中俄与“自由国际秩序”之兴衰
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摘要
西方近年来关于所谓"自由国际秩序"(liberal international order)是否已"终结"的辩论,无论在理论和政策层面都存在着相当的盲点和误区。将中俄两国定义为该秩序的"修正主义"大国不仅是匪夷所思,而且忽视了一个重要的历史事实,即这一秩序的早期阶段与冷战的两极体系是一个共生(symbiotic)建构,它不仅在国际层面制约了美国力量的滥用,而且在相当程度上改进或克服了美国国内制度的弊端(种族隔离等)。在冷战后期,美国主导的"自由国际秩序"对两个共产主义大国也起到一定的示范作用。冷战以后,中俄对"自由国际秩序"在不同的政策领域采取了不同的对接方式,也导致了不同的结果:中国的长期稳定崛起,以及俄罗斯与西方日益走向对抗。然而成也萧何,败也萧何,对所谓"自由国际秩序"损害最大的,恰恰是处于巅峰状态、对外扩张无度的西方本身。对中俄来说,"自由国际秩序"的困境,需要国际社会集体努力来修复。在没有全球性危机的情况下,如果把"婴儿"(自由国际秩序)和"洗澡水"一起倒掉,那么无人会从中获益。而这恰恰是我行我素的特朗普政府的政策走向。
Recent Western discourse regarding the "end" of the so-called "Liberal International Order"(LIO) has led to considerable confusion in both theoretical and policy domains. Much of the discourse also blames China and Russia for the alleged demise of the LIO. This paper, however, provides a different perspective. An overview of the early phase of the LIO depicts a symbiotic relationship of the LIO with the Cold War system of bipolarity. Such a systemic construct not only constrained U.S. power and forced the U.S. to confront its domestic problems(such as racism), but also shaped the partial LIO into a more cohesive and even attractive model for the two large Communist powers, China and Russia, though in different degrees and for different purposes. In the post-Cold War decades, both China and Russia have engaged the LIO, leading to quite different outcomes: China's protracted and steady rise and Russia's increasingly confrontational relations with the West. Nevertheless, the West's relentless intrusion into the non-West during the "unipolar moment"(the post-Cold War) has led to endless wars, many failed states, growing terrorism and refugees in many parts of the world, and ultimately to blowbacks against the West itself in the format of massive anti-establishment populism. For China and Russia, the LIO malaise requires a collective effort from the international community in order to repair, revise and revitalize the imperfect system. Short of a global crisis, no one benefits from dumping the "baby"(LIO) with the dirty "bath water." This, however, is exactly what the Trump administration has been doing, as it is accelerating the U.S. de-link from various international treaties and agreements.
Recent Western discourse regarding the "end" of the so-called "Liberal International Order"(LIO) has led to considerable confusion in both theoretical and policy domains. Much of the discourse also blames China and Russia for the alleged demise of the LIO. This paper, however, provides a different perspective. An overview of the early phase of the LIO depicts a symbiotic relationship of the LIO with the Cold War system of bipolarity. Such a systemic construct not only constrained U.S. power and forced the U.S. to confront its domestic problems(such as racism), but also shaped the partial LIO into a more cohesive and even attractive model for the two large Communist powers, China and Russia, though in different degrees and for different purposes. In the post-Cold War decades, both China and Russia have engaged the LIO, leading to quite different outcomes: China's protracted and steady rise and Russia's increasingly confrontational relations with the West. Nevertheless, the West's relentless intrusion into the non-West during the "unipolar moment"(the post-Cold War) has led to endless wars, many failed states, growing terrorism and refugees in many parts of the world, and ultimately to blowbacks against the West itself in the format of massive anti-establishment populism. For China and Russia, the LIO malaise requires a collective effort from the international community in order to repair, revise and revitalize the imperfect system. Short of a global crisis, no one benefits from dumping the "baby"(LIO) with the dirty "bath water." This, however, is exactly what the Trump administration has been doing, as it is accelerating the U.S. de-link from various international treaties and agreements.
引文
(1)这种观点可参见尼尔·弗格森(Niall Ferguson)和法里德·扎卡利亚(Fareed Zakaria)等学者在辩论节目中所讲的观点,Niall Ferguson and Fareed Zakaria,“The Future of Geopolitics:Be it resolved,the liberal international order is over…”,April 28,2017,The Munk Debates,http://munkdebates.com/
(2)1.0版本的乐观主义终结论叙事是弗朗西斯·福山(Francis Fukuyama)在《历史的终结》一文中所提出的,参见Francis Fukuyama,“The End of History?”,The National Interest,No.16,Summer 1989.
(3)弗格森坚持认为中国是全球自由主义秩序的赢家,别的国家是输家,参见弗格森与扎卡利亚的辩论。也可参见Robert Kagan,“Backing into World War III”,Foreign Policy,February 6,2017,http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-chin a-trump-obama/?utm_content=bufferd07ea&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer
(4)White House,National Security Strategy of the United States of America,Washington,D.C.,2017,25,https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
(5)奥巴马执政时期,对于两国的警惕性就已明显提升。奥巴马公开将俄罗斯与埃博拉病毒、伊斯兰国并列为世界的三大威胁。参见Jennifer Newton,“There’s a sense the world is spinning so fast and nobody is able to control it admits Obama,amid ISIS,Ebola and Ukraine crises”,Daily Mail,October 8,2014,http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2784702/AsEbola-ISIS-Russia-President-Obama-night-admits-There-s-sense-world-spinning-fast-able-con trol.html#ixzz59C3qQPFD
(1)直到2014年,西方世界对于“自由国际秩序”的乐观态度还是公共舆论空间的主流立场。John Ikenberry,“The Illusion of Geopolitics”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.93,No.3,May/June2014,pp.80-86,87-90.
(2)对于自由国际秩序“终结”的讨论主要发生在美国,欧洲学者在该议题上的参与相对有限。
(1)关于“自由国际秩序”走向失败的深入讨论可参考“What Was the Liberal Order?The World We May Be Losing”,Foreign Affairs,March 2017,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/system/files/pdf/anthologies/2017/b0033_0.pdf.也可参考Robert Jervis,Francis Gavin and Joshua Rovner,eds.,Chaos in the Liberal Order:The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-first Century,New York:Columbia University Press,2018;Celeste Wallander,“NATO’s Enemies Within:How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,July/August 2018;Martin Wolf,“Davos 2018:The liberal international order is sick”,Financial Times,January 23,2018,https://www.ft.com/content/c45acec8-fd35-11e7-9b32-d7d59aace167;Richard Haass,“Liberal World Order,R.I.P.”,Project Syndicate,March 21,2018,https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/end-of-liberalworld-order-by-richard-n--haass-2018-03;Richard Haass,A World in Disarray:American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order,New York:Penguin Books,2018;Barry Posen,“The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony”,Foreign Affairs,2018,Vol.97,No.2,pp.10-19;Fred Hu and Michael Spence,“Why Globalization Stalled”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.96,No.4,July/August2017,pp.54-63;Paul Miller,“Non-‘Western’Liberalism and the Resilience of the Liberal International Order,The Washington Quarterly,Vol.41,No.2,Summer 2018,pp.137-153;James Kirchick,The End of Europe:Dictators,Demagogues,and the Coming Dark Age,New Haven,CT:Yale University Press,2017;John Ikenberry,“The Plot against American Foreign Policy:Can the Liberal Order Survive?”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.96,No.3,May/June 2017,pp.1-7;Joseph Nye,“Will the Liberal Order Survive?The History of an Ida”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.96,No.1,January/February 2017;Jeffrey C.Isaac,“The Politics of Global Disorder”,Perspectives on Politics,March 2016,Vol.14,No.1;Anne Applebaum,“Is This the End of the West as We Know It?”,Washington Post,March 4,2016;Rebekka Friedman,Kevork Oskanian and Ramon Pacheco Pardo,eds.,After Liberalism?The Future of Liberalism in International Relations,London:Palgrave Macmillan,2013.关于自由主义秩序“失败”的文章往往同时也会参与到关于如何“失去了俄罗斯/中国”的论战中去,例如Richard Heydarian,“China Is Making a Bid for Global Primacy”,The National Interest,July 1,2018,https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-making-bid-global-primacy-24767l;Robert Atkinson,“Who Lost China?”,The National Review,July 26,2018,https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/08/13/us-china-relations-who-lost-them/;Peter Conradi,Who Lost Russia?How the World Entered a New Cold War,London:Oneworld Publications,2017.
