现金分红:“利大于弊”还是“弊大于利”——基于内控门槛绩效异质性视角的分析
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摘要
选取2011—2016年我国沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本,在内部控制门槛效应绩效异质性的视角下,分析了股利支付"利"与"弊"的关系。研究结果表明:当公司内部控制质量较高(高于门槛值)时,现金股利的治理收益大于支付成本,支付现金股利或提高股利支付水平能够促进公司绩效的提升,即支付股利"利大于弊";反之(低于门槛值),支付股利则"弊大于利"。总体来看,我国上市公司的现金股利可以发挥降低两类代理成本的作用,提高公司的经营与财务绩效,这支持和拓展了股利代理理论。
Using the data of A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2016 in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the sample, we analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of dividend payout from the perspective of the threshold performance hereogeneity of internal control. On one hand, when the internal control level is higher than the threshold level, the governance gains of cash dividends are greater than the costs. In this case, the payment of cash dividends or the improvement of dividends payment level would help to promote corporate performance, when the advantages of dividends payment are more than the disadvantages. On the other hand, the disadvantages are more than the advantages in opposite situation. Overall, the cash dividends of listed companies in China could reduce two types of agency costs and enhance the management level and financial performance of companies, which has proved and expanded the dividend agancy theory.
Using the data of A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2016 in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the sample, we analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of dividend payout from the perspective of the threshold performance hereogeneity of internal control. On one hand, when the internal control level is higher than the threshold level, the governance gains of cash dividends are greater than the costs. In this case, the payment of cash dividends or the improvement of dividends payment level would help to promote corporate performance, when the advantages of dividends payment are more than the disadvantages. On the other hand, the disadvantages are more than the advantages in opposite situation. Overall, the cash dividends of listed companies in China could reduce two types of agency costs and enhance the management level and financial performance of companies, which has proved and expanded the dividend agancy theory.
引文
[1]Rozeff M S.Growth,Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios[J].Journal of Financial Research,1982,5(3):249-259.
[2]Easterbrook F H.Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends[J].American Economic Review,1984,74(4):650-659.
[3]Lang L H P,Litzenberger R H.Dividend Announcements:Cash Flow Signalling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1989,24(1):181-191.
[4]La Porta R,Lopez-De-Silanes F,Shleifer A,et al.Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World[J].The Journal of Finance,2000,55(1):1-33.
[5]徐寿福,徐龙炳.现金股利政策、代理成本与公司绩效[J].管理科学,2015(1):96-110.
[6]Miller M H,Rock K.Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information[J].The Journal of Finance,1985,40(4):1031-1051.
[7]John K,Williams J. Dividends,Dilution,and Taxes:A Signalling Equilibrium[J].The Journal of Finance,1985,40(4):1053-1070.
[8]陈信元,陈冬华,时旭.公司治理与现金股利:基于佛山照明的案例研究[J].管理世界,2003(8):118-126.
[9]Goh B W,Li D.Internal Controls and Conditional Conservatism[J].Accounting Review,2011,86(3):975-1005.
[10]Altamuro J,Beatty A.How Does Internal Control Regulation Affect Financial Reporting?[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,49(1):58-74.
[11]Lambert R,Leuz C,Verrecchia R E.Accounting Information,Disclosure,and the Cost of Capital[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2007,45(2):385-420.
[12]陈汉文,周中胜.内部控制质量与企业债务融资成本[J].南开管理评论,2014,17(3):103-111.
[13]Jensen M C,Mecklin W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[14]DeAngelo H,DeAngelo L,Stulz R.Dividend Policy,Agency Costs,and Earned Equity[R].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2004.
[15]DeAngelo H,DeAngelo L,Stulz R M.Dividend Policy and the Earned/Contributed Capital Mix:A Test of the Life-Cycle Theory[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81(2):227-254.
[16]Denis D J,Osobov I.Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?International Evidence on the Determinants of Dividend Policy[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,89(1):62-82.
[17]Short H,Zhang H,Keasey K.The Link between Dividend Policy and Institutional Ownership[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2002(8):105-122.
[18]Firth M,Gao J,Shen J,et al.Institutional Stock Ownership and Firms’Cash Dividend Policies:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2016,65:91-107.
[19]Bhattacharyya N,Mawani A,Morrill C.Dividend Payout and Executive Compensation:Theory and Evidence[J].Accounting and Finance,2008,48(4):521-541.
[20]He W,Ng L,Zaiats N,et al.Dividend Policy and Earnings Management Across Countries[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2017,42:267-286.
[21]Lie E.Excess Funds and Agency Problems:An Empirical Study of Incremental Cash Disbursements[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2000,13(1):219-247.
[22]Leary M T,Michaely R. Determinants of Dividend Smoothing:Empirical Evidence[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(10):3197-3249.
[23]Nielsen A E B.Corporate Governance,Leverage and Dividend Policy[R].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2005.
[24]Haw I M,Ho S S M,Hu B,et al.The Contribution of Stock Repurchases to the Value of the Firm and Cash Holdings around the World[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(1):152-166.
[25]Jacob M,Michaely R.Taxation and Dividend Policy:The Muting Effect of Agency Issues and Shareholder Conflicts[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2017,30(9):3176-3222.
