,2010:590.
[16]国家监察体制改革试点取得实效[N].人民日报,2017-11-06(1).
[17]张维.扶贫办与中纪委建立线索移送机制[N].法制日报,2017-07-11(6).
[18] Quah J S T.Anti-corruption Agencies in Four Asian Countries:A Comparative Analysis[J].Research in Public Policy Analysis&Management,2007,8(2):85-109.
[19] Quah J S T.Benchmarking for Excellence:A Comparative Analysis of Seven Asian Anti-corruption Agencies[J].Asian Journal of Public Administration,2009,31(2):171-195.
[20]彭训文.四大亮点引领国家反腐败立法(发布与解读)[N].人民日报(海外版),2018-03-26(5).
[21] Yang M M.Gifts,Favors,and Banquets:The Art of Social Relationships in China[M].Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1994.
[22] Zhan J V.Filling the Gap of Formal Institutions:The Effects of Guanxi Network on Corruption in Reform-era China[J].Crime Law&Social Change,2012,58(2):93-109.
[23]关于基层“微腐败”治理的调研[N].中国纪检监察报,2018-05-17(7).
[24]李支国,温钦仁.“异地交叉”巡察化解“场外”干扰[N].株洲日报,2017-08-08(3).
[25]罗伯特·克利特加德.控制腐败[M].杨光斌,译.北京:中央编译出版社,1998:94.
[26]李玉长,王娜,仝连茂.打掉黑恶势力“保护伞”[N].中国纪检监察报,2017-11-25(2).
[27]秦前红.地方人大监督权[M].北京:法律出版社,2013:1.
[28] de Sousa L. Anti-corruption Agencies:Between Empowerment and Irrelevances[J].Crime,Law and Social Change,2010,53(1):5-22.
[29]马勇.破解纪检体制改革基层之困[J].瞭望,2014(36):44-45.
[30]何增科.反腐新路:转型期中国腐败问题研究[M].北京:中央编译出版社,2002:309.
[31]周银山.破解“巡不深、察不透”难题——各地探索开展市县交叉巡察见闻[N].中国纪检监察报,2018-05-11(1).
[32]仝连茂,叶楠.衡水:交叉联动深化市县巡察[N].中国纪检监察报,2016-10-26(3).
[33]毛海峰.陕西宝鸡:基层监察体制改革面临三大难题[J].瞭望,2018(7):56.
(1)本文所说的县级监察委是对各县、自治县、县级市、市辖区、旗、自治旗等县一级国家监察机关的统称。
(1)以北京市为例,据统计,北京市纪委市监委机关共设29个内设机构,比改革前涉改单位机构编制总数减少4个,16个区纪委监委机关内设机构数在14到17个之间,共减少5个。参见:改革“一号工程”精准施工记——北京市坚持首善标准构建党统一指挥全面覆盖权威高效的监督体系[N].北京日报2017年11月13日第5版。
(1)以杭州市桐庐县为例,据桐庐县纪委书记、监察委主任张启成介绍说,针对桐庐县纪检监察机关存在的“熟人之间监督难”等问题,该县从2016年开始探索交叉巡察,从14个乡镇抽调纪检和其他职能科室骨干人员组建巡察组,由乡镇纪委书记任组长,县委巡察领导小组统一调度,按照异地交叉原则开展巡察。实行交叉巡察之后,“力量分散、单兵作战”转变为“联合行动、协同作战”,巡察监督效能实现新突破,发现问题线索的能力大大提升。参见:周银山.破解“巡不深、察不透”难题——各地探索开展市县交叉巡察见闻[N].中国纪检监察报2018年5月11日第1版。