(2)Stephen Chaudoin,Helen V.Milner,and Dustin Tingley,“A Liberal International American Foreign Policy?Maybe Down but Not Out”,H-Diplo/ISSF Policy Roundtable 1(6),March 14,2017,https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/hvmilner/files/h-diplo_issf.pdf;John Ikenberry,“The End of Liberal International Order?”,International Affairs,2018,Vol.97,No.1,pp.7-23;Deudney and Ikenberry,“Liberal World:The Resilient Order”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,July/August 2018,pp.16-24.
(1)Haass,“Liberal World Order,R.I.P”.
(2)Patrick Porter,“A World Imagined:Nostalgia and Liberal Order”,Cato Institute,Policy Analysis No.843,July 5,2018,https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/worldimagined-nostalgia-liberal-order;Graham Allison,“The Myth of the Liberal Order:From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,July/August2018,pp.10-19;Paul Staniland,“Misreading the‘Liberal Order’:Why We Need New Thinking in American Foreign Policy”,Lawfare,July 29,2018,https://www.lawfareblog.com/misreading-liberal-order-why-we-need-new-thinking-american-foreign-policy?from=time line;Andrew J.Bacevich,“The‘Global Order’Myth”,The American Conservative,June 15,2017,http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-global-order-myth/;Naazneen Barma,Ely Ratner,and Steven Weber,“The Mythical Liberal Order”,The National Interest,March 1,2013,https://nationalinterest.org/article/the-mythical-liberalorder-8146
(3)Graham Allison,“The Myth of the Liberal Order”,p.133.米尔斯海默的观点也与艾利森相似,认为是自由主义的干预政策导致了在海外“无休止的战争”和“国内的非自由主义”。参见John Mearsheimer,The Great Delusion:Liberal Dreams and International Realities,New Heaven:Yale University Press,2018.
(4)Allison,Destined for War.
(1)David Kang and Xinru Ma,“Power Transitions:Thucydides Didn’t Live in East Asia”,Washington Quarterly,Vol.41,No.1,Spring 2018,pp.137-154.
(2)David Kang,East Asia before the West:Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute,New York:Columbia University Press,2012.
(3)A.F.K Organski and Jacek Kugler,The War Ledger,Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1980.
(4)Steve Chan,Weixing Hu and Kai He,“Discerning States’Revisionist and Status-quo Orientations:Comparing China and the US”,European Journal of International Relations,October 2018,pp.1-28.
(1)James Goldgeier,“The Misunderstood Roots of International Order-And Why They Matter Again”,The Washington Quarterly,Vol.41,No.3,Fall 2018,pp.7-11;关于两次世界大战之间国际体系崩溃、并最终导致第二次世界大战爆发的相关研究,可参见E.H.Carr,The Twenty Years Crisis,1919-1939,New York:Harper Perennial,1964;英国历史学家霍布斯鲍姆认为,20世纪上半叶是“极端年代”中最为暴力的阶段。他的观点参见Eric J.Hobsbawm,The Age of Extremes:The Short Twentieth Century,1914-1991,London:Michael Joseph,1994.
(2)Ikenberry,“The end of liberal international order?”;Samuel Huntington,“Democracy’s Third Wave”,Journal of Democracy,Vol.2,No.2,Spring 1991,pp.12-34.
(3)Michael Mazarr,Miranda Priebe,Andrew Radin and Astrid Stuth Cevallos,“Understanding the Current International Order”,Rand,2016.在伊肯伯里(John Ikenberry)看来,美国主导的全球秩序始建于第二次世界大战结束,那时华盛顿“已经在持续努力建立一个包括联盟、贸易协议和政治伙伴关系在内的广泛的多边机制体系”。参见:Ikenberry,“The Illusion of Geopolitics”.
(4)约瑟夫·奈认为,所谓的自由国际秩序在冷战时期是不完整的,当时它只包括“一群大西洋沿岸的志同道合的国家”,而没有苏联集团国家和其他大国,例如中国和印度。参见Nye,“Will the Liberal Order Survive?”还可参见Rebecca Friedman,Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper,“The Day after Trump:American Strategy for a New International Order,Washington Quarterly,Vol.41,No.1,Spring 2018,pp.8-10.
(5)笔者在为2018年4月26日在上海华东师范大学俄罗斯研究中心举办的“中俄关系及其对全球秩序的影响”研讨会提交的会议论文中首次提出该观点,随后帕特里克·波特(Patrick Porter)也提出了类似看法,相关看法参见Patrick Porter,“A World Imagined”,Cato Institute,July 5,2018;Allison,“The Myth of the Liberal Order”,in the July/August 2018issue of Foreign Affairs,and John Mearsheimer,“The Great Delusion:Liberal Dreams and International Realities”,The National Interest,October 5,2018,https://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-delusion-liberal-dreams-and-international-realities-32737
(1)John Lewis Gaddis,“The Long Peace”,International Security,Spring,1986.
(2)Gaddis,“The Long Peace”,p.131.
(1)John F.Kennedy,“American University Commencement Address”,10 June 1963,Washington,D.C.,https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkamericanuniversityaddress.html
(2)Ted Sorensen,Counselor:A Life at the Edge of History,New York:Harper-Collins Publishers,2008,sections 23 and 24.
(3)杰弗里·萨克斯(Jeffrey Sachs)指出,“有学者认为右翼分子对于肯尼迪的和平倡议极为不满,以至于暗杀了肯尼迪,这种观点是真实可信的。”参见Sachs,“Donald Trump’s dangerous China illusions”,Boston Globe,February 5,2017,https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/02/05/trump-dangerous-china-illusions/51H7yrI9vTE3PSmXDJDl3M/story.html
(1)Allison,“The Myth of the Liberal Order”.
(2)Ibid.
(3)Yu Bin,“Americas war against racism”,Asia Times online,June 26,2003,http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/EF26Aa01.html.在笔者《亚洲时报》(Asia Times)上的文章发表两个月后(2003年8月28日),美国广播公司(NBC)主播彼得·詹宁斯(Peter Jennings)为马丁·路德·金的“我有一个梦想”演讲40周年制作了一期特别节目,也得出相同结论,即冷战迫使美国政治精英直面美国国内的种族隔离政策,参见https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S2pfiTInjLE
(1)Yu Bin,“Americas war against racism.”
(2)“Without the Cold War,what’s the point of being an American”,cited in Samuel Huntington,“The Erosion of American National Interests”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.76,No.5,September/October 1997,pp.28-49.
(3)Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth,“American Primacy in Perspective”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.81,No.4,July/August 2002,pp.20-33;Keir Lieber and Daryl Press,“The Rise of U.S.Nuclear Primacy”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.85,No.2,March/April 2006,pp.42-54.
(1)Yu Bin,“Americas war against racism.”
(2)Jon Swaine,Oliver Laughland,Jamiles Lartey and Ciara McCarthy,“Young black men killed by US policy at highest rate in year of 1,134 deaths”,The Guardian,December 31,2015,https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/31/the-counted-police-killings-2015-young-bl ack-men
(3)Jeffrey Mankoff,“American Ideals Beat the USSR.Why Aren’t We Using Them Against Russia?”,Defense One,January 4,2018,https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/01/america n-ideals-beat-ussr-why-arent-we-using-them-against-russia/144954/
(4)转引自Godfrey Hodgson,The Myth of American Exceptionalism,New Heaven:Yale University Press,2009.
(5)George Will,“America’s political disharmony”,The Washington Post,January 21,2011,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104561.html
(6)Huntington,“Erosion”,p.30.