[26]John K,Knyazeva A.Payout Policy,Agency Conflicts,and Corporate Governance[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2006,9(9):1156-1160.
[27]Jiraporn P,Kim J C,Kim Y S.Dividend Payouts and Corporate Governance Quality:An Empirical Investigation[J].The Financial Review,2011,46(2):251-279.
[28]廖理,方芳.股利政策代理理论的实证检验[J].南开管理评论,2005(5):57-64.
[29]王茂林,何玉润,林慧婷.管理层权力、现金股利与企业投资效率[J].南开管理评论,2014(2):13-22.
[30]刘孟晖,高友才.现金股利的异常派现、代理成本与公司价值——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2015(1):152-160.
[31]Johnson S,La Porta R,Lopez-De-Silanes F,et al.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(2):22-27.
(1)本文在Rozeff(1982)[1]股利成本图的基础上,考虑了内部控制的影响,并将股利对代理成本的降低作用刻画为股利支付所带来的收益。
[2]Easterbrook F H.Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends[J].American Economic Review,1984,74(4):650-659.
[3]Lang L H P,Litzenberger R H.Dividend Announcements:Cash Flow Signalling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1989,24(1):181-191.
[4]La Porta R,Lopez-De-Silanes F,Shleifer A,et al.Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World[J].The Journal of Finance,2000,55(1):1-33.
[5]徐寿福,徐龙炳.现金股利政策、代理成本与公司绩效[J].管理科学,2015(1):96-110.
[6]Miller M H,Rock K.Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information[J].The Journal of Finance,1985,40(4):1031-1051.
[7]John K,Williams J. Dividends,Dilution,and Taxes:A Signalling Equilibrium[J].The Journal of Finance,1985,40(4):1053-1070.
[8]陈信元,陈冬华,时旭.公司治理与现金股利:基于佛山照明的案例研究[J].管理世界,2003(8):118-126.
[9]Goh B W,Li D.Internal Controls and Conditional Conservatism[J].Accounting Review,2011,86(3):975-1005.
[10]Altamuro J,Beatty A.How Does Internal Control Regulation Affect Financial Reporting?[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,49(1):58-74.
[11]Lambert R,Leuz C,Verrecchia R E.Accounting Information,Disclosure,and the Cost of Capital[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2007,45(2):385-420.
[12]陈汉文,周中胜.内部控制质量与企业债务融资成本[J].南开管理评论,2014,17(3):103-111.
[13]Jensen M C,Mecklin W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[14]DeAngelo H,DeAngelo L,Stulz R.Dividend Policy,Agency Costs,and Earned Equity[R].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2004.
[15]DeAngelo H,DeAngelo L,Stulz R M.Dividend Policy and the Earned/Contributed Capital Mix:A Test of the Life-Cycle Theory[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81(2):227-254.
[16]Denis D J,Osobov I.Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?International Evidence on the Determinants of Dividend Policy[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,89(1):62-82.
[17]Short H,Zhang H,Keasey K.The Link between Dividend Policy and Institutional Ownership[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2002(8):105-122.
[18]Firth M,Gao J,Shen J,et al.Institutional Stock Ownership and Firms’Cash Dividend Policies:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2016,65:91-107.
[19]Bhattacharyya N,Mawani A,Morrill C.Dividend Payout and Executive Compensation:Theory and Evidence[J].Accounting and Finance,2008,48(4):521-541.
[20]He W,Ng L,Zaiats N,et al.Dividend Policy and Earnings Management Across Countries[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2017,42:267-286.
[21]Lie E.Excess Funds and Agency Problems:An Empirical Study of Incremental Cash Disbursements[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2000,13(1):219-247.
[22]Leary M T,Michaely R. Determinants of Dividend Smoothing:Empirical Evidence[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(10):3197-3249.
[23]Nielsen A E B.Corporate Governance,Leverage and Dividend Policy[R].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2005.
[24]Haw I M,Ho S S M,Hu B,et al.The Contribution of Stock Repurchases to the Value of the Firm and Cash Holdings around the World[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(1):152-166.
[25]Jacob M,Michaely R.Taxation and Dividend Policy:The Muting Effect of Agency Issues and Shareholder Conflicts[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2017,30(9):3176-3222.
[26]John K,Knyazeva A.Payout Policy,Agency Conflicts,and Corporate Governance[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2006,9(9):1156-1160.
[27]Jiraporn P,Kim J C,Kim Y S.Dividend Payouts and Corporate Governance Quality:An Empirical Investigation[J].The Financial Review,2011,46(2):251-279.
[28]廖理,方芳.股利政策代理理论的实证检验[J].南开管理评论,2005(5):57-64.
[29]王茂林,何玉润,林慧婷.管理层权力、现金股利与企业投资效率[J].南开管理评论,2014(2):13-22.
[30]刘孟晖,高友才.现金股利的异常派现、代理成本与公司价值——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2015(1):152-160.
[31]Johnson S,La Porta R,Lopez-De-Silanes F,et al.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(2):22-27.
(1)本文在Rozeff(1982)[1]股利成本图的基础上,考虑了内部控制的影响,并将股利对代理成本的降低作用刻画为股利支付所带来的收益。