(1)Jennifer Newton,“There’s a sense the world is spinning so fast and nobody is able to control it admits Obama,amid ISIS,Ebola and Ukraine crises”,Daily Mail,October 8,2014,http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2784702/As-Ebola-ISIS-Russia-President-Obama-nig ht-admits-There-s-sense-world-spinning-fast-able-control.html#ixzz59C3qQPFD.
(2)Samuel Huntington,“The Clash of Civilizations?”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.72,No.3,summer1993,pp.22-49.
(3)Charles Krauthammer,“The Unipolar Moment”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.70,No.1,America and the World(1990/91),pp.23-33.
(4)中俄双方都认为联合国是当前国际秩序的核心,各国交往中应坚持相互尊重主权和领土完整,平等和互不干涉内政等原则。参见《中华人民共和国与俄罗斯联邦联合声明》,北京,2018年6月8日,http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-06/08/c_1122959198.htm,特别是第三部分的内容。
(1)俄罗斯与中国都参加了2010年(华盛顿)、2012年(首尔)和2014年(海牙)的三次核安全峰会。然而,2014年11月,俄罗斯宣布将不出席2016年的芝加哥峰会。“Russia told U.S.it will not attend 2016 nuclear security summit”,Reuters,November 5,2014,www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/us-nuclear-security-usa-russia-idUSKBN0IP24K20141105
(2)Xinhua,“China’s foreign trade up 14.2 pct in 2017”,January 12,2018,http://www.xinhua net.com/english/2018-01/12/c_136890444.htm;“Xi Jinping keynote at the World Economic Forum”,Davos,Switzerland,17 January 2017,www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-textof-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum
(3)Graham Allison,Destined for War:Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?,New York:Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company,2017.
(4)John Mearsheimer,“Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the Wests Fault”.
(5)Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner,“The China Reckoning:How Beijing Defied American Expectations”,Foreign Affairs,March/April 2018,pp.60-70.
(6)Ferguson and Zakaria,2017,op cit.
(1)“Trump accuses China of raping US with unfair trade policy”,BBC,May 2,2016,http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36185012;Fox News,February 16,2018,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SpWai3kZ-gM
(2)Campbell and Ratner,“The China Reckoning”.
(3)Ezra Vogel,Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,2011,p.93.
(4)Barry Naughton,Growing Out of the Plan:Chinese Economic Reform,1978-1993,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1996.
(1)习近平:《共担时代责任共促全球发展》,在世界经济论坛2017年年会开幕式上的主旨演讲,http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/18/c_135991184.htm
(2)“人民大学发起建立G20智库年会机制”,中国新闻网,2014年9月3日,http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/09-03/6559886.shtml
(3)http://en.ccg.org.cn/
(4)http://www.cctb.net/zzjg/yjzx/qqzl/
(1)“人民大学智库建设令人耳目一新”,《人民日报》,2014年7月24日,http://news.ruc.edu.cn/archives/85956
(2)习近平:《携手构建合作共赢新伙伴同心打造人类命运共同体》,在联合国大会第七十届会议一般性辩论上的讲话,2015年9月28日,http://www.en84.com/nonfiction/remarks/201509/00016638.html,还可参见:“中共中央政治局集体学习两次聚焦全球治理”,战略与政策论坛,2016年10月8日,https://freewechat.com/a/MzAxMDQ5ODMxOQ==/2654743486/1
(3)华盛顿认为,亚投行会对美国创立和主导的全球金融机制(世界银行,国际货币基金组织和亚洲开发银行)构成威胁。然而,美国对于封锁亚投行的努力在2015年3月12日宣告失败,这一天英国宣布加入亚投行,随后是意大利、德国和法国。可参见:Kishore Mahbubani,“Why Britain Joining China-Led Bank Is a Sign of American Decline”,Huffington Post,March 16,2015,www.huffingtonpost.com/kishore-mahbubani/britain-chinabank-america-decline_b_6877942.html;Andrew Higgins and David Sanger,“Three European Powers Say They Will Join China-Led Bank”,New York Times,March 18,2015,p.A4.
(4)黄仁伟:“西方对‘一带一路’的偏见,多数是源于对人类命运共同体本质的无知”,上观新闻,2018年12月1日,https://web.shobserver.com/wx/detail.do?id=119466
(5)“习近平在世界经济论坛上的主旨演讲”,瑞士达沃斯,2017年1月17日,http://www.china.org.cn/node_7247529/content_40569136.htm
(1)“习近平在世界经济论坛上的主旨演讲”,瑞士达沃斯,2017年1月17日。
(2)习近平:《在亚太经合组织第二十六次领导人非正式会议上的发言》,莫尔兹比港,2018年11月18日,http://www.sohu.com/a/277604746_498176
(3)“时殷弘谈如何取信于邻国:不要扮演利他主义者”,人民网,2015年1月4日,http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150104/42855504_0.shtml
(4)在2016年美国大选前2个月,北京的著名战略家时殷弘教授认为中国在2012-2016年间,在地缘政治和地缘经济领域的外交政策缺乏审慎,鉴于中国经济增长率持续下行,而国际介入和海外扩展急剧增长,中国在全球范围内进行大规模外向型经济投资的利益是不明确的。时殷弘说,中国需要的是国内的结构性改革和保持经济增长,“而非中国在国外的战略发力、权势扩展,以及在亚洲乃至全球的光荣获取。”参见“时殷弘教授:中国‘战略透支’风险日增”,《联合早报》,2016年9月21日,https://www.zaobao.com.sg/znews/greater-china/story20160921-668655;还可参见:沙祖康:“‘一带一路’研究不好,有可能成为绞杀中国外交的‘两根绳索’”,2018年8月18日,http://www.sohu.com/a/248659140_358040
(1)2008年1月,美国同意与TPP四个创始会员国就贸易自由化问题举行谈判。
(2)James Parker,“China and the TPP:The Trojan Horse Option”,The Diplomat,September24,2013,http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/china-and-the-tpp-the-trojan-horse-option/
(3)习近平:《守望相助,共创中蒙关系发展新时代》,习近平在蒙古国国家大呼拉尔的演讲,2014年8月22日,中国外交部网站,www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyj h_665391/t1185662.shtml
(1)Kimberly Dozier,“Frustrated Trump Team Sends Public Signals to Boss at National Security Retreat in Aspen”,The Daily Beast,July 23,2018,https://www.thedailybeast.com/frustrated-trump-team-sends-public-signals-to-boss-at-national-security-retreat-in-aspen
(2)“Vice President Mike Pence’s Remarks on the Administration’s Policy Towards China”,October 4,2018,https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarkson-the-administration-s-policy-towards-china102018.关于各方对彭斯讲话的反应,可参见Manuel Yepe,“Pence v.China:Cold War 2.0 May Have Just Begun”,Counterpunch,October22,2018,https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/10/22/pence-v-china-cold-war-2-0-may-have-ju st-begun/
(3)Michael Mazarr,Timothy Heath and Astrid Cevallos,China and the International Order,The RAND Cooperation,June 2018,https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2423.html.还可参见Andrew Scobell,Bonny Lin,Howard J.Shatz,Michael Johnson,Larry Hanauer,Michael S.Chase,Astrid Stuth Cevallos,Ivan W.Rasmussen,Arthur Chan,Aaron Strong,Eric Warner,Logan Ma,“At the Dawn of Belt and Road China in the Developing World”,Rand,October 2018,https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2273.html
(1)“刘丰,在第11届中国政治政治学与国际关系学术共同体年会上关于中国的战略适度问题的发言”,北京,2018年7月16-17日,http://www.dir.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/ir/3616/2018/20180625163649314254909/20180625163649314254909_.html;“时殷弘,在第13届海峡两岸和平研究会上的发言”,内蒙古赤峰,2017年7月30日-8月2日,http://222.29.218.113:8080/static/news/school/1030.html
(2)Cui Tiankai,“Misreading and misjudging China’s intentions:US and China still on the same boat”,China Daily,July 26,2018,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/interface/yidian/1120781/2018-07-26/cd_36654042.html.
(3)陈定定:“世界的领导权是多元的”,环球网,2017年11月23日,http://opinion.huanqiu.com/hqpl/2017-11/11394509.html
(1)BBC,“Putin deplores collapse of USSR,”April 25,2005,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm
(2)参见Angela Stent,“Reluctant Europeans:Three Centuries of Russian Ambivalence toward the West”,in Robert Legvold(ed.),Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past,New York:Columbia University Press,2007,pp.393-442.
(3)关于美俄两国围绕着《纳恩一卢格法案》(Nunn-Lugar Act)开展合作的相关问题可参见Angela Stent,Limits of Partnership:US-Russian Relations in the Twenty-first Century,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2015,pp.9-10.
(4)参见“Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism”,US Department of State,http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145499.pdf
(5)参见“Proliferation Security Initiative Participants”,US Department of State,June 4,2014,www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm
(6)http://www.mtcr.info/english/partners.html
(1)Stent,The Limits,pp.35-40,75-78.
(2)Ian Traynor,“Soviets tried to join NATO in 1954”,The Guardian,June 16,2001,http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145499.pdf
(3)Stent,The Limits,p.75.
(4)Traynor,“Soviets tried”,2001.
(1)参见Yu Bin,“China-Russian Relations:Strategic Distancing…or Else?”,Comparative Connections 2,No.2,July 2000,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0002qchina_russia.pdf
(2)Yu Bin,“New Century,New Face,and China’s`Putin Puzzle’”,Comparative Connections2,No.1,Pacific Forum,CSIS,1st Quarter,April 2000,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0001qchina_russia.pdf
(3)Yu Bin,“One Year Later:Geopolitics or Geoeconomics?”,Comparative Connections 4,No.3,Pacific Forum,CSIS,3rd Quarter,October 2002,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0203qchina_russia.pdf
(4)Yu Bin,“The Russian-Chinese Oil Politick”,Comparative Connections 5,No.3,Pacific Forum,CSIS,3rd Quarter,October 2003,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0303qchina_russia.pdf
(5)例如,1993年,时任俄罗斯外交部长的科济列夫在会见来访的美国前总统尼克松时表示,关于俄罗斯应如何界定其国家利益,如果尼克松可以为俄罗斯指点迷津,他将会“非常感激”。参见Stent,The Limits,p.25.
(6)Frederick Kempe,“Bush Can Take Another Look Into Putin’s Soul”,Bloomberg,June 6,2007,http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWrjoiCIMmL8
(7)普京在一名反塔利班的阿富汗领导人被暗杀后立即采取了上述行动,参见Stent,The Limits,p.63.还可参见Yu Bin,“A‘`Nice’Treaty in a Precarious World”,Comparative Connections 3,No.3,Pacific Forum,CSIS,3rd Quarter,October 2001,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0103qchina_russia.pdf
(1)Arshad Mohammed,“US Senate looks to have ended Trumps honeymoon with Russia”,Reuters,July 29,2017 http://www.atimes.com/article/us-senate-looks-ended-trumps-honey moon-russia/
(2)俄罗斯情报部门与西方情报部门的沟通与协作一直延续到2017年4月6日,直到叙利亚因“涉嫌使用化学武器”遭到轰炸后才停止。参见Seymour Hersh,“Trumps Red Line”,Die Welt,June 25,2017,https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article165905578/Trump-s-RedLine.html
(3)Iliya Pitalev,“Russia Sends Very Careful Message to Trump by Targeting Obama-Era Sanctions”,Sputnik,29 July 2017,https://sputniknews.com/russia/201707291055987722-rus sia-us-sanctions-obama-trump/
(4)The Economist interviews Barack Obama:“The president on dealing with Russia,”August2,2014,http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/08/economist-interviews-barack-obama-2
(5)Frederick Kempe,“Bush Can Take Another Look Into Putin’s‘Soul’,Soviets tried”,June 6,2007,http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWrjoiCIMmL8;Ben Smith,“Hillary:Putin doesn’t have a soul”,Politico,January 6,2008,http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0108/Hillary_Putin_doesnt_have_a_soul.html
(1)时任美国驻俄罗斯大使杰克·马特洛克(Jack Matlock)也对北约东扩持批评态度,“在我们达成一项将俄罗斯纳入欧洲防务结构的协议之前,我们没有理由将北约军事组织向东扩展”。他指责说,北约集团的东扩并不是由华盛顿推动的,而是由东欧国家所推动的,他们渴望得到西方的保护,使其免受俄罗斯可能复兴的共产主义的威胁。主观上北约扩大并不是要触动俄罗斯的利益,但客观上确实起到了这样的效果,特别是它所提供的安全架构中并不包括俄罗斯。“The Expendables:How NATO conquered Europe”,RT,April 5,2014,http://rt.com/news/nato-anniversary-expansion-europe-129/
(2)John Mearsheimer,“Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault”.
(3)Michael McFaul,“Russia as It Is:A Grand Strategy for Confronting Putin”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,July/August 2018,pp.82-91.
(4)http://www.amazon.com/review/R1NVWWAA1FVQRP/ref=cm_cr_dp_title?ie=UTF8&ASIN=5010004941&channel=detail-glance&nodeID=283155&store=books
(1)Andrei Tsygankov,Russian Foreign Policy:Change and Continuity in National Identity,Lanham,Maryland:Rowman and Littlefield,3rd ed.,2013,Ch.3.
(2)Vladislav Surkov(ВладиславСурков),“The Loneliness of the Half-Breed[Одиночествополукровки(14+)]”,Russia in Global Affairs(РоссиявГлобалбнойПолитике),May 28,2018,http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/book/The-Loneliness-of-the-Half-Breed-19575,https://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/Odinochestvo-polukrovki-14-19477
(3)休克疗法在波兰和捷克等东欧小国取得了更好的效果。
(4)Thomas Remington,“Politics in Russia”,in Gabriel Almond et al(eds),Comparative Politics Today:A World View,updated 8th edition,London:Pearson,2006,p.401.
(5)Stent,Limits of Partnership,p.12.
(6)LaFeber,America,Russia,p.357.
(7)根据戈尔巴乔夫的说法,美方承诺北约不会扩大,但这一承诺从未见诸于文字。从那以后,北约进行了4次东扩,1999年捷克、匈牙利和波兰加入;2004年保加利亚、爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、罗马尼亚、斯洛伐克和斯洛文尼亚加入;2009年阿尔巴尼亚和克罗地亚加入。本轮东扩将吸收波黑、格鲁吉亚、马其顿和乌克兰加入。经过东扩之后,北约的规模几乎扩大了一倍,从1990年的16个成员国增加到28个成员国,还有更多的国家在等待加入。参见“The Expendables:How NATO conquered Europe”,RT,April 5,2014,http://rt.com/news/nato-anniversary-expansion-europe-129/,近期关于西方在这个问题上是否有过承诺的研究可参见Joshua Shifrinson,“Deal or No Deal?The End of the Cold War and the U.S.Offer to Limit NATO Expansion”,International Security,Vol.40,Spring2016,pp.7-44.
(1)Henry Kissinger,“How the Ukraine crisis ends”,The Washington Post,March 5,2014,http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-t he-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html
(2)Henry Kissinger,Does American Need a Foreign Policy:Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century,New York:Touchstone,2001,pp.27,30.
(3)转引自LaFeber,America,Russia,p.370.
(1)“Joint news conference with King Abdullah II of Jordan”,April 5,2017,www.realclear politics.com/video/2017/04/05/trump_the_world_is_a_mess_i_inherited_it_and_i_will_fix_it.html
(2)George H.W.Bush,“Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit”,September 11,1990,Bush Presidential Library and Museum,http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&mon th=9
(3)Brooks and Wohlforth,“American Primacy”.
(4)在“终结论”提出之前,美国学者已经开始讨论关于美国/西方对于国际体系支配地位下降的问题。例如Fareed Zakaria,The Post-American World,New York:W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.,2008;Richard Haass,Foreign Policy Begins at Home:The Case for Putting Americas House in Order,New York:Basic Books,2013;Joseph Nye,Jr.,Is the American Century Over?Cambridge,UK:Polity,2015.
(5)Jeffrey C.Isaac,“The Politics of Global Disorder”,Perspectives on Politics,Vol.14,No.1,March 2016.
(1)金灿荣:“未来10年的世界大变局”,观察者网,2017年8月1日,http://www.guancha.cn/JinCanRong/2017_08_01_420867_s.shtml
(2)Ikenberry,“The End of Liberal International Order?”.
(3)Ferguson and Zakaria,The Future of Geopolitics.
(1)直到十年前,西方政策与学术界的焦点都是如何对非西方国家进行治理的问题。参见Arnaud Blin and Gustavo Marin,“Rethinking Global Governance,2007”,Forum for a New World Governance,Paris;“Global governance 2025:At a critical juncture”,US National Intelligence Council and the EU Institute for Security Studies,December 2010,http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Global__Governance_2025.pdf,p.17
(2)Tom Engelhardt,“Trump May Be Accelerating U.S.Decline,But He Surely Didn’t Start It”,Foreign Policy In Focus(FPIF),14 June 2017,www.fpif.org/trump-may-be-acceleratingu-s-decline-but-he-surely-didnt-start-it/
(1)帕特里克·波特(Patrick Porter)关于“自由国际秩序”的“失败”与“灵活性”等问题曾有一个非常精彩的批评,参见Patrick Porter,“A World Imagined”,Cato,June5,2018.
(2)Peter Spiro,“The New Sovereignists”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.79,No.6,Nov/Dec 2000,pp.9-15.
(3)Paul Kennedy,The Rise and Fall of Great Powers,New York:Random House,1987.
(4)例如Robert Keohane,After Hegemony:Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1984.
(5)Arnaud Blin and Gustavo Marin,“Rethinking Global Governance”,2007,Forum for a New World Governance,Paris.
(1)“金德尔伯格陷阱”也被称为“霸权稳定论”,指的是由于在两次世界大战期间缺少一个负责任且仁慈的霸权国,才会最终导致全球经济危机和第二次世界大战的爆发。
(2)1.0版本的乐观主义终结论叙事是弗朗西斯·福山(Francis Fukuyama)在《历史的终结》一文中所提出的,参见Francis Fukuyama,“The End of History?”,The National Interest,No.16,Summer 1989.
(3)弗格森坚持认为中国是全球自由主义秩序的赢家,别的国家是输家,参见弗格森与扎卡利亚的辩论。也可参见Robert Kagan,“Backing into World War III”,Foreign Policy,February 6,2017,http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-chin a-trump-obama/?utm_content=bufferd07ea&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer
(4)White House,National Security Strategy of the United States of America,Washington,D.C.,2017,25,https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
(5)奥巴马执政时期,对于两国的警惕性就已明显提升。奥巴马公开将俄罗斯与埃博拉病毒、伊斯兰国并列为世界的三大威胁。参见Jennifer Newton,“There’s a sense the world is spinning so fast and nobody is able to control it admits Obama,amid ISIS,Ebola and Ukraine crises”,Daily Mail,October 8,2014,http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2784702/AsEbola-ISIS-Russia-President-Obama-night-admits-There-s-sense-world-spinning-fast-able-con trol.html#ixzz59C3qQPFD
(1)直到2014年,西方世界对于“自由国际秩序”的乐观态度还是公共舆论空间的主流立场。John Ikenberry,“The Illusion of Geopolitics”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.93,No.3,May/June2014,pp.80-86,87-90.
(2)对于自由国际秩序“终结”的讨论主要发生在美国,欧洲学者在该议题上的参与相对有限。
(1)关于“自由国际秩序”走向失败的深入讨论可参考“What Was the Liberal Order?The World We May Be Losing”,Foreign Affairs,March 2017,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/system/files/pdf/anthologies/2017/b0033_0.pdf.也可参考Robert Jervis,Francis Gavin and Joshua Rovner,eds.,Chaos in the Liberal Order:The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-first Century,New York:Columbia University Press,2018;Celeste Wallander,“NATO’s Enemies Within:How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,July/August 2018;Martin Wolf,“Davos 2018:The liberal international order is sick”,Financial Times,January 23,2018,https://www.ft.com/content/c45acec8-fd35-11e7-9b32-d7d59aace167;Richard Haass,“Liberal World Order,R.I.P.”,Project Syndicate,March 21,2018,https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/end-of-liberalworld-order-by-richard-n--haass-2018-03;Richard Haass,A World in Disarray:American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order,New York:Penguin Books,2018;Barry Posen,“The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony”,Foreign Affairs,2018,Vol.97,No.2,pp.10-19;Fred Hu and Michael Spence,“Why Globalization Stalled”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.96,No.4,July/August2017,pp.54-63;Paul Miller,“Non-‘Western’Liberalism and the Resilience of the Liberal International Order,The Washington Quarterly,Vol.41,No.2,Summer 2018,pp.137-153;James Kirchick,The End of Europe:Dictators,Demagogues,and the Coming Dark Age,New Haven,CT:Yale University Press,2017;John Ikenberry,“The Plot against American Foreign Policy:Can the Liberal Order Survive?”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.96,No.3,May/June 2017,pp.1-7;Joseph Nye,“Will the Liberal Order Survive?The History of an Ida”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.96,No.1,January/February 2017;Jeffrey C.Isaac,“The Politics of Global Disorder”,Perspectives on Politics,March 2016,Vol.14,No.1;Anne Applebaum,“Is This the End of the West as We Know It?”,Washington Post,March 4,2016;Rebekka Friedman,Kevork Oskanian and Ramon Pacheco Pardo,eds.,After Liberalism?The Future of Liberalism in International Relations,London:Palgrave Macmillan,2013.关于自由主义秩序“失败”的文章往往同时也会参与到关于如何“失去了俄罗斯/中国”的论战中去,例如Richard Heydarian,“China Is Making a Bid for Global Primacy”,The National Interest,July 1,2018,https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-making-bid-global-primacy-24767l;Robert Atkinson,“Who Lost China?”,The National Review,July 26,2018,https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/08/13/us-china-relations-who-lost-them/;Peter Conradi,Who Lost Russia?How the World Entered a New Cold War,London:Oneworld Publications,2017.
(2)Stephen Chaudoin,Helen V.Milner,and Dustin Tingley,“A Liberal International American Foreign Policy?Maybe Down but Not Out”,H-Diplo/ISSF Policy Roundtable 1(6),March 14,2017,https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/hvmilner/files/h-diplo_issf.pdf;John Ikenberry,“The End of Liberal International Order?”,International Affairs,2018,Vol.97,No.1,pp.7-23;Deudney and Ikenberry,“Liberal World:The Resilient Order”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,July/August 2018,pp.16-24.
(1)Haass,“Liberal World Order,R.I.P”.
(2)Patrick Porter,“A World Imagined:Nostalgia and Liberal Order”,Cato Institute,Policy Analysis No.843,July 5,2018,https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/worldimagined-nostalgia-liberal-order;Graham Allison,“The Myth of the Liberal Order:From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,July/August2018,pp.10-19;Paul Staniland,“Misreading the‘Liberal Order’:Why We Need New Thinking in American Foreign Policy”,Lawfare,July 29,2018,https://www.lawfareblog.com/misreading-liberal-order-why-we-need-new-thinking-american-foreign-policy?from=time line;Andrew J.Bacevich,“The‘Global Order’Myth”,The American Conservative,June 15,2017,http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-global-order-myth/;Naazneen Barma,Ely Ratner,and Steven Weber,“The Mythical Liberal Order”,The National Interest,March 1,2013,https://nationalinterest.org/article/the-mythical-liberalorder-8146
(3)Graham Allison,“The Myth of the Liberal Order”,p.133.米尔斯海默的观点也与艾利森相似,认为是自由主义的干预政策导致了在海外“无休止的战争”和“国内的非自由主义”。参见John Mearsheimer,The Great Delusion:Liberal Dreams and International Realities,New Heaven:Yale University Press,2018.
(4)Allison,Destined for War.
(1)David Kang and Xinru Ma,“Power Transitions:Thucydides Didn’t Live in East Asia”,Washington Quarterly,Vol.41,No.1,Spring 2018,pp.137-154.
(2)David Kang,East Asia before the West:Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute,New York:Columbia University Press,2012.
(3)A.F.K Organski and Jacek Kugler,The War Ledger,Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1980.
(4)Steve Chan,Weixing Hu and Kai He,“Discerning States’Revisionist and Status-quo Orientations:Comparing China and the US”,European Journal of International Relations,October 2018,pp.1-28.
(1)James Goldgeier,“The Misunderstood Roots of International Order-And Why They Matter Again”,The Washington Quarterly,Vol.41,No.3,Fall 2018,pp.7-11;关于两次世界大战之间国际体系崩溃、并最终导致第二次世界大战爆发的相关研究,可参见E.H.Carr,The Twenty Years Crisis,1919-1939,New York:Harper Perennial,1964;英国历史学家霍布斯鲍姆认为,20世纪上半叶是“极端年代”中最为暴力的阶段。他的观点参见Eric J.Hobsbawm,The Age of Extremes:The Short Twentieth Century,1914-1991,London:Michael Joseph,1994.
(2)Ikenberry,“The end of liberal international order?”;Samuel Huntington,“Democracy’s Third Wave”,Journal of Democracy,Vol.2,No.2,Spring 1991,pp.12-34.
(3)Michael Mazarr,Miranda Priebe,Andrew Radin and Astrid Stuth Cevallos,“Understanding the Current International Order”,Rand,2016.在伊肯伯里(John Ikenberry)看来,美国主导的全球秩序始建于第二次世界大战结束,那时华盛顿“已经在持续努力建立一个包括联盟、贸易协议和政治伙伴关系在内的广泛的多边机制体系”。参见:Ikenberry,“The Illusion of Geopolitics”.
(4)约瑟夫·奈认为,所谓的自由国际秩序在冷战时期是不完整的,当时它只包括“一群大西洋沿岸的志同道合的国家”,而没有苏联集团国家和其他大国,例如中国和印度。参见Nye,“Will the Liberal Order Survive?”还可参见Rebecca Friedman,Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper,“The Day after Trump:American Strategy for a New International Order,Washington Quarterly,Vol.41,No.1,Spring 2018,pp.8-10.
(5)笔者在为2018年4月26日在上海华东师范大学俄罗斯研究中心举办的“中俄关系及其对全球秩序的影响”研讨会提交的会议论文中首次提出该观点,随后帕特里克·波特(Patrick Porter)也提出了类似看法,相关看法参见Patrick Porter,“A World Imagined”,Cato Institute,July 5,2018;Allison,“The Myth of the Liberal Order”,in the July/August 2018issue of Foreign Affairs,and John Mearsheimer,“The Great Delusion:Liberal Dreams and International Realities”,The National Interest,October 5,2018,https://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-delusion-liberal-dreams-and-international-realities-32737
(1)John Lewis Gaddis,“The Long Peace”,International Security,Spring,1986.
(2)Gaddis,“The Long Peace”,p.131.
(1)John F.Kennedy,“American University Commencement Address”,10 June 1963,Washington,D.C.,https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkamericanuniversityaddress.html
(2)Ted Sorensen,Counselor:A Life at the Edge of History,New York:Harper-Collins Publishers,2008,sections 23 and 24.
(3)杰弗里·萨克斯(Jeffrey Sachs)指出,“有学者认为右翼分子对于肯尼迪的和平倡议极为不满,以至于暗杀了肯尼迪,这种观点是真实可信的。”参见Sachs,“Donald Trump’s dangerous China illusions”,Boston Globe,February 5,2017,https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/02/05/trump-dangerous-china-illusions/51H7yrI9vTE3PSmXDJDl3M/story.html
(1)Allison,“The Myth of the Liberal Order”.
(2)Ibid.
(3)Yu Bin,“Americas war against racism”,Asia Times online,June 26,2003,http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/EF26Aa01.html.在笔者《亚洲时报》(Asia Times)上的文章发表两个月后(2003年8月28日),美国广播公司(NBC)主播彼得·詹宁斯(Peter Jennings)为马丁·路德·金的“我有一个梦想”演讲40周年制作了一期特别节目,也得出相同结论,即冷战迫使美国政治精英直面美国国内的种族隔离政策,参见https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S2pfiTInjLE
(1)Yu Bin,“Americas war against racism.”
(2)“Without the Cold War,what’s the point of being an American”,cited in Samuel Huntington,“The Erosion of American National Interests”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.76,No.5,September/October 1997,pp.28-49.
(3)Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth,“American Primacy in Perspective”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.81,No.4,July/August 2002,pp.20-33;Keir Lieber and Daryl Press,“The Rise of U.S.Nuclear Primacy”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.85,No.2,March/April 2006,pp.42-54.
(1)Yu Bin,“Americas war against racism.”
(2)Jon Swaine,Oliver Laughland,Jamiles Lartey and Ciara McCarthy,“Young black men killed by US policy at highest rate in year of 1,134 deaths”,The Guardian,December 31,2015,https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/31/the-counted-police-killings-2015-young-bl ack-men
(3)Jeffrey Mankoff,“American Ideals Beat the USSR.Why Aren’t We Using Them Against Russia?”,Defense One,January 4,2018,https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/01/america n-ideals-beat-ussr-why-arent-we-using-them-against-russia/144954/
(4)转引自Godfrey Hodgson,The Myth of American Exceptionalism,New Heaven:Yale University Press,2009.
(5)George Will,“America’s political disharmony”,The Washington Post,January 21,2011,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104561.html
(6)Huntington,“Erosion”,p.30.
(1)Jennifer Newton,“There’s a sense the world is spinning so fast and nobody is able to control it admits Obama,amid ISIS,Ebola and Ukraine crises”,Daily Mail,October 8,2014,http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2784702/As-Ebola-ISIS-Russia-President-Obama-nig ht-admits-There-s-sense-world-spinning-fast-able-control.html#ixzz59C3qQPFD.
(2)Samuel Huntington,“The Clash of Civilizations?”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.72,No.3,summer1993,pp.22-49.
(3)Charles Krauthammer,“The Unipolar Moment”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.70,No.1,America and the World(1990/91),pp.23-33.
(4)中俄双方都认为联合国是当前国际秩序的核心,各国交往中应坚持相互尊重主权和领土完整,平等和互不干涉内政等原则。参见《中华人民共和国与俄罗斯联邦联合声明》,北京,2018年6月8日,http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-06/08/c_1122959198.htm,特别是第三部分的内容。
(1)俄罗斯与中国都参加了2010年(华盛顿)、2012年(首尔)和2014年(海牙)的三次核安全峰会。然而,2014年11月,俄罗斯宣布将不出席2016年的芝加哥峰会。“Russia told U.S.it will not attend 2016 nuclear security summit”,Reuters,November 5,2014,www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/us-nuclear-security-usa-russia-idUSKBN0IP24K20141105
(2)Xinhua,“China’s foreign trade up 14.2 pct in 2017”,January 12,2018,http://www.xinhua net.com/english/2018-01/12/c_136890444.htm;“Xi Jinping keynote at the World Economic Forum”,Davos,Switzerland,17 January 2017,www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-textof-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum
(3)Graham Allison,Destined for War:Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?,New York:Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company,2017.
(4)John Mearsheimer,“Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the Wests Fault”.
(5)Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner,“The China Reckoning:How Beijing Defied American Expectations”,Foreign Affairs,March/April 2018,pp.60-70.
(6)Ferguson and Zakaria,2017,op cit.
(1)“Trump accuses China of raping US with unfair trade policy”,BBC,May 2,2016,http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36185012;Fox News,February 16,2018,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SpWai3kZ-gM
(2)Campbell and Ratner,“The China Reckoning”.
(3)Ezra Vogel,Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,2011,p.93.
(4)Barry Naughton,Growing Out of the Plan:Chinese Economic Reform,1978-1993,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1996.
(1)习近平:《共担时代责任共促全球发展》,在世界经济论坛2017年年会开幕式上的主旨演讲,http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/18/c_135991184.htm
(2)“人民大学发起建立G20智库年会机制”,中国新闻网,2014年9月3日,http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/09-03/6559886.shtml
(3)http://en.ccg.org.cn/
(4)http://www.cctb.net/zzjg/yjzx/qqzl/
(1)“人民大学智库建设令人耳目一新”,《人民日报》,2014年7月24日,http://news.ruc.edu.cn/archives/85956
(2)习近平:《携手构建合作共赢新伙伴同心打造人类命运共同体》,在联合国大会第七十届会议一般性辩论上的讲话,2015年9月28日,http://www.en84.com/nonfiction/remarks/201509/00016638.html,还可参见:“中共中央政治局集体学习两次聚焦全球治理”,战略与政策论坛,2016年10月8日,https://freewechat.com/a/MzAxMDQ5ODMxOQ==/2654743486/1
(3)华盛顿认为,亚投行会对美国创立和主导的全球金融机制(世界银行,国际货币基金组织和亚洲开发银行)构成威胁。然而,美国对于封锁亚投行的努力在2015年3月12日宣告失败,这一天英国宣布加入亚投行,随后是意大利、德国和法国。可参见:Kishore Mahbubani,“Why Britain Joining China-Led Bank Is a Sign of American Decline”,Huffington Post,March 16,2015,www.huffingtonpost.com/kishore-mahbubani/britain-chinabank-america-decline_b_6877942.html;Andrew Higgins and David Sanger,“Three European Powers Say They Will Join China-Led Bank”,New York Times,March 18,2015,p.A4.
(4)黄仁伟:“西方对‘一带一路’的偏见,多数是源于对人类命运共同体本质的无知”,上观新闻,2018年12月1日,https://web.shobserver.com/wx/detail.do?id=119466
(5)“习近平在世界经济论坛上的主旨演讲”,瑞士达沃斯,2017年1月17日,http://www.china.org.cn/node_7247529/content_40569136.htm
(1)“习近平在世界经济论坛上的主旨演讲”,瑞士达沃斯,2017年1月17日。
(2)习近平:《在亚太经合组织第二十六次领导人非正式会议上的发言》,莫尔兹比港,2018年11月18日,http://www.sohu.com/a/277604746_498176
(3)“时殷弘谈如何取信于邻国:不要扮演利他主义者”,人民网,2015年1月4日,http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150104/42855504_0.shtml
(4)在2016年美国大选前2个月,北京的著名战略家时殷弘教授认为中国在2012-2016年间,在地缘政治和地缘经济领域的外交政策缺乏审慎,鉴于中国经济增长率持续下行,而国际介入和海外扩展急剧增长,中国在全球范围内进行大规模外向型经济投资的利益是不明确的。时殷弘说,中国需要的是国内的结构性改革和保持经济增长,“而非中国在国外的战略发力、权势扩展,以及在亚洲乃至全球的光荣获取。”参见“时殷弘教授:中国‘战略透支’风险日增”,《联合早报》,2016年9月21日,https://www.zaobao.com.sg/znews/greater-china/story20160921-668655;还可参见:沙祖康:“‘一带一路’研究不好,有可能成为绞杀中国外交的‘两根绳索’”,2018年8月18日,http://www.sohu.com/a/248659140_358040
(1)2008年1月,美国同意与TPP四个创始会员国就贸易自由化问题举行谈判。
(2)James Parker,“China and the TPP:The Trojan Horse Option”,The Diplomat,September24,2013,http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/china-and-the-tpp-the-trojan-horse-option/
(3)习近平:《守望相助,共创中蒙关系发展新时代》,习近平在蒙古国国家大呼拉尔的演讲,2014年8月22日,中国外交部网站,www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyj h_665391/t1185662.shtml
(1)Kimberly Dozier,“Frustrated Trump Team Sends Public Signals to Boss at National Security Retreat in Aspen”,The Daily Beast,July 23,2018,https://www.thedailybeast.com/frustrated-trump-team-sends-public-signals-to-boss-at-national-security-retreat-in-aspen
(2)“Vice President Mike Pence’s Remarks on the Administration’s Policy Towards China”,October 4,2018,https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarkson-the-administration-s-policy-towards-china102018.关于各方对彭斯讲话的反应,可参见Manuel Yepe,“Pence v.China:Cold War 2.0 May Have Just Begun”,Counterpunch,October22,2018,https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/10/22/pence-v-china-cold-war-2-0-may-have-ju st-begun/
(3)Michael Mazarr,Timothy Heath and Astrid Cevallos,China and the International Order,The RAND Cooperation,June 2018,https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2423.html.还可参见Andrew Scobell,Bonny Lin,Howard J.Shatz,Michael Johnson,Larry Hanauer,Michael S.Chase,Astrid Stuth Cevallos,Ivan W.Rasmussen,Arthur Chan,Aaron Strong,Eric Warner,Logan Ma,“At the Dawn of Belt and Road China in the Developing World”,Rand,October 2018,https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2273.html
(1)“刘丰,在第11届中国政治政治学与国际关系学术共同体年会上关于中国的战略适度问题的发言”,北京,2018年7月16-17日,http://www.dir.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/ir/3616/2018/20180625163649314254909/20180625163649314254909_.html;“时殷弘,在第13届海峡两岸和平研究会上的发言”,内蒙古赤峰,2017年7月30日-8月2日,http://222.29.218.113:8080/static/news/school/1030.html
(2)Cui Tiankai,“Misreading and misjudging China’s intentions:US and China still on the same boat”,China Daily,July 26,2018,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/interface/yidian/1120781/2018-07-26/cd_36654042.html.
(3)陈定定:“世界的领导权是多元的”,环球网,2017年11月23日,http://opinion.huanqiu.com/hqpl/2017-11/11394509.html
(1)BBC,“Putin deplores collapse of USSR,”April 25,2005,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm
(2)参见Angela Stent,“Reluctant Europeans:Three Centuries of Russian Ambivalence toward the West”,in Robert Legvold(ed.),Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past,New York:Columbia University Press,2007,pp.393-442.
(3)关于美俄两国围绕着《纳恩一卢格法案》(Nunn-Lugar Act)开展合作的相关问题可参见Angela Stent,Limits of Partnership:US-Russian Relations in the Twenty-first Century,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2015,pp.9-10.
(4)参见“Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism”,US Department of State,http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145499.pdf
(5)参见“Proliferation Security Initiative Participants”,US Department of State,June 4,2014,www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm
(6)http://www.mtcr.info/english/partners.html
(1)Stent,The Limits,pp.35-40,75-78.
(2)Ian Traynor,“Soviets tried to join NATO in 1954”,The Guardian,June 16,2001,http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145499.pdf
(3)Stent,The Limits,p.75.
(4)Traynor,“Soviets tried”,2001.
(1)参见Yu Bin,“China-Russian Relations:Strategic Distancing…or Else?”,Comparative Connections 2,No.2,July 2000,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0002qchina_russia.pdf
(2)Yu Bin,“New Century,New Face,and China’s`Putin Puzzle’”,Comparative Connections2,No.1,Pacific Forum,CSIS,1st Quarter,April 2000,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0001qchina_russia.pdf
(3)Yu Bin,“One Year Later:Geopolitics or Geoeconomics?”,Comparative Connections 4,No.3,Pacific Forum,CSIS,3rd Quarter,October 2002,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0203qchina_russia.pdf
(4)Yu Bin,“The Russian-Chinese Oil Politick”,Comparative Connections 5,No.3,Pacific Forum,CSIS,3rd Quarter,October 2003,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0303qchina_russia.pdf
(5)例如,1993年,时任俄罗斯外交部长的科济列夫在会见来访的美国前总统尼克松时表示,关于俄罗斯应如何界定其国家利益,如果尼克松可以为俄罗斯指点迷津,他将会“非常感激”。参见Stent,The Limits,p.25.
(6)Frederick Kempe,“Bush Can Take Another Look Into Putin’s Soul”,Bloomberg,June 6,2007,http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWrjoiCIMmL8
(7)普京在一名反塔利班的阿富汗领导人被暗杀后立即采取了上述行动,参见Stent,The Limits,p.63.还可参见Yu Bin,“A‘`Nice’Treaty in a Precarious World”,Comparative Connections 3,No.3,Pacific Forum,CSIS,3rd Quarter,October 2001,http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0103qchina_russia.pdf
(1)Arshad Mohammed,“US Senate looks to have ended Trumps honeymoon with Russia”,Reuters,July 29,2017 http://www.atimes.com/article/us-senate-looks-ended-trumps-honey moon-russia/
(2)俄罗斯情报部门与西方情报部门的沟通与协作一直延续到2017年4月6日,直到叙利亚因“涉嫌使用化学武器”遭到轰炸后才停止。参见Seymour Hersh,“Trumps Red Line”,Die Welt,June 25,2017,https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article165905578/Trump-s-RedLine.html
(3)Iliya Pitalev,“Russia Sends Very Careful Message to Trump by Targeting Obama-Era Sanctions”,Sputnik,29 July 2017,https://sputniknews.com/russia/201707291055987722-rus sia-us-sanctions-obama-trump/
(4)The Economist interviews Barack Obama:“The president on dealing with Russia,”August2,2014,http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/08/economist-interviews-barack-obama-2
(5)Frederick Kempe,“Bush Can Take Another Look Into Putin’s‘Soul’,Soviets tried”,June 6,2007,http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWrjoiCIMmL8;Ben Smith,“Hillary:Putin doesn’t have a soul”,Politico,January 6,2008,http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0108/Hillary_Putin_doesnt_have_a_soul.html
(1)时任美国驻俄罗斯大使杰克·马特洛克(Jack Matlock)也对北约东扩持批评态度,“在我们达成一项将俄罗斯纳入欧洲防务结构的协议之前,我们没有理由将北约军事组织向东扩展”。他指责说,北约集团的东扩并不是由华盛顿推动的,而是由东欧国家所推动的,他们渴望得到西方的保护,使其免受俄罗斯可能复兴的共产主义的威胁。主观上北约扩大并不是要触动俄罗斯的利益,但客观上确实起到了这样的效果,特别是它所提供的安全架构中并不包括俄罗斯。“The Expendables:How NATO conquered Europe”,RT,April 5,2014,http://rt.com/news/nato-anniversary-expansion-europe-129/
(2)John Mearsheimer,“Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault”.
(3)Michael McFaul,“Russia as It Is:A Grand Strategy for Confronting Putin”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,July/August 2018,pp.82-91.
(4)http://www.amazon.com/review/R1NVWWAA1FVQRP/ref=cm_cr_dp_title?ie=UTF8&ASIN=5010004941&channel=detail-glance&nodeID=283155&store=books
(1)Andrei Tsygankov,Russian Foreign Policy:Change and Continuity in National Identity,Lanham,Maryland:Rowman and Littlefield,3rd ed.,2013,Ch.3.
(2)Vladislav Surkov(ВладиславСурков),“The Loneliness of the Half-Breed[Одиночествополукровки(14+)]”,Russia in Global Affairs(РоссиявГлобалбнойПолитике),May 28,2018,http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/book/The-Loneliness-of-the-Half-Breed-19575,https://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/Odinochestvo-polukrovki-14-19477
(3)休克疗法在波兰和捷克等东欧小国取得了更好的效果。
(4)Thomas Remington,“Politics in Russia”,in Gabriel Almond et al(eds),Comparative Politics Today:A World View,updated 8th edition,London:Pearson,2006,p.401.
(5)Stent,Limits of Partnership,p.12.
(6)LaFeber,America,Russia,p.357.
(7)根据戈尔巴乔夫的说法,美方承诺北约不会扩大,但这一承诺从未见诸于文字。从那以后,北约进行了4次东扩,1999年捷克、匈牙利和波兰加入;2004年保加利亚、爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、罗马尼亚、斯洛伐克和斯洛文尼亚加入;2009年阿尔巴尼亚和克罗地亚加入。本轮东扩将吸收波黑、格鲁吉亚、马其顿和乌克兰加入。经过东扩之后,北约的规模几乎扩大了一倍,从1990年的16个成员国增加到28个成员国,还有更多的国家在等待加入。参见“The Expendables:How NATO conquered Europe”,RT,April 5,2014,http://rt.com/news/nato-anniversary-expansion-europe-129/,近期关于西方在这个问题上是否有过承诺的研究可参见Joshua Shifrinson,“Deal or No Deal?The End of the Cold War and the U.S.Offer to Limit NATO Expansion”,International Security,Vol.40,Spring2016,pp.7-44.
(1)Henry Kissinger,“How the Ukraine crisis ends”,The Washington Post,March 5,2014,http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-t he-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html
(2)Henry Kissinger,Does American Need a Foreign Policy:Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century,New York:Touchstone,2001,pp.27,30.
(3)转引自LaFeber,America,Russia,p.370.
(1)“Joint news conference with King Abdullah II of Jordan”,April 5,2017,www.realclear politics.com/video/2017/04/05/trump_the_world_is_a_mess_i_inherited_it_and_i_will_fix_it.html
(2)George H.W.Bush,“Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit”,September 11,1990,Bush Presidential Library and Museum,http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&mon th=9
(3)Brooks and Wohlforth,“American Primacy”.
(4)在“终结论”提出之前,美国学者已经开始讨论关于美国/西方对于国际体系支配地位下降的问题。例如Fareed Zakaria,The Post-American World,New York:W.W.Norton&Company,Inc.,2008;Richard Haass,Foreign Policy Begins at Home:The Case for Putting Americas House in Order,New York:Basic Books,2013;Joseph Nye,Jr.,Is the American Century Over?Cambridge,UK:Polity,2015.
(5)Jeffrey C.Isaac,“The Politics of Global Disorder”,Perspectives on Politics,Vol.14,No.1,March 2016.
(1)金灿荣:“未来10年的世界大变局”,观察者网,2017年8月1日,http://www.guancha.cn/JinCanRong/2017_08_01_420867_s.shtml
(2)Ikenberry,“The End of Liberal International Order?”.
(3)Ferguson and Zakaria,The Future of Geopolitics.
(1)直到十年前,西方政策与学术界的焦点都是如何对非西方国家进行治理的问题。参见Arnaud Blin and Gustavo Marin,“Rethinking Global Governance,2007”,Forum for a New World Governance,Paris;“Global governance 2025:At a critical juncture”,US National Intelligence Council and the EU Institute for Security Studies,December 2010,http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Global__Governance_2025.pdf,p.17
(2)Tom Engelhardt,“Trump May Be Accelerating U.S.Decline,But He Surely Didn’t Start It”,Foreign Policy In Focus(FPIF),14 June 2017,www.fpif.org/trump-may-be-acceleratingu-s-decline-but-he-surely-didnt-start-it/
(1)帕特里克·波特(Patrick Porter)关于“自由国际秩序”的“失败”与“灵活性”等问题曾有一个非常精彩的批评,参见Patrick Porter,“A World Imagined”,Cato,June5,2018.
(2)Peter Spiro,“The New Sovereignists”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.79,No.6,Nov/Dec 2000,pp.9-15.
(3)Paul Kennedy,The Rise and Fall of Great Powers,New York:Random House,1987.
(4)例如Robert Keohane,After Hegemony:Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1984.
(5)Arnaud Blin and Gustavo Marin,“Rethinking Global Governance”,2007,Forum for a New World Governance,Paris.
(1)“金德尔伯格陷阱”也被称为“霸权稳定论”,指的是由于在两次世界大战期间缺少一个负责任且仁慈的霸权国,才会最终导致全球经济危机和第二次世界大战的爆发。